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ABSTRACT
This thesis centers on that aspect of superpower strategic nuclear 
systems that lies beyond pure deterrence. Much has been offered under the 
rubric of deterrence, but little analysis of compellence has been 
attempted. Considering the widespread criticisms of deterrence theory, 
this is surprising. A comprehensive look at nuclear strategy from the 
conceptual framework of compellence helps clarify the limits of deterrence 
and indicates that deterrence and compellence are increasingly 
interrelated.
To demonstrate these assertions, this dissertation provides a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of intercontinental nuclear systems. 
The thesis is that nuclear strategy in the United States and the Soviet 
Union from 1970-1986 may be described at least equally well by compellence 
rather than deterrence. By looking closely at technological capabilities, 
the real capability of these nuclear systems can be more accurately 
determined. This analysis includes an assessment of how these nuclear 
systems could interact in combat, based on a Soviet correlation of nuclear 
forces model. This is the first time in the West that this model has been 
used for this purpose. It provides a unique Soviet perspective on nuclear 
strategy.
This dissertation begins with the theoretical basis of deterrence and 
compellence, and then establishes two models based on these two concepts 
which provide the conceptual framework for the dissertation. The second 
chapter examines the theoretical basis for arms control based on each 
paradigm. The next two chapters address alternately the American and the 
Soviet nuclear strategies, attempting to draw out the deterrent and 
compellent aspects therein.
The fifth chapter narrows the focus to the role of arms control in 
identifying actual nuclear strategy; to what extent are the superpowers 
attempting to achieve foreign policy objectives in SALT I, SALT II and 
START? The sixth chapter considers the NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship to 
determine to what extent the superpowers are using their respective 
alliance systems in their strategic interrelationship. The next three 
chapters analyze quantitatively and qualitatively the American and Soviet 
strategic nuclear force structures to determine a correlation of forces 
trend and develop some predictions as to the viability of each force 
structure in supporting its respective strategy.
The paradigmatic analysis of superpower nuclear strategy clearly 
portrays the limitations of deterrence as an explanation for international 
strategic behaviour. The compellent paradigm is shown as a reasonable 
alternative that in many ways better explains what has happened in 
superpower strategic relations from 1970-1986.
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1Chapter One 
THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC PARADIGMS
In one way or another, the United States and the Soviet Union, as 
superpowers, expect to influence other actors in the world society. Since 
the threat of force has always played a key role in generating 
expectations of international behaviour and perceptions of relative 
influence,^ understanding the conceptual basis of nuclear strategy is of 
fundamental importance.
The key question since 1945 has been to what degree can nuclear 
weapons actually support political objectives. In practice, each 
superpower has political goals that in effect provide strategic direction 
to its armed forces and this highest level of strategic thought is called 
grand strategy in the United States, or military doctrine in the USSR. 
Military and nuclear strategy are in fact subsets or lesser orders of 
strategy imbedded in these higher orders. The military strategies of the 
superpowers are intended to support their respective national policies and 
nuclear strategies are designed as their ultimate sanction. This 
dissertation will examine this complex relationship between security 
policy and superpower nuclear weapons with primary focus on the years 
1970-1986, the period immediately prior to Gorbachev's dramatic and far 
reaching reforms.
 ^ For traditional but solid analysis of this view see Martin Wight, 
Power Politics (London: Leicester University Press, 1978) or Georg
Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study of World Society (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).
For an interesting and unique account of the various levels of 
strategy, see Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Howard University Press, 1987) pp. 69-71.
While this dissertation accepts the notion of various levels of 
military/strategic thought or action, it does not accept Luttwak's 
breakdown per se.
2Deterrence has been the primary rationale for superpower nuclear 
weapon construction for this period. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the late 1960's accepted that the conditions of nuclear 
parity and assured destruction were overriding factors in their strategic 
inter-relationship, and yet between 1970 and 1986 each superpower created 
ever more massive levels of nuclear armaments. For example, in spite of a 
tremendous increase in Soviet nuclear power during this period, the number 
of United States warheads that could survive a Soviet first strike have
O
increased fivefold. There have been several attempts to explain this 
phenomenology, but most analysis has been based on deterrent thinking and 
has been largely unconvincing. This dissertation will provide a 
paradigmatic approach that will examine the possibility that thinking 
based on compellence may be playing a far greater role in superpower 
nuclear strategy than has been generally acknowledged.
A paradigm is a theoretical construct that usually has an enduring 
group of adherents who explain its subject through a unique set of 
criteria which assist in puzzle solving. Its power is in its ability to 
identify a way of thinking about its subject, and different paradigms 
imply significantly different ways of thinking. This dissertation and its 
descriptions are therefore concerned primarily with the hermeneutics of 
deterrent and compellent thought processes, and thus they are not 
historical explications nor accounts of decision making per se.
This dissertation intends to construct, within the framework of the 
realist perspective of international relations, two competing strategic 
paradigms and determine their utility for assessing intercontinental 
strategic systems and their respective force structures. The deterrent
 ^ McGeorge Bundy in his excellent historical account raises this 
problem but offers no explanation. See his Danger and Survival (New York: 
Random House, 1988), p. 591.
3paradigm appears to have been the dominant model for declaratory nuclear
strategy in each superpower, but in recent years deterrence has come
under increasing criticism as a paradigmatic construct or basis for
nuclear strategy. More and more, strategic nuclear systems and policies
have moved beyond limits that appear necessary for "pure" deterrence or
assured destruction, toward a different paradigm that can be called
compellence. An excellent analysis of deterrence has already hinted at
this other paradigm's existence:
It is always attractive for diplomatic and foreign policy 
purposes to insist that the central objective of one's own 
forces is simply to deter but this cannot obscure the fact
that they are available for some or all other uses of arms.^
This chapter will establish the deterrent and compellent paradigms 
then construct a conceptual framework necessary for the paradigmatic 
analysis of nuclear strategy. The second chapter in fact completes this 
formulation by examining the theoretical basis for arms control based on 
each paradigm. Subsequent chapters will proceed to apply this framework 
to American and Soviet nuclear strategy, the arms control dialogue, 
alliance nuclear strategy and finally to specific American and Soviet 
nuclear force construction and deployment patterns. The principle 
argument of this thesis is that deterrence and compellence may be closely 
interrelated and that the compellent paradigm may offer a more appropriate 
explanation of the thinking behind superpower nuclear strategy.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN STRATEGY
To account for the shift in strategic thought that began in 1945, one 
must understand in what conceptual framework earlier strategists were
operating. This section will explore the essence of strategic assumptions
^ Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (London:
Sage Publication, 1983), p. 30.
4in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with particular emphasis 
on technology, and will then extrapolate on some continuities and 
discontinuities that are characteristic of the nuclear era.
Strategy can mean several things, but this study uses the definition 
provided by Andre Beaufre; it is "the art of applying force so that it 
makes the most effective contribution towards achieving the ends set by 
policy."^ Beaufre continues by stating that strategy must be considered 
as the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills either using or 
threatening to use force to further their political aims. The influence 
of the international environment inevitably provides certain constraints
to this abstract dialectic, and a correct assessment of the international
£
situation is therefore a vital element of strategy. How a given state 
perceives its milieu, then, largely determines its strategic approach, and 
in the modern age up to 1945 a "traditional" strategic style can be 
identified.
Politically and philosophically, the modern age of thought was 
heralded by Machiavelli who broke with the classical and Christian 
tradition of "imagined republics" to seek the "effectual truth of the 
t h i n g . T h e  modern age of thought changed the object of philosophy from 
abstract contemplation to more immediately practical ends, that of 
political success in which morality played a significantly reduced role. 
Thomas Hobbes furthered these notions by conceiving man as being 
constantly at war with every other man unless a common power exists "to
** Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (London: Faber and
Faber, 1965), p. 22. This is an excellent introduction to the subject.
 ^ Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, p. 26.
 ^ Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince translated by Leo Paul S. de 
Alvarez (Irving, Texas: University of Dallas Press, 1980), pp. 93-95.
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keep them all in awe."° For Hobbes, therefore, a commonwealth or state 
must logically be in competition or at war with all others even though 
"battles" might take place infrequently. Furthermore, in such a state of 
total anarchy, "nothing can be unjust", and the major factor that inclines 
men toward peace is the fear of death.^
After Hobbes, two interpretations in modern thought have increasingly 
crystallized, and both have had a profound impact in Western political 
traditions. A tradition of optimism leads to the view of rational 
historical progress where greater adversity leads to greater expectation 
that man will overcome it. The opposite tradition of pessimism is however 
extraordinarily critical of irreversible historical progress through human 
harmony and rationalism.-^ While the first tradition tends to idealism 
and utopianism, the latter, when coupled with the Hobbesian notion of 
perpetual human competition, can lead to pessimism and despair.^ For the 
most part, international behaviour has been based upon the latter 
tradition, and throughout the modern age, strategy has tended to share the 
Hobbesian assumptions of state competition and anarchy.
International relations theorists have recently established 
conceptual paradigms as constructs that offer contending explanations of 
how nations interact. In the traditional or realist perspective, state
® Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), pp.
185-186.
 ^ Ibid.. p. 188.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract. Translated by 
Judith P. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 46. "L'homme
est ne libre, et partout il est dans les fers." One interpretation is
that man was born into the natural freedom of nature and has been enslaved
by civilized society. See editor's comments, pp. 9-11.
Sir Ian Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1980). To Clark, the tradition of
optimism contributes to resistance to reform and the tradition of 
pessimism contributes to reform of the international system.
6security is paramount and remains based on Hobbes' notion that no
restraints exist except those based on fear and on Rousseau's notion that
areas of common agreement are insignificant and short lasting.12 Some
analysts see no progress or major restructuring of the operative
principles of international policies since 1815, particularly in the realm
1 ^of strategic interaction. J Traditional strategy has tended to base its 
assumptions on those of the realist tradition, and even during the peak of 
idealistic thought, strategy still focused on state-centric behaviour.1^
The realist structure was largely put in place by Hans Morgenthau as 
a reaction to Wilsonian idealism in the United States. Morgenthau's 
concept of reality was based on the notion that each nation pursued its 
interests defined in terms of power such that the balance of power was an 
"inevitable and essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign 
nations."13 There are two assumptions in this conceptualization, firstly 
that conflict is a permanent feature of human society and secondly that 
power is the most important element in structuring the international 
system. The roots of these assumptions go back to Machiavelli and are so
12 K.J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in 
International Theory (Boston, Massachusetts: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 
24-25.
13 Ian Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order, p.
174.
1^ Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," in Margot Light and 
A.J.R. Groom, eds. , International Relations: A Handbook of Current
Theory (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), p. 7.
13 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1965) gives an excellent historical review of the balance of power 
concept pp. 167-223. The citation can be found on p. 167.
7deep that many still hold them to be universally valid.^
In this framework the emphasis on national interests results in the 
international community seeking to achieve an equilibrium or a balance 
that is conceived in terms of power. In the nineteenth century Britain 
successfully sought to create an effective balance of power in Europe so 
as to check her strongest rival and prevent any one continental state from 
becoming too "powerful." Since there is no clear evidence that the state 
system is in decline, and since a balance of power remains very much a 
condition of this system, wars in the final analysis only contribute to 
it.^ As each state is ultimately concerned with its own survival and is 
"unwilling to rely on the power and will of the international community as 
a whole to protect it," according to a respected historian, raison d'etat 
and self-sufficiency tend to form the basis for strategic behaviour.-^®
The role of military force in a balance of power system is to 
contribute to those assets which the state can use to pursue unilaterally 
its avowed interests. While political power is seldom directly equivalent 
to military power, there is an obvious linkage between the two, and there 
is no evidence that this has significantly changed in the nuclear age.^^ 
In reality the relationship between theory and practice is often blurred 
and the notion of national interest links realist theory to traditional
See C.R. Mitchell, "Conflict, War and Conflict Management," in 
Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, eds., International Relations, p. 133, and 
Randolf M. Siverson, "War and Change in the International System," Ole 
Holsti, et al.. Change in the International System (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1980), p. 227.
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977), p. 198.
Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, 
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1978), pp. 134-135.
John Garnett, "The Role of Military Power," in John Baylis, et 
al.. Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (New York: Holmes and
Meier Publishers, 1975), p. 55.
8strategy in a very imprecise manner. ^  What is a virtue in politics is
not necessarily of great assistance to strategy, and thus military
strategy has been primarily a praxis, often left to military experts.
Those "strategists'’ that studied the application of force before the
French revolution tended to reduce warfare to its technical
characteristics, so that war was considered to be more an exact science
than an art. The legacy of jurists such as Grotius and the human carnage
of the Thirty Years' War made limited wars with restrained political aims 
91the norm,  ^ but the French revolution and Napoleon once again changed the 
nature of wars. No longer was manoeuvre in itself sufficient to determine 
the outcome, but mass armies were required and decisive battles had to be 
won to achieve more open-ended aims. Clausewitz was the analyst that was 
best able to capture the essence of modern war. His philosophy emphasized 
the importance of the moral and political implications rather than the 
technical. His detailed understanding that the danger and demands of war 
placed a premium on moral qualities of endurance, resolution and "sang 
froid," all emanating from the willpower of a leader, had a "sympathetic 
audience among military men who by temperament have little patience with
theoretical strategists."22
The impact of Clausewitz on military strategy has been mixed because 
his massive and partially finished volumes have been effectively studied 
by few, yet cited as authoritative by many. One interesting study 
determined that, had the Germans properly studied and understood
20 Alexander George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. 
Foreign Policy: The Need for Political Legitimacy," in Ole Holsti, et 
al.. Change in the International System, p. 234.
21 J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (London: Methuen and 
Co., 1961), Chapter 1, "The Limited Wars of the Absolute Kings," pp. 15-25.
22 Michael Howard, preface to Roger Leonard Ashley, A Short Guide 
to Clausewitz on War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p. X.
Clausewitz, "the First World War might never have been unleashed. "23
Clausewitz held the view that abstract logic could approach a conceptual
purity that reality could never achieve, and thus his heavy and unbalanced
emphasis on absolute war and battle was open to misinterpretation.
Clausewitz acknowledged the "friction" of war which meant in part that:
The object of war in the abstract... the disarming of the 
enemy, is rarely attained in practice, and it is not a 
condition necessary to peace.2^
The greatest impact of Clausewitz's philosophy of war is its linkage to
realist thought, the logical extension of which is the statement, "if you
9 Swish for peace, understand (or prepare for) war.,UJ While some analysts
deny the close relationship of politics and war established by
9Clausewitzian philosophy, ° the utility of miliary power to support a 
state's political goals became an accepted part of traditional strategic 
thought by the twentieth century.
In the twentieth century, however, the technological level of weapons 
produced by the industrial age outstripped the ability of man to cope with 
their strategic implications. For Sun Tsu and Clausewitz the weapons 
themselves were not important, but for Fuller and Douhet they had become 
perhaps the most significant part of strategic thought. In World War I, 
few military leaders were properly able to appreciate the cycle of
23 Jehuda L. Wallack, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The
Theories of Clausewitz and Schleiffen and their Impact on the Conduct of 
Two World Wars (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 204.
2^ Carl Von Clausewitz, cited in B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), p. 247.
23 B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defence (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1960), p. 247.
9 f\ Anatol Rapoport rejects the Clausewitzian or political paradigm 
of war as being the only or best one. He establishes three views of war: 
political, eschatological, and cataclysmic in his introduction of Carl 
Von Clausewitz, On War (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1908; Penguin 
Books edition, 1968), pp. 11-80.
10
technology, and as a result, strategy was moribund and millions of lives 
were sacrificed to no effect. In World War II, French strategic thinking 
based on the power of the defence in 1914-1918 was overcome by new modes 
of thought that had more appropriately assimilated the modern technology. 
More than ever in the twentieth century the "development of warfare has 
been closely related to the process of historical change."27
The concept of strategy has become more complex as kingdoms have 
grown into nation states, and international competition has expanded to 
include almost every facet of human endeavour. In the eighteenth century 
strategy merely referred to the science of "military movement beyond the
visual circle of the enemy, or out of cannon shot" - a range that would
9 Qapproximate 1,000 yards. ° The closest concept to our present notion of 
strategy was that of a "campaign plan" up to the nineteenth century when
Jomini described strategy as "the art of properly directing masses upon
9 Qthe theatre of war."i? Strategic thinking has been changing to more 
closely reflect the increasing power of technology and the greater
complexity of state ambitions.
Traditional strategic thought, such as it can be defined, is then 
really a sum of several threads of thinking deeply rooted in Western 
intellectual tradition. With the advent of nuclear weapons, however, 
again technology to a degree preceded strategic thought, and analysts 
disputed the degree of continuity with what this study has called 
traditional or pre-nuclear strategy. The marriage of the bomber and
nuclear weapons, however, soon made it abundantly clear that the
27 Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, Men in Arms. Second
Edition, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 8.
28 Jay Luvaas, Frederick the Great on the Art of War (London: 
Collier-MacMillan, 1966), p. 306.
29 Ibid.
11
technological discontinuities required a deeper review of strategy to 
determine what political goals could be achieved by nuclear weapons. The 
conduct of World War II had demonstrated the propensity for war to "create 
its own logic" such that war goals expanded and developed their own
o n
momentum. u It had become evident that nuclear weapons could raise 
serious challenges to a state achieving the object of war, to achieve "a 
better state of peace - even if only from your own point of view."31 If 
the opponent had nuclear weapons, the prospect of any retaliation made it 
quite problematic for the initiator to achieve his goals.
Nuclear weapons rendered practicable Douhet's notion that one state 
could punish another without having first to destroy its traditional armed 
forces . This created a problem for strategic thought in that the 
relevance of traditional strategy became extremely problematic. One 
result is a literature "rich in highly technical analysis of the strategic 
balance, but relatively weak in empirically based theory dealing with the
o o
underlying concepts." Perhaps strategic thought has been pushed by the 
technological shock of the nuclear age to over-compensate somewhat by 
focusing unduly on technology lest strategy be left behind once again. 
The revolution in strategic thought heralded by the nuclear age was summed 
up neatly by Brodie:
Russel F. Weigley, "Military Strategy and Civilian Leadership," 
in Klaus Knorr, ed. , Historical Dimensions of National Security. 
(Lawrence, Kansas: Allan Press, 1976), p. 68. See also Wendell J.
Coates, "Clausewitz's Theory of War: An Alternative View," Comparative
Strategy 5 (November 4, 1986), pp. 351-373.
Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 351.
And fortunately so. See A.J.R. Groom, "Strategy," in Margot 
Light and A.J.R. Groom, eds. , International Relations. p. 141. Leon 
Wieseltier called deterrence a counter-factual proposition that does not 
admit of proof, see his Nuclear War Nuclear Peace (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1983), p. 75.
12
Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has 
been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to 
avert them. It can have almost no other purpose.^
II. STRATEGIC PARADIGMS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
/
The nuclear revolution has led to the elevation of the notion of
deterrence through technology as the ultimate source of state security in
the nuclear age. Although the theoretical base of deterrence has a sound
deductivist logic, as a strategy for the superpowers it has become
increasingly inappropriate, and as a consequence, traditional strategic f
thought has reappeared:
One reason why the periodic "great debates" about national 
security policy have been so inconclusive is that the 
participants often argue from different premises - one side 
from the point of view of deterrence, and the other side 
from the point of view of defence. ^
The nature of the above citation from Snyder suggests that there are 
at least two ways of viewing the security problem and that these views may 
not be compatible. This section will develop this notion into two 
paradigms that provide two distinct views of nuclear strategy, one based 
on deterrence and the other based on compellence. Before describing the 
nature of each paradigm, however, it is necessary to establish more 
precisely what a paradigm is and to account in greater detail for the 
increased emphasis on technology in the nuclear age.
Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World
Order (New York: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946), p. 76. 
More recent works also note the revolution in strategy caused by nuclear 
weapons, see The Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Living With Nuclear Weapons 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 30-32.
Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defence (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 4. The gap between theory and 
strategy is also a main theme of Alexander George and Richard Smoke, 
"Deterrence and Foreign Policy," World Politics. 41 (January 1989), p. 
180.
V
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1. Paradigms as a Research Tool
The growth of knowledge has been fostered in part by scientific 
discoveries, and often these discoveries have been related to scientific 
revolutions in history, the overturning of existing theoretical beliefs in 
favour of new ones. Following David Hume, who questioned the validity of 
positivist induction - the prevalent logic of science - Karl Popper 
proposed a system of negative induction implying that no longer could
O  C
science infer from the specific to the general. J By claiming that any 
scientific statement could be subject to falsification by future empirical
O C
testing. Popper was in part proposing an alternative paradigm of 
knowledge. A paradigm is thus a way of structuring thought as well as a 
coherent set of beliefs that tends to accumulate over time.
According to Thomas Kuhn, major scientific breakthroughs are usually 
accompanied by paradigm shifts, and his conclusion was that those 
achieving great discoveries had already shed the limitations to thought 
established by older paradigms. For Kuhn, a new paradigm must appear to 
better explain the world, to be aesthetically more suitable to the problem
O *7
at hand and to offer a mystical kind of future promise. ' To be accepted 
as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, yet need 
not and seldom does explain all of the facts with which it is
O Q
confronted. ° A paradigm can also precede theory in a sociological sense; 
it can be concrete and observable as a form of professional or scientific
^  Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: 
Hutchison and Company, 1968), p. 30.
Ibid.. p. 47.
^  Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 153-156.
Ibid.. p . 17.
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achievement or accomplishment.^ Kuhn also described what happens when a 
paradigm is stretched too far; the results are conceptual inconsistency, 
absurdity, misexpectation, disorder, complexity and confusion. 
Eventually, such a paradigm collapses because of the inadequacy of its own 
structure rather than falsification, and a new paradigm takes its place.
As different paradigms encompass competing ways of viewing the world, 
they can provide a unique tool that can help the analyst penetrate to the 
essence of the problem and better explain contending points of view. 
Strategic thinkers in the nuclear age have been charged with lacking "the 
rudiments of precision" and in some cases having no relevance.^ Another 
criticism of strategic thinking is that it derives from a scientific 
pursuit of rational considerations and that "its power can be applied only 
in the solution of problems, not in their f o r m u l a t i o n . " ^  This study 
intends in part to address these criticisms and will attempt to provide 
greater precision to the analysis of the nuclear conundrum.
2. The Problem of Technology
In the modern age, scientists and technologists together have become 
one of the most potent groups in all history.
on
Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in Imre Lakatos 
and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 65-66. This a brilliant little 
book.
^  Ibid.. p. 83.
^  Joseph E. Schwartz, "Strategic Thought: Methodology and
Reality," in Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, eds. , A Political 
Politics: A Critique of Behaviouralism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,
1967), p. 55.
Anotol Rapoport, "Critique of Strategic Thinking," in Naomi 
Rosenbaum, ed., Readings on the International Political System (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 215-226.
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After Descartes based his own philosophy on the discoveries 
of Galileo, philosophy has seemed condemned to be always one 
step behind the scientists and their ever more amazing 
discoveries, whose principles it has striven arduously to 
discover ex post facto and to fit into some overall 
interpretation of the nature of human knowledge.^
The above passage applies equally to the philosophical relationship
between strategic thought and the technological advance of weaponry, thus
indicating the substantive impact technology has had on our modern
society. Since knowing and making have become practically synonymous,
"technology is the ontology of the age."^ Political doctrines of today
are driven by the need to be technically efficient, and all is then
converted to a technical problem that correct technique can solve. The
state therefore exploits doctrines to support its own ends; power is
technique, and complex intellectual constructs such as national strategy
no longer have any usefulness beyond justification.^ Particularly in the
United States technological mastery for its own sake appears so strong
that the men who undertake it "still identify what they are doing with the
Lc
liberation of mankind."
The implications of this technological momentum on nuclear strategy 
are profound for they indicate that the strategist is more closely tied to 
technology than ever. One study suggests that technology is so far ahead
^  Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1958), p. 294.
^  George Grant, "The Computer does not impose on us the ways it 
should be used," in Abraham Rotstein, ed. , Beyond Industrial Growth 
(Toronto: Massey College, 1977), p. 128. This is a brilliant article.
^  See Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 282-284.
^  George Grant, Technology and Empire (Toronto: House of Anansi,
1969), p. 27. Philip Green also rejects the proposition that science is 
neutral, see his "Science, Government and the Case of Rand," World 
Politics. 20 (January 1968), p. 325.
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of thought that the ends of products must be adapted to suit the means, a 
process labelled "reverse adapta t i o n . O p e r a t i n g  within the concept 
that healthy things grow, a given system manipulates the needs it serves 
and strongly influences the political processes that create and expand 
missions necessary for its survival and growth. If this were true, in the 
domain of nuclear strategy, strategists would be seeking uses for products 
they had never anticipated.
Nuclear strategy for the superpowers is increasingly tied to 
technological developments, and no immediate alternative appears 
available. Only non-violent resistance avoids the position where "tout 
retard technologique risquerait d'apparaitre comme une faiblesse 
strategique dont l'adversaire pourrait profiter de fagon decisive. 
Advocates of this approach claim that non-violent means of deterrence are 
more compatible with Clausewitz than nuclear deterrence which mistakenly 
tends to see war and defence in purely military or technological terms. ^  
Clausewitz indeed relegated technology to a lesser order of importance, 
but, as previously noted, technology has significantly changed the nature 
of warfare leaving Clausewitz's work somewhat dated. The real problem
^  Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology (London: MIT Press, 1977), 
pp. 238-260.
A O
Christian Mellon, et al. . La Dissuasion Civile: Principes et
Methodes de la Resistance non violente dans la Strategie Francaise
(Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationales, 1985), p. 10.
It should also be noted that the smaller countries judged to be most
secure are those with strength, Yugoslavia and Switzerland. See Reneo 
Lukic, La Dissuasion Populaire Yougoslavie (Paris: Centre
Interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur la Paix et d'Etudes Strategiques, 
1984), p. 41.
^  Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War Without Weapons: Non-
Violence in National Defence (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), pp. 170-180.
Michael I. Handel, "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology,"
Journal of Strategic Studies 9 (June/September 1986), p. 83.
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in modern strategy is technological change which prevents a definitive 
solution in terms of some perceived condition of stasis, which creates 
strong pressures to pursue technical research as an end in itself. This 
is the ontological dilemma of technology.
In sum, the technological arms competition between the superpowers 
has grown to the point that military superiority is essentially a function 
of national technological supremacy, and some have called this strategic
CO
contest a war.  ^ While the advocates of technological pursuit strongly 
favour increased emphasis on technology to overcome the Soviet Union, 
others abhor the power of the war m a c h i n e . T h e  increasingly unmitigated 
reliance on technique has led us to a complicated present, but nihilistic 
philosophy "tells us very little about what can be done to guide and 
direct the technological innovation along socially beneficial lines."-^ 
We are thus trapped in a situation wherein the seriously contradictory 
views expressed above epitomize two dominant streams of thought within 
which our strategic paradigms can be found.
3. The Deterrent Paradigm
Essentially this paradigm accepts the premise that nuclear weapons 
have created a revolution in arms such that traditional strategic thought
Raymond Aron, The Great Debate. Theories of Nuclear Strategy 
(New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 43.
C O
Stefen T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology: 
Winning the Decisive War (Cambridge: University Press of Cambridge, 1970),
pp. 11-12.
c o
See Ibid.. p. 51, for the former view. See Anotol Rapoport, The 
Big Two: Soviet-American Perceptions of Foreign Policy (New York:
Pegasus, 1971), p. 210 for the latter view.
Melvin Kranzberg, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science, 
Research and Development, U.S. House of Representatives, Historical 
Aspects of Technology Assessment (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1970), p. 385.
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can no longer apply and deterrent thought has replaced it. Because we 
have no empirical evidence to falsify the tenets of deterrence at the 
strategic nuclear level, doctrine and beliefs have an increased role in
c c
creating reality. J As a consequence, any paradigm must be somewhat 
artificial and subjective, and the following models are not intended to be 
definitive solutions but heuristic tools designed to improve our 
understanding of the process of strategic thinking. To construct the 
paradigm of deterrence, this section will first review the concept, the 
strategy and the requirements for deterrence. Then, it will address the 
underlying assumptions and relevant criticisms of deterrence as an 
explanatory model.
The concept of deterrence is not new, but in the nuclear age its use 
has been greatly extended. The basic theory of deterrence, however, is 
simply a relationship involving a distinctive type of influence openly 
based on the threat of sanctions where one party aspires to prevent
c C
another party from initiating a specified action. ° By threatening to 
make this action sufficiently costly to the potential initiator, the 
deterrer hopes to make the costs outweigh the gains and therefore preclude 
any incentive on the part of the deterree from initiating it. In 
traditional strategy, deterrence was imbedded in overall military posture, 
but offensive air power and nuclear weapons now allow such great and 
unacceptable pain to be inflicted on an adversary that deterrent and
Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 22. See also David Allan 
Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945-1950," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists. 38 (May 1982), p. 30.
Phil Williams, "Deterrence," in Contemporary Strategy: Theories
and Policies, pp. 69-70.
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defence values can be clearly separated. ^  With this separation, the 
threat of unacceptable damage or deterrence could be applied to a 
defensive situation rather than forcible military denial by pure defence. 
This is workable so long as the deterrent is absolutely effective. 
Nuclear weapons can be an effective deterrent, but because their use would 
be fatal to so many, military strategy tends to be limited primarily to
C O
the threat of their use - the diplomacy of violence.
The contemporary strategy of deterrence therefore relies on the 
threat of using weapons of massive destruction without actually having to 
use them. Should the other side have the same capability, however, the 
result is a situation where either power can destroy the other. As long 
as a nation is secure in its ability to retaliate and destroy what the 
opponent values most, deterrence strategy maintains that both will be 
deterred from attacking, producing a stable situation known as mutual 
assured destruction (MAD). Deterrence as a strategy creates a distinction 
between those weapons intended for defence (first use) and those weapons 
intended for deterrence (second strike), but modern technology has blurred 
this distinction over time with smaller and more accurate warheads. 
There is a danger that, as a strategy, deterrence is being driven by 
technology; the concept of deterrence reigns, but it rules neither
^  Good classical discussions of the concept of deterrence can be 
found in T.C. Schelling Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defence, p. 
11; and Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 269-273.
c o
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (London: Yale University
Press, 1967), pp. 33-34. This is an excellent review of theory.
David Owen, "Effective Deterrence," in Frank Barnaby and Geoffrey 
Thomas, The Nuclear Arms Race - Control or Catastrophe? (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1982), p. 38.
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strategy nor tactics.60 In its purest form a deterrent strategy simply 
invokes a sanction of retaliation or retribution if a certain action takes 
place; the aim is to prevent that action from taking place by threatening 
to initiate a process in risk-taking that would engulf both parties in 
mutually devastating nuclear war.
The requirements to achieve a basic deterrent strategy are generally 
considered to be fourfold; the will to fight, a commitment worth fighting 
for, the capability to fight and a clear communication to the adversary of 
all of the above. The will to fight is an important component of a 
nation's war potential.61 It is closely linked to commitment in an effort 
to enhance the credibility that the deterrent will be initiated if a 
specified action takes place. An unequivocal commitment is generated by 
having evident interests, troops in place or by unambiguous policy 
statements such that a given state's intentions are very visible and 
explicit. At times, however, perhaps "too much attention is given to 
making commitments credible and not nearly enough to understanding what 
prompts an adversary to challenge them."62 The capability to inflict 
unacceptable levels of damage is essential to supporting an effective 
deterrence strategy, but this requirement is "not nearly as demanding" as
60 Janice Stein, "Deterrence in the 1980's: A Political and
Contextual Analysis," in R.B. Byers, Deterrence in the 1980's: Crises and
Dilemma (Bechenham: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 45.
61 Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 3. See also chapter four 
where the author suggests that, up to a point, will can be substituted 
for capability.
62 Richard Ned Lebow, "Deterrence Reconsidered: The Challenge of
Recent Research," in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, e t al. Nuclear 
Deterrence: New Risks. New Opportunities (London: Permagon-Brassey's,
1986), p. 140.
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some theorists assert.^ So long as populations are hostage to the 
effects of nuclear weapons, a deterrent strategy based on assured 
destruction does not require thousands of warheads; about four hundred is 
probably enough.^ The communication of the above to the adversary is 
perhaps the most important requirement, for deterrence essentially 
operates in men's minds. ^  As the probability of the outcome is a key 
variable in calculating projected gains or losses,66 a clear perception of 
the likelihood of retaliatory action is vital to the establishment of 
effective deterrence.
What the essential requirements for deterrence do not demand is 
superiority in numbers or even matching the adversary weapon for weapon. 
In the nuclear age, "the potential deterrent value of an admittedly 
inferior force may be sharply greater than it was before," and there is a 
point at which "each unit of additional damage threatened brings 
progressively diminishing increments of d e t e r r e n c e . E x t e n d e d  
deterrence to protect one's allies however implies a requirement to avoid 
giving the adversary a position of escalation dominance, the ability to
6^ McGeorge Bundy, "The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy," 
in Gwyn Prins, ed., The Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1984), p. 53.
6^ Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 207-210; and David T. Johnson and Barry 
R. Schneider, eds., Current Issues in U.S. Defence Policy (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 141-143. See also Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, 
"The Mutual Hostage Relationship between America and Russia," Foreign 
Affairs 52 (October 1973), pp. 109-118.
6^ Robert Jervis, et al. . Psychology and Deterrence (London: John 
Hopkins Press, 1985), Introduction. This book provides a first rate 
review of the present state of deterrence theory.
66 Richard Rosecrance, "Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered," in 
Christoph Bertram, ed. , Strategic Deterrence in a Changing Environment 
(London 6c Gower and Allanheld, Ossnum, 1981), p. 7.
67 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp. 275-276.
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gain some advantage by threatening higher levels of conflict.^® While 
this concept can create nuclear requirements at theatre level, at the 
strategic/intercontinental level assured destruction remains all that the 
deterrence strategy requires . As incremental additions to nuclear 
strategic power only contribute marginally to increased deterrence, the 
essential requirements of the deterrent paradigm may not be that 
extensive.
Several underlying assumptions are fundamental to the deterrent 
paradigm, but the primary one assumes that the power of nuclear weapons 
precludes major war as a policy option. Deterrence theory has thus 
replaced the traditional theory of war, and its specific conditions must 
be assumed wherever deterrence theory is applied. This means that 
superpower relations are assumed to remain essentially bipolar and
r q
relatively static.^ It is also presumed legitimate to infer from the 
specific to the general so that immediate or contingent deterrence can 
apply to general strategy.^® Another fundamental assumption of deterrence 
theory is that the capacity to destroy the opponent is a necessary and 
sufficient condition to prevent him from initiating an aggressive act.^ 
The strategy of deterrence further assumes rational decision-making by 
each nation such that the choice to act or not act is based on sufficient
^  For an excellent explanation of escalation dominance, see Herman 
Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1965), pp. 23-25. For a rebuttal see Anotol Rapoport, "The 
Sources of Anguish," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 21 (December 
1965), pp. 35-36.
C Q
Edward Thompson, "Deterrence and Addiction," in Frank Barnaby and 
Geoffrey Thomas, The Nuclear Arms Race - Control or Catastrophe?, p. 71.
^  Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, p. 31. See
also Michael MccGwire, "The Dilemmas and Delusions of Deterrence," in The 
Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security, p. 82.
^  Anotol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1964), p. 187.
23
information and an accurate assessment of possible gains or losses. Other 
assumptions of the deterrence model are that population and industry are 
sufficiently important to warrant threatening them as the means of 
inhibiting unacceptable activity by an adversary, that the use of any 
nuclear weapons would probably escalate to strategic war, and that this 
risk of escalation would deter provocative behaviour.^ These assumptions 
form the framework of the deterrence paradigm. Since this paradigm has 
held a dominant position with Western academics and policy-makers for over 
forty years, ample criticism of it has accumulated.
The major criticism of the deterrence paradigm is that it cannot 
adequately explain much of what happens in international relations, and it 
is no longer appropriate either as a theory of state behaviour or as a 
strategy of conflict management.^  While the essence of deterrence theory 
is deductive and abstract pertaining to a very narrow range of specific 
circumstances, it has been expanded as a normative-prescriptive theory, 
with the result that the theory's prescriptions are limited in scope, 
utility and accuracy by the simplifications inherent in the number of 
abstractions in its deductivist methodology.^ The concept of rational 
unitary actor decision-making has been rejected as an appropriate model 
for state governments, now considered to be complex bureaucracies which in 
reality do not necessarily function within the prescribed postulates of
Keith B. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Relations 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 11-12. In a rigorous
attack on the assured destruction paradigm, the author compares the 
deterrence paradigm to classical strategy.
^  Robert Jervis, et al. . Psychology and Deterrence, p. 203. See 
also Keith Payne, Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Relations, p. 7.
^  Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American 
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1974), pp. 72-81.
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rationality in deterrent situations.75 To some, the limitations inherent 
in the deterrent paradigm are referred to as an "intellectual 
s t r a i t j a c k e t " 7 6  or "intellectual t r a n q u i l i z e r "7 7  imposing a rigid 
framework on strategic thinking preventing its natural evolution. One 
dilemma of the deterrence paradigm is that superpower survival depends on 
mutual interdependence through vulnerability, yet this is "fundamentally 
at variance" with what is perhaps the central assumption of deterrence, 
that one's enemy would attack if no deterrent e x i s t s . 7 8  Other criticisms 
reflect that deterrence is not fully effective and not only could it fail, 
as a  strategy it could result in greater insecurity over t i m e . 7 9
Increasingly, deterrence is subject to attack as being dogmatic and
on
based on obsolete assumptions.ou As these attacks are so widespread, one 
wonders why an alternative paradigm has not yet been accepted. One
75 See Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company, 1971), p. 6; Janice Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision
Making:____Israel's Security Choices. 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State
University, 1980), p. 62. See also Graham Allison, et al. . "The Owls 
Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War," The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1986), 
pp. 45-58.
76 Hedley Bull, "Future Conditions of Strategic Deterrence," 
Adelphi Paper 160 The Future of Strategic Deterrence (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 16-17.
77 Michael MccGwire, "Deterrence: The Problem - Not the Solution," 
International Affairs (Winter 1985/1986), p. 58.
78 Janice Stein, "Deterrence in the 1980's," p. 40.
79 Richard Rosecrance, Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered. Adelphi 
Paper 116 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975),
p. 33. See also Dennis Bobrow, "Cool Heads and Hot Weapons," in Catherine 
McArdle Kelleher, et al. . Nuclear Deterrence: New Risks. New
Opportunities. p. 98, and Raymond Aron, The Great Debate: Theories of
Nuclear Strategy, p. 210.
80 Fred Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" 
Foreign Affairs 51 (January 1973), pp. 267-85. See also Philip Green, 
Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Ohio: Ohio State
University Press, 1966), p. 271.
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analyst described these criticisms as resembling Thomas Kuhn's puzzles in 
science "that accumulate until they provoke a paradigm s h i f t . I t  is 
the theme of this dissertation that the compellent paradigm may offer 
reasonable alternative heuristic criteria to the deterrent model.
4. The Compellent Paradigm
Although this paradigm recognizes that nuclear weapons are 
significantly different from previous arms, it has strong links to the 
traditional strategic pattern in that it offers an account for aggressive 
as well as defensive strategic action. As deterrence relates to defence, 
compellence relates to offence. Whereas defence and offence form the 
heart of traditional military strategy based on the use of force if 
necessary in support of national objectives, deterrence and compellence 
form the basis for nuclear strategy based on threats and coercion to
ensure compliance in support of national goals. This study will focus on
the pure compellent aspects of this paradigm to clearly differentiate it
from the deterrent paradigm while recognizing both as abstract forms.
This section will describe the concept of compellent action, the strategy 
of compellence, the requirements to fulfil it and then outline the 
assumptions inherent in this paradigmatic construct.
In theory, the concept of compellence is as simple as that of 
deterrence. While deterrence threatens a retaliation that hurts to 
prevent or deter an act that is not desired, compellence threatens pain or 
force to induce or compel an act that is desired. In general,
Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, p. 220. See
also Janice Stein who calls for a wholly new paradigm to integrate the 
political and military dimensions of national security, "Deterrence in 
the 1980's," p . 53.
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The threat that compels rather than deters often requires 
that the punishment be administered until the other acts, 
rather than if he acts. This is because often the only way
to become committed to an action is to initiate it.®^
A compellent threat then is used in an aggressive manner; "it is designed
to persuade the opponent to give up something of value."®® The
distinction between compellence and forcible offence is essentially that
of threat; "to be coercive, violence has to be anticipated and it has to
Q  A
be avoided by accommodation."0^ Compellence in the nuclear age can be 
separated from offensive action in the same way that deterrence is 
conceptually different from defence.
The strategy of compellence in a situation where both major 
adversaries are equipped with nuclear weapons logically implies a degree 
of competition; it is inconceivable that a superpower would knowingly 
surrender any clear advantage to an opponent in an endeavour as vital as 
war.®-* Even though each side has a secure assured destruction capability, 
a compellent strategy seeks to exploit asymmetries in nuclear arsenals in 
a way that one analyst compares to a form of strategic mercantilism, the 
seeking of comparative advantage.®® To exploit the shared interest of 
avoiding mutual devastation in war to induce the adversary to make
®^ Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. p. 70. For an earlier
version of the same concept, see Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 
196.
®® Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defence, p. 40.
®^ Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. p. 2.
®® John Alger, The Quest for Victory (London: Greenwood Press,
1982), p. 1.
O C
Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), pp. 123-124. Mandelbaum presents in a clear way 
a convincing argument that almost exactly parallels the compellent thought 
process.
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concessions is a key element in compellent action. A coercive nuclear 
threat that aims to compel a country to do what it is morally at liberty
O O
not to do could even be considered nuclear blackmail.00 In Schelling's 
view, all conflict situations that contain a cooperative element are 
essentially bargaining situations, and since both sides wish to win and at 
the same time avoid nuclear war, coercive bargaining is theoretically
OQ
equivalent to ordinary bargaining.7
When the nature of compellent bargaining is coupled with the notion 
of anticipated violence, the concept of time looms as a significant 
element in compellent strategy. While a deterrent commitment can be 
relatively precise and last indefinitely, a compellent threat tends to be 
more open-ended and needs a finite deadline to be effective. 90 In 
specific case studies, compellence has proven more measurable than 
deterrence;91 however, as a result of the constraints of time, a national 
strategy of compellence comparable to that of deterrence becomes 
problematic. But even if a state seeks to pursue compellent activity on 
specific occasions, this strategy would still place similarly high demands 
on a state's military forces because the greater the probability of
^  Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, p. 30.
Jeff McMahan, "Nuclear Blackmail," in Nigel Blake and Kay Pole,
eds. , Dangers of Deterrence: Philosophers on Nuclear Strategy (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 30.
**9 Glen Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 196-209.
90 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. p. 72.
91 Bruce Russett, "Deterrence in Theory and Practice," The Jerusalem
Journal of International Relations (June 1986), p. 216.
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victory in war, the greater the probability of compellent success.^ It 
is evident that a compellent strategy requires forces that, similar to 
those of traditional strategy, can be used for aggressive and defensive 
missions and that these requirements significantly exceed those needed for 
deterrence.
In attempting to enforce a compellent strategy, the will to act is 
far more evident because the initiator must make the first move, and 
therefore his commitment is usually more obvious than in the case of a 
deterrent posture. Because the compellent actor seeks to impose his will 
in the coercive bargaining process, some form of advantage is required, 
and in terms of nuclear strategy this translates into an effective damage- 
limiting capability and the threatened ability to fight nuclear war at 
levels short of intercontinental exchange. A damage-limiting capability
Q  O
includes all forms of defence against nuclear attack7'' and fast and 
accurate counterforce capabilities^ such that the adversary could have 
doubts about his assured destructive abilities in crisis situations. Even 
if an effective damage-limiting capability were not in place, a compellent 
strategy could threaten action at lower levels implicitly accepting the 
attendant risk of mutual destruction. But clearly, credibility would be
92 Walter J. Petersen, "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical 
Assessment of Conventional Wisdom," International Studies Quarterly 30 
(September 1986), p. 281. In this sound article Petersen emphasizes that 
compellent success avoids war.
93 Compellence places a premium on defence. See Colin S. Gray, 
"The Transition from Offence to Defence," The Washington Quarterly 9 
(Summer 1986), p. 61. Some insist that defences are required for 
deterrence as well but this notion of deterrence goes beyond this study's 
deterrent paradigm. See Keith Payne, "The Deterrence Requirement for 
Defence," The Washington Quarterly 9 (Winter 1986), p. 151.
9^ By this, counterforce against ICBM as well as other forms of 
nuclear strength are included. For one approach that decries the dangers 
of offensive oriented strategy see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the 
Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 
9 (Summer 1984), p. 106.
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greater if flexible and controllable forces were to exist at all levels.^ 
These strategies are often labelled "war fighting deterrence" strategies, 
and their stated requirements are significantly greater than those 
necessary for finite or minimum deterrence.^
Another stringent requirement for a compellent strategy is 
communicating exactly what is wanted and assuring the adversary that the 
compellent threat is clearly limited. If a threat is ambiguous and 
permits more flexible interpretation, it may be perceived as being open- 
ended, but if a threat to a status-equal is explicit and compels an 
action, it may appear so provocative and threatening that the recipient 
would doubt the ultimate intent could be limited.^ Assurances that must 
accompany a compellent action are harder to demonstrate in advance, but 
the threat and the proffered avoidance must give the adversary credible 
o p t i o n s . Should the combination of threat and assurance work, then the 
compellent action must be controllable so that it can be stopped.
The compellent paradigm assumes primarily that war is still a policy 
option in spite of the power of nuclear weapons, and therefore traditional 
strategy with some important modifications is still a valid guide to 
international behaviour. This paradigm is supported by some psychological 
research that describes patriarchy in modern society as the main cultural 
determinant to war in that pressures to achieve actually result in
^  See Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning 
(Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), pp. 79-86. In
this rather general book, the author describes a strategy which is capable 
of compellent action.
^  Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980*s (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 43. See also p. 33 for a description 
of increased requirements for multi-stable deterrence (at all levels).
^  For an excellent discussion on threats and warnings, see Glen 
Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, pp. 213-219.
q o
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. pp. 73-75.
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aspirations to dominance, not parity.^ Compellence is built on the
foundation of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz; it has a coherent
traditional logic that has endured as the basis of realist thought.1^0
The concept of military advantage is an essential component of
compellence, and the traditional assumptions imbedded in its realist logic
are principally that an advantage in force relates to an advantage in
international politics.
There is no real security in being just as strong as a 
potential enemy; there is security only in being a little 
stronger. There is no possibility of action if one's 
strength is fully checked; there is a chance for a positive 
foreign policy only if there is a margin of force which can 
be freely used.101
Compellence assumes a significant continuity with pre-nuclear strategic
logic, and as Herman Kahn describes:
. . .more than ever there are lessons in the application of 
the nuclear threat as 'a continuation of politics/policy by 
other means' and as an instrument for advancing the national 
interest by deploying forces, though some important caveats 
and modifications are needed.102
Not only is war not yet obsolete, but war could occur. Therefore,
realistic military preparations and a perceived superiority should prove
useful in coercive bargaining or combat situations. Because nuclear war
could lead to self-destruction, this paradigm also implicitly assumes that
conventional war or limited nuclear use does not necessarily lead to total
nuclear war. As the risk of escalation remains, however, it does not seek
^  Charlene Spretnak, "Naming the Cultural Forces that Push Us 
Toward War," Journal of Humanistic Psychology 23 (Summer 1983), pp. 104-114.
100 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning, p. 43.
101 Nicolas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The
United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace and
Company, 1942), p. 21.
102 Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980's. p. 
84. See also p. 95 for a discussion on the continuities with traditional 
strategy.
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nuclear or major war, only the advantages that stem from being in a better
position to risk war.
Compellence is concerned not merely with staving off threats to the
very existence of the state, but primarily "for protecting a variety of
lesser interests and exerting political pressure on others. Behind
this linking of military force to political pressure lies the realist
assumption that power is a major determinant of international relations.
Never in history has it happened that a nation achieved 
superiority in all significant weapons categories without
seeking to translate it at some point into some foreign
policy benefit.
Although nuclear compellence as a strategic paradigm includes deterrence, 
it also involves making threats that portend the risk of war to force an 
adversary to act; therefore, it requires a force structure and a mode of 
thought significantly different from that of the deterrence paradigm.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR PARADIGMATIC ANALYSIS
The deterrence and compellent paradigms in theory both rely primarily 
on the psychological impact of threats, but the nature of these threats 
and the force requirements they generate differ greatly. Knowledge of the 
operating paradigm is important, especially in a crisis, when there is 
significant reluctance to embark on new modes of thought. As Moltke found 
in the 1914 crisis, staying with the established strategic plan was easier 
than changing it even though it was outdated. The importance of
Lawrence Martin, The Two-Edged Sword: Armed Forces in the
Modern World (London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 21.
Henry Kissinger, "NATO, The Next Thirty Years," in Christoph 
Bertram, ed., Strategic Deterrence in a Changing Environment, p. 107.
Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of
International Crisis (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 
236-237.
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paradigms is highlighted by the fact that in a crisis modes of action are 
"a function of cultural, organizational and personal behaviour patterns 
established long before the onset of any crisis.
This section will meld the previously established paradigmatic 
constructs into a framework for analysis of superpower strategic 
interaction. The following framework is divided into three levels of 
assessment: The strategic intentions to determine the aim of a given
strategy, policy or act; the threat of force and the perceptions of that 
force used to support the achievement of these aims; and, the actual 
correlation of nuclear forces that create the ultimate threat.
1. The Strategic Intention
Notwithstanding the emphasis that each paradigm places on 
communication, the real strategic intentions embodied in any policy, act 
or strategy are rarely so clear as to eliminate all doubt. Increasingly, 
declaratory strategy has become separated from operational strategy; hence 
the importance of also examining the explicit and implicit threats as well 
as the actual nuclear forces. In fact, only after a thorough examination 
of all issues can a final determination of probable intention achieve any 
degree of reliability. It may well be that strategic intentions are not 
uniformly held by various components of a given government, and the 
resultant strategy is a compromise or a locus of competing perceptions. 
This section will examine the variable of declared or official policy to 
determine, to the extent possible, the degree to which it reflects 
operational policy and to establish which paradigm best explains these 
strategic intentions.
106 Ibid.. p. 335.
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A major problem for analysis is that often strategy can be "muddled” 
so that a clear idea of the objective is not evident. The notion that
nuclear weapons are political not military weapons means they "serve vital 
political objectives on a continuous basis, perhaps thus obviating the 
need for discrete and explicit utilization."108 This notion implies that 
nuclear weapons lack credibility to support specific policy options but 
recognizes that the very existence of these weapons provides an 
unspecified level of support. Such argument best fits the deterrence 
model, but the counter argument that "it would be absurd to believe that 
such powerful means of destruction can be wholly and permanently divorced 
from political conflicts" tends to fit in the compellent p a r a d i g m . T h e  
perceived utility of nuclear weapons to support policy initiatives is thus 
a subtle but important tool for analysis.
Some worthwhile research into the nature of deterrence and 
compellence has helped clarify one distinction between the two paradigms; 
its
findings suggest that initiators threaten to use military 
force to change the status quo under conditions that are 
significantly different from the conditions under which they 
will initiate threats to defend the status quo.^®
The intent to maintain or to change the status quo thus becomes a
Sir John Slessor, The Great Deterrent (London: Cassell and 
Company, 1957), p. 196.
1 A O
Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 49. This is an
important work. See also D.W. Heister, "Nuclear Prolification: A Cause 
for Optimism," International Relations (May 1985), p. 225.
Lawrence Martin, "Limited Nuclear War," in Michael Howard, 
Restraints on War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 119.
Walter J. Petersen, "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical
Assessment of Conventional Wisdom," p. 282. All powers could have some 
status quo objectives, see Barry Buzan, People. States and Fear: The
National Security Problem in International Relations (Brighton, Sussex: 
Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 178.
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reasonable indicator of strategic intentions. Generally, a threat that
deters supports the status quo, and a threat that compels seeks to change
the existing status quo.
The political value of what is at stake is also of fundamental
importance, perhaps more so than the visible degree of commitment.
Given the overwhelming incentive each contestant has under 
an effective nuclear balance to avoid general nuclear war, 
there is effectively no level of commitment of prestige or 
troops , which will be assumed to be equivalent to an 
irrevocable commitment. If this is the case, the chief part 
of any assessment of the strength of a contestant's 
commitment to an objective must be a process of political 
evaluation focused on the value of the obj ective.
A key aspect of assessing political advantage or value associated with a
given strategy relates to the fact that "the strategic competition is only
119the symptom of a much deeper and broader political struggle. As a
consequence, national self-respect and prestige can suffer from a policy 
which "deliberately accepts a permanent inferiority in nuclear striking
1 1 O
power." The underlying values are a key variable in determining what
objectives are really being pursued in any given situation.
The most important variables for analyzing strategic intentions of 
declaratory policy are the perceived utility of strategic nuclear weapons 
to support national policies, the degree to which the goal appears to
Stephen Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence. Adelphi Paper 50 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968), p. 18.
The greater the value in question the greater the resolve. This is why 
deterrence of a nuclear attack on a nuclear armed state's homeland is 
assumed more credible, the incentive to retaliate is exceedingly high. 
This highlights the problems of "extended deterrence."
Edward Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and
Political Utility (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, 1976), p. 6. See also Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, 
"What Makes Deterrence Work?" World Politics 36 (July 1984), p. 500. The 
higher the values, the greater the credibility of extended deterrence.
1 1 9
Glen Snyder, Deterrence and Defence, pp. 117-118. See also 
Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War, p. 5.
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accept or reject the status quo, and the underlying political values 
implicitly at stake in a given policy or act. Careful analysis of these 
variables appears to offer the greatest promise of differentiating and 
identifying various aspects of deterrent and compellent behaviour.
2. The Threat of Force
This section is concerned with examining only those variables that 
can help identify deterrent or compellent behaviour in the explicit or 
implicit threat to use force to achieve a given policy goal. In the 
construction of the two paradigms earlier in this study, it was evident 
that both rely on the ultimate military sanction.
Certainly the superpowers have demonstrated great restraint in the 
application of force against one another, but the quantity and nature of 
their respective threats has not always been so reserved. Since
deterrence threats are more enduring, one might expect an increase in the
frequency of threats to represent an increase in compellent behaviour. 
Some research shows that the greater the disparity in military strength 
between two adversaries, the more dampened the physical use of force will 
be and the greater the peaceful resolution of conflicts, but as parity is 
reached "the utility of threats decreases.1 1 The degree of superpower 
reliance on strategic threats, however, has not necessarily declined with 
parity. As compellence is more applicable to specific situations, it is 
reasonable that a greater number of different threats in a given period
may be one indicator of increased compellent behaviour.
Robert Art and Robert Jervis, "When will force be used?" in 
Robert Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics: Anarchy. Force.
Political Economy and Decision-Making (Toronto: Little, Brown and
Company, 1985), p. 210.
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To differentiate between the two paradigms also requires an 
examination into the nature of the threats themselves, and the best way to 
do this is to extend threat logic to the fight and see what implications 
can be drawn. In Clausewitz's theory of war, deterrence, or more properly 
defence, was grounded on the threat of war not retaliation, but 
retaliation in fact inevitably leads to a response which is by definition 
war. Threats to retaliate are usually and primarily deterrent threats,
but threats to initiate an attack are usually and primarily compellent 
threats. Logic demands that if an actor is going to initiate an attack, 
the first and more important objective must be to limit damage to himself 
by attacking the enemy's retaliating f o r c e s . B y  this logic a counter­
force threat is primarily a compellent rather than a deterrent threat. 
Thus, to threaten an opponent's strategic nuclear forces implies greater 
utility for the compellent function, and to threaten an opponent's 
population and urban industrial base implies greater utility for the 
deterrent function. Since retaliation, however, invokes war, there is 
some deterrent utility in damage limitation as well, but clearly the 
compellent paradigm places a premium on counterforce and defensive 
capability.
Armed force in the nuclear age still provides the essential 
underpinning for the international political system between states, but 
the absence of warfare has fed the belief that war would be hard to 
control which has led to some doubts as to whether it could "serve useful
H** Wendel Coates, "Clausewitz's Theory of War: An Alternative
View," Comparative Strategy 5 (November 4, 1986), p. 368.
Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 165.
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national purposes. If war cannot be controlled, then total
ideological demands for victory will lead to total war,^-^ and if war can 
be controlled, one remains "accessible to coercion" concerning decisions 
effecting that c o n t r o l . W h i l e  the former characterization suits the 
deterrent paradigm, the latter fits the compellent, especially when a 
possible war is calculated. The extent of controlled or limited war 
notions is therefore an appropriate indicator of paradigmatic thought.
If a deterrent does not work, the ex poste facto incentives rapidly
assume the nature of compellence, for the defender either has to compel
the aggressor to withdraw or be compelled to accept a new status q u o . 120
Some analysts believe that the greatest likelihood of nuclear war will
occur when one superpower attempts to compel the other to give up some
recent g a i n . 121 one major difficulty in examining the threat is the
problem of terminating war in such a way that does not "ultimately rely
upon pushing the enemy beyond a threshold of unendurable pain and thereby
1 9 9compelling him to s t o p . C e r t a i n l y  the theoretical basis for 
compellence should provide greater scope for war termination concepts than 
deterrence based on assured destruction.
Lawrence Martin, Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age (London: 
Heinemann, 1979), p. 17.
H ®  Michael Howard, Restraints on War (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), p . 13.
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp. 293-294.
Controlled nuclear war concepts can be based on just war and
proportionality criteria, see Joseph S. Nye, Nuclear Ethics (New York:
The Free Press, 1986), pp. 49-51.
120 Richard Rosecrance, The Future of the International Strategic 
System (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing, 1972), p. 134.
121 Colin Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory is Possible," Foreign 
Policy 39 (Summer 1980), p. 27. This shallow article is overstated.
12^ Ian Clark, Nuclear Past. Nuclear Present: Hiroshima. Nagasaki
and Contemporary Strategy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p. 87.
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This highlights the first aspect of the nature of threat - its 
duration and the assurances that accompany it. As noted earlier, a 
deterrent threat is a relatively open-ended commitment and although the 
probability of its initiation may be low the expected damage is 
exceedingly high. A compellent threat is more likely to be contingent, 
but, since the threatened violence is usually less, the probability of its 
use must be higher for the initiator cannot be inhibited from its 
initiation or the threat will have no credibility. In each case, the 
adversary must have received believable assurances or else no meaningful 
bargaining can take place. Coercion depends on a subjective feeling which 
one is trying to create in the opponent's mind, generated from fear and 
respect, and it is possible to convey a stronger message than intended.^ 3  
The critical dimension of strategic policy is political, and in the end, 
the necessarily vague perceptual factors may count for more than the 
weapons themselves.
Perceptions created through communicating threats and assurances are 
vital to ensuring the success of threats; they must be understood for what 
they are and neither exaggerated nor undervalued. What may seem a
reasonable demand to one party may be perceived as the start of a series 
of threats the aim of which may go far beyond the initial stated
objective. One always sees a threat to oneself more seriously than one
I O C
pointed the other way.  ^ With the coercive diplomacy involved in both 
paradigmatic constructs, it is the leaders' beliefs that really matter,
^ 3  Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p. 397.
Edward Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and
Political Utility, p. 16.
I O C
Mary Midgley, "Deterrence, Provocation and the Martian
Temperament," in Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds., Dangers of Deterrence: 
Philosophers on Nuclear Strategy, p. 29.
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not rationality according to detached analysis. ^ 6
The key variables pertaining to a paradigmatic analysis of threats 
include the quantity and the nature of the threats as well as the 
perceptions associated with a given policy or action. The nature of the 
threat itself offers good potential for recognizing the operative paradigm 
in a given policy.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
The final level of analysis is more concrete in that the nuclear 
force structures can be readily identified and can be more easily 
measured. Each superpower has established a huge arsenal of nuclear 
firepower that each feels necessary to back up its explicit and implicit 
nuclear threats in its quest to emerge from this competition as the new 
centre of gravity in the world. ^ 7  jn addition to the concept of balance, 
however, the correlation of nuclear forces also refers to the potential 
interaction of strategies in conflict, and the degree to which a nuclear 
posture is able to engage in war fighting may be a significant measure of
the degree of compellence in nuclear strategy.
The first variable is the quality of the nuclear forces themselves. 
The demands for deterrence on weapons accuracies and yields are fairly 
simple, with the most important qualitative factor in the deterrent
paradigm being survivability. On the other hand, the requirements for 
compellence call for far greater accuracies and specific yields for
Richard Betts, "Elusive Equivalence: The Political and Military
Meaning of the Nuclear Balance," in Samuel Huntington, The Strategic
Imperative (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982), 
p. 117. See also Henry T. Nash, Nuclear Weapons and International 
Behaviour (Leyden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1975), p. 69.
^27 James Trapier Lowe, Geopolitics and War (Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1981), p. 551.
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specific purposes requiring tailored or special nuclear effects. Since
the credibility of use must be higher, the technological demands of
fighting with and controlling these weapons are more "exigent."
The problems associated with designing nuclear strategy to 
do more than deter a major nuclear strike calls for a more 
complex system than simply assured destruction but may offer 
correspondingly greater reward, by way of leverage on world 
politics.1^8
A second aspect of the correlation of nuclear forces is the proximate 
relative balance between the superpowers; if one holds a definite 
advantage in numbers one may be able to better support compellent 
behaviour. So long as states are primarily preoccupied with their 
survival, however, they will seek to maintain some kind of balance which 
in some degree regulates and reduces to order the political conditions
I O Q
that may lead to war. This notion of balance does not equate to
stability; it is only one factor contributing to it. Studies tend to show 
that additional actors and that conflict of interest among them can 
contribute to general stability which implies the continued existence of
1 Of)
all the major actors. There is, however, no clear empirical evidence
that can support the hypothesis that the strategic weapons balance between 
the superpowers can influence the outcomes of conflict situations. 
Many factors contribute to the relative equilibrium of geopolitical
1 O O
Lawrence Martin, "The Determinants of Change: Deterrence and
Technology," The Future of Strategic Deterrence. Adelphi Paper 161 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 18.
1 9 9 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Leicester University
Press, 1978), p. 184.
1 O A
Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy (London: Faber and
Faber, 1965), p. 81 argues that a third party introduces an element of 
stability to a dyadic relationship, and Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of 
Games and the Balance of Power," World Politics 38 (July 1986), p. 574 
finds that constant sum systems are stable in spite of conflict.
1 ^1 Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War, p. 132.
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1 OO
forces, but no theory ties them all together. The balance of nuclear
forces is only a key factor when one side has a clear preponderance of 
weapons. If overall numbers are high and increasing, however, this would 
tend to fit the compellent paradigm as each nation seeks advantage; if 
overall numbers are low and stable, this would fit the deterrent paradigm.
A more promising variable is the prospective utility of these nuclear 
forces in war, as only a combined quantitative and qualitative analysis 
can determine the probable outcome of nuclear use in specific scenarios. 
Actual power is more difficult to measure than potential power because 
power is relational and as soon as war is engaged the relative forces are
1 O O
constantly changing. ° Assuming counterforce attacks, in some situations 
a given state's relative advantage could actually increase if its 
adversary attacks f i r s t . 134 If a state's relative ability to fight a 
nuclear war improves over time, compellence may be enhanced, and it may be 
that each superpower has developed increased counterforce capabilities for 
these reasons.
To assist in the correlation of nuclear forces analysis, a numerate 
Soviet method provides, for the first time, a Soviet conceptualization of
I O C
the interaction of the nuclear balance. This tool is important not
only because it provides an excellent method for analyzing nuclear force 
deployments, but it also offers a unique insight into the way the Soviet
132 Giro E. Zoppo, On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. 9.
1 Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 18; see 
also p. 111.
134 Edward Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and
Political Utility, p. 62.
I O C
J-~>J This model is described in more detail in chapters seven and 
eight. It has only recently appeared in the West and has, before now, not 
been applied to strategic nuclear forces in a comprehensive way.
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Union may view the nuclear problem. A careful examination of the 
interaction of, as well as the quality and quantity of nuclear forces, 
should reveal whether they are more appropriate for simply securing the 
assured destruction of the deterrent paradigm, or they are increasingly 
able to obtain some advantages for the compellent paradigm.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The paradigmatic approach to nuclear strategy is a heuristic tool to 
help disclose the operating mechanisms of how strategic nuclear weapons 
were thought to support superpower foreign policy. The deterrent and 
compellent paradigms are artificial constructs that have different 
requirements in theory to effect their desired consequences. The thesis 
of this dissertation is that the compellent paradigm, by encompassing both 
deterrence and compellence, more closely reflects this strategic thought 
process than the popular and accepted deterrent paradigm.
As a code of beliefs and a way of structuring thought, a paradigm 
establishes a mode of thinking consistent within itself. It provides 
heuristic criteria based on the superpower nuclear relationship from 1970, 
the date parity was generally acknowledged, until 1986, the date it became 
clear that strong winds of change were blowing in the U.S.S.R. Although 
this historical context predates the major changes of the late 1980's, it 
nevertheless covers a very important era in the ambiguous superpower 
relationship. From detente to strident competition, this period 
emphasizes the considerable importance of analyzing the deterrent and 
compellent approaches to nuclear strategy.
While deterrence is used to justify vast nuclear arsenals, as a 
strategic paradigm it is under a great deal of stress and is starting to 
display the inconsistency and confusion of a paradigm stretched too far.
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A consensus is gradually building that deterrence theory "is wrong or 
inappropriate for a period characterized by essential equivalence."136 
Deterrence does not recognize that nuclear weapons can be used effectively 
to project foreign policy as they are deemed too powerful to be credible 
for anything other than defending vital national goals.
Compellence, on the other hand, is very much concerned with 
projecting influence with nuclear power if necessary. The compellent 
paradigm acknowledges nuclear weapons may be used, and limited war is a 
possibility that the compellent actor appears ready to risk to achieve his 
aim. Clearly, a state with an appropriate war fighting force posture 
would have an advantage in a compellent situation if it was seeking 
limited objectives against a defender whose force structure was based on a 
deterrent paradigm.
This study has established a framework for paradigmatic analysis that 
will allow analysis of a given strategy, policy or act to determine to 
what degree it correlates with either paradigm. All that awaits is to 
apply this framework on a comprehensive basis to superpower relations in 
recent years. Since prevailing theory holds that deterrence and 
compellence are distinct, and since the deterrent paradigm excludes 
compellent action while the compellent paradigm does not exclude deterrent 
considerations, empirical indications of both compellent and deterrent 
behaviour would demonstrate the greater utility of the compellent 
paradigm. If this proves to be the case, then there may be much more 
interaction between deterrence and compellence than heretofore realized.
Colin Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 21.
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Chapter Two
ARMS CONTROL THEORY IN A PARADIGMATIC PERSPECTIVE
Superpower nuclear strategy and modern arms control have become so 
inextricably intertwined that it is now virtually impossible to assess one 
without the other. While nuclear strategy, as we have seen, is really an 
extension of politics by an admixture of military means, arms control is a 
continuation of politics by a mutual restraint on military means.^  It is 
international politics that cements the link between these two concepts. 
As a consequence, arms control forms a significant component of superpower 
national strategy and hence must have an important place in any 
paradigmatic strategic analysis.
Much of the discussion of arms control theory, however, has served to 
keep nuclear strategy and arms control as separate intellectual 
activities. The reason for this is directly related to the fear of 
nuclear war and the popular characterization of arms control as "good" in 
that it contributes to peace, and nuclear strategy as "bad" in that it 
exacerbates the potential for war. Over the years, peace movements in 
Western society have created a strong impetus for disarmament that has 
compounded perceptions of arms control issues and complicated the pursuit 
of strategic arms control.
This chapter will review the theoretical development of arms control 
in the nuclear age as it relates to the paradigms of deterrence and 
compellence. The first part provides the conceptual background necessary 
to understand the growth and the content of arms control theory, and the 
following two parts analyze this theory from the perspective of deterrent
 ^ Kenneth Booth, "Disarmament and Arms Control", in John Baylis, et 
al.. Contemporary Strategy, p. 89. Booth deliberately uses Clausewitz's 
phraseology to show the political nature of arms control.
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and compellent strategies. Since nuclear arms control and superpower 
military strategy are so interdependent, this chapter effectively 
completes the establishment of the respective strategic paradigms to 
permit the subsequent comprehensive examination of superpower strategic 
policy.
I. ARMS LIMITATION THEORY
The evolution of arms limitation theory has for the most part been a
Western process that has concentrated on improving state security
primarily via negotiations and bargaining to restrain force structure
developments which threaten the international system. Thus, many of the
systemic factors that affected the formulation of strategic thought have
also affected the construction of the theory to limit armaments. Arms
limitation as is used in this study refers to any efforts to restrain or
limit national armaments and is inclusive of disarmament and arms control.
The notion of disarmament has played a significant role in international
relations for it has provided the theoretical foundation upon which arms
control has rested. While disarmament refers to the reduction or
abolition of armaments, arms control is generally accepted as
restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy, 
whether in respect of the level of armaments, their 
character, deployment or use.
Disarmament is based on the idealistic concept that without weapons there
would be no war, but arms control is based on more pragmatic concerns.
Arms control theory must therefore acknowledge the "real clashes of
interest and the brutal power relationships which actually e x i s t . I n
Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1961), p. ix.
Kenneth Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm,
1979), p. 18.
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the nuclear age, the eventual abolition or at least the control of nuclear 
weapons is generally regarded as an essential component in avoiding the 
devastation of nuclear war. Because disarmament is the broader of the two 
concepts and because it is the intellectual antecedent of arms control, it 
will be discussed first.
1. Disarmament Theory
As a concept, disarmament is perhaps as old as war itself, but most 
analysts point to the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817 as the first pertinent 
example of a successful disarmament treaty.^ It has helped establish the 
world's largest undefended border, and it epitomized the values of 
disarmament that later developed into the rising tide of liberalism of the 
late nineteenth century.
The inability of strategic leaders to account for their failures 
during World War I gave great popular support to the concept of 
disarmament. The high loss of life for no evident purpose made it the war 
to end all wars. The League of Nations was formed and disarmament 
negotiations became an accepted part of European diplomacy. Naval arms 
limitation was initiated in 1921, and in 1928 a major treaty, the Kellogg- 
Briand Pact, outlawed war.
The advocates of disarmament established ethical, social, economic, 
military and political grounds to support their cause. War was not 
considered beneficial or necessary, and weapons were the root of 
international tensions and war, because they, by definition, had to be 
directed towards another state. To prepare for war in general was not
^ United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agreements (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980 edition), p. 3. 
An even earlier example of arms control was the agreement between Rome and 
Carthage after the second Punic War to ban elephants.
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possible; one had to prepare for a specific war because detailed and 
complex staff plans required an enemy. The disarmers became strongly 
identified as idealists who believed a better world was close at hand. 
They believed that the practical difficulties of disarmament could be 
overcome but that progress towards universal disarmament was blocked by 
bureaucrats and militarists who held narrow and false logic.^ These 
concerns have continued into the nuclear age as "ban the bomb" and "peace" 
movements display similar intellectual characteristics although they still 
remain in a minority position. What has prevented disarmament from 
gaining greater political acceptability is its dissonance with the realist 
point of view, that power is a significant factor in world politics.
The inability of a disarmed Europe to cope with Hitler in the 1930s 
highlighted the tension between defence or deterrence on the one hand and 
cooperation or appeasement on the other. Armaments were not the cause of 
World War II, they were but the symptom of deep political conflict. ^ 
Britain and France, in attempting to manage the revival of German power, 
in retrospect, erred by placing too much trust in appeasement and 
cooperation. The Western powers eventually threatened war to prevent 
Hitler from invading Poland, yet at the time had no military plans nor the
O
forces to bring such a war to a successful conclusion. The high level of 
disarmament and the spirit of international cooperation after World War I 
was insufficient in itself to prevent another even more devastating war
 ^ Salvador de Madriaga, Disarmament (New York: Coward-McCann, 1929), 
p . 14.
 ^ Philip Noel-Baker, The First World Disarmament Conference 1932- 
1933 And Why It Failed (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1979).
 ^ Philip Towle, Arms Control and East-West Relations (London: Croom 
Helm, 1983), p. 175.
® Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1971), p. 117.
48
'within one generation. One can disarm, but the knowledge of weapons 
remains, and political instability and conflict creates incentives to re­
arm such that the central premise of disarmament theory is proven 
fallacious.^ The experience of the 1930s seemingly demonstrated at least 
some of the dangers of cooperation, prepared the ground for the advocates 
of deterrence through strength after World War II, and added a complex 
dimension to the arms control and disarmament debate.
Disarmament thought in the nuclear age has concentrated primarily on 
the abolition of nuclear weapons because of the cataclysmic consequences 
of their use. If all nations were to disarm, clearly serious 
consideration of the feasibility of some form of "far-reaching 
international organization is probably essential to the control of war. 
Because the international state system is so well entrenched, however, it 
is unlikely that the superpowers will completely disarm in the near future 
or allow any international organization the degree of power necessary to 
prevent or control war. Disarmament proponents recognize the long term 
nature of their utopian proposals and regard the reduction of the reliance 
on nuclear weapons as an important first step to be followed by abolition 
of nuclear weapons and then a reduction and abolition of conventional 
weapons. The technical details of dismantling missiles and warheads are 
not the problem; the problem is one of political will, trust, and the
 ^ This is the theme of Hedley Bull in The Control of the Arms Race. 
See also Robin Ranger, Arms Control in Theory and Practice 1958-1981 
(Kingston, Ontario: Center for International Relations, 1981), p. 5.
^  Coit Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., International Arms Control: 
Issues and Agreements (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1984), pp. 342-344.
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organization of the world community. ^  Unilateral disarmament was 
discredited by the events leading up to World War II, so general or 
negotiated disarmament approaches came to the fore in the 1950's.
The harsh climate of the cold war conditioned or even distorted the
practice of disarmament negotiations in the United Nations Eighteen Nation
Disarmament committee in Geneva. World wide aspirations for disarmament
were never higher, but the political and technological basis for it were
never so lacking. The result was that neither superpower was able to
reject disarmament without a severe propaganda defeat, nor could it accept
an agreement without seriously jeopardizing its national security - the
1 9result was psychological warfare. In this climate, agreement was
impossible and discussion in the United Nations disarmament committee 
became "a perfunctory affair."H The antagonisms of the Cold War ran so 
deep that they sustained themselves into the 1980s through a unique 
language focused on a narrow way of interpreting global relations that 
affected superpower relations in general and East-West arms control and 
disarmament in particular.
One impact of the lack of East-West dialogue is the fact that 
discussion of strategic studies and disarmament during this period was 
concentrated in Western academia. David Singer distinguished three 
approaches among this community that variously sought first to address
H  David Lynch, "Dismantling Nuclear Missiles: Military Logistics 3
(January/February 1987). The United States for example could probably 
dismantle 4000 warheads in one year. See also de Madriaga, Disarmament, 
p . 48.
12 John Spanier and Joseph Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament (New 
York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), pp. 5-6. See also Robert W. Malcolmson, 
Nuclear Fallacies: How We Have Been Misguided Since Hiroshima (Kingston,
Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), p. 114.
11 Hedley Bull, Arms Control: A Stocktaking and Prospectus. Adelphi
Paper 55 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969),
pp. 15-16.
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either the tensions, the political conflicts or the armaments
themselves.^  It is quite possible that this theoretical debate has not
had as great an impact on policy as has been presumed, essentially because
the actual development and deployment of strategic systems remained in the
hands of military professionals throughout this period.^
As a consequence of the failure to make any significant progress
towards East-West disarmament, arms control came increasingly to be
regarded as a more practical theoretical alternative. One result of this
process was the expansion of the concept of arms control to include
reductions in weapons. Originally arms control denoted internationally
agreed rules limiting the arms competition rather than attempting to
reverse it, but it now has an expanded meaning to include arms limitation
and even disarmament.^ The notion that arms control in theory could
eventually lead to disarmament still holds some allure, but for the most
part disarmament theory in its pure form is not considered reasonable or
achievable by most of the strategic community. Richard Barnet has penned
a suitable epitaph:
Fifteen years of apocalyptic warnings of atomic annihilation 
have deadened us to the significance of the arms race, for 
the mind, like the hand, can become calloused. Words like 
"survival" and "devastation" no longer evoke any response 
but apathy.^
^  David Singer, Deterrence. Arms Control and Disarmament: Towards
a Synthesis in National Security Policy (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1962), Chapter 7.
^  See Roy Licklider, The Private Nuclear Strategists (Ohio: Ohio
State University Press, 1971), p. 166, and Donald Snow, National Security: 
Enduring Problems of U.S. Defence Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1986), pp. 189-190.
Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control Agreement: A Handbook (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. xiii.
Richard Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament? (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Beacon Press, 1960), p. 1.
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2. Arms Control Theory
While disarmament theory sought to achieve absolute global security, 
the central objective of arms control theory has been to enhance the 
specific security of a given state or states. Thus military strategy must 
be interpreted in the broadest sense so that the goals of arms control and 
of military strategy are substantially the same.^  Arms control then is 
far more limited in scope than is disarmament, and arms control theory is 
critical of the assumption that complete disarmament should be the 
objective of arms control policy. This section will establish the goals 
of arms control and then address some specific concepts of the theory to 
include the need for confidence building measures, the impact of 
technology, the role of verification and the significance of limited war.
The proponents of arms control portray it as an alternative means to 
military strategy, the goal of both being greater security. The essential 
objectives of arms control are to enhance national security, to release 
economic resources for worthier endeavours and to contribute to the demise 
of war as a means of conflict resolution.^ The central assumption of 
arms control theory is that the world would be more secure if a controlled 
or reduced level of armaments existed. The resultant logic suggests that 
a balanced, controlled level of armaments is the best way of providing
1 ft Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control 
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 141-142. This work plus the
two books by Bull and Brennan cited in. the following footnote are
excellent and together they have set the standard for arms control theory.
19 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race. p. 3. See also
Donald Brennan, "Setting and Goals of Arms Control," in his Arms Control.
Disarmament and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 
40. For the view that military spending is an unproductive burden on 
society, see Lloyd Dumas, "Military Spending and Economic Decay," in Lloyd 
J . Dumas, The Political Economy of Arms Reduction: Reversing Economic
Decay (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 1-26.
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20greater security at the lowest risk and cost/ Because arms do 
contribute to tensions, arms control can contribute to the regulation of 
international behaviour, thus reducing the probability of international 
crises and the threat of escalation to or during nuclear war.^
These objectives of arms control overlap those of disarmament 
considerably. Disarmament specifically seeks to curtail manufacture of 
weapons, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to prevent new 
areas of the world from becoming the scene of deployment of nuclear 
weapons, to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to limit the effects 
of nuclear war if one does break out.^ The key difference is that arms 
control recognizes that national interests preclude immediate disarmament 
and stresses the importance of recognizing the potential of joint interest 
between political adversaries. As a result of less ambitious theory, arms 
control is more feasible and consequently has had far greater political 
acceptance.
Because arms control theory is more closely related to strategy, the
concept of balance has emerged as central to arms control.
It was recognized in the negotiations of the League of 
Nations period, and it has been recognized in recent 
negotiations, that any general reduction would have to 
preserve an agreed balance, replacing a balance at a higher 
quantitative and qualitative level with one at a lower 
level.23
2® Edward Luttwak, "Why Arms Control Has Failed," Commentary 65 
(January 1978).
21 Coit Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., International Arms Control: 
Issues and Agreements.p. 336.
22 Albert Legault and George Lindsay, The Dynamics of the Nuclear 
Balance (London: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 209.
23 Hedley Bull, "Arms Control and the Balance of Power," in Ernest 
Lefever, ed. , Arms and Arms Control (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), 
p. 46.
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The notion that arms control could and should contribute to a stable 
strategic balance grew from the fear of nuclear instability generated by 
the strategic analyses of the 1950s. 2^ This requirement to achieve 
strategic stability has furthered the thought that arms control 
negotiations could be separated from the political relationship between 
the superpowers because arms control in the West became viewed as a search
for "limited technical solutions." As this Western view has not been
9 Sshared by the Soviet Union, J considerable difficulty in achieving success
between the superpowers has hampered arms control in practice.
Arms control is primarily concerned with formal negotiations, but in
practice, unilateral actions and tacit or informal understandings may be
equally or more important. In the international sphere the line between
9 fiwhat is legally binding and what is not has less significance; 
therefore, all possible avenues to achieve one's aim should be pursued. 
As a consequence, arms control relies on trust and faith that extend 
beyond the letter of treaties, highlighting the criteria for acceptability
which include applicable limitations, methods of verifying compliance and
9 7the consequences of violation.
2^ Robin Ranger, Arms Control in Theory and Practice 1958-1981. p. 
22. See also Albert Wohstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign 
Affairs 37 (January 1957), pp. 211-34, and his influential Rand studies, 
Selection and Use of Strategic Air Base. Rand Report R266, 1954, and
Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back. Rand Report R290, 1956.
25 Robin Ranger, Arms and Politics 1958-1978: Arms Control in a 
Changing Political Context (Toronto: MacMillan, 1979), p. 3.
26 Roger Fisher, "Constructing Rules that Affect Governments" in 
Donald Brennan, ed., Arms Control Disarmament and National Security, p. 67.
27 Robert Bowie, "Basic Requirements for Arms Control," Daedalus 
(Fall, 1960), p. 712.
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Raising the idea of arms control to prominence in strategic 
thought has provided a constant reminder of the two edged 
nature of armed force, and established the importance of not 
needlessly provoking dangerous reactions in the behaviour of 
others.^
The achievement of sufficient trust to rely on tacit arms control is 
not as simple in practice as it may sound in theory. No verification of 
compliance can achieve absolute effectiveness, and thus the inherent 
intentions of one's opponent can never be fully known. It is possible 
that a state could temporarily pursue arms control due to the economic 
imperative of limiting defence expenditures and not be philosophically 
committed to the spirit of a given negotiation. Arms control theory 
therefore creates tension between the perceived level of tacit 
understanding and the hard requirements deemed necessary for national 
security.
In sum, arms control seeks greater security for a given state through 
the incremental and often tacit achievement of restraint on weapons 
programmes. Nuclear arms control policy should therefore complement 
nuclear strategy as both share the same goals, hence there is a 
significant political connection between the two. If the apparent 
objectives of each are seen as inconsistent by the adversary, then 
confidence is reduced that arms control is not being pursued for 
propaganda or political purposes.
To instil confidence that one's arms control policies really intend 
to promote international security, the notion of confidence building 
measures has been introduced. These measures are primarily political and 
psychological rather than military, and they endeavour to reduce mistrust
Lawrence Martin, The Two Edged Sword: Armed Force in the Modern 
World (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 66.
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O Q
through improved transparency and communication.  ^ While confidence 
building measures are useful to facilitate progress on reducing
conventional forces in central Europe to preclude a surprise attack option
to either side, according to some analysts, they are no substitute for
o n
arms control at the strategic nuclear level. u Others feel that 
confidence building measures are the only way to achieve reduced political 
tensions and arms control breakthroughs in all possible strategic 
situations. The central thrust of confidence building is to improve
on
communication or strategic dialogue-''1 thereby reducing mutual fear of 
surprise attack. In Europe in the mid-1980s, important confidence and 
security building measures have facilitated such progress on arms control 
issues such that the distinction between them has eroded.
While arms control theory initially tended to concentrate on the
capabilities of weapons systems, confidence building measures address 
specific intentions or fears such as surprise attack. As strategic
O O
surprise in the nuclear age could determine the outcome of a conflict, J 
the result is high states of readiness and serious strains on arms
29 Stephen Larrabee, "Introduction," in Stephen Larrabee and 
Dietrich Stobbe, eds., Confidence Building Measures in Europe (New York: 
Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983), p. 26.
Istvan Farago, "Confidence Building Measures in the Age of 
Nuclear Overkill," in Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe, eds., 
Confidence Building Measures in Europe, p. 56.
^  Dan Caldwell, "Arms Control and Deterrence Strategies," in R. B. 
Byers, ed. , Deterrence in the 1980's: Crises and Dilemma (Bechenham:
Croom Helm, 1985), p. 191.
^2 Jeremy Stone, Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitation Through
Dialogue (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), stresses
communications as a component of strategic dialogue to achieve success in 
arms control.
^  Patrick Morgan, "The Opportunity for Strategic Surprise," in 
Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, eds., Strategic Military Surprise: 
Incentives and Opportunities (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction
Books, 1983), p. 240.
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control. Because nations with high propensity to use force are
relatively appreciative of the advantages of doing so and relatively
O C
insensitive to the costs, J the superpowers, each perceiving the other as 
having such propensity, are deeply suspicious of one another. Given the 
human stubborn attachment to old beliefs and an equally stubborn 
resistance to new ones, there is a tendency "to pay greater attention to 
signals that support current expectations about enemy behaviour. 
Confidence building measures are a means to break down strong perceptual 
barriers and to instil an awareness of how the other side views a given 
action.
Arms control theory also depends to a degree on the technology of 
weapons systems. If strategic weapons are vulnerable, greater impetus 
exists to expand the quantity of weapons systems, but if both forces are 
invulnerable then a stable equilibrium exists where there is no need to 
increase offensive forces. The advent of relatively invulnerable 
ballistic missile firing submarines is one example of a technological 
innovation that on balance probably contributes more to stability than it 
does to the arms race. While in the 1950s and the 1960s a widespread 
consensus supported the contention that nuclear weapons systems, 
especially large and easily verifiable nuclear delivery systems, should be 
the focus of arms control, ^  increasingly technological momentum threatens
^  Jack Nunn, The Soviet First Strike Threat: The U.S. Perspective
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 254.
Klaus Knorr, Military Power and Potential (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 
1970), pp. 137-150.
^  Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 392.
George Rathjens, "Changing Perspectives on Arms Control," in 
Franklin Long and George Rathjens, eds., Arms. Defence Policy and Arms 
Control (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 202.
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to make early arms control achievements irrelevant. The decision to 
deploy MIRV warheads has been cited as an example of such a process that 
overtook the SALT I negotiations.®® Modern small and mobile nuclear 
delivery systems further contribute to concerns that the measures 
available to verify arms control agreements may not be adequate in the 
future.
Verification of arms control achievements has become a significant 
component of arms control, particularly since the development of national 
technical means coincided with the articulation of arms control theory. 
Earlier efforts in the 1950s to achieve arms limitations stumbled over the 
issue of on-site inspection to confirm compliance, but space based 
surveillance is now capable of monitoring with confidence much, although 
by no means all, of the weapons related activities of the superpowers to
O Q
the degree that much uncertainty is reduced. v Progress in arms control 
has become directly linked to verification ability, but in recent years 
the technical standards of verification have risen as this issue has 
become highly politicized. As a result, the SALT II agreement, which 
included many specific measures to enhance verifiability such that one 
observer called it "an historic accomplishment in verification," ran into 
political difficulties.^ Clearly no arms control agreement can be 
established and no verification technique can work if the superpowers have
O O
~>° Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence,
the Arms Race and Arms Control (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1983), p. 79.
3 Q See Kosta Tsipis, David Hafemeister and Penny Janeway, Arms 
Control Verification: The Technologies that Make it Possible (Washington:
Pergamon-Brassey' s , 1986). See also Ted Greenwood, Reconnaissance.
Surveillance and Arms Control. Adelphi Paper 88 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 2.
^  William Kincaide, "Challenges to Verification: Old and New," in
Ian Bellamy and Coit Blacker, eds., The Verification of Arms Control 
Agreements (London: Frank Cass, 1983), p. 23.
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a tendency to exploit ambiguities in these agreements or if the political 
relationship between negotiating partners is not solid.^
One final aspect of arms control theory that deserves brief mention 
is the notion that constraint on war, including limited nuclear war, is 
really a form of arms control. Because absolute or unlimited nuclear war 
probably can serve no useful political purpose and may even end politics, 
Clausewitzian logic demands limited war.^ Any limitation in war is based 
on a tacit bargain between participants, and the frequently made 
distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons appears to be the 
most obvious and the easiest form of tacit arms control.^ Unilateral 
restraint of any kind prior to and during war, in theory, can serve to 
signal intentions and could form the basis of tacit bargains that could 
allow for de-escalation and war termination. In the event that deterrence 
failed and major war between the superpowers developed, however, the 
success of tacit arms control would be problematic. For a number of 
reasons including that of psychological denial, nuclear strategy in 
practice has not allowed for the termination of war.^
Among the various approaches to arms limitation in general, modern 
arms control offers such sufficient prospects that it is now an important 
part of strategic interaction between the superpowers. Arms control theory
^  Michael Krepon, "Verifying Arms Control Treaties," in Thomas
Perry and Diane Demille, eds., Nuclear War: The Search for Solutions
(Vancouver, British Columbia: Physicians for Social Responsibility, 1985), 
pp. 190-192.
Kenneth Booth, "Unilateralism: A Clausewitzian Reform" in Nigel
Blake and Kay Poole, eds., Dangers of Deterrence: Philosophers on Nuclear
Strategy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 52-53.
^  John Spanier, Games Nations Play (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1978), p. 220.
^  Clark Abt, A Strategy for Terminating Nuclear War (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), Chapter 8.
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has evolved from the idealistic notions of disarmament and has become far 
more politically acceptable. Advocates of arms control are however 
divided among themselves; according to one study, moderate arms 
controllers propose a minimum level of nuclear weapons and skeptical arms 
controllers support more sophisticated nuclear force structures to pursue 
flexible nuclear options.^ These two views of arms control in some ways 
parallel the two paradigms established in chapter one, and an assessment 
of the implication of these two paradigms on arms control theory is now in 
order.
II. THE DETERRENT PARADIGM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL
As the dominant strategic paradigm, deterrence can be expected to be 
closely connected with arms control theory. During the past forty years, 
deterrence and arms control have shared much of the same intellectual 
attention, but the two concepts appeared to have drifted apart with the 
"failure" of arms control in the late 1970's and early 1980' s. ^  Arms 
control negotiations that lead to reductions cannot however be viewed as 
an end in themselves, "but must be judged in terms of their impact on the 
character of the strategic relationship."^ This section will use the 
three levels of analysis established in chapter one to clarify what one 
might expect from arms control when viewed from the deterrent paradigm.
^  R.B. Byers and Stanley C.M. Ing, eds., Arms Limitation and the 
United Nations. Polaris Paper 1 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1982), p. 4.
Leslie Gelb, "A Glass Half Full," Foreign Policy 36 (Fall 1979), 
pp. 21-32.
^  Richard Burt, "Reducing Strategic Arms at SALT. How Difficult? 
How Important?" in Christoph Bertram, ed. , The Future of Arms Control: 
Part I. Beyond SALT II. Adelphi Paper 141 (London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 13-14.
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1. Strategic Intentions
To discover the real aim of anything is of fundamental importance; 
the " de quoi s'agit-il" query by Foch is still the most important
AO
strategic question. ° Arms control theory that aspires to enhance a 
state's security in a deterrent framework must adopt or at least be 
compatible with the assumptions and objectives of the deterrent paradigm. 
In the framework for analysis the key variables to analyze strategic 
intentions included the perceived political utility of nuclear weapons, 
the degree of support for the status quo and the underlying political
values at stake.
The deterrent view of arms control would logically hold that the 
current levels of nuclear weapons, having minimal political utility, 
should be eminently controllable and probably reducible. If nuclear war 
has no military meaning because of mutual destruction, then it can have no 
political meaning, and the inescapable conclusion must be that the "macro­
limitations inherent in war itself" preclude it as an option.^ Senior 
officials in private have often acknowledged that war between the great 
powers "just doesn't make sense" as nothing can be gained commensurate 
with the loss.-^ What this line of thought encourages is the notion that 
arms control at any cost is preferable as long as mutually assured
destruction is maintained. An important factor which contributes to an
^  Philip A. Crowl, The Strategists Short Catechism: Six Questions
Without Answers (Denver, Colorado: United States Air Force Academy, 1978), 
p. 4.
^  Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1982), 
p. 240. See also Gerald Segal, "Strategy and Survival" in Gerald Segal, 
et al.. Nuclear War. Nuclear Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983),
p. 28.
Thomas Powers, Thinking About the Next War (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1982), p. 16. The analysis in this book is weak, but this point is 
valid.
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optimistic view of the scope for arms reduction is the tendency to neglect
the complex inertia of national weapons acquisition processes.^ One
result is that at times arms control proposals can lack the benefit of a
clear theory of security-^  and become an end in themselves.
The second variable, the degree of support for the status quo, should
logically be relatively high in a deterrent strategy of arms control.
Deterrence inherently implies resistance to change in the status quo, and
thus arms control initiatives along these lines seek to preserve an
existing balance. Naval arms control agreements in the 1920s and 1930s
remained effective until Japan elected to change the status quo in 1934 by
beginning a naval arms race in the Pacific that served to undermine
deterrence. Advocates of a balance of strategic weapons sometimes confuse
this concept with the balance of power; what deters is not a balance of
power or equal forces per se, it is a strong or powerful status quo power,
s ^willing to fight to maintain it. J
The underlying political values in a deterrent arms control 
perspective are of fundamental importance, and they are inherently 
defensive in nature. The deterrent model does not imply a desire to upset 
an existing balance for it holds that the shared value of avoiding 
nuclear catastrophe is by far the most important variable. While some 
advocates of arms control reflect disarmament values, for the most part, 
arms controllers in the West have accepted the ultimate utility of nuclear 
deterrence. Even those who hold strong aversion to the first use of
Graham T. Allison and Frederic Morris, "Armaments and Arms 
Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons," Daedalus
(Summer 1975).
Lawrence Freedman, "Europe Between the Superpowers," in Gerald 
Segal, et al.. Nuclear War Nuclear Peace, p. 106.
Philip Towle, Arms Control and East-West Relations, p. 22.
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nuclear weapons also support the maintenance of mutual assured 
destruction.
With respect to strategic intentions, an arms control policy 
compatible with a deterrent paradigm could be expected to stress 
significant reductions of nuclear weapons and define security in terms of 
maintaining the status quo. To seek a balance of strategic weapons at 
relatively low levels would fulfill these requirements.
2. The Threat of Force
Since arms control policies in themselves do not introduce threats,
the key question here is to what degree do arms control policies condition
existing deterrent threats? There are those that believe that nuclear
weapons, by their very nature, are "more useful as an instrument of
deterrence than of compellence."-^ The arms control problem in this level
of analysis is directly related to technical capability, for the deterrent
model requires a threat that is credible yet does not create alarms or
tensions on behalf of the adversary.
Arms control to a certain extent seeks to limit the threat to that
which is deemed legal, fair and necessary. In World War II, Britain and
Germany initially showed marked reluctance to use strategic bombing even
S f*though by then it was considered legally acceptable to bomb civilians.
By the previously established definitions, this reluctance was both a form
McGeorge Bundy, et al . . "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic 
Alliance," Foreign Affairs 60 (Spring 1982), p. 764.
Samuel Huntington, "The Renewal of Strategy," in Samuel 
Huntington, ed., The Strategic Imperative (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1982), p. 35.
Geoffrey Best, "How Right is Might? Some Aspects of the 
International Debate About How to Fight Wars and How to Win Them 1870- 
1918," in Geoffrey Best and Andrew Wheatcroft, eds., War Economy and the 
Military Mind (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 133.
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of deterrence and a form of arms control, but in either sense it must be
judged a failure as the Germans were not deterred and strategic bombing
became an accepted mode of warfare. A major problem for strategy is that
deterrence and its failure are "fundamentally different o p t i o n s , and
strategic planning must attempt to
take into consideration the fact that the kinds of attack 
which, for purposes of deterring war, it is most appropriate 
to threaten, are not the same as the kinds of attack which, 
for purposes of waging a war or surviving one, it is most 
appropriate to carry out.^
The need to limit the threat yet retain credibility sets up a tension 
within which arms control, in a deterrent paradigm, seeks a technological 
compromise that the adversary would not consider aggressive or 
destabilizing. The central assumption implicit in this compromise is that 
limited technical solutions to specific problems of strategic stability 
could be negotiated between politically antagonistic superpowers, the 
result being a divorcing of arms control from politics which "flows 
naturally from the mechanistic model of deterrence."-^ The most obvious 
limitation in this paradigm, that no strategic forces should threaten 
counterforce, is now "an article of faith" within much of the Western 
strategic community.^ The belief that stable mutual assured destruction 
requires no great accuracy, no strategic defences and survivable 
systems,stems from technical stability analysis, the intent of which is to
Christoph Bertram, "Security Without Order: Nuclear Deterrence
and Crisis Management in the 1980's," in Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck, 
eds., Arms Control and International Security (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1984), p . 6.
Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, p. 209.
Robin Ranger, Arms Control in Theory and Practice 1958-1981. p.
24.
^  Richard Burt, "The Relevance of Arms Control in the 1980's," 
Daedalus (Winter 1981), p. 162.
64
achieve a balance through arms control that each superpower can accept. 
Few analysts attempt to shift the emphasis of arms control away from a 
technical search for numerical solutions and equivalent capabilities by 
focusing on intentions and confidence building measures.^
The deterrent paradigm implies an arms control policy to limit 
nuclear threats to levels of assured destruction capability on either 
side. It regards nuclear weapons as so powerful that a credible deterrent
exists even if the probability of its use is low.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
The final level of analysis addresses how strategic forces would 
interact in war and builds directly on the notion of stability which 
conditions the threats to deter. In the deterrent model, the primary role 
of arms control is to generate a safe dyadic relationship wherein neither 
party has incentives to strike first with nuclear weapons.
Arms control goes directly to the correlation of strategic nuclear
forces and attempts to balance the various forms of control or restraint
against one another. For example, missile silo survivability is a 
function of missile accuracy and yield of the warhead as well as the 
hardness of the silo itself, and any change in one variable leads to a 
different technical solution. The factor which has the greatest influence 
on the stability of mutual deterrence is the weapon for weapon exchange 
rate in the counterforce role; the greater the ability to destroy opposing
f i 1x One exception is Alton Frye, "Confidence Building Measures in 
SALT: A PAR Perspective," in Jonathan Alford, ed. , The Future of Arms
Control: Part III. Confidence Building Measures. Adelphi Paper 149
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 14-22.
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weapons, the greater the i n s t a b i l i t y . ^  what becomes apparent in detailed 
stability analysis is that minimum deterrence occurs in a region of great 
instability because small changes in numbers of weapons or even
perceptions of potential changes can give one side a significant
advantage. The uncertainties inherent in minimum deterrence require a 
margin which provides a measure of insurance to cover for technological 
advances, increases in numbers of weapon systems or violations of arms 
control agreements. As the only means of restoring the balance after its 
disruption by one superpower remains the counteraction of the other, this 
margin must be sufficient to allow time for the other superpower to
monitor and verify the destabilizing action and to initiate an appropriate 
response.
Consequently, arms control is under pressure to establish a stable 
equilibrium of weapons in greater numbers than required for assured
destruction, and this margin is in part determined by the ability of each 
superpower to monitor the other's weapons programmes. An upper limit to 
this margin is reached when improvements in nuclear weapons and delivery
filxmeans tend to be of diminishing importance in the stability equation. H 
Arms control in the deterrent paradigm seeks a controlled balance at the 
lowest level possible where neither side has any incentive to build 
additional weapons for their security.
^  G.D. Kaye, "Arms Control and the Strategic Balance," Defence
Research Analysis Establishment Memorandum No. M21 (Ottawa: Department of 
National Defence, 1970), p. 14.
^  Ibid.. pp. 6-8 and p. 19.
^  Bernard Brodie, "Technical Change, Strategic Doctrine, and
Political Outcomes," in Klaus Knorr, ed. , Historical Dimensions of
National Security Problems, p. 263.
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4. The Implications for Arms Control
The prevailing theory of arms control appears to be very compatible
with the theory of deterrence. Deterrence refers to a very specific
theoretical relationship that has been applied to a far broader range of 
f t  spolicy situations0-^ than would be the case if deterrence had not come to 
be accepted as the dominant strategic model. Arms control, to a large 
degree, has developed within this conceptual environment and thus shares 
many of the assumptions that underlie the deterrent paradigm. As a
consequence, many of the similarities are highlighted or reinforced, yet 
some of the incompatibilities are camouflaged or ignored.
In the West, arms control and deterrence theory have resulted in 
complex technical constructs, the aim of which is to achieve balance,
stability and mutual assured destruction. The emphasis on technology
rather than political will was strongly reinforced by technical trends in 
the 1960s, but the effectiveness of this approach has been much less in 
the 1980s. Deterrence and arms control, by focusing heavily on the need 
to achieve such a balance, have served to complement each other and
emphasize the compatibility of the two concepts. Both share similar
notions as to the usefulness of nuclear weapons and both lend themselves 
to sustaining the status quo.
What has eluded attention, however, is that aspect of arms control
theory which is potentially less compatible with the deterrent paradigm. 
Arms control theory provides for restraint on the use of arms to prevent a 
war from escalating, and since war has not yet been eliminated as a policy 
option between states, in theory it allows for limited nuclear war. 
Controlling escalation in this kind of war places a premium on flexible
^  R.B. Byers, "Deterrence Under Attack: Crisis and Dilemma" in
R.B. Byers, ed., Deterrence in the 1980*s: Crisis and Dilemma, p. 12.
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offensive and defensive weapons systems that are inconsistent with the 
deterrent paradigm, in the sense that what is required for national 
security may not be equal to that required for arms control. What 
exacerbates this tension is the fact that arms control theory precludes a 
safe and stable, minimum or finite, deterrent option. The degree of 
margin required for the appropriate level of stability is then open to 
interpretation and confusion. The result is, on the one hand, strong 
efforts by moderate arms controllers to limit offensive capabilities and 
abolish defensive systems or, on the other hand, a conceptual stretching 
of "deterrence" by skeptical arms controllers to encompass nuclear force 
capabilities beyond those necessary for assured destruction purposes.
Although the above inconsistencies exist, the compatibilities between 
arms control theory and deterrent theory are profound and their shared 
fundamental assumptions are more important. The limitation of national 
strategy to defensive motivations inherent in the deterrent paradigm 
contributes to an enhanced role for arms control in national policy, and 
if both superpowers shared these motivations, arms control could be 
expected to be a dynamic and fruitful process. Unfortunately, however, in 
spite of official recognition that nuclear weapons have a role limited to 
deterrence, "the propensity grows to use them for political purposes and
to make them the measure of international power and status.
III. THE COMPELLENT PARADIGM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL
If the requirement for compellence is a component of national 
strategy, arms control policy can be expected to pursue a more competitive 
path. As the compellent paradigm includes greater scope for threat
^  William Kaufmann, The 1986 Defence Budget (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 22.
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utilization for those aggressive purposes often attributable to great 
power behaviour, arms control, when viewed from this perspective, would 
logically stress the usefulness of force or its threatened use, to attain 
foreign policy goals other than those of national defence.67 This section 
will again apply the previously established three levels of analysis to 
determine the implications of arms control theory from the perspective of 
the compellent paradigm.
1. Strategic Intentions
In the framework for paradigmatic analysis established in the 
previous chapter, the strategic intentions of superpower declaratory 
policy provide a positive indication as to which mode of thought might be 
motivating strategic behaviour. The political utility of nuclear threats, 
the degree of support for the status quo and the underlying political 
values at stake are the key variables that enable a distillation of 
potential compellent intentions.
According to arms control theory, the achieving of a given state's 
security depends on national military strategy and arms control; both are 
alternative means to achieving national policy. In contradistinction to 
the deterrent perspective that nuclear weapons are not politically or 
militarily useful, however, the compellent view holds that they can 
support foreign policy. Despite several disclaimers of declaratory
policy, "the history of nuclear development over the past three decades
/TO
has been one of consistent attempts to make nuclear weapons usable."00 
This trend has been reflected in arms control proposals by the superpowers
67 Richard A. Falk, "Arms Control, Foreign Policy and Global
Reform," Daedalus (Summer 1975), p. 37.
68 Desmond Ball, in Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck, eds. , Arms
Control and International Security, p. 23.
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over the years in that each proposal on the surface looks very appealing
yet each contains a "joker” that results in its inevitable rejection by
the other side. This "joker" serves a dual function:
to compel a rejection of the whole plan and thus place the 
onus for deadlock on the other side, and to protect the 
vital interests of the proposing side. ^
The result is that a state can appear to be pursuing arms control for
altruistic motivations yet really be working to enhance its interests by
increasing its nuclear advantage.
Compellence implies an effort to alter a status quo situation, and 
arms control can theoretically be used to change the existing balance of 
forces. William Kincaide in an important article has noted a strategy 
that he calls arms control through arms coercion where unilateral build­
ups and threats are designed to achieve more favourable arms control 
agreements.^® Because this requirement implies a competitive strategy in 
which stability plays a reduced role, this form of approach accounts for 
those strategic analysts who firmly believe that a strategic nuclear 
posture and its guiding doctrine should be designed for time of war.^ 
Increasingly, arms control is being affected by the perception that the 
superpowers are locked in a quest for nuclear superiority where they seek 
to manipulate the risk of war for political objectives.^
f\ Q John Spanier and Joseph Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament, pp. 
5-6. See also John Garnett, "Disarmament and Arms Control Since 1945," in 
Lawrence Martin, ed., Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, p. 215.
7® William Kincaide, "Arms Control or Arms Coercion," Foreign Policy 
62 (Spring 1986), p. 24.
Colin Gray, The MX ICBM and National Security (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1981), p. 106.
7 9' Barry Blechman, "Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a Future?" 
Foreign Affairs 59 (Fall 1980), pp. 111-112.
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The final and perhaps the most important variable, the political
values at stake, can also indicate which paradigm is operating. In the
compellent paradigm, arms control is conceived as another arm of strategic
policy, and national interest becomes a key variable:
if the position of one's country can be improved militarily, 
economically or politically by a disarmament policy, then it 
will be pursued.'-^
A linkage of domestic policy and arms control is thus possible as it is 
easier to make proposals which promote one's interests to gain domestic 
support. Arms control therefore can be a political process and, like any 
important political process, its main objective can be to prevail or to 
achieve gains. It is quite understandable that the fear of "appearing to 
give anything away in an area where political emotions run so high and the 
stakes are genuinely so great" contributes to the politicization of arms 
control.^ If two powers adopted a similar approach with no restraints, a 
reliable political basis for arms control concessions would not exist,^ 
and arms control negotiations would become a competitive forum.
In a compellent paradigm, arms control goals would plausibly include 
proposals specifically designed to enhance a state's national interest 
even if, or especially if, these were at the expense of one's competitor. 
In such an environment a stable balance is not the ultimate goal, 
superiority is. What prevents the achievement of superiority is the 
adversary's strategy, and the compellent actor would logically attempt to 
seek a "balance" that would maximize his advantage to the highest degree
^  Kenneth Booth, "Disarmament and Arms Control," p. 109.
^  Alan F. Neidle, ed. , Nuclear Negotiations: Reassessing Arms
Control Goals in U.S.-Soviet Relations (Austin, Texas: University of
Texas, 1982), p. xx.
^  Christoph Bertram, "Rethinking Arms Control," Foreign Affairs 59 
(Winter 1980/1981), p. 353.
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possible.
2. The Threat of Force
When threats become part of arms control, it is likely that 
compellent, not deterrent, behaviour is behind it. One major problem with 
pursuing arms control in a competitive framework is that compellent 
threats "usually breed resentment, rejection and counter t h r e a t s , a n d  
thus are not conducive to the normal interpretation of bargaining or arms 
control negotiations, but bargaining it is.
As the compellent paradigm accepts a greater continuity between peace 
and war, there is a propensity toward accepting nuclear war fighting 
technology that has significant ramifications on the nature of stability. 
Operational effectiveness of weapon systems is a more important variable, 
and thus stability is a far more dynamic concept. The increased 
counterforce and damage limiting capabilities required for compellent 
strategy mean that stability is closely related to their utility in war. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have made continual efforts to 
improve their counterforce capability while officially supporting the need 
for stability.^ The Soviet Union, for example, has never acknowledged 
that submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are less destabilizing 
than intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and appears to possess a 
perception of strategic stability significantly different from that of the
^  William Kincaide, "Arms Control or Arms Coercion," p. 26.
^  See Jeffrey Porro, "Counterforce and the Defence Budget," in 
William Kincaide and Jeffrey Porro, Negotiating Security (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), p. 68; and Paul 
Stockton, Strategic Stability Between the Superpowers. Adelphi Paper 213 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), pp. 26, 83.
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United States.^ Arms control equilibrium in the compellent view appears 
to be more closely linked to the notion of technical predictability, 
thereby increasing expectations from confidence building and verification 
measures.
In the deterrent paradigm technological developments are considered 
problems that need restraint before the strategic equilibrium becomes 
unstable, but in the compellent view technological advances are benefits 
that are sought to gain strategic leverage or military advantage. They 
may be bargained away, but only in return for something else of value. 
The compellent view is more comfortable with technical progress and 
recognizes that arms control restraints cannot be expected "to halt 
innovation or prevent the military application of advances in scientific 
and technological d e v e l o p m e n t s . " ^  In part, this is due to the inability 
of governments to control effectively the bureaucratic weapons procurement 
process,^ and to the fact that technology is forcing the superpowers to 
change their nuclear strategies to make better use of new capabilities. 
Strategic nuclear forces are now perceived very widely as the "ultima
Q O
ratio" of a superpower,^1 and as such deserve a central and privileged 
place in arms control negotiations. In the compellent model, nuclear
7^ Richard Burt, "The Relevance of Arms Control in the 1980's," p. 
163; and Paul Stockton, Strategic Stability Between the Superpowers, p. 27.
79 Farooq Hussain, The Future of Arms Control: Part IV. The Impact
of Weapons Test Restrictions. Adelphi Paper 165 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 50.
John Steinbruner and Barry Carter, "Organization and Political 
Dimensions of the Strategic Posture: the Problem of Reform," Daedalus
(Summer 1975), p. 149.
Frank Barnaby, The Automated Battlefield (London: Sidgwick and
Jackson, 1986), pp. 149-151.
Colin Gray, "The Future of Land Based Missile Systems," in 
Christoph Bertram, ed. , Strategic Deterrence in a Changing Environment 
(London: Gower and Allenheld, Osmun, 1981), p. 94.
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weapons can only be reduced or dismantled when the perceived benefits of 
mutual reductions exceed the potential for political leverage on a long 
term basis.
One technological innovation that increases pressure for greater 
numbers of offensive systems is the concept of strategic defence. If 
strategic defence could be limited to the defence of nuclear systems and 
not be extended to protect cities, then it could help stabilize mutual 
assured destruction. Unfortunately, the technology knows no such bounds; 
it can be applied to area ballistic missile defence (BMD) and, if 
accompanied with bomber and cruise missile defences, can erode the whole
O O
concept of strategic nuclear deterrence. Carefully limited defences can 
reinforce the deterrent paradigm, but expanded defences involve an 
alternate mode of thinking that represents a total break with the past 
concept of deterrence. In spite of an Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty 
signed in May 1972, both superpowers have expressed a preference for
O A
increased defensive measures. Since the compellent paradigm places a
premium on expanded defence, arms control in such a paradigm could be 
expected to lead to eventual implementation of strategic defences.
The compellent threat of force has profound implications for arms 
control because it causes a rejection of the deterrent concept of 
achieving a relatively harmonious stable strategic balance between rival 
superpowers. As long as one side fears that the other seeks to attain a 
first strike capability, deterrence will become unstable and pressures
O O
George Lindsay, The Strategic Defence of North America (Toronto: 
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986), p. 37.
Magnus Clarke, "Nuclear Deterrence and SDI," Arms Control 6 
(September 1985), p. 178.
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will mount for defensive s y s t e m s . T h e  technological impetus behind the 
superpower competition permits the expansion of damage limitation and 
counterforce systems which serve to better support the flexible nuclear 
strategies necessary to back compellent threats.
3. Correlation of Nuclear Forces
In this level of analysis the compellent quest for advantage leads to
significantly different arms control prospects than the deterrent search
for stability. In the compellent paradigm arms control seeks more
security by having better or more nuclear weapons than the adversary, the
aim of which is to gain a potential bargaining advantage through a
superior military position.
In theory, arms control can be applied to check the technological
momentum of the adversary in specific areas or freeze forces at
advantageous levels. It can be used to maintain the balance of agreed
strategic systems while permitting improvements in other systems not
covered by agreements. Although technological progress is so rapid that
Rfiquantitative restrictions are no longer adequate for arms control,00 
numbers of weapons still appear critical to a superpower "balance of 
r e s o l v e . B o t h  superpowers appear to believe that
^  Robert S. McNamara, "Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War: Is Star
Wars the Answer?" Millennium: Journal of International Studies 15 (Summer
1986), p. 139.
^  Christoph Bertram, The Future of Arms Control: Part II. Arms
Control and Technological Change: Elements of A New Approach. Adelphi
Paper 146 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978),
p. 1.
^  John Spanier, Games Nations Play, pp. 183-193.
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an appearance of inferiority in nuclear weapons brings great 
political damage. It follows that they believe - although 
they do not say this - that an appearance of superiority 
brings great political advantage.^
These trends provide greater scope for a competitive interpretation of
arms control that permits technological developments to become a recipe
for unlimited expansion even during major strategic arms limitation
achievements.^
Since arms control can affect preparations for possible nuclear war, 
it may also be used as a partial tool to create or expand a compellent 
threat. The possibility exists that arms control could be pursued in bad 
faith to achieve deception, the foundation of all warfare,^ but this 
cannot succeed as a long term strategy due to the extensive nature of 
modern verification means. It is also possible to use geopolitical 
asymmetries as levers to generate military advantages in specific areas; 
thus one side may favour one weapon system while the other may abhor it. 
The competitive search places a premium on strategic calculations as arms 
control and nuclear strategy require careful integration to achieve a
coordinated effect. For coercive limited war to achieve its aim, it 
requires more detailed prior planning than forms of total war,^ and for 
compellent arms control to produce an advantage, it requires more 
calculations than for deterrence.
O O
00 Sverre Lodgaard and Frank Blackaby, "Nuclear Weapons and Arms 
Control," in Marek Thee, ed. , Arms and Disarmament: SIPRI Findings
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 328.
O Q
oy John Simpson," New Nuclear Weapon Systems and Concepts for
Limiting Nuclear Warfare," in William Gutteridge and Trevor Taylor, The
Dangers of New Weapon Systems (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 128.
90 Sun Tsu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel Griffith (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 60.
91 Charles Fairbanks, "War-Limiting, " in Klaus Knorr, ed.,
Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, p. 219.
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Because arms control agreements affect the correlation of nuclear 
forces, they impact directly on the potential interaction of strategic 
systems in war. To achieve comparative strategic advantages, a given 
nation may attempt to reduce specific weapon systems that it finds most 
threatening, or it may seek to channel arms competition into areas where 
it has a natural advantage. In the compellent paradigm arms control can 
become a weapon with which to attack the opponent's strategy, but to 
achieve results careful integration with military strategy is required. 
In this situation arms control becomes simply a tool to discredit or to 
thwart the opponent's strategic credibility over time.
4. The Implication for Arms Control
Nuclear strategy and arms control both strive to enhance national 
security, but the former in the compellent paradigm has ambitions that 
extend beyond defence. Thus the latter, by virtue of their shared 
strategic objective, also has political motivations that include the 
potential to impose one's will in certain situations. Because compellence 
emphasizes competitive aspects not evident in deterrence, cooperative 
behaviour tends to receive less emphasis.
The major implication for arms control in a compellent framework is 
the degree of self interest implied by its strategic intentions, making 
national interest a significant factor in arms control negotiations. The 
competitive expectations in this model imply a clear lack of willingness 
to maintain a stable balance or the status quo evident in the deterrent 
paradigm.
The search for advantage logically requires military superiority as 
an ultimate goal, but this Kantian logic is not as inconsistent with arms 
control theory as it appears. Arms control theory provides for restraint
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of arms to contribute to the national security of a given state, but does 
not necessarily require equal restraint from negotiating states. While 
the notion of mutual restraints comes primarily from the impact of 
deterrent thought on arms control, the constraints on compellent arms 
control stem from the competitor's strategy. Arms control then becomes a 
bargaining contest where the compellent actor seeks to maximize his gain. 
This form of arms control requires political direction that subordinates 
the values of arms control in itself to the strategic interests of the 
state. It follows that such a strategy would only sincerely pursue arms 
control negotiations when prospects for success were relatively high and 
would stubbornly cling to its "jokers” when conditions were otherwise.
Arms control in a compellent strategy also acknowledges that specific 
technological advantages can be militarily and politically useful. It 
assumes, in consonance with the themes of the Intriligator-Brito research 
model, that arms races do not necessarily lead to war and disarmament does
Q O
not necessarily lead to peace. The use of arms control negotiations to 
gain political and military advantages is not only a moral and political 
responsibility, it does not necessarily contribute to an increased risk of 
war. Clearly this compellent position is incompatible with the deterrent 
paradigm, and the two views of arms control described as the moderate and 
the sceptical are merely reflections of paradigmatic incommensurability.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Arms limitation theory adds considerable texture to the paradigmatic 
landscape of strategic relations between the superpowers. The idealistic 
notions of universal disarmament retain a small but dedicated group of
no
Thomas Mayer, "Arms Races and War Initiation: Some Alternatives
to the Intriligator-Brito Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 30 (March 
1986), p. 25.
78
supporters whose ideas have helped shape modern arms control theory that 
simply seeks restraint on arms policy. Arms control has substantially the 
same aims as national military strategy, to enhance state security, but as 
its scope is far more limited than disarmament, it has become more 
politically useful. This combination has made modern arms control a 
central part of superpower interaction, but tendencies within the arms 
control community reflect at least partially the two strategic paradigms, 
deterrence and compellence.
Since arms control theory has been developed within the deterrent 
framework, it is very compatible with the deterrent paradigm in most 
respects. The focus on a stable minimum nuclear balance has been the 
dominant theme of deterrent arms control, the central objective being the 
shared avoidance of nuclear catastrophe. If threats were limited to 
defensive or deterrent levels, arms control could play a major role in 
national policy, and balanced nuclear force structures could be achieved 
at minimum quantities.
Compellent strategy results in a more competitive form of arms 
control, the major aim of which is to achieve comparative advantage. It 
accepts possible restraint in war fighting means but not in strategic 
ends . Because the compellent state in a sense is forced to accept 
constraints on its nuclear forces by strategic competition, it seeks to 
maximize its advantage to the degree possible. These factors fuel the 
technological impetus toward counterforce capable and damage limiting 
systems. Arms control can be compatible with compellence if it becomes 
politically responsive to a national compellent strategy and seeks to 
protect those national interests that may require the projection of 
nuclear threats.
Arms control can therefore be used in flexible ways to support at 
least two contending strategic approaches to war. As a major component of 
international politics, arms control theory contributes to these two 
paradigms and completes their theoretical formulation. The next two 
chapters will now analyze each superpower's nuclear strategy before 
returning to a detailed discussion of nuclear arms control in practice.
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Chapter Three 
NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN THE UNITED STATES
Victory in global war and the development of nuclear weapons in 1945 
propelled the United States to superpower status, and the world began to 
pay closer attention to American ambitions. American strategic analysts 
for the most part viewed nuclear weapons as a revolution in destructive 
capability, and deterrence soon became the concept that framed the 
declaratory strategy of the United States. In the complex American 
political system, extensive open debates on nuclear strategy have markedly 
increased the volume of strategic material over preceding historical 
periods, but most of the debate accepts the concept of deterrence as its 
fundamental objective. In spite of this production of strategic thought, 
however, the action policy of how the United States intends to use nuclear 
weapons to support its foreign policy is far from clear.
This chapter examines the United States' nuclear strategy in an 
attempt to identify any elements of compellence that may exist. The 
framework for the paradigmatic analysis established in chapter one 
provides the tools to accomplish this task. The first section describes 
American strategic culture, a necessary and useful starting point for this 
analysis. The following sections deal with the general periods of massive 
retaliation, flexible response and more recent evolutions of "realistic" 
or "countervailing" deterrence. Although the primary focus of this 
dissertation is on the period 1970-1986, the earlier American experience 
with nuclear strategy is extremely relevant. The analysis will focus 
primarily on the objectives and threats embedded in the nuclear strategy 
of the United States; detailed quantitative analysis of the correlation of 
nuclear forces will be left to later chapters.
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I. UNITED STATES STRATEGIC CULTURE
Strategic culture refers to a set of acquired beliefs, attitudes and 
behavioural patterns that condition the patterns of strategic thinking. 
While it evolves over time, it does not reflect specific policy, but 
rather represents a more permanent view resulting in and stemming from a 
socialization process. Embedded within the concept of strategic culture 
one finds the fundamental assumptions governing the constitution of 
military power and the ends it is designed to serve. Clearly the military 
behaviour of most societies has reflected to a high degree their political 
culture.1 Strategic culture is therefore simply a subcomponent of a 
nation's political culture.
In the United States, as in most democratic countries, a perceptible
shift in strategic culture occurred with World War Two and the advent of
the nuclear age. Throughout American history up to 1945,
...the United States usually possessed no national strategy 
for the employment of force or the threat of force to attain 
political ends, except as the nation used force in wartime 
openly and directly in pursuit of military victories...^
In American society however the concept of war was slowly changing from
the view of war as a struggle for survival or conquest to an image of war
as a "malfunctioning of the international s y s t e m . A  nuclear war would
1 Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture", Comparative Strategy 5 
(Number 3, 1985), p. 271. See also Kenneth Booth, Strategy and
Ethnocentrism. pp. 14-15. Ethnocentrism in strategy is equated to being 
culture-bound. A good example of cultural impact can be found in Benjamin 
S. Lambeth and Kevin N. Lewis, "Economic Targeting in Nuclear War: U.S.
and Soviet Approaches," Orbis, 27 (Spring 1983), p. 146.
O
 ^ Russell F. Weigley, The American Wav of War (London: Collier
Macmillan Publishers, 1973), p. xix. See also Samuel Huntington, American 
Military Strategy (Berkeley, California: University of California, 1986),
p. 16.
Anotol Rapoport, "Changing Conceptions of War in the United 
States," in Kenneth Booth and Moorhead Wright, eds., American Thinking 
About Peace and War (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1978), p. 67.
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simply be an unmitigated disaster and the only political purpose of 
nuclear weapons had to be to deter their use. But these societal changes 
did not necessarily convince the strategic community that nuclear weapons 
could not be used in a more traditional sense. Drawing on its history and 
an increasingly sophisticated strategic studies community, the United 
States has produced a unique strategic culture that reflects the 
complexity of its make-up. Scientists, bureaucrats, military officers, 
politicians, industrialists and academics all form an active part of the 
United States strategic community.
An important factor in shaping the present American strategic culture 
is geopolitics. Due to its geographic insularity, the United States has 
faced few significant threats for most of its history. One observer even 
declared that compared to most great powers, the United States has had a 
"free ride" with respect to security until the twentieth century and, 
again, to a lesser degree, from 1945 until the Korean War.^ When a threat 
did appear, it was often distorted, and significant oscillations mark the 
history of American security policy resulting in a tendency to under 
prepare in peace and to exaggerate the danger in war.^ It is therefore a 
relatively new experience for the United States to assume global 
responsibilities or to feel threatened in peacetime. The effect of 
nuclear weapons and the ICBM has been to deprive the United States of an 
unquestionably secure military position that was based on its geographic
^ C. Vann Woodward, "The Age of Reinterpretation," in Arthur Waskow, 
ed. , The Debate Over Thermonuclear Strategy (Boston, Massachusetts: D.C. 
Heath, 1966), pp. 1-2.
 ^ Colin S. Gray, "National Style in War: The American Example,"
International Security 6 (Fall 1981), p. 45.
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location and a comparatively advanced technology. United States 
strategic culture to a certain degree reflects a longing for absolute 
security stemming in part from its past geographic insularity.
The second factor that shapes American strategic culture grows from 
its view of the international environment. American political leaders 
have tended to a relatively unsophisticated view of the role of military 
force in the international community. The United States, as a major 
economic power with little direct threat to its homeland, has been 
primarily interested in promoting its economic interests to achieve a 
favourable world order.^ The United States has tended to view war as a 
"great moral crusade" which was only necesary after the "failure" of
O
diplomacy. In general, war and peace were viewed as separate conditions,
and this tendency still permeates much of the United States strategic
community. Increasingly, however, part of the American strategic elite
has accepted a more Machiavellian view heralded by the realist school of
international relations.
Nations which renounce the power struggle and deliberately 
choose impotence will cease to influence international 
relations either for evil or for good and risk eventual 
absorption by more powerful neighbours.^
The rise of the Soviet Union as a powerful and antagonistic rival has
 ^ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Developments in
Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign
Policy (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1959), p. 3.
 ^ Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States
National Interests in the 1980's (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1985), p. 202.
O
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago, Illinois: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 84, and Morton H. Halperin, Limited 
War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), p. 19.
 ^ Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 446. For a recent but 
lackluster expression of the same thought see David C. Henderson, The 
Future of American Strategy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987).
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reinforced this view and propelled the United States into its leadership 
role in defence of the "free" world. The American strategic culture 
probably reflects a synthesis of past naivete and present realism in that 
power is held to be very important, but political ideals, to a degree, 
still guide strategic policy. A tension between those who believe power 
to be the most salient factor in international relations and those who 
feel political ideals to be more pertinent has marked the American polity, 
and to a degree the former tend to reflect a compellent view of nuclear 
strategy while the latter tend to reflect a deterrent view.
A third aspect of strategic thinking therefore relates directly to 
certain political values embedded in American political culture. The
constitution of the United States, with its Anglo-Saxon heritage, combined 
a series of checks and balances that implied a certain distrust of the
m i l i t a r y . T h i s  bias is reflected in the myth of the citizen soldier and
the perception that large standing forces, especially armies, were not 
required in peacetime. Another part of the Anglo-Saxon heritage is a
strong reliance on the rule of law that permeates the entire political 
system giving it a high degree of openness, stability and moderation.H 
The law of proportionality, for example, makes it difficult for some 
politicians to accept nuclear first use. One student has even suggested 
that the concept of nuclear deterrence is incompatible with the 
ideological and political system of the United States. 12 The moral 
component of American foreign policy has provided a sense of optimism in
Donald M. Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S.
Defence Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 21.
H  John F. Dulles, "Challenge and Response in U.S. Policy," Foreign 
Affairs 36 (October 1957), p. 43.
12 Martin Griffiths, "A Dying Creed: The Erosion of Deterrence in
American Nuclear Strategy," Millennium: Journal of International Studies
15 (Summer 1986), p. 245.
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that history appears equated with progress, but many American politicians 
and strategic theorists have lacked a deeper knowledge of diplomatic 
history or of the theory of international relations.^
The fourth factor to affect American strategic culture is the 
military history of the United States. The predominant historical 
influences stem from the impact of the American frontier and of the oceans 
that surround the North American continent. Few professional military 
were required, not that force was not important to American leaders, but 
that appropriate force could always be raised when it was required. By 
World War Two, the United States Army had never been defeated, and it won 
again primarily because it had a preponderance of material resources.^ 
Notwithstanding this effort, the United States economy never really 
lowered its level of civilian productivity, otherwise millions more men 
with weapons could have been raised.-^ The overwhelming amount of 
resources available to the United States in the past has permitted its 
military to cling to the concept of "attrition” warfare when it no longer 
necessarily had the superiority in materiel or firepower to wage such a
war.^ This is in part due to the narrow view of military officers who
have tended to be apolitical and to concentrate on "pure" military 
matters. It took the Korean War before the United States strategic
community "discovered" Clausewitz, and the military themselves began to
Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American
Experience (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1982), p. 77.
Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower' s Lieutenants (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 729-730.
^  John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), p. 172.
Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the
Military Balance," Survival 21 (March/April 1979), p. 57-60. This 
persistence of an obsolete style of warfare is due to an understandable 
"cultural lag."
86
view the role of force in a larger context. ^
Within the strategic community, an impressive continuity of these
four concepts is evident. The United States holds a fundamental self-
confidence in its ability to fight and a Manichean idea of security that
make it natural to agree to relative unpreparedness and then to intervene
1 Rmassively once aroused. ° The bitter experience in Vietnam shook this
faith, and civilian strategists in particular were accused of leading the
government astray.^ The American strategic community however is a
diverse grouping of individuals many of whom have alternately worked for
academia and the government and thus have had access to classified
information. As a result much more information is available about
American strategic matters than in most other powers. This factor is
probably more responsible than any other for maintaining strategic
continuity among the bureaucratic elites in spite of a political system in
90which domestic experts tend to become political leaders.
The final factor contributing to strategic culture in the United 
States is the increasing mechanization of war that has challenged man's
1^ John R. Elting, The Super-Strategists (New York: Charles
Scribner's and Sons, 1985), p. 175.
1 R■LO John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and
Learning," The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1 (February 1971), p. 
221.
19 See Colin S. Gray, "What Rand Hath Wrought," Foreign Policy 
(Number 4, 1971-72), pp. 111-129, and Bernard Brodie, "Why Were We So
(Strategically) Wrong?" Foreign Policy (Number 5, 1971-72), pp. 151-162. 
The counter argument is that the strategic community is far more complex. 
See Bruce L.R. Smith, The Rand Corporation: Case Study of a Non Profit
Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1966), p. 298.
Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American
Experience," p. 46.
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sense of moral values.21 Technology permitted the United States to expand 
its frontiers and dominate a continental mass,^ and the "belief that 
America is the moral leader of the world through modernization still 
sustains even the most banal and ruthless of our managers."23 The United 
States, more than any other power, relies on technological innovation to 
maintain its military power. The American concepts of escalation 
dominance and multiple levels of deterrence implicitly rely on flexible 
and precise weapons systems involving sophisticated technology.2^ it has 
now become a standard assumption in the United States that "many 
possibilities for controlled manipulation of the level of violence would
O C
actually exist in most situations."^ Strong belief in the rationality of 
decision making and high confidence in reason are other assumptions in 
this American propensity to seek technological answers. American 
strategic culture is strongly influenced by a fundamental belief in the 
ingenuity of its scientists and the capability of its military equipment.
As a result of these factors, American strategic culture is imbued 
with the concept that the American military can combine superior fighting 
qualities with superior technology to meet any situation. Although the
21 John F.C. Fuller, Armament and History (New York: Charles 
Scribner's and Sons, 1945), p. xiv.
22 George C. Reinhardt and William R. Kintner, The Haphazard Years: 
How American Has Gone to War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1960), p. 232.
9 ^ George Grant, Technology and Empire, p. 27.
2^ Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 39 and p. 279. Political and 
technological forces are therefore constantly at play in American defence 
decision making, see Jonathan B. Stein, From H-Bomb to Star Wars: The
Politics of Strategic Decision Making (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington 
Books, 1984).
9 S Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (London: Harvard
University Press, 1977), p. 13. Emphasis in original.
American historical experience is unique, it should also be noted that the
traditional American approach to strategic thinking shared more
characteristics with its West European counterparts than is generally 
9 ftrealized. D In the United States as well as in Europe, the linking of 
military and political considerations in American strategic culture was 
not forged until the polarization of the international community forced 
the United States to assume a global military leadership role.
II. THE ERA OF MASSIVE RETALIATION
In the late 1940's and 1950's the United States nuclear strategy 
envisaged the massive use of large yield weapons in the event of war with 
the Soviet Union. This period was marked for the most part by a United 
States nuclear military superiority in an era that became known as the 
"Cold War." Because of this advantage and the fact that the United States 
had used nuclear weapons in 1945 to compel the Japanese surrender, 
American nuclear threats had a considerable degree of credibility. This 
section will briefly examine the key elements of American nuclear strategy 
during this period when nuclear weapons were being introduced on a major 
scale. This analysis is based on the paradigmatic framework established 
in chapter one; the American strategic intentions, the use of threats and 
the correlation of nuclear forces will be examined in that order.
1. The Strategic Intention
The United States emerged from World War Two as the world's only 
nuclear power, but within three years the Soviet Union had demonstrated 
that it was not intimidated by that reality and that it intended to catch
9 fi Kenneth Booth, "American Strategy: The Myths Revisited" in
Kenneth Booth and Moorhead Wright, eds., American Thinking About Peace and 
War. p . 5.
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up. The aggressiveness of the Soviet Union in Europe, the "loss" of 
China to communist revolutionary forces, and the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea combined to convince the United States that strong nuclear 
power was required to maintain a world order favourable to American 
interests.
In the 1950's the utility of nuclear weapons to support American
policy appeared self-evident. Not only had they promptly succeeded in
convincing Japan to surrender, but no other power could threaten the
United States with the same magnitude of destructive power. Under Truman,
a major study, that became known as NSC-68, concluded that the Soviet
Union was now a "permanent" enemy and a major threat to the United States
for the foreseeable future.27 NSC-68 devoted a great deal of attention to
war fighting considerations, and strategic elites were slow to grasp the
9 8deterring significance of countervalue retaliation. ° Eisenhower,
however, in his "new look" placed greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, and
his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, declared that it was the
decision of the United States "to depend primarily upon a great capacity
9 Qto retaliate instantly by means and at places of our own choosing."
This strategy was designed to fill the gaps in the United States' policy
27 Steven L. Rearden, The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine: 
Paul Nitze and the Soviet Challenge (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1984), p. 21. Paul Nitze was a principle author of NSC 68; he is also one
of the most influential "compellent" thinkers in the United States.
28 NSC 68 recommended "a form of flexible response" according to
John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat
Reconsidered," International Security 4 (Spring 1980). See also George H. 
Quester, "The Strategy of Deterrence: Is the Concept Credible?" in R. B.
Byers, ed. , Deterrence in the 1980's: Crisis and Dilemma (Bechenham:
Croom Helm, 1985), p. 72.
9 Q^  New York Times. January 1954. According to George Quester,
Eisenhower understood the need to firmly support massive retaliation to 
keep it credible, "Was Eisenhower a Genius?" International Security 4 
(Fall 1979), p. 162.
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of containment which was then only really protected by strong forces 
against attacks on the United States or on Europe.^ Massive retaliation 
as a nuclear strategy was clearly intended to intimidate the Soviet Union 
and China from attempting further expansion, but it immediately raised 
questions of its credibility in all situations. Notions of graduated 
deterrence, primarily British in origin, encouraged the use of weapons 
graduated to the scale of attack and created pressures to expand the 
utility of nuclear weapons to the battlefield. In the United States
nuclear weapons were increasingly being regarded as able and necessary to 
restrain the large conventional armies of the Soviet Union and China.
The core of the United States foreign policy in this period was
o o
containment.  ^ This policy was essentially based on a concept attributed 
to George Kennan that if the Soviet Union could be prevented from
O O
expanding, in due course it would decay from within. J At first glance 
this policy appears to support the status quo, but deeper analysis reveals 
an interpretation that containment also served as a means of expanding the 
role of the United States in the w o r l d . F o r  instance, an early United
William Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in William 
Kaufmann, ed. , Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 12. This article was one of 
the first to criticize massive retaliation as a strategy.
O 1
Anthony Buzzard, et al. . On Limiting Atomic War (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1956), p. 7.
o 9
Robert E. Osgood, "Containment, Soviet Behaviour and Grand 
Strategy," in Robert E. Osgood, ed. , Containment. Soviet Behaviour and 
Grand Strategy (Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies,
1981), pp. 1-2.
George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign 
Affairs 25 (July 1947), p. 581.
George H. Quester, "The Impact of the Strategic Balance on 
Containment," in Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: 
Concept and Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 
1986), p. 256.
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States war plan from this period clearly aimed "to bring about a basic
change in the conduct of international relations by the government in 
o s
power m  R u s s i a . T o  "contain" possible Soviet expansion, the United 
States in the 1950's expanded its influence globally by creating a string 
of alliances surrounding Communist territory wherever possible.
As the United States developed its nuclear arsenal in the early 
years, it clearly had tendencies that extended beyond deterrence. The 
United States was expanding its global influence, and the massive first 
use of nuclear weapons was considered useful to support these global 
obj ectives.
2. The Threat of Force
During this period the United States used explicit or implicit
o r
nuclear threats more often than in any other time in its history. These 
threats generally were created by long range bombers that needed to 
penetrate to their targets to drop nuclear bombs; it was simply an 
extension of Douhet's concept that influenced Allied air strategy in World 
War Two. For the most part, the United States Air Force (USAF) had a free 
hand in the preparation of the first war plans based on massive use of 
nuclear weapons. Targeting was based on the strategic concepts developed 
in World War Two, and counterforce and countervalue targets were both 
included. General Lemay knew, however, that it was the first strike that 
counted, and he was deeply concerned with preventing the delivery of any
O *7
Soviet weapons to the United States. ' These plans gave priority to the
See Anthony Cave Brown, DROPSHOT: The United States' Plan for
War with the Soviet Union in 1957 (New York: Dial Press, 1978), p. 137.
o r
JD Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War, p. 47.
Peter Pringle and William Arkin, STOP the Secret U.S. Plan for 
Nuclear War (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983), pp. 44-47 and p. 106.
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destruction of Soviet nuclear capability followed by military targets and 
government control centers.^
While the Air Force was thinking in terms of massive destruction, the 
Army was addressing the problems of limited war. Army leadership was far 
more sensitive to the impact of the Korean War, and to them that 
experience dispelled the notion of massive retaliation without political
o Q
limits.  ^ Some prominent Army generals took early retirement and spoke 
out against massive retaliation.^® The concept of fighting limited wars 
developed momentum, and plans were made to test nuclear artillery as early 
as 1951.^1 Even John Foster Dulles acknowledged that tactical nuclear 
weapons made defence against a conventional attack more feasible. 
Consequently it was possible to place "less reliance upon deterrence of 
vast retaliatory p o w e r . S i n c e  the United States could not achieve 
anything near the Soviet or Chinese levels of conventional forces, 
Eisenhower readily substituted cheaper nuclear weapons to deter any
O O
J David Alan Rosenburg has done solid research in this area. See 
his "U.S. Nuclear War Planning, 1945-1960," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey 
Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (London: Cornell University
Press, 1986), p. 35, and "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and
American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 6 (Spring 1983), p. 
17, and "A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours," International 
Security 6 (Winter 1981/1982), p. 10.
Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1960), p. 24.
^® Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages. 3rd edition (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 997. The generals were Taylor, Gavin and 
Ridgeway, and their resignations had some impact on the 1960 Presidential 
election. See Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army 
Enlarged Edition (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984),
p. 526.
^  Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1980), p. 268. The Army Chief of Staff insisted on 
having nuclear capable artillery.
^  John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in U.S. Policy," p.
31.
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communist conventional expansion into West Europe or elsewhere. While
massive retaliation remained the United States' declared nuclear strategy,
there was considerable support for more flexible utilization of nuclear
threats well before the United States itself faced a significant threat.
During this period certain nuclear threats were used to accomplish
specific tasks. In 1945 the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, used atomic
power as an implied threat to convince the Soviet Union to broaden the
Romanian and Bulgarian governments.^ This threat did not work, however,
for at the time the USAF did not "have the strength to dictate political
developments in those regions where the Soviets already enjoyed
dominance.^  A more credible threat to resort to nuclear weapons was used
by Eisenhower after his election to end the stalling of the Chinese
government in the Korean truce negotiations.^ Although some felt that
this nuclear threat did not have a decisive effect, no one doubts that
lxf\this threat was made and that it was limited to the Korean negotiations. ° 
During the 1956 Suez crisis, the use of nuclear weapons was first 
threatened by Khrushchev, but as soon as SACEUR made a counter threat, the 
Soviet Union remained silent. ^  In the 1958 crisis in Lebanon, the United 
State's nuclear threats helped preclude Soviet action. In addition to
^  Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological
Explanation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 
336. The so-called "bomb in his pocket tactics" did not impress the Soviets.
^  Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Airpower and
Containment Before Korea (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 107.
^  Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate For Change
1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), pp. 178-181.
^  C.F. Barnaby and A. Boserup, Implication of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems (London: Souvenir Press, 1969), p. 218. The authors claim 
that no evidence supports that this threat had a decisive effect.
^  Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p.
393.
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using nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe, American 
nuclear threats have also been very contingent, a characteristic of 
compellent use.
Throughout the 1950's, conventional defence of Western Europe proved 
too expensive, and United States' strategy came to rely on nuclear first 
use to prevent Soviet expansion. In addition to their role as a 
substitute for conventional forces, nuclear threats were used for general 
intimidation and for specific compellence.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
Until the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear device, the United 
States was slow to develop its nuclear strike capability. By mid 1947 the 
United States had sufficient material for only 29 bombs, and their use 
required several days' work by the two bomb assembly teams at the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the agency that controlled all nuclear energy, 
including the early bombs.^ Only 27 B-29 aircraft were modified to carry 
nuclear weapons, and they were never deployed to Europe. During the 1948 
Berlin crisis when the United States deployed other B-29 bombers to
Britain, Stalin probably knew that no real nuclear threat was being 
made.49 Once the Soviets had clearly entered the nuclear arms race,
however, Truman agreed to step up American nuclear weapons production and
to develop thermonuclear weapons to keep ahead of the Soviet Union.
By 1950, the United States possessed an "overwhelming superiority" in 
strategic weapons, and by 1954, when Dulles declared his massive
4  ^ Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Airpower and
Containment Before Korea, p. 106.
49 Ibid.. pp. 125-128.
Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, The Nuclear Barons (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), pp. 87-88.
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retaliation strategy, the American advantage was even greater. Less 
capable Soviet bombers faced long range one-way missions while more 
numerous United States bombers could forward deploy and had global range 
with air-to-air refueling.This situation lasted until 1957 when, with 
the launching of Sputnik, the Soviet Union threatened to develop ICBM's 
that could reach the United States in 30 minutes. The shock served to 
spur the American missile programmes, which had experienced significant 
cultural resistance in the early 1950's when compared with the bomber. 
For the first time in its history the United States faced a significant 
nuclear threat, but it was to take several years for the Soviet military 
scientists to deploy effective ICBM's in significant quantities. By then 
the Americans were already deploying their own ICBM's.
The American efforts to outproduce and keep ahead of Soviet nuclear 
capable strategic forces implied a reluctance to rely on deterrence. Not 
only did the United States pursue military nuclear superiority, but they 
projected landing the first decisive blows in order to preclude Soviet 
retaliation.
4. The Implication of Massive Retaliation
The United States military adapted quickly to nuclear weapons, but 
maintained, for the most part, a strategy that followed logically from the 
American victory in World War Two. The United States intended to deter 
communist expansion by threatening the transgressor with near total
Harland B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity: The United
States and the Strategic Arms Race 1961-1971 (London: Greenwood Press,
1973), p. 11.
Ibid.. p. 14.
Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 220-224.
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nuclear destruction when that nation could not destroy the United States. 
A lasting result of Eisenhower's "new look" was a strategic orientation 
around "a hope that nuclear weapons could be employed in such a way as to 
particularly favour the West."-^
By including as primary targets any potential means of Soviet nuclear 
response, this strategy implied a degree of war fighting. At the same 
time that massive retaliation was adopted as official policy, the American 
strategic community faced the spectre of limited war, noting that in 
practice, no war has been fought without some restraints. Advocates of 
limited war proposed that if the means of deterrence were more 
"proportionate to the objectives at stake," it would "maximize the 
opportunities for effective use of military force as a rational instrument
C C
of policy."J In this period tactical nuclear weapons were introduced in 
Europe to deter a Soviet invasion and for use in the event of war. If war 
were to erupt, the United States clearly was planning to win and roll back 
communism wherever possible. The United States was prepared to interpret 
any Soviet move outside of its borders as the cause of war, and thus 
massive retaliation as a strategy to support the policy of containment 
appeared directed at curbing or changing what was perceived to be an 
expansionist Soviet policy. Massive retaliation contained more than just 
"elements of compellence"; it threatened nuclear intimidation generated by
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 84. This point is well made by Freedman.
George H. Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Airpower
Background of Modern Strategy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 180.
c C
Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American
Strategy (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1957). See p. 
242 and p. 26 for each quotation.
threats of massive first use to achieve deterrence.*^
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III. THE ERA OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
As long as the United States maintained military superiority or at 
least nuclear superiority, the policy of massive retaliation could be 
supported. But increasingly senior American officials questioned the 
utility of such massive nuclear use in deterring relatively minor 
conventional military operations, and when the Soviets began to develop 
the ability to severely damage the United States, the concept of massive 
retaliation began to appear suicidal. The vulnerability of both countries 
to ICBM attack with nuclear warheads made assured destruction an emerging 
fact.
The election of Kennedy in 1960 provided the opportunity for the
United States to review these important strategic concerns. The new
administration soon decided on a new strategy and on 16 June, 1962, the
Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, made this new policy public.
The United States has come to the conclusion that to the 
extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible 
general nuclear war should be approached in much the same 
way that more conventional military operations have been 
regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military 
objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a 
major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of 
the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian 
population. *^
This section will focus briefly on the historical period where the 
superpowers reached near parity in strategic nuclear arms. The key 
elements of United States nuclear strategy will be analyzed from the
The citation can be found in William H. Kincaide, "Arms Control 
or Arms Coercion," Foreign Policy 62 (Spring 1986), p. 28. See also Henry 
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1957), p. 200.
Cited in William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1964), p. 116.
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paradigmatic perspective, examining the strategic intentions, the use of 
nuclear threats and the correlation of nuclear forces in that order.
1. The Strategic Intentions
For most of the period in question, about 1960-1970, the United 
States appeared to accept the inevitability of the Soviet accretion of 
nuclear power. This period included what may have been the zenith of 
American strategic thought where complex nuclear deterrence concepts were 
elaborated and stability concerns seemed paramount. To much of the 
strategic community, the reality of parity spelled the decline of nuclear 
weapons as a significant supporting element to foreign policy. Not­
withstanding some rhetoric to the contrary, the utility of nuclear weapons 
appeared officially limited to strategic deterrence. ^  What needs to be 
further analyzed is exactly what was intended by "strategic deterrence."
For many observers, major war was now simply too dangerous to 
threaten with any degree of credibility, but they also noted with concern 
that military officers still aspired to seek victory for its own sake.^® 
President Kennedy echoed these concerns and feared that the largest risk 
of nuclear war was from miscalculation, madness or accident. Robert 
McNamara, who had initially strongly supported counterforce developments,
McGeorge Bundy, "The Future of Strategic Deterrence" in Christoph 
Bertram, ed. , Strategic Deterrence in a Changing Environment (London: 
Gower and Allanheld, 1981), p. 113. Bundy clearly holds a deterrent 
perspective, but as evidenced by the following simple works, there was no 
doubt that USAF officers wanted to maintain strategic superiority. See 
General Curtis E. LeMay, America is In Danger (New York: Funk and
Wagnells, 1968), p. 52, and General Thomas S. Power, Design for Survival 
(New York: Coward-McCann, 1965), p. 14.
^  Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, p. 426 and pp. 490-493. See 
also Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy, p. 23. USAF 
officers in particular stressed the need to win a nuclear war.
Frank Barnaby, Nuclear Disarmament or Nuclear War (Stockholm: 
SIPRI, 1975), p. 9.
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recanted his position somewhat. In part, this was due to the relatively 
unlimited financial and equipment resources called up by counterforce 
requirements, but also he deplored the "ineradicable tendency" to view 
security as being exclusively a military problem that could be solved
C O
exclusively with weapons.  ^ Even Henry Kissinger changed his earlier 
views about the utility of nuclear weapons to meet the spectrum of 
possible challenges, when he noted the increasing pressures against
using any nuclear weapons and the resultant psychological burden placed on
f\L.Western political leaders.
In the 1960's the United States also shifted to a somewhat more
defensive stance with respect to sustaining the global status quo. The
dilemma of assured destruction initially convinced most analysts that
no major challenge to the existing status quo is likely, 
unless and until someone develops a winning strategy that 
can, in his opinion, overcome the dilemma.^5
Thus for the United States, a strategy that sought to maintain the status
quo would require fewer resources than a strategy which could only respond
to a small "fait accompli" by threatening to create a significant change
f i  fiin the status quo.DD One consequence of this new strategic thinking was
See Robert S. McNamara, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," 
Department of State Bulletin. 57 (9 October 1967), p. 445, and his The 
Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 142.
Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, pp. 14-15. 
Here the author notes, in an influential work, the opportunities presented 
in limited nuclear use. Richard Nixon in his Memoires (New York: Grosset 
and Dunlap, 1978), p. 340, noted its impact on his thinking.
f i l l Henry Kissinger, "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A
Reappraisal," Daedalus 89 (No. 4, 1960), p. 809. Kissinger now recommends 
conventional defence rather than limited nuclear use to maintain deterrence.
^  Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory
and Defeat (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 254.
f i f tDD Ibid. . pp. 254-257. The complexities of this argument are well 
handled by Desmond Ball, Targeting For Strategic Deterrence. Adelphi Paper 
185 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), pp. 8-13.
100
that in the Vietnam conflict, the United States restrained itself to an 
attempt to maintain the existing political conditions and never intended 
to achieve an overall victory.67 Not everyone, however, was convinced 
that a purely defensive strategy was in order. Since the Soviet Union 
appeared to be waging political warfare against the United States, some 
observers felt that what was needed was a comparable offensive strategy. 
The difficulty was that an American strategic posture based on assured 
destruction and deterrence "spells failure of such a counter-offensive 
from the start."68
In terms of the fundamental political values at stake, the United 
States also demonstrated a degree of ambivalence. To a degree there was a 
shift in strategic values in that the American people, partly out of 
fatigue with the Vietnam War, began to feel that maintaining a strategic 
military advantage as compared with settling for parity was not worth the 
additional costs. 69 On the other hand the strategy of controlled 
response, announced by McNamara in 1962, extended the notion of bargaining 
into the period after the inception of general nuclear war.^  This 
concept implied acceptance of the need for some advantage to conduct this 
bargaining, and to a large degree the strategy of containment had already 
given the United States an important strategic edge. President Kennedy, 
according to one observer, set out to convince the Soviet Union "that it
67 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the
Vietnam War (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 103. Such a
victory would undoubtedly have been over North Vietnam.
r o
William R. Kintner and Joseph Z. Kornfeder, The New Frontier of 
War: Political Warfare. Present and Future (Chicago, Illinois: Henry
Regnery, 1962), p. 159.
69 Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence.
The Arms Race and Arms Control (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1983), p. 106.
^  Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy, p. 78.
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can comfortably and honorably live within a balance of power which is 
decidedly in our favour."71
As the United States introduced the strategy that became known as 
flexible response, considerable divergences of strategic thinking began to 
emerge. The cost of maintaining the nuclear superiority desired by
military officers was simply no longer politically supportable. The 
reality of assured destruction degraded the perceived utility of nuclear 
weapons at least among political and academic elites. In terms of
attitudes towards the status quo and towards political values some
ambivalence is evident. Clearly, a significant shift towards the 
deterrent paradigm took place this period, but strong elements of 
compellent thought remained imbedded in the prevalent concepts of
"strategic deterrence."
2. The Threat of Force
The American use of nuclear threats from 1960 to 1970 tended to run 
much greater risks as the Soviets gradually reached parity. One could 
plausibly expect a major decrease in the use of military threats, but this 
did not appear to be the case.^ The number of nuclear related threats 
remained fairly constant, but the quality of these threats did change 
significantly.
One major impact of a controlled response strategy was a greater 
influence of counterforce targeting ideas. Deterrence of the Soviet Union 
remained the primary objective of nuclear threats, and the action policy 
to implement this strategy was contained in the Single Integrated 
Operation Plan (SIOP) . The development of this plan was a "really new
71 Walter Lippmann, The Washington Post. 3 December, 1963.
77 Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War, p. 47.
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departure" in United States military planning because it finally placed 
some restrictions on Strategic Air Command (SAC) which had planned all 
previous nuclear targeting.^3 This targeting plan produced in the early 
1960's remained essentially unchanged in the early 1970's, when Nixon and 
Kissinger raised concerns that it limited the United States to only one 
massive strategic course of action.^ Both counterforce and countervalue 
targets were included in the early SIOP; the counterforce targets, 
however, were those that required increased accuracy and more warheads. 
Planning for assured destruction tasks was directly linked to a target 
baseline based on where the principle of diminishing returns caused the 
effectiveness curve to level off.^ According to McNamara, by 1968 the 
United States had greatly exceeded its stated requirement for assured 
destruction of the Soviet Union that required only 340-440 missiles. 6^ 
Pressure for far greater numbers of missiles came from the military who 
wanted in excess of 2,400 Minuteman missiles to cover a growing military
^  George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 399-400. This was in spite of the 
United States Navy's desire to control its own targeting for Polaris.
^  David Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power (Boston,
Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), p. 151 and p. 258.
^  A first rate source for this period is Alain C. Enthoven and K. 
Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 207.
^  Lynne Etheridge Davis, "Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and
New American Doctrine" in Christoph Bertram, ed., Strategic Deterrence in 
a Changing Environment (London: Gower and Allanheld, Osmun, 1981), p. 61. 
See also Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?. p. 
178, and Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile
Programme of the Kennedy Administration (London: University of California 
Press, 1980), p. 268.
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target array.^
A key element of military efforts to procure greater numbers of 
nuclear systems than required for assured destruction was to achieve 
operational flexibility. To deter provocation and encourage "acceptable" 
behaviour on the part of the Soviet Union required a capability to be able 
to fight and survive a war to the extent possible. McNamara tried for 
seven years to get more flexible nuclear options, but was stalled by a
bureaucracy that feared more flexible options would require more new
forces.^ Furthermore, in 1962 it became evident that the United States
had such an advantage in flexibility and counterforce targeting that it
appeared the Soviet technological capability for flexibility would forever 
remain inferior.^® But to the degree that operational targeting 
flexibility existed in United States plans, it existed outside the SIOP 
and had been prepared on the initiative of the Joint Chief of Staff and 
major military commanders.^ Changes to American nuclear doctrine were 
evolutionary and while assured destruction remained its essential core,
^  A.G.B. Metcalf, "The Minuteman Vulnerability Myth and the MX," 
Strategic Review 11 (Spring 1983), p. 7, noted that the original Minuteman 
programme sought 3000 missiles. See also Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne
Smith, How Much is Enough?. p. 195. In the USAF, General Curtis LeMay 
wanted 2,400 while General Thomas Power sought 10,000 Minuteman missiles. 
The USN, however, accepted finite deterrence at lower numbers of missiles.
^  Herman Kahn, The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence 
(Santa Monica, California: Rand P-1888-RC, 1960), p. 39, and by the same 
author, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 
pp. 122-125.
Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 217.
Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S.
Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 
232.
Henry S. Rowen, "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine," in 
Lawrence Martin, ed., Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, p. 151. This 
article is an excellent review of its subject.
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that core was a small percentage of the nuclear target array. Although 
the assured destruction mission had top priority, it did not necessarily 
mean that cities would be attacked first or even given the most weight of 
effort. It meant only that confidence in the ability to attack them must
OO
remain high in all conditions.^
During this period the actual use of threats displayed an American 
propensity to view them as being useful in "guiding" Soviet actions. 
During the Berlin crisis in 1961, the United States deliberately communi­
cated to the Soviet Union the American awareness of the Soviet strategic
Q O
weakness to curb Khrushchev's bellicose behaviour.-' The inability or the 
unwillingness of the United States to make use of or to press its military 
advantage may possibly have contributed to Khrushchev's decision to place 
missiles in Cuba and the resulting October 1962 crisis. The American 
deliberate threat of nuclear escalation during the Cuban missile crisis 
backed up conventional superiority in the Caribbean region and helped
OA
convince Soviet leaders to back down from the threat of war. This
82 Ibid.. p. 133.
88 Richard Ned Lebow, "Clear and Future Danger: Managing Relations
with the Soviet Union in the 1980's," in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner, 
eds., New Directions in Strategic Thinking (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1981), p. 224. This is an excellent book. See also Fred Kaplan, 
The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 291- 
306. The U.S.S.R. had only 4 operational SS-6 missiles. This information 
was only available in 1961 from the Discoverer satellite programme.
8^ The danger of nuclear war during this crisis was real, greater 
than either leader could have wished. See McGeorge Bundy, Danger and 
Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 461-462. The United States 
had two thousand nuclear bombers and 200 ICBM's operational while the 
Soviet Union had 135 bombers and only a few ICBM's. See Philip Bobbitt, 
Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy
(London: MacMillan Press, 1988) p. 46. See also Richard K. Betts, "Elusive 
Equivalence: The Political and Military Meaning of the Nuclear Balance,"
in Samuel Huntington, ed. , The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for
American Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1982), p. 115. Betts feels the nuclear threat made the difference. For a 
contrary view see Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1972), p. 280.
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nuclear global alert was very specific and was directly linked to the 
strategic balance, for Soviet intermediate range missiles in Cuba would 
place much of the United States under the threat of direct nuclear attack. 
The nuclear alert during the Cuban missile crisis was a clear case of 
compellence where a specific Soviet action was demanded, but other threats 
also carried implications beyond deterrence, for the United States 
appeared to seek modification of Soviet behaviour.
The American use of threats has displayed persistent tendencies to 
counterforce targeting, flexible use and contingency. While political 
elites appeared to accept assured destruction logic, the American 
military, the USAF in particular, have clung to the view of nuclear 
weapons as instruments of war fighting not simply agents of deterrence.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
During this period both superpowers built impressive strategic 
nuclear arsenals. This section will focus briefly on the relative quality 
of strategic nuclear forces, the overall balance of numbers and the 
expected combat utility of these systems. A more detailed quantitative 
analysis will follow in chapter seven.
In general, the United States favoured having fewer high quality 
nuclear delivery systems than having larger numbers of less capable 
systems. The example of the Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry 
Vehicle (MIRV) demonstrates the American emphasis on technological 
solutions. No operational requirement predated MIRV; it was a classic
o c
example of technology shaping a strategic decision. As funds were cut 
and the numbers of Minutemen were reduced, the military bureaucracy was
Ronald L. Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation of
Defence Strategy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 81 and p. 107. 
MIRV was an offshoot of the penetration aid and space programmes.
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quick to accept this solution as it would allow each missile to attack a 
number of different targets, sharply increasing their counterforce 
potential.00 The success of MIRV demonstrates that the military had a 
significant influence on the bureaucratic milieu in W a s h i n g t o n . M o r e  
importantly, MIRV passed the stringent test of McNamara's cost 
effectiveness analysis, and it provided the United States the 
technological means to deliver more nuclear firepower than the Soviet
O O
Union, even though the United States had fewer missiles.
By 1970, the United States had allowed the Soviet Union to deploy a 
greater number of ICBM's without attempting to maintain an exact numerical 
balance. This was a significant departure from 1963 when McNamara 
declared that "the damage-limiting capability of our numerically superior
O Q
forces is, I believe, well worth its incremental cost."03 The concept of 
ballistic missile defence and MIRV's reinforced this damage-limiting 
momentum because greater numbers of Soviet missiles could be threatened 
while even a partially effective defence could further blunt the 
retaliation. Soviet determination to reach parity and high costs 
precluded the United States from maintaining the degree of superiority
O C
Scilla McLean, How Nuclear Weapons Decisions are Made (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1986), p. 79. See also Alain Enthoven's testimony before 
the Hearings Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of 
the Committee on the Armed Services. 1968 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1968), 
pp. 140-148.
Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: 
A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. 
Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 57.
®® James M. Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of
the Role of the Secretary of Defence (Coral Gables, Florida: University of 
Miami Press, 1970), p. 74.
Remarks to the Economic Club of New York 18 November, 1963, 
printed in Arthur Waskow, ed., The Debate Over Thermonuclear Strategy, p. 
46.
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experienced at the start of this period. Nevertheless, with MIRVs, only 
220 Minuteman 3 ICBM's could destroy 21% of the Soviet population from 
immediate effects alone and 72% of the Soviet industry.90 Thus an arsenal 
of over 1000 ICBM's plus hundreds of bombers and hundreds of submarine 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) constituted a nuclear force far 
greater than that required for countervalue assured destruction tasks. To 
enhance survival of strategic forces, ICBM silos were also hardened to 
withstand anything but the most accurate attacks.
The United States strategic community had become increasingly 
accustomed to assessing the combat utility of nuclear weapons. The 
concept of launching a nuclear attack "before the aggressor has hit either 
us or our allies," was described in Congress as the only reliable form of 
d e t e r r e n c e; 9^- this is pure damage limitation. In 1961 SAC authorized the
first withholding of ICBM's from the initial launches, an introduction of
Q 9war fighting techniques.  ^ One key adviser to Kennedy declared that he 
believed "in the importance of maintaining superiority over the Communists
q o
in every element of our military p o w e r . O t h e r s  remained convinced of 
the necessity to maintain superiority in areas that matter, for if the 
United States could maintain a
90 Barry Carter, "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons," Scientific 
American (May 1974), p. 22. Twelve Poseidon SSBNs could do the same 
amount of damage.
91 Report of the House Appropriations Committee on Defence 
Appropriations for 1961 cited by Melvin R. Laird, A House Divided: 
America's Security Gap (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), p. 81.
92 Paul Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 206.
93 Paul Nitze was assistant Secretary of Defence for International 
Security Affairs, cited in Steven L. Reardon, The Evolution of American 
Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge, p. 52.
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sufficient margin of superiority without giving a large 
stimulus to the arms race, it may hope to deter not only war 
but also the dangerous employment of Soviet strategic power 
for political ends.^
Many elements in the United States strategic community were not eager 
to accept complete parity with the Soviet Union. The political detente 
that evolved over the late 1960's and early 1970's helped those who 
believed in stability to convince many of the American political elite 
that parity would in the final analysis help the United States by 
encouraging the Soviet Union to adopt less confrontational policies. Thus 
at the beginning of this period when the United States had unequivocal 
nuclear superiority, significant compellent characteristics were evident, 
but as parity was achieved and deterrence apparently became the dominant 
paradigm in United States declaratory strategy, significant traces of 
compellent thinking still remained within the American strategic 
community.
4. The Implication of Flexible Response
The first part of this period resembled the era of massive 
retaliation because much of the United States political elite felt that 
some useful degree of nuclear superiority would be achievable. By the end 
of this period, however, these views seemed illusory and parity seemed to 
be the apparent objective.
Different students have drawn vastly different implications from this 
shift. Some observers suggested that the United States and the Soviet 
Union drew different lessons from the Cuban Crisis, the Soviets drawing a 
longer term view to build up their military power while the United States
Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) p. 218. See
also Bernard Brodie, The Communist Reach for Empire (Santa Monica, 
California: Rand Corporation P-2916, 1964) p. 16.
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believed detente and Soviet growth to nuclear parity would prevent a 
similar crisis in the future. 95 A different view was that the present 
United States superiority was indispensible to the preservation of
O /:
peace. ° A 1965 study of eight cases concluded that United States 
strategic forces played a part in conducting fear of unwanted consequences 
in the minds of Soviet leaders and thus influenced Soviet policy.97 Those 
who held this view tended to see alarm in the trends in relative military 
strength.
...the United States is moving toward a posture of minimum 
deterrence in which we could be conceding to the Soviet 
Union the potential for a military and political victory if 
deterrence failed.98
The American failure in Vietnam seemed to cast doubts on the utility 
of force, but this interpretation ignored the successful North Vietnamese 
use of force. Nevertheless a belief in a declining utility of force, the 
possibility of greater cooperation with the Soviet Union, Soviet
determination to reach parity, and the high costs of maintaining nuclear
superiority combined to allow proximate superpower parity to come about. 
The United States began to reduce its expectations. It dropped the 
criteria of not allowing the Soviets to gain the ability to cause greater 
damage to the United States than the United States could inflict on the
95 John Van Oudenaren, Potential Threats to U.S. Soviet Deterrence: 
The Political Dimension (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-
6826, 1982), p. 3. See also W. Scott Thompson, National Security in the 
1980's: From Weakness to Strength (San Francisco, California: Institute
for Contemporary Studies, 1980), p. 14.
9^ William R. Kintner, Peace and the Strategy Conflict (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. xi.
97 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
9® Paul Nitze, ’’Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," 
Foreign Affairs 54 (January 1976), p. 227. This is an important article 
that helped coalesce and shape right wing opinion.
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Soviet Union.99 jn a 1971 report, Melvin Laird expounded a strategy of 
"realistic" deterrence, simply a continuation of the United States retreat 
from massive retaliation.100
During this period, the United States officially shifted towards a 
greater emphasis on deterrence, but strong indications of compellent 
thinking remained among the strategic elite. In particular, in the sense 
that the USAF retained its war fighting orientation and MIRVed systems 
provided certain advantages even with fewer missiles, the compellent model 
reappears and is useful as an alternative means of explaining some aspects 
of United States policy during this period.
IV. THE SEARCH FOR ADVANTAGE 1970-1986
In the most recent period of American nuclear strategy, a reasonably 
consistent pattern emerges as various American administrations attempt to 
recover, at least to some degree, the ability to restrain or to modify 
Soviet international behaviour.
Some people in Washington have a nostalgia for the early
days of the Cold War, when the U.S. had strategic
predominance, and nuclear massive retaliation was a
101plausible strategic posture.
In the aftermath of the American failure to achieve its goals in Vietnam, 
the 1973 oil embargo by Arab states served to intensify global strategic 
competition. Increasingly, throughout this period, the United States re­
emphasized the view that the Soviet Union was a formidable rival with
99 Warner Schilling, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970's: 
The Search for Equivalent Countervailing Parity," in Robert O'Neill and 
D.M. Horner, eds., New Directions in Strategic Thinking, p. 46.
100 Albert Legault and George Lindsey, The Dynamics of the Nuclear 
Balance, p. 164.
Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence,
the Arms Race and Arms Control, p. 41.
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global ambitions. Inevitably, nuclear strategy reflected these thoughts, 
and American nuclear doctrine evolved towards greater complexity so as not 
to allow the Soviet Union any potential advantage. This section will 
briefly examine recent American nuclear strategy to determine which 
paradigmatic approach more closely reflects United States policy.
1. The Strategic Intentions
Shortly after his election as President, Nixon began to question the
American nuclear strategy as it had evolved in the I960's. The new
administration sought to change nuclear strategy and "made it clear that
1 09it would not be bound by earlier theories of deterrence. " The changes 
in American nuclear strategy initiated by Nixon were important because 
they were not only continued but were further developed by subsequent 
administrations. At the root of these changes lay different expectations 
about the utility of nuclear weapons, different views with respect to the 
status quo and slightly different values from that which existed in the 
1960's .
Nixon was appalled by the prospect that in response to any form of 
nuclear attack, a President could be left with a single option of ordering 
the mass destruction of enemy civilians "in face of the certainty that it
1 no
would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans. -LU-> In the early 
1970's, Nixon charged Kissinger "to come up with additional nuclear war
Lynn E. Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New
American Doctrine. Adelphi Paper 121 (London: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 3.
103 Nixon's 1970 Foreign Policy Report cited by Schlesinger in 
Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law 
and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Briefing on 
Counterforce Attacks (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975), pp. 5-6.
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options. " 104 This study led directly to National Security Decision 
Memorandum 242, signed by Nixon in early 1974. These "new options” 
reflected a fundamental desire to change the United States declaratory 
policy as well as its nuclear action policy. The United States nuclear 
strategy as it emerged in what became known as Schlesinger's limited 
nuclear options assumed that the Soviet Union could not destroy the United 
States reserve strategic forces, and thus the traditional military values 
of using nuclear weapons to achieve sensible objectives should deterrence 
fail, were elevated to greater importance.105
The Carter and Reagan administrations steadily pursued this strategic 
drift initiated by Nixon. Carter's Presidential Directive 59 emphasized a 
countervailing strategy to preclude any Soviet advantage, and Reagan's 
National Security Decision Document 13 went even further, proclaiming the 
American strategic goal is "to prevail in a protracted nuclear war” and to 
"restore peace on favourable terms."106 Notwithstanding this strategic 
objective, many observers felt that the United States still needed to 
develop an articulate, coherent and credible strategy of how to apply this 
force to promote the attainment of policy objectives.107
Desmond Ball, "The Role of Strategic Concepts and Doctrine in 
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Development," in Bernard Brodie, Michael D. 
Intriligator and Roman Kolkowicz, eds. , National Security and 
International Stability (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and 
Haig, 1983), p . 52.
105 Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Evolution of U.S. strategic Doctrine- 
1945 to 1981," in Samuel Huntingdon, ed., The Strategic Imperative: New
Policies for American Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1982), see pages 56 and 76.
106 Caspar Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress. Fiscal Year 
1984 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1983), p. 32, and Robert Scheer, With 
Enough Shovels (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 12.
107 William J. Taylor, The Future of Conflict (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1983), p. 89, and Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory is 
Possible," Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980), p. 18.
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Increased attention to achieving favourable outcomes if deterrence
failed resulted in a reinforced belief in the utility of nuclear weapons
to support American overall objectives. Assured destruction was not
abandoned, but it was not enough; however measured, it would not lead to
assured crisis stability in the face of a Soviet strategic nuclear 
1 DRadvantage. The classical view that the best way to deter war is to
prepare for war was gaining momentum, particularly among those that were 
familiar with Soviet nuclear s t r a t e g y . 109 United States strategic policy 
in this period moved clearly towards a war fighting orientation that 
reflected a great deal more than assured destruction thinking.HO
Another indication of paradigmatic intentions is the degree of 
commitment to the status quo. According to Weinberger, the United States 
must "contain Soviet aggression or subversion long enough for the internal 
contradictions of Soviet communism to emerge. "HI But the policy of the 
Reagan administration took a more assertive view of containment. It 
implied a need to have a more explicit strategy for competing with the 
Soviet Union and even suggested that Soviet withdrawals could be induced
108 William R. Van Cleave, "The Requirement for and the Purpose of 
Quick Fixes to American Strategic Nuclear Forces," in William R. Van 
Cleave and W. Scott Thompson, eds. , Strategic Options for the Early 
Eighties: What Can Be Done? (New York: National Strategy Information
Centre, 1979), p. 15. The author expresses concern that studies have 
shown that a substantial strategic disparity exists in strategic 
capability in favour of the Soviet Union. See p. 3.
George Keegan, "Editorial Letter," Strategic Review 5 (Spring
1977), p. 7. Keegan was head of USAF intelligence.
H O  James Schlesinger, "The Evolution of American Policy Towards the 
Soviet Union," International Security 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 42-43; and 
Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Forces and SALT: A Question of Strategy,"
Comparative Strategy 2 (Number 2, 1980), p. 125.
H I  Caspar Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress. Fiscal Year 
1987 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), p. 7.
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by an appropriate American s t r a t e g y . N o t  only was there a belief in 
the Reagan administration that perceptions of relative military 
superiority were very important, but the tendency to link American
economic policy to foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union implied a
1 1 O
strong mercantilist orientation. •LJ
American perceptions that nuclear use could be threatened to impose a 
change in the international system appeared to stem primarily from the 
belief that the Soviet Union "might entertain the illusion that nuclear 
war could be an option. American nuclear policy makers were far more
concerned with Soviet strategy than they were in previous periods, and one 
result was a subtle but significant change in how the United States
leadership viewed the ability and utility of nuclear weapons to alter the 
status quo when desired.
These notions questioned the values that underlay American strategic 
intentions. Certainly from the Soviet perspective, it appeared that the 
United States was not prepared to accept the Soviet Union as a status 
equal. This point was emphasized by Reagan when he stated that the Soviet 
leaders were "the focus of evil in the modern world. "H5 Soviet analysts
ibid. . p. 28. See also Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, 
"Defence Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from
Containment," International Security (Spring 1983), p. 34.
113 Michael D. Wormser, United States Defence Policy. 3rd edition 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1983), p. 50. The pursuit of 
wealth has given greater utility to military force in the 1980's, see 
Hedley Bull, "Force in International Relations: The Experience of the
1970's and Prospects for the 1980's" in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner, 
eds., New Directions in Strategic Thinking, p. 19.
See Harold Brown's testimony in the Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear War Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
USGPO, 1981), pp. 32-33.
Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the 
Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983, Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents vol. 19 (March 14, 1983), p. 359.
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also tended to view American limited nuclear options as
an attempt to utilize and maximize those particular features 
of the U.S. strategic offensive forces in which the U.S. 
considers itself ahead of the Soviet Union.
Although there was some Soviet recognition of the American acceptance of
the principle of assured destruction, the Soviet leaders were struck by
what they perceived as a "constant search for ways of using strategic
power in a more active and offensive manner.
The American objectives in recent strategic formulations appear to 
assume the utility of nuclear weapons, to question the validity of the 
Soviet system and not accept that the Soviet Union has an equivalent moral 
right to compete with the West. Although the United States may have been 
prepared on the surface to accept "essential equivalence" in nuclear 
systems, it did not appear prepared to accept the Soviet political or 
economic system as a status equal.
2. The Threat of Force
Although military threats were about as frequent as in other periods, 
from 1970 to 1986 there was only one major direct American threat to use 
nuclear force. American resort to military force did not occur where 
conflict with Soviet forces appeared probable, and American strategy to
counter possible Soviet expansion relied instead on allied states to
defend themselves. Where this strategy appeared insufficient, the Reagan 
administration threatened horizontal escalation rather than nuclear
Henry Trofimenko, Changing Attitudes Toward Deterrence (Los 
Angeles, California: Centre for International and Strategic Affairs,
1980), p. 23. The author equates deterrence with compellence.
^-7 M.A. Mil'shtein as cited in David Holloway, "Military Power and
Political Purpose in Soviet Policy," Daedalus 109 (Fall 1980), p. 30. See 
footnote 29. This is a very good article.
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1 1 O
escalation.10 Some American "hawks" expressed concerns that unless 
American nuclear forces were significantly improved, there would be a time 
window in the late 1980's where the Soviets would have a "perceivable and 
usable strategic superiority. "H9 others felt that major efforts were 
needed to improve the American nuclear posture "to make the Russians 
insecure in order to coerce them and reduce their influence."120 This 
section will assess the United States' threats to use nuclear weapons, 
1970-1986.
The only overt nuclear threat in this time frame was the global
nuclear alert declared as a response to Soviet preparations to intervene
in the October 1973 war between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria
on the other. The aim of this threat appears to have been more than
simply to deter the Soviet threat, as it also carried far broader
191implications that embittered Moscow.111 In fact, American policy during
those years was being conducted to reduce or eliminate where possible,
1 9 9Soviet influence in the Middle East. *-
To expand a conflict to another region where the United States 
has an advantage. See David Ransom, et al. . Atlantic Co-operation for 
Gulf Security (Washington, D.C.: National War College Paper, 1983), p. 23. 
See also Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military
Strategy," International Security 7 (Winter 1983-1984), p. 7.
119 France P. Hoeber, Slow to Take Offence: Bombers. Cruise Missile
and Prudent Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, 1980), pp. 19-20.
120 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, p. 188. 
See footnote 62.
121 Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, "The Owls 
Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War."The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1986), 
pp. 51-52.
1 9 9 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 574. This theme did not appear in 
official statements at the time; see Henry Kissinger's news conference of 
October 25, Department of State Bulletin vol. 69 (November 12, 1973), pp. 
585-94.
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A second less obvious threat resulted from the 1979 Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, a step that was particularly galling to Carter and his 
emphasis on genuine self determination.123 Although Carter had warned 
Brezhnev at a summit conference not to intervene in Afghanistan, the 
United States was in no position to threaten the use of force in the face 
of Soviet local superiority. Nevertheless Carter used the "hotline" to 
communicate to the Soviet leaders that unless they drew back from and 
restored Afghanistan as a neutral non-aligned state, they were 
jeopardizing "the course of United States-Soviet relations throughout the 
world."124 worth noting that the American demands included the
restoration of Afghanistan to a status that had not obtained since prior 
to 1978. Although it was not articulated, the implication in each threat 
was that the United States was thinking in terms of compellence as well as 
deterrence.
The degree of counterforce and war fighting orientation to nuclear 
targeting systems is another paradigmatic indicator. While some claim 
that the practical difference between counterforce and countervalue 
targeting is slight, it is also true that all United States nuclear 
strategies have addressed essentially the same targets - the only 
difference is the priority of effort.125 Counterforce targeting
123 President Carter's Address at Commencement Exercises, Annapolis, 
June 7, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 14 (June 12,
1978), p. 1053.
124 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoires of a President (New York:
Bantam Books, 1982), p. 472. See also Cyrus Vance, Department of State 
Bulletin, vol. 80 (May 1980), p. 18, and Jimmy Carter, Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents, vol. 16 (April 14, 1980), p. 636.
125 Jeffrey Richelson, "The Dilemma's of Counterpower Targeting," 
Comparative Strategy 2 (Number 3, 1980), p. 225. See also William 
Dougherty, Barbara Levi and Frank Von Hippel, "The Consequences of Limited 
Nuclear Attacks on the United States," International Security 10 (Spring
1986), p. 42.
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requirements have continuously been a major part of United States
strategic planning, especially among USAF officers. As the Soviets had
achieved parity, it was now clear to the United States that having an
assured capability to destroy Soviet cities no longer provided effective
deterrence. It was now necessary to be able to destroy the Soviet Union
197as a nation, including its war recovery potential. ^ ' Damage limiting and 
hard target kill capabilities appeared necessary to allow the United 
States the credibility to use these threats for political advantage.
Increasingly, the United States nuclear strategy had extended its 
logic to include limited war notions of war fighting. One purpose was to 
obtain a post war government in the Soviet Union more compatible with 
Western values, and the United States now appeared willing to attack the 
Soviet top command and control apparatus before it could disperse into its 
hardened s h e l t e r s . 128 This strategy was a reversal from that of the 
1960's and implied that retaliation alone was not enough and that 
protracted war was a possibility. 129 -phe Reagan initiatives to strengthen
126 John T. Chain, "Strategic Fundamentals," Air Force 70 (July
1987), p. 66. General Chain was Director Joint Strategic Planning Staff 
and Commander SAC. See also Robert C. Aldridge, The Counterforce 
Syndrome: A Guide to U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Doctrine 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978), p. 4.
127 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives, Department of Defence 
Appropriations for 1978. part 2 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 167. 
See also General George G. Brown, cited in Defence Monitor 6 (August
1977), p. 2, where he indicates that such a strategy has not been seen in 
history since Carthage.
128 Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," 
International Security 2 (Spring 1978), p. 72. See also Colin S. Gray, 
"Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory," International
Security 3 (Summer 1979), p. 21.
129 Lori Esposito and James A. Schear, The Command and Control of 
Nuclear Weapons (Queenston, Maryland: Aspen Institute for Humanistic 
Studies, 1985), p. 23. In the 1960's the U.S. strategy was to spare 
Moscow to enable negotiation to take place.
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strategic nuclear forces reflected a desire for greater flexibility and a 
clear emphasis on sophisticated notions of nuclear war fighting to prevail 
if deterrence failed.130 According to the Secretary of Defence, such a 
capability was not something separate from deterrence, but was a necessary 
part of it.-^1
The concept of fighting the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons placed
considerable emphasis on nuclear targeting, and in 1978, Carter initiated
a series of studies to determine the optimum targeting strategy. One of
these studies suggested that United States nuclear targeting strategy
1 ^ 9could in part contribute to the breaking up of the Soviet "empire.
1 O  *3
These notions were based on ethnic nationalism literature as well as 
the fact that most Soviet ICBM's were already located within the Russian 
ethnic area of the Soviet Union. 134
Soviet vulnerability to the breakup of its "empire" in time of war 
fueled American consideration of the use of ethnic targeting to gain some 
leverage over the Soviet Union. What contributed to greater awareness of
130 Jon Connell, The New Maginot Line (London: Seeker and Warburg,
1986), p. 131. See also Louis Rene Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America's
Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 1;
and, William R. Van Cleave and Roger W. Barnett, "Strategic Adaptability," 
Orbis 18 (Fall 1974), p. 656.
^31 Caspar Weinburger, Annual Report to the Congress. Fiscal Year 
1987 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), p. 11.
132 Richard B. Foster, The Soviet Concept of National Entity 
Survival (Arlington, Virginia: SRI Project 7167, 1978), p. 62. The fact 
that Carter's National Security Advisor was keen on ethic targeting of 
Russians may have furthered developments. See Peter Pringle and William 
Arkin, SIOP. The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War, pp. 189-190.
133 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso 
Editions, 1983); and Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self Determination (New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 10.
13^ Gary L. Guertner, "Strategic Vulnerability of a Multinational 
State: Deterring the Soviet Union," Political Science Quarterly 96
(Summer 1981), pp. 211-213.
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these potential vulnerabilities was the Soviet demographic trend; the
Russian birth rate was declining while that of other nationalities,
particularly Muslim, was increasing. 135 Among the Russian ethnic group, 
nationalism was becoming a stronger force than ideology, and as a result 
ethnic nationalism was growing faster than integration in the Soviet
Union. ~>° Notwithstanding considerable efforts on the part of Soviet
elites to Russify their important institutions of power, the growing
national aspirations of minorities in the Soviet Union may eventually
result in irresistible pressures to create nation states.137 These ethnic 
trends have been held to be a fundamental weak link in the Soviet Union 
that could potentially be exploited by the United States. 138 It is the
only problem that has the potential to bring down the Soviet Union from
135 Soviet Union, USSR in Figures. 1983 (Moscow: Finansy: Statistika 
Publishers, 1984), pp. 11-12. See also Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie 
Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 
p. 124.
-1-36 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in the 
USSR," in George W. Simmonds, ed. , Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin (Detroit, Michigan: University 
of Detroit Press, 1977), p. 32. See same author in Robert Conquest, ed. , 
The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future (Stanford, California:
Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 259. Increasing Russian nationalism 
begets subnationalism, see Susan Olzak "Contemporizing Ethnic 
Mobilization," Annual Review of Sociology (Number 9, 1983), p. 364.
137 Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided
Societies (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1980), pp. 65- 
67. See also by same author, Police. Military and Ethnicity: Foundations
of State Power (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 
2-9. Richard Pipes believes that in time, these nation states must 
inevitably be created. See Carl A. Linden and Dimitri K. Simes, 
Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR: A Soviet Dilemma (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977), p. 21.
138 Colin S. Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War," Naval War 
College Review 32 (January-February 1983), pp. 11-12.
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1within, and in time of war these tensions could explode.
What gave the concept of ethnic targeting great appeal was its 
potential for leverage over Soviet policy. Because these ethnic conflicts 
are virtually systemic and long terra in nature, most Western observers 
have concluded that ethnic related conflict could increase in 
intensity. By threatening Russians and not non-Russians, incentives 
are created for greater resistance to Russian rule, and Soviet leadership 
could be kept on a "short l e a s h .  Thus, an American targeting strategy
could threaten what the Soviet leaders value most, their power. The 
implication of threats of this nature more closely reflect compellence 
than deterrence and relate conceptually to the early notions of 
containment. In the final analysis, even though ethnic targeting was 
apparently rejected as official strategy, its consideration may have 
influenced the United States to target Soviet command and control 
facilities. By threatening to destroy the Soviet leadership, many of
the aims of ethnic targeting have been preserved without raising moral
Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims and the Muslim World," in
S. Enders Wimbush, ed. , Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective 
(London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 222. See also Helene Carriere d'Encause, 
Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt (New York:
Newsweek Books, 1980), p. 246. For an opposite but very isolated and 
narrow view see William Mandell, Soviet But Not Russian (Palo Alto, 
California: University of Alberta Press, 1984), p. 28.
Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "Ethnonationalism and Political 
Stability: The Soviet Case," World Politics 36 (July 1984), p. 578.
Rasma Karkhins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1986), p. 224.
George Quester, New Alternatives for Targeting the Soviet Union 
(Washington, D.C.: Defence Nuclear Agency 5047T, 1979), p. 62. See also 
George Quester, "Ethnic Targeting: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come,"
Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (June 1982), pp. 228-9.
Harold Brown, Department of Defence Annual Report Fiscal Year 
1982 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981), p. 42. Population "per se" would 
not be targeted.
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questions.
The use of threats in this period had gained in sophistication. 
Nuclear targeting, damage limiting and war fighting concepts demonstrate 
continued appearance of compellent type of thinking in United States 
nuclear strategy. Although deterrence remained the official rationale for 
nuclear threats, the nature of threats in the 1970's and 1980's has long 
surpassed that required for "pure” deterrence.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
During the 1970-1986 period, the United States has gradually come to 
view the correlation of nuclear forces as an important variable in 
strategic planning. The greater the emphasis on nuclear war fighting, the 
more the importance of the relative ability of nuclear forces in the 
respective strategies of the superpowers.
By 1985, the United States had fewer delivery systems than the Soviet 
Union, but still had a hard target kill advantage if slower cruise 
missiles were counted, The quantitative measurement of relative combat 
utility will be dealt with in a later chapter, but in terms of numerical 
balance the United States had rough equivalence to the Soviet Union. 
Total numbers of warheads were higher than ever, more than ten times the 
number available in 1962. In spite of this huge number, in 1977 the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff warned President Carter that the Soviet Union had achieved 
a "significant nuclear weapons advantage. " Yet ten years after that 
dire warning, the United States faced a relatively similar strategic 
correlation of nuclear forces, and even after a surprise attack, could 
still retain one-third of its bombers, forty percent of its SLBM's and
144 clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Carter Warned on Soviet Nuclear 
Advantage" Aviation Week and Space Technology (November 7, 1977), p. 18.
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several ICBM's.^^
What the military really wanted was combat capability, "the essence 
of deterrence. This combat capability provided the military
justification for prompt hard target kill warheads. Increased accuracies 
and increased yields were required to destroy hardened silos and command 
and control facilities. According to the Carter administration, the hard 
target capability of the MX was "a major step in strengthening 
deterrence. "
The Reagan administration continued to develop greater prompt hard 
target kill capabilities, but also introduced the Strategic Defence 
Initiative (SDI). SDI is an attempt to coordinate and accelerate research 
on ballistic missile defence systems. The combination of first strike 
capable offensive systems and ballistic missile defence epitomizes the 
logic of damage limitation by providing an excellent war fighting 
capability that could reduce the Soviet ability to threaten or 
intimidate. Another aspect of SDI, however, is the cost to the Soviets 
to follow suit, and some believe that it was designed to create serious 
pressures on the already strained Soviet economy.
Edgar Ulsamer, "Missiles and Targets," Air Force 70 (July 1987),
p. 68.
General Welch, cited by John T. Correll in "The Future of the 
ICBM," Air Force 70 (July 1987), p. 53. General Welch was USAF Chief of 
Staff.
1^7 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives, Department of Defence 
Appropriations for 1978 Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 542.
148 william Van Cleave, Fortress USSR: The Soviet Defence Initiative 
and the U.S. Strategic Defence Response (Stanford, California: Hoover
Institution Press, 1986), see pp. 39-41. It is worth noting that it does 
so by increasing the American capability to do the same. This point is 
deliberately overlooked in this slanted piece.
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The financial cost to both sides of a virtually open ended 
arms race in space would be huge and it is thought the USSR 
would be less able to afford it than the USA.-*-^
Although the capability of the United States strategic forces was at 
an all time high level, so was the Soviet capability. Each superpower 
appeared to be interested in survivable systems that could withstand the 
rigours of combat. In the United States, various basing modes for MX were 
discussed, mobile ICBM's were being developed, and air launched cruise 
missiles helped extend the accurate range of bombers. In spite of these 
developments, the United States control of its nuclear forces was so 
vulnerable that one analyst concluded with virtual certainty that 
thousands of megatons of explosive power could be delivered to the United 
States before authorization to retaliate could be passed to the armed 
forces.-*--’® Due to limitations in control means, much of the 
discrimination built into the United States nuclear war plans was probably 
significant only to American target planners.-*--’-*- While great improvements 
in combat utility were made in this period, significant deficiencies 
remained.
The United States nuclear strategy appeared designed to compete with 
the strategy of the Soviet Union. The numbers of nuclear systems, the 
hard target kill capability and damage limiting orientation tended to
14-9 Frank Barnaby, What on Earth is Star Wars? A Guide to the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (London: Fourth Estate, 1986), pp. 159-160.
150 Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the
Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 283.
-*--’-*- Desmond Ball, "Toward a Critique of Strategic Nuclear 
Targeting," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear 
Targeting (London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 19. This book
contains some excellent research by Ball and Rosenberg into the details of 
U.S. nuclear targeting.
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1 tio
support more than "high quality" deterrence. The United States
military strategy appeared intended to establish military advantages,
1 C O
indicating a reluctance to accept Soviet parity. The analysis of the
correlation of nuclear forces shows strong evidence of compellent thought.
4. The Implications of the Search for Advantage
Recent American strategic developments have emphasized war fighting 
capabilities to a higher degree than ever, and the coming to power of the 
political right in the United States only reinforced this tendency. The 
Reagan administration began its first term with a strong belief that only 
strong strategic forces could prevent the "Finlandization of America."154 
The fact that questions were raised in public by a senior Defence 
Department official as to whether the world could continue to exist half 
slave and half free implied a propensity to extirpate the "evil 
empire."155 Notwithstanding the rhetoric, Reagan's initial budgets made 
very few changes to the military plans, and a trend of increased military 
spending can be traced to 1971.-*--^  The swing to war fighting doctrine is
not explained simply by the Reagan administration and its right wing
Donald W. Hanson, "Is Soviet Strategic Doctrine Superior?" 
International Security 7 (Winter 1982/1983), p. 69.
A. Trofimenko, "Political Realism and the Realistic Deterrence 
Strategy," in Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie, eds., Nuclear 
Strategy and National Security: Points of View (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 38-53.
Norman Podhoretz, The Present Danger (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1980), p. 12. See also Malcolm Wallop, "Opportunities and 
Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defence," Strategic Review 7 (Fall 1979), 
p. 21. Podhoretz chaired the right wing Committee of the Present Danger.
This official was Noel Koch, overseer of the U.S. Special 
Operation Force, cited in "Soviet Geopolitical Momentum: Myth or Menace?"
The Defence Monitor 15 (Number 5, 1986), p. 9.
Michael D. Wormser, U.S. Defence Policy, pp. 8-9.
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orientation, for this trend had been reflected in United States strategic 
considerations throughout this whole period.
The Soviet reaction to Schlesinger's limited nuclear options and 
subsequent American attempts to construct usable nuclear plans had been 
intense. The Soviet Union accused the United States of seeking to make 
their deterrence of the Soviet Union more efficient than Soviet deterrence 
of the United S t a t e s . T h e  Soviet Union appeared convinced that the 
United States fully intended to conduct its international affairs from a 
position of strength.
What the United States appeared to desire was to regain at least in 
part the powerful strategic position that it held prior to the Soviet 
achievement of parity. The search for whatever leverage technology could 
bring was an attempt to recapture an important element of strategic 
advantage. The analysis of strategic intentions indicates that the United 
States was reluctant to accept the Soviet Union as a status equal and 
therefore sought a strategy that would reduce Soviet influence. The 
analysis of nuclear threats revealed a serious flirtation with ethnic 
targeting that implied a high degree of motivation to induce major change 
in Soviet affairs through limited nuclear strikes. The correlation of 
nuclear forces analysis demonstrates a strong commitment to damage 
limitation in the form of fast and accurate hard target kill as well as 
ballistic missile defence capability.
Henry Trofimenko, cited in Robert Levgold, "Military Power in 
International Politics: Soviet Doctrine on its Centrality and its
Instrumentality," in Uwe Nerlich, ed. , The Soviet Asset: Military Power
in the Competition Over Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1983), p. 138. This is solid work with good articles.
Whence the Threat to Peace (Moscow: Military Publishing House,
1987) , p. 3.
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All of these elements in United States nuclear strategy have been 
officially justified in terms of deterrence, but there is no doubt that 
they contribute to compellence as well as deterrence. It is clear that 
recent United States nuclear strategy can be more fully explained by the 
logic of the compellent paradigm.
V. CONCLUSIONS
When the concept of nuclear deterrence became official policy in the
United States, the belief grew that massive strategic bombing was the
optimum means to avoid wars, but conceptual difficulties immediately 
1 S9arose. American strategic culture has always demonstrated a complex
ambivalence toward nuclear weapons; for some they were simply too powerful 
to use, and for others they represented a challenge that science can
ultimately solve. For the latter the answers lay in complex methodologies 
that sprang from operational analysis, game theory and technically
improved systems. While the former have tended to reflect the modes of 
thought found in the deterrent paradigm, the latter have become immersed
i £r\
in the logic of the compellent model.
To a degree, declaratory American nuclear strategy appears to resolve 
the tensions inherent in these different points of view by holding the
deterrence of war to be its principle objective. The combination of the
policies of massive retaliation and containment, however, held significant 
elements that transcended deterrence. During this period the United 
States held a significant nuclear superiority and attempted to threaten 
massive first use not only to prevent a potential Soviet conventional
See Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence: The History and
Future of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 19-39.
1 60•LDW For a good review of the logic of deterrence, see Frank C. 
Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence," World Politics 42 (January 1990).
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invasion of Europe, but also to modify Soviet international behaviour.
As the Soviet Union developed its nuclear capable systems, however, 
for the first time in American history the United States faced a 
continuing threat that could result in its destruction. The outcome was 
that the United States modified its strategy to make its extended 
deterrent more credible by introducing the notion of graduated deterrence. 
Strong tendencies to counterforce targeting surfaced but assured 
destruction of the Soviet Union remained the primary aim of United States 
nuclear strategy. The dominance of deterrent thinking in the late 1960's 
contributed to a heavy focus on stability and mutual assured destruction 
that precluded progress toward more flexible nuclear use options.
From the early 1970's, the United States began to shift its official 
policy to provide more flexible nuclear options. One major objective of 
increased operational flexibility was to prevent the Soviet Union from 
gaining any strategic advantage from the Soviet nuclear force buildup, but 
another equally obvious American goal, was the seeking of some form of 
American strategic leverage over the Soviet Union. A premium was placed 
on damage limitation and war fighting capabilities that clearly mixed both 
deterrent and compellent capabilities.
The United States' declaratory strategy emphasized its commitment to 
deterrence, but it also sought to win if nuclear war came. While the 
United States' strategic rhetoric focussed on deterrence, its nuclear 
force structure reflected increasing reliance on compellent capability. 
This brief overview of United States nuclear strategy indicates that 
deeper examination of the compellent paradigm as an appropriate 
explanation of American strategic thinking is clearly warranted.
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Chapter Four 
NTTCT.RAR STRATEGY IN THE SOVIET UNION
Military power is an essential adjunct to Soviet diplomacy and has, 
more than any other factor, contributed to the elevation of the USSR to 
superpower status. In spite of theoretical and practical difficulties, a 
substantive philosophy of international relations theory does exist in the 
Soviet Union, and although it has changed significantly over the years, it 
continues to rely heavily on the concept of power.^ How the Soviet Union 
intends to use nuclear weapons to support its political ambitions and how 
nuclear strategy evolves over time are important questions. Even though 
the interaction of opposing strategies is still not fully understood, in 
recent years serious attempts have been made to understand Soviet as well 
as American nuclear strategy.
These efforts have met with mixed success due to the tremendous 
difficulties in interpreting those relatively few Soviet sources that are 
generally available. These sources tend to be incomplete and 
contradictory, ranging from political assertions of the non-utility of 
nuclear weapons to detailed military assessments of their utility in 
combat.^ Depending on one's basic assumptions about the Soviet Union, one 
can find documentation to support several different interpretations. The
1 Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations 
(Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988) pp. 316-317. This book is a 
very useful review of Soviet international relations theory.
 ^ For example, see Avner Cohen and Steven Lee, eds. , Nuclear 
Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions (Totowa,
New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1986), p. xi. The editors single out 
U.S. nuclear strategy and its growing emphasis on counterforce targeting 
in itself as making nuclear war more likely.
 ^ William C. Green, Soviet Nuclear Weapons Policy: A Research and
Bibliographical Guide (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 1.
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veil of secrecy that shrouds the Soviet internal strategic dialogue 
seriously complicates the interpretive process.^ In the Soviet Union, 
declaratory policy essentially reflects military doctrine while action 
policy for the most part reflects military science, but throughout the 
nuclear age a tension has existed between these two levels of analysis.-* 
It has been difficult to discern to what degree Soviet declaratory policy 
reflected actual Soviet military strategy or represented Soviet reliance 
on a strategy of deception and concealment on a grand scale. Among those 
Western experts that study and interpret Soviet military doctrine, at 
least six different approaches have been identified, all of which tend to 
emphasize different aspects of the problem.^
This chapter will apply the previously established paradigmatic 
framework to Soviet nuclear strategy in an attempt to illuminate the 
prevailing basis of Soviet strategic thinking from 1970 to 1986. The 
first section describes Soviet strategic culture, the basic milieu in
^ Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy 
for Nuclear War (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 
2 .
-* In the analysis of Soviet sources, it is important to note that 
military doctrine is often decided at the highest levels and forms the 
apex of military thought. Military science is subordinate to military 
doctrine and can be divided into military strategy, operational art and 
tactics. Soviet analysts do accept the interrelationship of these levels, 
but not to the degree that Edward Luttwak implies in his Strategy: The
Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1987), pp. 69-71.
 ^ Albert L. Weeks, "Soviet Credibility Gap: Offencist Strategy and
Defencist Propaganda," Journal of Defence and Diplomacy 4 (July 1986), 
pp. 17-19. See also Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: 
Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's,
1984), pp. 188-189. Moscow has developed the ability to conduct deception 
on a "massive" scale, but it can be subtle as well. See Stanislav 
Levchenko, "Same Deception, Different Style," Counterpoint 4 (February 
1989), pp. 1-4.
 ^ See Douglas M. Hart, "The Hermeneutics of Soviet Military 
Doctrine," The Washington Quarterly 7 (Spring 1984).
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which strategic decisions in the USSR are taken. Three following sections 
then deal with the thinking that accompanied the introduction of Soviet 
nuclear weapons, the drive to achieve parity and the subsequent tendency 
to search for strategic advantage. The focus of this chapter will 
primarily be on the objectives and threats embedded in Soviet nuclear 
strategy; detailed quantitative analysis of the correlation of nuclear 
forces will be left to later chapters.
I. SOVIET STRATEGIC CULTURE
Soviet strategic culture is a subset of Soviet political culture 
that, for the most part, is determined by the slowly changing attitudes of 
top party leaders and senior military officers.® Soviet military leaders 
tend to reflect the major historical values of Russian political culture; 
an expansion of Russian/Soviet interests, a proclivity to 
authoritarianism, an acceptance of a fundamental ideological framework, 
and a propensity toward modernization. These are but some of the several 
contributing factors that have played a decisive role in shaping a unique 
Soviet strategic style.^
One permanent feature that conditions strategic thought in the Soviet 
Union is the lack of natural geographic boundaries and the scope of 
continental requirements that have inevitably led to large armies. 
Russian growth and self-perpetuation has largely been due to the size and 
capability of its army, an army that today is still largely based on
8 The Soviet elite suffers a paradox in that it is simultaneously 
conservative and revolutionary. Soviet strategic culture, as could be 
expected, reflects this dialectic. See Dimitri Simes, "Disciplining 
Soviet Power," Foreign Policy 43 (Summer 1981), p. 40.
 ^ Rebecca Strode, "Soviet Strategic Style," Comparative Strategy 3 
(November 4, 1982), pp. 319-320.
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nineteenth century traditional military structure and values.^  Army
thinking still dominates a Soviet Armed Forces that envisages massive
battles over "vast flat areas of sparsely populated land."H Recent wars
of the twentieth century have reinforced the Soviet belief that mass and
sizeable reserves are of vital importance in war. From 1914 to 1920, 12
million people were killed, and the loss of life in the Great Patriotic
War (World War Two) was even g r e a t e r . 12 The impact of these wars on
modern Soviet strategic thought has been enormous, and even in the nuclear
age, all officers are thoroughly schooled in the continuity of strategic
principles, for the most part derived from past victories.H
The combination of heavy reliance on the military for the
preservation and expansion of the state and an authoritarian political
history has emphasized the role of the military in Soviet society.1^
The accumulation of military power was not in the past and 
is not presently viewed as an unwanted but necessary burden.
Rather, its acquisition has been a clearly articulated and 
acted upon state objective....1^
With such a societal impact, the ability of Soviet military professionals
1® Richard Gabriel, The New Red Legions (London: Greenwood Press, 
1980), p. 227-229. See also Norman Stone, "The Historical Background of 
the Red Army" in John Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger, eds., Soviet 
Military Power and Performance (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), pp. 15-16.
H  C. N. Donelly, Heirs of Clausewitz: Change and Continuity in the
Soviet War Machine (London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic 
Studies, 1985), p. 14.
12 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the 
USSR. 3rd edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 19.
1 ^ Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War (New York: Crane Russak,
1982). Leites' study was heavily based on World War Two and the author 
finds much continuity of thought with the present.
1^ Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State," Daedalus 109 
(Fall 1980), p. 1. Pipes claims this process has gone to the point of 
"militarization," but this is somewhat overstated.
1^ John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The
Interaction of Theory and Practice (New York: Crane Russak, 1981), p. 9.
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to exercise greater influence than their American counterparts "in shaping 
their nation's strategic programs and arms control policies seems 
overwhelmingly powerful."16 in contrast to the United States, where the 
civil community has great impact on resource allocations, Soviet nuclear 
strategy has been developed and implemented almost exclusively by military 
officers. This reflects a profound difference between Soviet and American 
strategic cultures.17 In an excellent article, David Holloway surmises 
that the very success of the Soviet Union in creating military power 
allows the military a "comparative advantage" in formulating security 
policy.I® This does not mean that the party leaders are not in charge or 
that there are not periodic political-military tensions. What it does 
mean is that in a system with "no institutional mechanism for the 
resolution of conflicts among competing interests," the military "experts" 
cannot be authoritatively challenged and therefore have had a powerful 
impact on strategic style.19
A third component that helped shape a unique Soviet strategic culture 
was the adherence to a fundamental ideological framework that evolved 
relatively slowly when compared to changing political governments in the
16 Arnold L. Horelick, "The Strategic Mindset of the Soviet 
Military," Problems of Communism 26 (March-April 1977), p. 81. See also 
Edward L. Warner III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 55.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Contemporary Soviet Military Policy," in 
Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds., The Soviet Calculus 
of Nuclear War (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 35. This is an
extremely useful book, in spite of the fact that only two chapters were 
relatively new at the time of printing.
16 David Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose in Soviet 
Policy," Daedalus 109 (Fall 1980), p. 17.
l^ Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 189. See also Howard Frost," Soviet Party- 
Military Relations in Strategic Decision Making," in Kenneth M. Currie and 
Gregory Varhall, eds., The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? (Washington,
D.C.: USGPO, 1984), p. 67.
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West. Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Soviet Union had effectively
replaced the Russian messianic role in "liberating" and "civilizing" other
peoples, the justification for six centuries of Russian expansion.20 To
Marx, historical experience confirmed the often determining role of
violence in political affairs, and to Lenin peace and war were but tools
91of policy to be flexibly employed to achieve political ends. x Marxism- 
Leninism indeed provides a comprehensive and sophisticated political 
military conceptual framework that has had a profound impact on all levels 
of military theory and practice in the USSR.22 Military doctrine in the 
Soviet Union therefore embodies that element of political strategy that 
concerns itself with those specific principles, methods and forms of 
preparing for and waging w a r . 23 Although military professionals produce 
the details of nuclear strategy, within the context of military science, 
it remains rooted in political formulations of military doctrine and
2® John S. Reshetar, Jr. The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics
in the USSR (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 7-10. Some feel that
Marxist-Leninist ideology appears to be bankrupt as a mobilizing tool and 
the search for a viable substitute has stimulated the revival of Russian 
nationalism. What is clear is that ideology does form the legitimizing 
core of Soviet policy. See Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, "Warsaw Pact: The
Question of Cohesion Phase II - Vol. 3," Operational Research and Analysis 
Establishment Extra Mural Paper No. 39 (Ottawa: Department of National 
Defence, 1986), p. 243.
21 See Adolfo Sanchez Vasquez, "Are the Theses of Classical Marxism 
on Just War and Violence Valid Today," in John Somerville, Soviet Marxism 
and Nuclear War (London: Aldwych Press, 1981), p. 95; and, Peter Vigor, 
The Soviet View of War. Peace and Neutrality (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1975), p. 87.
22 Kenneth Booth, The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy 
1917-1972 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1973), p. 63. See 
also Bernard Semmel, Marxism and the Science of War (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), p. viii.
23 Phillip Petersen, "The Soviet Conceptual Framework for the
Application of Military Power," Naval War College Review (May/June 1981), 
p. 15. See also Joseph Douglass, Soviet Military Strategy in Europe (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 8-12.
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invariably addresses the larger purposes of military power.2^ Soviet 
leaders recognize that such a comprehensive view is essential to optimize 
the relationship of military force to the achievement of political 
objectives, and Soviet military doctrine attempts to provide a 
hierarchical framework within which military strategy, operational art and 
tactics are subordinate variables. One significant impact of this 
ideology is that at times there has been considerable conceptual 
resistance among the military to the view that nuclear weapons have
altered in any major fashion this fundamental political military
9 Srelationship.^ J
A fourth factor in Soviet strategic culture is an apparent 
ambivalence toward the west. On the one hand the West is feared for its 
potential ability to wage war, but on the other hand the West is admired 
because of economic and technological strength. Soviet fears of the West 
have been fueled by perceptions filtered through ideological and
parochial suspicions that created a "woefully distorted picture,
9 fiparticularly of Western motives and intentions." Furthermore, the
formative years of strategic nuclear doctrine in the USSR coincided with a 
period of Soviet strategic inferiority that had a profound affect on
2^ Roman Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Union: The Elusive Adversary," in 
Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds., The Soviet Calculus 
of Nuclear War, p. 22.
25 See V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, edited by Harriet 
Fast Scott (New York: Crane Russak and Company, 1975), p. 15. This view 
is supported by the extensive efforts by Soviet forces to prepare soldiers 
for nuclear war. See V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotochkin and K.K. Platonov, 
eds., Military Psychology, translated and published by United States Air 
Force (Moscow: 1972), pp. 65-66.
26 Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Voice in the East-West Strategic 
Dialogue (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-2851, 1964), p. 21.
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Soviet strategic culture.27 These concerns have resulted in an imbedded
Soviet reluctance to accept that in some areas they are ahead of the West.
Somehow the West, they fear, with devilish cunning, is going 
to pull a technological rabbit from its hat and defeat all 
their efforts.28
The result has been a consistent attitude among the Soviet strategic 
elites, at least until 1986, that priority of effort to modernize the 
armed forces has been essential to overcome the economic and technical 
limitations inherent in the Soviet economy.
Another facet of Soviet strategic culture is the Russian propensity 
to respect strength. The ideology of the present Soviet state is really 
not incompatible with much of the previous Russian political culture in 
that it reflects centuries of bureaucratic and authoritarian r u l e . jn 
Russian and Soviet history, the legitimacy of authoritarian rule and its 
supportive ideology is a very complex matter that in many respects has 
strong roots in the Soviet polity and is sustained by fear of what can
o rj
happen if strength dissolves. w One impact of this respect for strength 
leads to cautious behaviour so as not to needlessly provoke a powerful
27 Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for
Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation R- 
2154-AF, 1977), pp. 26-27.
28 Jon Connell, The New Maginot Line (London: Seeker and Warburg,
1986), p. 95. See also Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership.
Stability and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), p. 245.
29 Richard Pipes, "Diplomacy and Culture: Negotiating Styles," in
Richard R. Staar, ed. , Arms Control: Myth versus Reality (Stanford,
California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 154. Pipes overstates
the importance of force somewhat. Colin S. Gray also believes that 
Soviet strategic culture is more Russian than Marxist-Leninist. See his 
"Strategic Stability Reconsidered," Daedalus 109 (Fall 1980), p. 142.
T.H. Rigby, "Conceptual Approach to Authority, Power and 
Policy," in T.G. Rigby, Archie Brown and Peter Reddaway, Authority. Power 
and Policy in the USSR (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 10. See 
also Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in Management (New York: Crane Russak,
1985), p. 109.
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enemy; in a subculture that takes a long term ideological view of 
struggle, rashness is a decided liability.31 Another impact of Soviet 
respect for strength is the deep conviction among military officers that 
"the political utility of military power is a function of its combat
OO
effectiveness."-^ This leads to strategic style that values combat power 
as the most important variable or measure of strength such that any 
Western unilateral arms renunciation could well be interpreted by 
communist military analysts as a sign of political weakness.33
Soviet military strategy therefore relies heavily on traditional 
indices of power, notwithstanding the scientific technical revolution in 
military affairs brought about by nuclear weapons. The concepts of 
deterrence and stability are important but not central to a Soviet 
military doctrine that appears to accept them as useful by-products of 
military power and proper strategy. According to the principles of 
military science, the more effective a state's fighting capability, the 
less likely another state would be to initiate war.^ The Soviet military 
tend to regard all weapons, even nuclear weapons, as but tools of war and 
not the determinants of strategy; it is their ability to fight that is 
important.
In the Soviet military view, therefore, "mutual defencelessness"
31 Nathan Leites, Kremlin Thoughts: Yielding. Rebuffing. Provoking. 
Retreating (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation RM-3618-ISA, 1963).
32 Steve F. Kime, "The Soviet View of War," Comparative Strategy 2 
(Number 3, 1980), p. 205.
33 Bernard Brodie, The Communist Reach for Empire (Santa Monica, 
California: Rand Corporation P-2916, 1964), p. 5.
3^ Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Forces and SALT: A Question of
Strategy," Comparative Strategy 2 (Number 2, 1980), p. 122. See also
Paul Holman, "Deterrence versus War-Fighting: The Soviet Preference,"
Air Force Magazine 64 (March 1981), p. 50.
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makes no sense whatsoever. ^  To minimize the damage to the Soviet Union 
from the power of nuclear weapons, Soviet military thought has emphasized 
surprise and deception to enable the Soviet Union to initiate their first 
decisive use.^ In Soviet military thought, the defensive is a forced 
form of military operations, the chief goal of which is to create 
conditions for a subsequent transition to the offensive.^7 Defence is
therefore a vital necessity when faced with a powerful enemy; it is an
essential element of strategic thought, even in the nuclear age. Thus
while political leaders at times have openly accepted the reality of
mutual assured destruction, military officers have tended not only to
resist MAD logic as a basis for strategy but also to question the United 
States' commitment to it.
The final component of the Soviet strategic subculture is the concept 
known as the correlation of forces. This fundamental concept is a Soviet 
account of the international system that appears more than ever a 
combination of Russian national interests in substance and Marxist- 
Leninist ideological principles in form.^^ The correlation of forces has 
been in Soviet use since revolutionary days and combines military,
John Erickson, "The Chimera of Mutual Deterrence," Strategic 
Review 6 (Spring 1978), pp. 11-17.
For a useful review of surprise (VNEZAPNOST) and deception 
(MASKIROVKA) in Soviet Strategy, see Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. 
Marsh, "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought," Military
Review 57 (June and July 1982).
Marshal A.A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State 2nd
Ed. translated and published by United States Air Force (Moscow: 1975), p.
260. See also Col. A.M. Danchenko and Col. I.F. Vydrin, eds. Military
Pedagogy, translated and published by United States Air Force (Moscow:
1978), p. 213.
Paul Dibb, The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower
(Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 15.
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economic, political and geographic factors.^  It clearly suggests that an 
appropriate preponderance of overall strength results in an increase in
political influence. As the Soviet leaders take an extremely broad view
of this concept, the correlation of forces makes Moscow measure its 
strategic position relative to the United States, Europe and China 
simultaneously, as one single security problem.^ Thus, a Soviet 
strategic analyst must consider the USSR surrounded by potential enemies 
and could have no basis for much confidence.^ Given Soviet political and 
economic limitations, this inevitably drives a requirement for very strong 
military forces in an attempt to achieve a favourable overall correlation 
of forces. Military power is therefore one of the "most important 
instruments" available to support foreign policy, and for the Soviet Union 
the effect of growing military power has been to create more "favourable 
conditions" for achieving Soviet goals.^
From a military perspective, the correlation of forces provides a 
guide within which military officers prepare their estimates for various 
strategic situations. To the Soviet officer, the main characteristic of
war is Clausewitzian in that "the essence of war is the continuation of
Michael Deane, "The Soviet Assessment of the Correlation of 
World Forces: Implications for American Foreign Policy," Orbis 20 (Fall
1976), p. 627.
Rebecca V. Strode, "Strategic Issues and Soviet Foreign Policy," 
in Gerrit W. Gong, Angela E. Stent and Rebecca V. Strode, eds., Areas of 
Challenge for Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980's (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 91.
^  Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership. Stability and
Change in the Soviet Union, p. 245.
^  v.  M. Kulish, Military Power and International Relations, 
translated and published by United States Air Force (Moscow: 1972), pp.
30-31.
140
politics by means of armed force. But war is not just a technical
enterprise, it is also a complex and many-sided process involving 
economic, diplomatic and ideological forms of struggle. The main 
objective of Soviet strategic thought is to be in a position to win, if at 
all possible, any potential conflict. The objective of victory adds an 
offensive military component to the correlation of forces that further 
fuels a consensus favouring a strong military. Because the conflictual 
dialectic of Soviet ideology is incompatible with defensive doctrine or 
the commonly held Western notion of "peace," and because Soviet doctrine 
claims the correlation of forces is shifting towards socialism, one would 
be guilty of "capitulationism" if one did not take advantage of one's 
opportunities.^
Clearly Soviet strategic culture is significantly different than that 
found in the West. The greatest single difference at least until recently 
has been the lack of a civilian security community in the Soviet Union 
that could speak with sufficient authority to challenge the Soviet 
military. Thus the concept of the correlation of forces has provided the 
military a central role in both political ideology and military doctrine. 
Although significant theoretical shifts have occurred over the years, the 
Soviet military remains for the most part committed to traditional 
military values and tends to seek the large forces necessary to ensure 
security if not victory in major war. Soviet military leaders tend to 
regard security in terms of military power, and to the Soviet political
Marxism-Leninism on War and Army 5th ed. (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1972), reprinted under auspices of United States Air Force. 
See pp. 10-12.
^  See Institute for the Study of Conflict, The Strategic Intentions 
of the Soviet Union (London: Eastern Press, 1978), pp. 7-8, and Uri
Ra'anan, "The USSR and the Encirclement Fear: Soviet Logic or Western
Legend," Strategic Review 8 (Winter 1980), p. 50.
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and military elites, too much power would probably constitute a 
contradiction in terms; Soviet leaders appear to equate military power 
with security, respect and influence in the world.
II. THE EARLY IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
At the close of World War Two, the United States introduced nuclear 
weapons, using them twice to compel Japan to consent to an unconditional 
surrender. The Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership appeared to ignore 
the impact of nuclear weapons on strategy and acted as if they were not a 
decisive factor in the dialectic of superpower relations. Because this 
declaratory strategic approach changed so rapidly after the death of 
Stalin, it appeared that Stalin had stifled the development of Soviet 
military thinking.^ More recent studies, however, have discerned greater 
continuity in Soviet strategic thinking from World War Two to the present. 
This section will briefly survey the key developments of Soviet strategy 
as nuclear weapons were being introduced into the Soviet Armed Forces. As 
in previous chapters, this study will utilize the paradigmatic framework 
by examining strategic intentions, the explicit and implicit threats and 
then the correlation of nuclear forces.
1. The Strategic Intention
In the period 1945-1954, the Soviet Union concentrated on recovering 
from the devastation of World War Two and rebuilding its security position 
by consolidating gains along its periphery. It was the latter objectives 
that caused confrontation with the West that led to the Cold War. In
Yosef Avidar, The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1983), pp. 67-91. See also Roman Kolkowicz,
Soviet Strategic Debate: An Important Recent Addendum (Santa Monica,
California: Rand Corporation P-2936, 1964), p. 4.
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retrospect it appears that Stalin deliberately downplayed, at least in 
public, the changes that nuclear weapons forced on the international 
community, but some Soviet debate undoubtedly took place in private.
Stalin clearly regarded nuclear weapons as significant, but he 
probably believed that, in limited numbers, they did not constitute a 
sufficient advantage against a country as vast as the USSR. Others such 
as Malenkov felt otherwise, and by the time of Stalin's death, Malenkov 
declared that permanent deterrence of the United States was not only 
possible, but a preferable strategy.^ A major reason that Khrushchev was 
able to replace Malenkov as party leader after only one year in power was 
that Khrushchev had the support of the Armed Forces (including Marshal 
Zhukov) who were quite outspoken in their rejection of Malenkov's view of 
deterrence.^  During this initial period, the Soviet Union did not appear 
to consider nuclear weapons in themselves sufficient to support foreign 
policy, and Soviet military strategy relied on conventional arms directed 
towards Europe, not the United States.
The huge Soviet conventional advantage over a war torn Europe 
outweighed or at least matched the political utility of American incipient 
nuclear power. The vast modern Soviet armies created in World War Two 
were only partially demobilized, and Soviet traditional military strategy 
did have considerable relevance in supporting the construction of a new
Ll(\ H.S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1962), p. 77. Malenkov echoed many of the American strategic 
community who felt nuclear weapons were not usable other than to deter.
^  Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 112.
According to Edward Crankshaw, there was no love lost between Malenkov 
and senior Army leaders, see Khrushchev Remembers (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Little, Brown, 1970), p. 322.
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Soviet security system in Eastern Europe. Stalin's objective was
undoubtedly to advance the interests and ideology of the Soviet Union in 
whatever ways were most expedient so long as the survival of Soviet power 
itself was not threatened.^ Nuclear strategy during the Stalinist 
period, if it existed at all, was a closely guarded secret, and the MVD 
under Beria, not the military, controlled nuclear development. The fact 
however that within six months after the arrest of Beria, the USSR held 
its first full scale nuclear military manoeuvres indicated that at least 
some nuclear planning had taken place in the military general staff. ^  
During this early period, nuclear strategy in the Soviet Union remained 
for whatever reason heavily influenced by traditional military strategy.
2. The Threat of Force
A Soviet nuclear threat did not exist until after 1949, and even then 
the nuclear threats implicit in the early stages of nuclear deployment 
were limited to Europe. The bomber was the only means of delivery, 
consequently air defenses became an important strategic resource, one in 
which the Soviet Union invested heavily. Through Soviet intelligence 
sources, it is highly probable that Stalin knew the exact status of the
Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behaviour" in 
Gerald Segal and John Baylis, eds. , Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm,
1981), p. 185.
^  Raymond L. Garthoff, The Soviet Image of Future War (Washington, 
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 2. The fundamental role of ideology 
in this process is highlighted by the Milovan Djilas chapter in G.R. 
Urban, ed., Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World (London:
Maurice Temple Smith, 1982).
William C. Green, "The Early Formulation of Soviet Strategic 
Nuclear Doctrine," Comparative Strategy 5 (Number 4, 1984), p. 381. The 
KGB continue to guard nuclear warheads and appear to control access to 
nuclear warheads and communications to strategic weapons in what may be a 
dual key arrangement between the KGB and SRF. See Andrew Cockburn, The 
Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Vintage Books,
1983) .
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United States nuclear programme. He would have known that a minimal
American nuclear threat existed prior to the Korean War, and thus he would
have felt no immediate pressure to change military strategy, at least
until the Soviet weapons production programme could catch up with that of
the United States.
As Soviet nuclear forces became available, targeting became an issue.
During World War Two, the Soviets eschewed strategic bombing, and their
historical analysis of British-American strategic bombing concluded that
there was no evidence to support notions that strategic 
bombing of cities with the purpose of inflicting punishment 
on the civilian population could have a substantial effect 
on the outcome of a war.^
The Soviet military came to reject reliance on a strategy of nuclear
bombing of the enemy's war making potential; attacking industrial and
economic targets was not considered the most effective means to attain
C O
victory. J In fact, the Soviet leaders have charged that since the United 
States nuclear bombings of Japan were militarily pointless, they were 
really intended to intimidate the USSR.^ During this early period when 
Soviet nuclear targeting plans were initially prepared, priority was given 
to military targets in Europe.
The primary Soviet threat was a potential rapid conventional
William C. Green, "The Early Formulation of Soviet Strategic 
Nuclear Doctrine," p. 375.
Stephen Meyer, Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces Part I: 
Development of Doctrine and Objectives. Adelphi Paper 187 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 10. This is a 
very good analysis of Soviet nuclear thinking.
Raymond L. Garthoff, The Soviet Image of Future War (Washington, 
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 11.
William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy," in Desmond 
Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 91. See also David Holloway, The 
Soviet Union and the Arms Race (London: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 
20.
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offensive against Western Europe, and nuclear attacks on industries that 
could be quickly overrun in the event of war did not make sense. Nuclear 
threats were used implicitly to support a traditional strategy; war would 
be won by the destruction of enemy military forces, and nuclear weapons 
could greatly assist but were not in themselves decisive weapons. The 
concept of nuclear deterrence that was being developed in the West did not 
find much support among the Soviet strategic community.
3. Correlation of Nuclear Forces
During these early years, regardless of whether or not the United 
States' nuclear advantage effectively countered the Soviet conventional 
superiority in. Europe, the United States did enjoy a favourable
correlation of nuclear forces. In spite of rhetoric to the contrary, 
Stalin at a private meeting among other communist leaders, recognized that 
the United States was the most powerful state in the world.
According to a superb review of Soviet military policy, Stalin 
undoubtedly appreciated the strategic significance of nuclear weapons; 
secret work had begun on nuclear weapons in the 1930's and continued
throughout most of the Second World War.-^ Soviet nuclear weapons
development was clearly not a simple reaction to the United States'
success. Equal priority was given to rapidly developing strategic delivery 
systems, and decisions made under Stalin enabled the Soviets to be the
Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behaviour," in 
Gerald Segal and John Baylis eds., Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm,
1981), p. 188.
William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy 
Since World War II (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1986), pp. 10-16. Work on nuclear weapons was however accelerated in 
1943 when the Soviet Union became aware of American efforts.
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first to place a satellite in orbit around the earth. ^  The Soviets were
probably eager to develop systems to counter the American strategic
advantage in nuclear capable bombers and were not satisfied with the
quantity or quality of their own bomber force.
To the Soviet military, the effectiveness of their nuclear weapons
was measured in concrete military terms that analysts in the West began to
call counterforce. According to the Soviet Maj. Gen. M.A. Mil'shtein,
it is essential to select most carefully the targets for 
strategic air strikes so that the enemy cannot deal a 
retaliatory blow.-^
During this formative period several basic patterns of Soviet nuclear
strategy were developed. War was still regarded as a political
phenomenon, the objective of which was to achieve victory, and this could
best be achieved by acting in accordance with an overarching strategy to
direct decisive blows in a counterforce manner. As the Soviet Union
entered the nuclear age, the Soviet strategic elite tended not to consider
nuclear weapons as having created a revolution in military strategy.
4. The Implications of the Early Period
The legacy of this early period on Soviet nuclear strategy is 
profound. It established a clear link between nuclear weapons and 
traditional military strategy to a degree that did not exist in the West. 
Initially this was attributed to "stagnation” in Soviet military doctrine 
caused by the direct strategic control that Stalin allegedly maintained 
over strategic thinking.^ This lack of "progress" resulted in a Western
•*7 lb id. See also William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting
Strategy," p. 93.
Cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 75.
Ibid.. p. 63.
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perception that Soviet thought was lagging behind that of the West, but 
this view downplays the significant continuity between traditional 
military thought and subsequent Soviet strategic innovations. What this 
period did do is instill a strong desire for professional autonomy and 
influence among senior military officers who were responsible for 
producing Soviet military doctrine and nuclear strategy.60 With the fear 
of another purge lifted, these officers moved the strategic debate onto 
more visible levels and began to clarify their war fighting orientation 
toward nuclear weapons. Their problem was how to defeat a superior war 
fighting capability of the United States, and thus Soviet nuclear strategy 
closely resembled the traditional emphasis of the compellent paradigm.
III. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY
In the period between the mid 1950's and the late 1960's, the Soviets 
slowly but steadily developed the capability to attack and destroy the 
United States, and in the process recognized the scientific-technical 
revolution related to nuclear weapons. As Soviet nuclear programmes 
evolved, tensions over military doctrine developed between Khrushchev and
C 1
his senior military officers, and Soviet strategy reached a crossroads. 
Fundamental issues regarding the utility of nuclear weapons were only 
resolved after Khrushchev's dismissal when an important political military 
consensus was reached. This section will examine the changes in nuclear 
strategy from the paradigmatic perspective to ascertain the declaratory
Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for
Limited Nuclear Operations, p. 27. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, The Role 
of the Military in Post-Stalin Soviet Politics. (Santa Monica, California: 
Rand Corporation P-937, 1956), p. 20.
61 Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 259-262. Khrushchev 
began to back track from his stance in the mid 1950's that had earned him 
sufficient military support to oust Malenkov.
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nature of Soviet military doctrine.
1. Strategic Intentions
The advantage of an overarching ideology is that Soviet fundamental 
political objectives are relatively constant over time. What varies of 
course is the policy to achieve them. The advent of the ICBM, from which 
no real defence appeared possible, seriously challenged the tenet that 
nuclear weapons had not radically changed the nature of war.
Although Khrushchev in 1954 was able to oust his rival Malenkov in 
part through the support of the military, he subsequently demobilized 
about one million men and began to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons. 
However, when he attempted in 1959 to cut defence budgets further and 
again reduce the size of the Soviet army, his emphasis on nuclear 
substitutes antagonized more than just the "traditionalists" in the Soviet 
armed forces.^ Many in the Soviet military were reluctant to underwrite 
the short war concept inherent in Khrushchev's concept of strategic rocket 
war even if the early missiles could be made more reliable. To them 
powerful conventional forces were still essential. This brought the 
military doctrine of Khrushchev into serious conflict with his military 
officers who for the most part sought military superiority at all levels 
as emphasized by Marshal Grechko: Soviet armed forces "must always be
C O
superior to those of the imperialists." J
By the twenty second congress of the Communist party, a compromise
Yosef Avidar, The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union, pp. 
246-301. This solid study is based on interviews with several Soviet 
sources. See also Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategic Thought in Transition 
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-2906, 1964), p. 12. The
"modernists" favoured increased reliance on nuclear weapons, but the 
"traditionalists" viewed nuclear weapons primarily as adjuncts to strong 
conventional forces.
^  Thomas W. Wolfe, Strategic Thought in Transition, p. 14.
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was reached. It reflected the attempt to incorporate both the strategic 
rocket forces and balanced military forces in a new military doctrine that 
was first published in Marshal Sokolovsky's book, Military Strategy. 
Tension in military doctrine nevertheless remained over the primacy of 
nuclear weapons and the issue of whether nuclear war could still be won. 
Political leaders tended to fear the consequences of nuclear escalation, 
while military officers clung to the theoretical possibility of military 
victory. The third edition of Marshal Sokolovsky's book marked another 
important political military consensus in that escalation was no longer
C A
considered inevitable.
The goal of military superiority was strongly held by the Soviet 
military elite;
to assert that victory is not at all possible in a nuclear 
war would not only be untrue on theoretical grounds but 
dangerous as well from the political point of view.^
One year later another Soviet military author was even more explicit in
proclaiming that "long industrial efforts" were required to win the
f i f i"struggle for superiority" that "must be waged continually."00 Nuclear 
strategic forces were a vital component of military strategy, and
^  V.D. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, edited by Harriet Fast 
Scott, p. 69. Also between the first and third editions, the McNamara 
doctrine of counterforce was introduced, and it in turn affected Soviet 
doctrine. Note that the title of Sokolovsky's book is incorrect in this 
American translation.
Lieutenant-Colonel E. Rybkin, "On the Nature of a Nuclear Missile 
War," in Roman Kolkowicz, The Red Hawks on the Rationality of Nuclear War 
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation RM-4899-PR, 1966), p. 46. For 
the view that Rybkin represents official Soviet policy, see William F. 
Scott, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy: Realities and
Misunderstandings," Strategic Review 3 (Summer 1975), p. 62.
^  Lieutenant - Co lone 1 R.M. Bondarenko, "Military-Technical 
Superiority: the Most Important Factor of the Reliable Defence of the
Country," Communist of the Armed Forces 17 (September 1966) translated in 
William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott, eds. and translators, The 
Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman, Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), p. 358.
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superiority appeared to be the ultimate military objective.
A major difficulty in Soviet military doctrine, however, was the fact 
that even if a Soviet pre-emptive attack resulted in the first decisive 
use of nuclear weapons, the United States could still inflict intolerable 
damage on the USSR. The concept of assured destruction was not popular 
among the Soviet military, but it was an objective reality that 
underscored the tensions with political leaders over military doctrine. ^  
As the Soviet Union gradually achieved the ability to destroy the United 
States, however, Soviet strategy became less concerned with an American 
direct attack and focussed on the far more demanding task of deterring 
American nuclear use if a Soviet conventional victory in Europe appeared 
likely. The overriding Soviet objective became avoiding nuclear
devastation of the USSR while still being free to pursue ideological and 
political goals.
During this period, the primary objective of Soviet strategy appeared 
to have been to catch up with the United States to check American
strategic power. This aim and the desirability of achieving superiority 
as a long term goal displayed a tendency to compellence, but it was also 
clear that a strong component of deterrence was imbedded in it. This was 
not the strategy of a status quo power, and the Soviet Union actively
sought to compel a gradual change in Europe that would enhance the 
security and stability of the socialist system. ^ 9 The attempt to place
^  Gerald Segal and John Baylis, Soviet Strategy, pp. 11-22.
^  Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 49. Although this
study is written from a fairly narrow deterrent perspective, it is 
nevertheless an excellent work.
^  John Van Oudenaren, "The Soviet Conception of Europe and Arms 
Negotiations," in Uwe Nerlich, The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the
Competition over Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1983), p. 162 and p. 178.
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offensive missiles in Cuba must be seen in this context, and it is usually 
portrayed as a shortcut to catching up to U.S. strategic power.70
In Soviet strategy, compellence and deterrence thus became 
intermeshed in the dialectical synthesis that sought to resolve the 
tensions between military doctrine and military science. Although the 
military had made major efforts to identify Soviet military doctrine with 
the fundamentals of military science, in the final analysis political 
interests were not that different, and by the late 1960's a consensus 
emerged.71
The USSR is quite serious about deterring an American 
nuclear attack, but it rejects any notion that the United 
States is equally justified in seeking to deter a Soviet 
attack.72
2. The Threat of Force
The first significant use of nuclear threats by the Soviet Union 
occurred in this period. While Khrushchev was particularly prone to 
nuclear boastfulness, most of the implied or explicit threats between the 
mid 1950's and the late 1960's were general military threats that were not 
specifically nuclear. According to the data of one superb study, the 
total number of threats to use force appeared to have remained relatively
70 Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 
214.
71 Thomas W. Wolfe, The Role of the Soviet Military in Decision 
Making and Soviet Politics (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 
1963), p. 3. The right wing view is that those who felt nuclear weapons 
have utility won out. See Richard Pipes testimony in the Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Soviet Strategic Forces (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), p. 
4.
72 William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy 
Since World War II. p. 24.
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constant compared to previous years.73 This was consistent with the
Soviet propensity to rely on military threats to support foreign policy,
but in only one case was the USSR ever thought to have increased its
nuclear alert status.7^
If the quantity of military threats did not change with the
introduction of nuclear weapons the nature of those threats did. The
Soviet Union only threatened the use of nuclear weapons implicitly in
support of military force in general and reserved explicit nuclear threats
for vital interests.75 The greater the commitment to a given policy, the
greater the propensity to threaten significant military force, and the
greater the likelihood of potential escalation to nuclear levels. In
those cases where force was used to coerce, it was meant not only to deter
7 f tcertain behaviour but also to compel an action. ° Until the Soviet Union 
achieved at least parity with the United States, however, it generally 
attempted to use military threats as a "counter-deterrent" to deter the 
United States from resorting to its nuclear deterrent. Thus for the USSR, 
the American concept of deterrence was a double-edged sword, "capable of 
offence as well as defence."77 The Soviet leaders retained a declaratory
73 Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 689-693.
7^ That case was Cuba, but recent evidence indicates that no Soviet 
nuclear alert was called. See comments by David Burchival and Richard H. 
Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, "U.S. Strategic Airpower, 1948-1962: 
Excerpts from and Interview with Generals Curtis E. Lemay, Leon W. 
Johnson, David A. Burchival and Jack J. Cotton," International Security 
12 (Spring 1988), p. 95.
73 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet 
Strategy (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-5506, 1975), p. 20.
76 Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power, p. 644. Soviet use of 
force to influence behaviour in East Europe is an obvious example.
77 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: A Historical 
Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 111.
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strategy that emphasized military targets in a war fighting capacity in an 
effort to neutralize the American nuclear advantage.
To a Soviet military officer in the 1960's, fighting a limited 
nuclear war was to misuse a decisive strategic weapon and had no place in 
Soviet declaratory strategy. The underlying rationale was probably that 
it might weaken the effectiveness of Soviet restraints on the Western use 
of military and nuclear p o w e r .7® Soviet emphasis on a pre-emptive nuclear 
strategy of first decisive use was criticized for avoiding the realities 
of nuclear combat, 79 but even if all the forces were not yet in place to 
support this strategy, it still held considerable deterrent value. Soviet 
strategists regarded with contempt complicated Western attempts at 
creating escalation ladders, being inclined to view these formulations as
products of misplaced scholasticism on the part of naive
civilian defence intellectuals, who neither understand war
nor treat important defence issues with the sort of
80 %seriousness they properly warrant.
To a Soviet officer, a decision to engage in war is the key threshold, and 
once joined in battle, nuclear weapons must be used decisively or not at 
all.
Of those threats in this period that could be considered serious 
enough to escalate to the nuclear level, the Suez crisis was the first. 
Khrushchev attempted to use nuclear threats against the British and 
French, but when SACEUR declared that the United States was prepared to
7^ Leon Goure, Soviet Limited Nuclear War Doctrine (Santa Monica, 
California: Rand Corporation P-2744, 1963), p. 15.
79 Peter King, "Two Eyes for a Tooth: The State of Soviet
Strategic Doctrine," Survey 24 (Winter 1970), pp. 45-46.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, "On Thresholds In Soviet Military Thought," 
The Washington Quarterly 7 (Spring 1984), p. 73.
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retaliate, Soviet nuclear posturing quickly a b a t e d . I n  the second case 
the Soviet Union achieved its objectives in crushing the revolt in Hungary 
in spite of the American strategic superiority, and this may have later 
encouraged Khrushchev to run increased risks in B e r l i n . Thirdly, the 
decision to place offensive missiles in Cuba may have been a risky attempt 
to gain some strategic leverage over the United States, but Khrushchev 
appeared genuinely appalled at the possibility of war.®® A final 
significant use of a threat was the Soviet nuclear threat against China in 
1969. This threat followed six months of tensions and culminated in the 
cessation of border incidents; China felt compelled to begin negotiations 
within one month of the threat.®^ All Soviet threats were relatively 
contingent and limited to a specific target, a characteristic of 
compellent use. These threats were not intended to lead to war, but were 
carefully planned to create a politically exploitable environment.®-*
To a similar degree, Khrushchev attempted to enhance the perception
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 
393. Soviet threats were issued only after Eisenhower's ultimatum to 
London and Paris. See Robert J. Hanks, American Sea Power and Global 
Strategy (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's , 1985), p. 56.
For support for this view, see Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, 
Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 212-213.
®® Sergey Vladislavovich Chugrov, "Political Reefs of the Caribbean 
Crisis," Mirovava Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnwe Otnosheniva (May 1989),
translated by FBIS/JPRS 7 September 1989, pp. 14-23. See also Raymond
Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story," Foreign Policy (Fall
1988), 66. That Khrushchev expressed empathy with the pain and horror of 
war was revealed in his letter to Kennedy. See Robert F. Kennedy,
Thirteen Days (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 86-88.
®^ Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Force, p. 647; and David 
Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 87. For an account of 
how senior Soviet military officers helped convey these threats, see Harry 
Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), pp. 102-3.
®® Kenneth Booth, The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy, 
p . 58.
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of Soviet nuclear power. According to one study, what matters is not 
superiority as such, but the perception of superiority.^^ Khrushchev 
clearly attempted not only to accelerate the acquisition of Soviet nuclear 
power, but he also sought to enhance the image of Soviet nuclear power. 
To extract concessions in political negotiations over critical issues such 
as Berlin, he sustained the image of a growing Soviet lead in missile 
technology "through frequent misleading claims on Soviet missile 
strength. "87
This brief analysis of the use of nuclear threats indicates that 
their quantity and nature demonstrate the interrelationship of both 
compellent and deterrent characteristics. The use of the nuclear threat 
against China, a country over which the USSR had nuclear superiority is a 
good indicator of a compellent component in the Soviet use of threats.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
It was during this period that the Soviet Union progressed from a 
position of strategic inferiority to one of perceived parity with the 
United States. According to Benjamin Lambeth, Soviet nuclear doctrine 
had not really changed that much; what had changed was the Soviet ability
OO
to field more modern nuclear systems to implement it.00 This was 
attributable to Soviet resource allocations that increased defence
Jonathan Steele, World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy Under
Brezhnev and Andropov (London: Michael Joseph, 1983), p. 37.
Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: 
Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1982), p. 47. This is a good review of Soviet nuclear force construction. 
See also Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Policy under Khrushchev's 
Successors (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-3193, 1965), p. 25.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Contemporary Soviet Military Policy," in 
Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds., The Soviet Calculus 
of Nuclear War, p. 32.
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spending steadily from about 1960 until at least 1976 in spite of a
O Q
serious impact on the Soviet economy. 7
The scale and proportion of this early Soviet nuclear development
implies that catching up with the United States was an overriding
objective. The attempt to place medium range missiles in Cuba would have
put a substantial proportion of United States strategic bases under risk 
of a no-warning attack. The Soviet effort appeared intended to create a 
"fait accompli" of such a nature that the prompt unilateral action 
required to reverse it would require the initiation of violence.90 This 
action and subsequent Soviet ICBM deployments demonstrated that the USSR 
probably did not regard the possession of an assured destruction 
capability against the United States as an adequate guarantee of Soviet 
security. It appears that the Soviet Union intended as a minimum to match 
the United States in strategic power and regarded superiority as clearly 
preferable.91
The Soviet assessment of the combat utility of nuclear weapons during 
this period also reflected the need for a wider range of military options 
and a divesting of the political liability of having a second best 
strategic posture.^ The Soviet military were seeking a fighting
**9 Abraham S. Becker, "Sitting on Bayonets? The Soviet Defence 
Burden and Moscow's Economic Dilemma," in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen 
Propper Mickiewicz eds., The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War. p. 195. 
Although increases in defence spending had slowed since 1977, it was still 
increasing. For an early version of the same article see Rand Corporation 
P-6908 (1983), p. 17.
90 Arnold L. Horelick, The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of
Soviet Calculations and Behaviour (Santa Monica, California: Rand
Corporation RM-3739-PR, 1963), p. vii.
91 David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 44.
92 Georgy Melorovich, "Soviet American Relations at a New Stage," 
Mirovava Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnvve Otnosheniva (September 1988) , 
translated by FRIS/JPRS 24 January 1989, p. 19. See also Thomas W. Wolfe, 
Evolution of Soviet Military Policy (Santa Monica, California: Rand
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capability second to none, and the standard distinctions in Western 
strategic discourse between first and second strike and between tactical 
and strategic nuclear operations were "entirely alien to the idiom of 
Soviet military philosophy."93 To a Soviet war planner, damage limitation 
was a key element, and this reinforced a tendency to pre-emptive strategy, 
civil defence and attacking enemy command and control.94 If war was 
perceived to be inevitable in a crisis, then Soviet strategy sought to 
alter the initial correlation of forces as rapidly as possible by 
optimizing the use of its available forces. Soviet strategists believed 
that if strategic command, control and communications were destroyed at 
the outset of nuclear war, the United States nuclear response would be 
ragged and uncoordinated allowing increased scope for other damage 
limitation measures.^ The SS-9 Soviet ICBM with a 20 megaton warhead 
designed in this period, was probably intended for attacks on U.S. 
Minutemen launch control centers and other "nuclear decapitation" tasks. ° 
This Soviet strategy was an effective way to deal with a larger more 
diverse nuclear force; without effective command and control, American
Corporation P-3773, 1968), p. 7.
93 Benjamin S. Lambeth, "How to Think About Soviet Military 
Doctrine," in Gerald Segal and John Baylis, eds., Soviet Strategy, p. 113. 
Strike connotes the use of nuclear weapons.
9^ Fritz Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic 
Thought," in Derek Leebaert ed., Soviet Military Thinking (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 65-66. Active and passive defence operates in 
conjunction with pre-emptive attacks, see Leon Goure, The Role of Civil 
Defence in Soviet Strategy (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation RM- 
3703-PR, 1963), p. V.
93 Desmond Ball, "Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of 
Nuclear War" in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz eds., The 
Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, p. 50.
96 John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy 45 
(Winter 1980-1981), p. 18. See also Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, 
Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 53.
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limited war options would be ineffective.
Soviet efforts to construct a credible strategic nuclear force
appeared directed to increasing their relative strategic position, not
achieving assured destruction. Soviet strategic thought in this period
developed on a different track than in the United States and emphasized
the ability to fight. Deterrence was to be ensured by having the ability
to win if possible, but significant demands on nuclear forces appeared to
approach the requirements for compellence.
The strategic course of U.S. policies is now changing before 
our very eyes from "pax Americana" to a definite form of
necessity for peaceful coexistence. We must clearly
understand that this change is a forced one and it is 
precisely the power of the Soviet Union and the socialist 
countries that is compelling American ruling circles to 
engage in an agonizing reappraisal of values.^
4. The Implications of Parity
As parity became tangible, Soviet military doctrine shifted to a pre­
emptive declaratory strategy for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, Soviet 
nuclear inferiority made it obvious that if the Soviet Union was to have 
any chance of winning a nuclear war, its strategy must allow it to land 
the first decisive blows. Secondly, an offensive oriented strategy 
required minimal modification of pre-nuclear military strategy thus 
maintaining a consistent approach to Soviet security that was 
ideologically compatible with Soviet foreign policy objectives. It may be 
that Soviet threats to use and the actual use of military force in East 
Europe directly reflected Soviet strategic weakness, in that force was the
^  Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler and Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear 
Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Miami, Florida: University of Miami, 
1974), p. xxiii. The theme was echoed by Marshal A.A. Grechko in The 
Armed Forces of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 272.
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only potential lever available. The pre-emptive nuclear strategy
probably reflected the Soviet need to deter United States nuclear threats 
while at the same time supporting an ideologically aggressive foreign 
policy. It combined a clear sense of purpose and an unrivalled 
conventional army in an attempt to maximize Soviet comparative strategic 
advantages, recognizing that nuclear weapons have not changed the 
fundamental relationship between policy and war.^
The Soviet goal of achieving at least parity with the United States
was an extremely high priority, but many in the strategic community viewed
military superiority as the ultimate objective. The use of threats 
indicated an early propensity to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to 
gain political advantage. During this period, the deterrence of American 
nuclear power, a fundamental requirement to protect the Soviet Union, did 
not constrain the Soviets from actively pursuing a declaratory strategy 
that also contained a significant amount of compellence.
IV. THE SEARCH FOR ADVANTAGE. 1970-1986
In the 1970-1986 period, great controversy over the strategic 
intentions of the Soviet Union centered on whether or not the Soviet 
leaders still sought military superiority. The political military 
consensus over strategic military doctrine that was reached in the late
9^ In the sense that real power and the need to threaten violence 
are opposites. See Hanna Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1970), pp. 53-56.
99 a . Belyayev, "Defining Modern Wars: Conventional, Nuclear,"
Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (April 1985) , translated by FBIS/JPRS 29 
August 1985, p. 19. See also Benjamin S. Lambeth, Trends in Soviet 
Military Policy (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-6819, 1982), 
p. 23.
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1960's began to show signs of increasing tension in the later 1970's.100 
At least since 1977 Soviet political declarations have implied greater 
acceptance of nuclear deterrence,101 but the continuous build up of Soviet 
military forces has resulted in the accumulation of military equipment far 
in excess of what one might reasonably expect for defensive p u r p o s e s . 102 
This section will examine Soviet nuclear strategy (1970-1986) to determine 
which paradigmatic approach more closely reflected Soviet policy. The 
analysis of Soviet strategic intentions will determine, to the extent that 
available evidence permits, the degree of strategic consensus within the 
Soviet political-military elite. Subsequent sections will analyze the use 
of threats and the correlation of proximate nuclear forces.
1. Strategic Intentions
Although the tone of Soviet foreign policy may have moderated 
somewhat from the days of Stalin and Khrushchev, the underlying objectives 
did not appear to have changed. The Soviet achievement of nuclear parity 
added momentum to a cautious incrementalist strategy to outflank, envelope 
and neutralize her divided adversaries and eventually force them to 
acquiesce to Soviet hegemony. The fundamental goal of such action 
appeared to be the alteration of the global correlation of forces by
100 In the early 1970's the conservative trend in reaction to 
Khrushehev's reforms still held considerable influence. See Roy A. and 
Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1976), p. 183.
Cynthia Roberts, "Soviet Military Policy in Transition," Current 
History (October 1984), p. 332. See also Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual 
Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," Strategic 
Review 4 (Fall 1982), p. 49.
102 United States Department of Defence, Soviet Military Power 1987 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1987), p. 21. The Soviet force construction 
has raised concerns parallel to those raised after Sputnik. See Herbert
S. Dinerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking," Foreign 
Affairs 36 (January 1958), p. 252.
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increasing Soviet pressure on Europe, the strategic pivot of Soviet 
i maspirations. This was not only traditional great power behaviour, but
it was legitimized by an ideology that ascribed a dominant role to 
military power and was supported by a strategic culture that accepted 
nuclear weapons as an important component in this process.
The Soviet Union clearly continued to see some utility in its nuclear 
arsenal to support its policies, and it rejected any acceptance of a 
status quo, particularly one based on a previous correlation of forces 
that had significantly changed.^ 4  In this sense the Soviet leaders 
rejected the notions of "equivalence" or "balance" for they implied 
acceptance of a status quo; they embraced concepts such as "equal 
security" and "correlation of forces" that are more permissive and 
elastic.
Soviet political values included an ideology that implied a 
fundamental questioning of the legitimacy of the United States regime. In 
a dialectical fashion, Marxist-Leninist ideology provides such purpose and 
direction to pragmatic politics that traditional state policy is held to 
be complementary to the class dominant paradigm.^ 6  The Soviet leaders
103 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: 
Imperial and Global (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1981), p. 259.
During the Brezhnev period, the correlation of forces was particularly 
influential. Chapter eight covers this in more detail.
Sh. Sanakoyev, "The World Today: Problem of the Correlation of 
Forces," International Affairs" (November 1974), pp. 45-49. Soviet 
analysts believe that the correlation of forces has serious implications 
for international relations. See Abraham S. Becker, Strategic Breakout as 
a Soviet Policy Option (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1977), 
pp. 53-56.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet 
Equivalence," International Security 4 (Fall 1979), pp. 25-26. This is a 
good paper.
John Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 267.
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also expressed concerns that the United States rejected the Soviet Union's 
right to exist as a major actor in international politics.107 Thus,
fundamental political antagonisms existed which, for the Soviet rulers, 
maintained the possibility of cataclysmic conflict and drove a requirement 
for powerful nuclear forces.
Increasingly, the Soviet Union was coming to terms with the fact that
in spite of considerable efforts by the military, the USSR was still
liable to be destroyed in any nuclear war. Soviet forces have in the past
and continue to assign high priority to missile and space defence in spite
of a significant technological lag in this area. SDI was therefore seen
as an American attempt to push Moscow into a distant second place in the
1 ORtechnological competition by breaking the rules agreed upon in SALT. wo 
The possibility of a global climatic change or a nuclear winter possibly 
reinforced a growing tendency to focus on conventional weapons, but the 
Soviet military have been reluctant to accept this hypothesis.109 Soviet 
leaders understood that the biggest threat to political control of the 
party in the USSR was a possible breakdown in war, and the nuclear forces 
of the United States posed their most immediate danger. It may be that 
the growing Soviet focus on the conventional phase of war and the 
acknowledged possibility of the non-use of nuclear weapons was leading to 
an ultimate view in some quarters that war cannot be won with nuclear
107 v.  Bolshakov, "Human Rights in the U.S. Strategy of Social 
Revenge," International Journal (January 1986), p. 26. See also Lawrence 
T. Caldwell and Robert Levgold, "Reagan through Soviet Eyes," Foreign 
Policy 52 (Fall 1983), p. 5.
108 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Soviet Union and the Strategic Defence 
Initiative: Preliminary Findings and Impressions (Santa Monica,
California: Rand Corporation N-2482-AF, 1986), p. 30.
109 Stephen Shenfield, "Nuclear Winter and the USSR," Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 15 (Summer 1986), p. 206. See Annex A.
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weapons . H ®
The issue of whether the Soviet Union really sought strategic or 
nuclear superiority was emotive and hinged in part on whether the Soviet 
Union ever believed it could fight and win a nuclear war. Richard Pipes, 
among other hawkish observers, felt that the Soviet leaders aspired to 
reach this objective.m  A more balanced study however determined that 
since about December, 1966 the Soviet goal of superiority dropped to a 
second order of objectives while deterrence of nuclear devastation became 
the first order Soviet goal.H^ Yet another analysis found that 
"conservative" and "modernizing" factions with the Soviet elite "disagreed
*1 1 O
about the merits of pursuing strategic superiority. " The official 
American view from 1978 to 1986 appears to support Richard Pipes, and the 
United States National Intelligence Estimate acknowledged for the first 
time in 1977 that the Soviet Union was really striving for superiority. 
Others felt that the twin drives for global domination and total security 
compelled the USSR toward constant expansion that denied the possibility
110 xhis is Marshal Ogarkhov's theme in History Teaches Vigilance 
(Moscow: 1985). This view is also held by Malcolm Macintosh, Operation
Research Analysis Establishment Lecture (Ottawa: ORAE Lecture, 13 April
1987).
H I  Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Can Fight and 
Win a Nuclear War," Commentary (July 1977). See also Francis P. and
Amoretta M. Hoeber, "The Soviet View of Deterrence: Who Whom?" Survey 25
(Spring 1980), p. 19.
H 2  Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, 
p. 235. This first class study notes the strong Soviet desire to avoid 
the devastation of the USSR if at all possible.
H I  Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, The Scientific-
Technological Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Pergamon
Press, 1982), p. 184.
11^ Eugene V. Rostow in Forward to Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and 
Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy For Nuclear War (Stanford, California: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. xii. The right wing in the U.S. 
begins to gain domestic influence as Soviet declaratory strategy was
becoming increasingly deterrence oriented.
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of reaching any point of lasting equilibrium between the superpowers.
The key issue may not be whether Soviet leaders ever believed the
achievement of a nuclear superiority to be possible, but rather whether
they believed that a proper combination of weapons systems and strategy
could achieve political advantages.
Whether or not the Soviets seek strategic superiority, every 
aspect of their force development over the past two decades 
points toward their determination to see what the traffic 
will bear in 
can acquire...
A major question that arises from the conflicting evidence is whether 
the political-military strategic consensus achieved in the 1960's had 
unravelled by the 1980's. Brezhnev's declaration in 1977 that no one 
could win a nuclear war, the Soviet declaration of 1982 not to be the 
first country to use nuclear weapons, and Gorbachev's initiatives in 
national security all seemed to question the continuing degree to which 
the military could retain its impressive control over strategic 
matters.H7 This military position was primarily attributable to the 
monopoly on information and expertise on military strategic affairs in
H-^ Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest
for Superiority (Miami, Florida: Advanced International Studies
Institute, 1982), p. 284. This work provides strong support for the
compellent view. See also Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the
Decline of Detente (London: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 36.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, The State of Western Research on Soviet 
Military Strategy and Policy (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation 
N-2230-AF, 1984), p. 21. See also Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Soviet Strategic 
Conduct and the Prospects for Stability," in The Future of Strategic 
Deterrence. Adelphi Paper 161 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 35.
H 7  Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev's First Year: 
Building Power and Authority," Problems of Communism (May-June 1986), p.
2. See also Martin McCauley and Stephen Carter, Leadership and Succession 
in the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe and China (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
1986), p. 6.
pursuit of whatever strategic advantages they
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what has been an extremely compartmentalized bureaucracy. The
fundamental problem facing the Soviet Union has been slowing economic 
growth and an increasing reluctance on the part of party leaders to 
sustain the tremendous rates of growth of defence budgets that were easily 
achievable in the 1960's and 1970' s. From 1977-1982, the Soviet
military have had to adjust to decreasing growth of their budgets while 
the United States initiated a major defence buildup. The resultant 
tensions between party and military leaders in Moscow may be leading to 
party efforts to achieve greater independent analysis of strategic 
concerns implying a possible degradation of the primacy of the military in
nuclear m a t t e r s . 1 2 0
One interpretation of these events is that the party leadership 
denies that victory in nuclear war is possible while military leaders 
continue to assert that victory in nuclear war remains an "objective 
possibility." In Soviet ideological jargon this expresion allows the
1 1 O
-L-LO Senior military officers still maintain that the possibility of 
war is a harsh reality that could require offensive operations with any 
weapons. See Vice Admiral G. Kostev, "Our Military Doctrine in Light of 
New Political Thinking," Kommunist Vooruzhennvkh Sil (September 1987), 
translated by FBIS/JPRS 23 December 1987, pp. 2-4. See also Arthur J. 
Alexander, Decision Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement. Adelphi Paper 
147/148 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 
40-41.
Abraham S. Becker, Guns. Butter and Tools: Tradeoffs in Soviet
Resource Allocation (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-6816,
1982), and by the same author, "Sustaining the Burden of Soviet Defence: 
Retrospect and Prospect," in Uwe Nerlich, ed., The Soviet Asset: Military
Power in the Competition over Europe, pp. 233-276.
120 Rebecca Strode, "The Soviet Armed Forces: Adaptation to
Resource Scarcity," The Washington Quarterly 9 (Spring 1986), p. 67. 
Brezhnev in 1976-77 also took steps to reassert direct political control 
over the armed forces: he promoted himself Marshal, he announced his
chairmanship of the Defence Council and he appointed Ustinov as Defence 
Minister. It may be no coincidence that this took place prior to the 
political assertion of the Tula line. See Michael J. Deane, Political 
Control of the Soviet Armed Forces (New York: Crane Russak and Company,
1977), pp.271-272.
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military to admit the unlikelihood of the event while maintaining a
theoretical purity that allows continuity with past strategy. As
achieving an effective war fighting capability can justify limitless
military procurement, this debate is directly linked to the resource
191allocation p r o b l e m . T h e  most visible manifestation of this process was 
the dismissal of Marshal Ogarkov from the Chief of Staff position and his 
eventual apparent acceptance of the party line established by Brezhnev at 
Tula in 1977.122 Closer analysis of Ogarkov's writings, however, 
indicates that he has steadfastly supported war fighting concepts and has 
consistently avoided saying that victory in nuclear war is impossible.123 
In spite of a general acknowledgement of the reality of assured 
destruction, it appears that the Soviet military have never accepted it as 
a strategic objective. Since two-thirds of the top 200 military officers 
have retired from 1985-1988 and since Gorbachev has strengthened the 
ability of the party to independently review military matters, 12^
however, it appears likely that post 1986 military influence in the
1 9 Spolitburo will diminish.
121 George G. Weickhardt, "Ustinov versus Ogarkov," Problems of 
Communism 34 (January - February 1985), p. 78. Many military officers 
define the new doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency" in an open ended way 
with respect to military requirements. See Gloria Duffy and Jennifer Lee, 
"The Soviet Debate on Reasonable Sufficiency," Arms Control Today 18 
(October 1988), p. 21.
122 Dale R. Herspring, "Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific- 
Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs," Comparative Strategy 6 
( Number 1, 1987), pp. 29-57. Brezhnev's Tula speech initiated a new 
Soviet declaratory strategy that appears to accept assured destruction.
123 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Soviets on Nuclear War Fighting," Problems 
of Communism 35 (July-August 1986), pp. 77-79.
124- Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," U.S. News 
and World Report (March 13, 1989), pp. 40-42.
123 Strong statements from senior political leaders signify a 
decreasing military input into military doctrine. See Mikhail Gorbachev, 
Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper
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An overview of Soviet strategic intentions demonstrates impressive 
continuity in Soviet strategic thought in that Soviet fundamental 
objectives have not significantly changed. The military focus on the 
combat function is not inconsistent with the party need for deterrence to 
preserve their state. The Soviet Union evolved a strategy that prior to 
the 1980's left open the option of victory, and this required a degree of 
superiority that created a demand for high defence resource 
allocations. 126 What was probably at issue in Moscow was not whether 
superiority was desirable, but whether it was affordable or achievable. 
The Soviet Union probably had as its top priority the deterrence of an 
American nuclear attack, but at the same time it continued to manifest 
tendencies that were also attributable to the compellent paradigm.
2. The Threat of Force
The use of military threats has not abated with the Soviet Union's 
achievement of parity, and the Soviet frequency of military use over the 
years appears to have remained relatively stable. What has changed is the 
more assertive use of Soviet and allied forces to support foreign policy 
objectives, primarily in the third world. Soviet use of force led one 
observer to conclude that the Soviet Union had gained confidence and was 
prepared to run greater risks. 127 Others point out that, due to several 
uncertainties for Soviet planners, they remain cautious and will tend to
and Row, 1987), pp. 140-141; Edward Shevardnadze, "The Important Line of 
Soviet Diplomacy," International Affairs (March 1989), p. 10; and Dimitri 
Yazov, "The Soviet Proposal for European Security," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 44 (September 1988), p. 10.
126 Arnold L. Horelick, "The Strategic Mindset of the Soviet 
Military," p. 84.
127 Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (London: 
George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 40.
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avoid coercion when the United States' direct involvement is likely.12® 
The Soviet operations in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan have 
demonstrated that Soviet confidence in their ability to exploit the 
external function of their armed forces has increased, and it is highly 
probable that nuclear parity has encouraged more assertive Soviet 
behaviour.
The Soviet Union has continued to expand its nuclear systems in the 
1970's and 1980's in such a way that simple deterrence or assured 
destruction cannot explain. Most significantly, accuracy improvements and 
the "MIRVing" of "heavy" ICBM's has given the USSR a significant hard 
target kill advantage over the United States. Soviet concerns over the 
American improvements of their hard target or counterforce capability are 
probably "founded upon the desire to maintain a Soviet edge in this 
a r e a . "129 -^ he Soviet Union was also the first to deploy anti-ballistic 
missile defenses and an anti-satellite capability. The Soviet military 
have not only improved the survivability of their ICBM's by hardening 
silos and producing mobile ICBM's, but they have hardened their command 
and control facilities such that reconstitution after a nuclear attack is 
possible. 13® Although the Kremlin has put more strategic forces in 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), these systems appear to remain 
strategic war fighting reserves, and the Soviet Union tends to rely on
12® Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner," 
International Security 7 (Winter 1982-1983), p. 145. For an earlier
version see Risk and Uncertainty in Soviet Deliberations about War (Santa 
Monica, California: Rand Corporation R-2687-AF, 1981).
129 Robin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet Union and 
Strategic Arms (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 101. This 
book provides a solid overview of Soviet nuclear thinking.
1 ^  Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet Control
Structure: Capabilities for Wartime Survival (New York: Crane Russak,
1983), p. 129. See also David Rees, Soviet Preparedness (London:
Institute for the Study of Conflict #163, 1984), p. 32.
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ICBM's for their priority targets.
The concept of fighting limited nuclear war is still rejected by the 
Soviet elite as an American ploy to make its diversified strategic systems 
more useful in combat. Not only does the United States have a 
technological advantage in this domain, but geographical asymmetries could 
favour the United States in a limited nuclear war. There is however 
increasing possibility the Soviet Union would respect a limited nuclear
1 0 1
war as long as Soviet soil was not targeted. This Soviet rejection of
limited nuclear war appears to contradict what otherwise is a consistent 
war fighting approach, and the explanation likely has more to do with 
deterring the NATO nuclear deterrent than any other f a c t o r . T h e ^ey 
variable here is for the Soviet Union to avoid its devastation through 
escalation to intercontinental nuclear strikes.
Since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviet Union has kept the 
focus of the use of its military power on its conventional capabilities. 
No explicit nuclear threats have been noted since 1969, but in two cases 
at least the threat of escalation was sufficiently high to warrant 
attention. The first case occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and 
involved widely perceived Soviet preparations to deploy their airborne 
forces to protect Egypt from a humiliating defeat. Soviet military 
posturing made their threat to intervene sufficiently credible that, 
notwithstanding conciliatory signs from Brezhnev, the United States placed 
its forces on a global nuclear alert and pressured Israel to stop its
General Gareyev, a leading doctrinal spokesman for the Soviet 
military establishment has implied this. See David Yost, Soviet Ballistic 
Missile Defence and the Western Alliance (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 113. See also Jonathan S. Lockwood, 
The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decision-
Making (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1983), p. 1973, and 
Benjamin S. Lambeth, "On Thresholds in Soviet Military Thought," p. 75.
Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War, p. 379.
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offensive and respect the c e a s e f i r e A f t e r  close analysis of the 
Soviet threat it appears more likely that the Soviet Union "did not intend 
actual battlefield intervention, but rather the threat of 
intervention. "134 this is so, then the real objective of the Kremlin
may have been to compel the United States to apply greater pressure on 
Israel to cease its operations by threatening a military action that could 
bring superpower forces into mutual conflict. The second case involved 
extensive Soviet military posturing during the Polish crisis with the 
apparent aim of compelling action on the part of the Polish government to 
control Solidarnosc. It is quite plausible that military "exercises" may 
have also been intended to deter NATO reaction to any necessary Soviet 
military action in Poland. Both cases involved implicit nuclear threats 
and a high degree of contingency; deterrence and compellence clearly 
appear in each threat.
The Soviet leaders perceived the need for flexible and accurate 
nuclear systems and appeared to believe that offensive power was essential
I O C
to their claim to superpower status. They viewed with concern United
States' attempts to contain Soviet force development, claiming the United 
States wanted its deterrence of the Soviet Union to be "more efficient"
133 Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power, p. 656. United States 
intelligence also believed that nuclear materials were deliberately being 
shipped toward Egypt and this may have been with knowledge the United 
States would detect them. (Interview with retired senior officer who 
worked at NORAD Headquarters during the DEFCON 3 alert.)
13^ Galia Golan, "Soviet Decision-Making in the Yom Kippur War, 
1973," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter eds., Soviet Decision Making 
for National Security (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 210.
135 See Soviet Defence Minister Yazov's comments cited in Soviet 
Military Power (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1988), p. 12. See also Fritz 
Ermath, "The Evolution of Soviet Doctrine," in Power and Policy: 
Doctrine. The Alliance and Arms Control Adelphi Paper no. 206 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), p. 7.
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than Soviet deterrence of the United States.136 Thus Moscow viewed the 
American military buildup under Reagan as an attempt by the United States 
to achieve military superiority. 137 This reflected the Soviet view that 
nuclear superiority can be a meaningful commodity that at some point 
translates into political advantage.
In general, since Khrushchev, Soviet leaders have continued to avoid 
direct nuclear threats against the United States and have tended to rely 
primarily on their superior conventional forces to provide implicit 
support for their policies. Nevertheless the Soviet counterforce 
capability and the nature of Soviet threats indicated that at least some 
compellent tendencies were imbedded in their nuclear strategy. As 
demonstrated in 1973, the Soviet Union had shown more interest in 
exploiting international crises than in preventing them.138
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
In the Soviet lexicon, the correlation of forces tends to be viewed 
in its totality, and the nuclear correlation is therefore seen in a longer 
term perspective than in the West. The Soviet analysts tend to focus on 
trends rather than static balances, and in their view the overall
13 6 John Erickson, "The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General
Survey," Survival 24 (November-December 1982), p. 247. The same article 
is reprinted in Frank Barnaby and Geoffrey Thomas, The Nuclear Arms Race
- Control or Catastrophe?, pp. 73-93.
13 7 Aleksey Alekseyevich Vasilyev and Mikhail Gerasev, "Certain
Results of the Reagan Administration's Military - Political Course,"
Mirovava Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnvye Otnosheniva (May 1988), translated by 
FBIS/JPRS 6 October 1988, p. 33. See also Paul Dibb, The Soviet Union: 
The Incomplete Superpower, p. 124, and Lawrence T. Caldwell, "Optimism 
Versus Pessimism: A Soviet View of the Strategic Environment," in Keith
A. Dunn and William 0. Staudenmaier, Alternative Military Strategies for 
the Future (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p. 63.
138 Philip Windsor, "The Soviet Union in the International System 
of the 1980's" in Christoph Bertram, ed. , Prospects of Soviet Power 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1980), p. 21.
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correlation of forces is shifting in their favour. Believing that the
achievement of parity was not an accident, the Soviet Union appeared 
determined to seek a "quantitative and qualitative" advantage in weapons 
and forces to support foreign policy; Soviet declarations to the contrary 
could have been, at least to some degree, disinformation.-^^ Although 
many in the West have belittled Soviet technical capabilities to produce 
first class equipment, Soviet design philosophy has emphasized operational 
effectiveness through simplicity, and the "consumer sovereignty" of the 
Soviet Armed Forces ensures that these criteria are met.-^^ Soviet 
nuclear systems in the 1980's displayed increasing sophistication, and 
the variety of yields and accuracy appeared well suited to the operational 
requirement of attacking military targets.
During this recent period, the numbers of nuclear delivery systems 
stabilized, even though the total numbers of deliverable warheads 
increased far beyond that required for assured destruction purposes. The 
SALT limits, however, have established an upper numerical limit that the 
Soviet Union will not likely exceed. Increasingly, Soviet political 
leaders appear to have reached the conclusion that the payoff for 
additional nuclear systems does not warrant the cost. The realization 
that a European war could remain conventional for a significant period has 
also resulted in Soviet command and control changes leading to increased
Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of 
Detente. p. 29. This was particularly true of the Brezhnev era.
1^0 william T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy 
Since World War II. pp. 29-34. See also Max Beloff, "The Military Factor 
in Soviet Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism 30 (January-February 
1981), p. 73.
Stan Woods, Weapon Acquisition in the Soviet Union (Aberdeen, 
Scotland: Centre for Defence Studies, 1982), p. 63. See also Mikail
Agursky, The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex (Jerusalem: The Magnes
Press, 1980), p. 31.
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centralization and hardening of nuclear assets to protect them from 
conventional attack. Because the Soviet Union has a comparative
advantage in deploying ground forces, a rough equivalence at the strategic 
nuclear level can provide a "nuclear umbrella" that could allow the Soviet 
Union to pursue more assertive policies along its periphery. In short,
strategic nuclear weapons can deter Western first use while compellence at 
lower levels can be pursued to modify the international status quo. 
Notwithstanding Soviet pronouncements of their peaceful intentions, the 
use of force in Afghanistan and the threat of force in the Polish crisis 
displayed a certain Soviet confidence in their ability to apply military 
power to achieve their political aims.
The overall correlation of forces has made these Soviet advances
possible, but military power is its essence.
The ultimate purpose of Soviet military power is not simply 
to deter an attack on the USSR, but to intimidate the 
opponent to the point of paralyzing his will to resist 
Soviet geopolitical advances.
Although the above appears to have been generally accepted by the Soviet
strategic elite, it is important to note that no clearly defined strategy
John G. Hines and Phillip A. Petersen, "Changing the Soviet 
System of Control: Focus on Theatre Warfare," International Defence
Review (March 1986), p. 281.
Bernard Brodie, The Communist Reach for Empire (Santa Monica, 
California: Rand Corporation P-2916, 1964), p. 17. See also Avigdor
Haselkorn, The Evolution of Soviet Strategy 1965-1975 (New York: Crane
Russak, 1978), p. 92.
144 Dimitri Simes, "Deterrence and Coercion in Soviet Foreign 
Policy," International Security 5 (Winter 1980-1981), p. 97.
M.A. Suslov, Selected Speeches and Writings (Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1980), p . 6.
Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest
for Superiority (Miami, Florida: Advanced International Studies
Institute, 1982), p. 186. This corresponds closely with the views of 
Robert E. Osgood in his Containment. Soviet Behaviour and Grand Strategy 
(Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, 1981), pp. 9-15.
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exists to make it h a p p e n . T h e  Soviet leadership, however, seems to 
have been reasonably satisfied with the return on its military investment. 
To them,
Soviet power is credited with "sobering" the United States 
and "compelling" it to accept detente, with accelerating the 
rise of "progressive" forces in the Third world, and
1 ZlRgenerally with preserving world peace. . .
The American adoption of flexible response inevitably appeared from the 
Soviet perspective as a United States retreat from the strategy of massive 
retaliation, and the limited nuclear options, although more disturbing, 
seemed like an American attempt to regain a lost advantage. The Soviet 
strategic community concluded that the evolution of United States 
strategic doctrine was the result of a forced response to the growth of
1 A Q
Soviet strategic power.
From the perspective of the correlation of nuclear forces, the Soviet 
leadership appears to have been seeking advantages on a macro level that 
could be translated into political significance. There appears no doubt 
that the Soviet military values military supremacy, but the competition 
with the United States has made quantifiable nuclear superiority 
unreachable. Nevertheless the overall search for a favourable correlation 
of forces means that the Soviet Union would be happy to accept nuclear
Robert Levgold, "Military Power in International Politics: 
Soviet Doctrine on its Centrality and Instrumentality," in Uwe Nerlich, 
ed., The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition over Europe
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 1983), p. 148.
John Van Oudenaren, Deterrence. War-Fighting and Soviet Military 
Doctrine. Adelphi Paper 210 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1983), p. 41.
Colonel P. Skorodenko, "Military Strategic Parity as a Factor in 
Preventing War," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (June 1988), translated by 
FBIS/JPRS 15 September 1988, pp. 3-8. See also Jonathan S. Lockwood, The 
Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decision Making.
p. 174.
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advantages were the United States to default.^® Although deterrence of 
American nuclear attack in all conditions probably remains the most 
important Soviet strategic requirement, Soviet nuclear strategy also 
displayed compellent characteristics in that the achievement of nuclear 
advantages over the long term remained a fundamental goal.
4. The Implications of the Search for Advantage
In spite of apparent changes in military doctrine post 1977, a 
consistent tendency of Soviet military strategy appeared related to a 
search for some form of usable advantage. Soviet nuclear strategic forces 
developed to a point where the potential interaction of superpower 
military strategies actually permitted Soviet political leaders to 
restrain military spending, without great risk, and to declare that Soviet 
military forces exist for defensive or deterrent purposes only.^^- In 
this fashion political asymmetries can be exploited by generating public 
sympathy in the Western nations that result in greater political pressure 
to reduce their armaments.
Whether the Soviet politburo was truly seeking military superiority 
is in some respects irrelevant; what is important is that some elements of 
the Soviet strategic elite did seriously value this advantage. In this 
period the Soviet Union was not faced with the choice of accepting parity 
or superiority; the choice was "between parity and a dangerous 
competition for superiority, the outcome of which was by no means
Vernon V. Asputarian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation 
of Forces," Problems of Communism 29 (May-June 1980), pp. 12-13.
Mikhail Gorbachev, cited by Major General Yu Lebedev, "Military 
and Strategic Parity and the Realities of the Nuclear and Space Age," 
International Affairs (July 1986), p. 27. See also John Van Oudenaren, 
Deterrence. War-Fighting and Soviet Military Doctrine, pp. 12-15.
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certain. ”152 -j^ e Soviet search for advantage therefore remained more
subtle than an outright drive for superiority, and its goals were directed
1to the ancient art of winning without fighting. J By attempting to deny
the United States the ability to use its strategy, the Soviet leaders
hoped not only to deter American reaction to Soviet successes but to
create a poltical atmosphere that corresponded with Soviet interests.
The first danger to the West, therefore, is not war as such, 
but rather the threat of war, and that the West will succumb 
to that threat, and be gradually Sovietized without ever a 
shot being fired.15^
Although such a strategy creates deterrence, its expressed intention is
also to compel the United States to accept an increasing Soviet voice in
international relations that eventually would lead to increased Soviet
influence in the world.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Nuclear strategy in Soviet terms is a component of Soviet military 
strategy and is subordinated to military doctrine, the political-military 
strategy of ideological confrontation with the West. While military 
doctrine has evolved considerably over time, the precise makeup of nuclear 
strategy has been largely determined by Soviet military officers who 
appear heavily influenced by traditional concepts of combat utility which 
they have adapted to the nuclear age. These officers have contributed 
impressively to a unique Soviet strategic culture that is identifiable and 
differs in significant ways from that found in the United States. To the
152 David Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose in Soviet 
Policy," p. 20.
153 see sun Tzu, The Art of War, pp. 77-78.
15^ Chris N. Donnelly, Heirs of Clausewitz: Change and Continuity
in the Soviet War Machine, p. 22.
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Soviet strategic elite, greater military power, including nuclear power, 
results in greater security, respect and influence in the world, and these 
attitudes more closely reflect the more traditional themes of the 
compellent paradigm than those of the deterrent.
During the early period of Soviet nuclear weapon development, nuclear 
strategy became closely linked with traditional or pre-nuclear strategy to 
a degree not found in the West. Soviet political and military leaders 
viewed the nuclear superiority of the United States with respect and set 
out to close that gap as rapidly as possible. It is perhaps a reflection 
of Soviet strategic culture that the notion of deterring superior American 
power did not grow roots as deeply as it did in the West which enjoyed the 
strategic advantage at the time.
As the Soviet Union began to achieve the capability to attack the 
United States, a pre-emptive strategy of being first to initiate the 
decisive use of nuclear weapons became Soviet policy. This reflected an 
appropriate strategy for a weaker power yet it still carried the 
ideological connotations of offensive action. While striving to catch up 
to the United States' nuclear power, the Kremlin's military experts 
appeared to accept the ultimate usefulness of military superiority.
More recently, with the achievement of parity, the Soviet Union 
adopted a more assertive foreign policy backed by powerful conventional 
and nuclear forces. Military elements of the Soviet strategic elite 
continue to view military superiority as desirable, but competition with 
the technologically superior United States and the high cost to a stagnant 
Soviet economy have made this goal unattainable. As evidenced by 
deterrent declaratory policy and the no first use declaration, Soviet 
military doctrine has shifted towards assured destruction and deterrence, 
but these changes do not appear to have been accepted at lower levels.
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The analysis of Soviet military strategy to 1986 indicates that it 
retained an ideologically motivated offensive strategy, as well as a 
sensitivity to opportunities to seek relative advantage. While the Soviet 
leaders sought above all to deter a United States nuclear attack on the 
Soviet Union, they also sought to reap political advantages through 
compellence when specific occasions presented themselves.
In the Russian language two meanings are often translated as
deterrence, "keeping out" and "intimidation. "155 *jhe former usually
refers to the Soviet strategic forces and reflects the defence value
inherent in strong military forces, but the latter often characterizes the
United States strategic forces and reflects the compellent value of a
1 Sfisuperior position. The Soviet Union acknowledged that deterrence is
necessary and that assured destruction obtains, but it appeared loath to 
accept it as a strategy. Military doctrine appeared to be shifting to a 
deterrent view of nuclear weapons, but military strategy appeared not to 
change at all. The fundamental reason may be that the Soviet strategic 
elite has, for the most part, never accepted the deterrent paradigm nor 
are they convinced that the United States has. As a consequence the 
compellent paradigm may more accurately describe Soviet military strategy 
or at least the thinking behind it from 1970 to 1986.
David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 32-34.
Aleksandr G. Savelev, "Averting War and Deterrence: The
Approaches of the Warsaw Pact and NATO," Mirovava Ekonomika I 
Mezhdunarodnyve Otnosheniva (June 1989), translated by FBIS/JPRS 5 October 
1989, p. 11. The author attributes all the characteristics of the 
compellent paradigm to the United States and NATO.
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Chapter Five 
THE COMPETITION IN ARMS CONTROL
Arms control theory discussed in chapter two provides the 
intellectual background within which the practitioners of arms control 
have sought to achieve agreements acceptable to their respective 
societies. That chapter further developed the theme that there are at 
least two perspectives which, to a degree, reflect the deterrent and 
compellent paradigms of strategic thinking. It follows therefore that an 
analysis of the strategic arms control policies of the superpowers from a 
paradigmatic perspective should indicate which paradigm tends to dominate.
The focus on the United States and the Soviet Union strategic arms 
control practices will concentrate on the period 1970-1986. The role of 
other nuclear powers in strategic arms talks during this period has been 
minimal and therefore will not be specifically addressed. This in itself 
raises questions "about the political structure of the world and the 
distribution of power within it."^ This study accepts the fact that the 
superpowers may conceive of arms control to their mutual advantage, 
perhaps even, at times, to the detriment of the international system.
The initiation of strategic arms control negotiations seemed to 
imply a commitment by each superpower to institutionalize mutual 
vulnerability in some form, and yet chapter two demonstrated how each 
paradigm could in theory support responsible negotiations and the reaching 
of an arms control agreement. The deterrent paradigm emphasizes the 
cooperative achievement of a stable balance through mutual assured 
destruction. It is essentially defensive in orientation and in its purest
1 Hedley Bull, "Arms Control and World Order," International 
Security 1 (Summer 1976), p. 3.
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form precludes limited and flexible nuclear war as a responsible policy 
option. The compellent thinker, on the other hand, views arms control as 
a competitive process, the ultimate logic of which is superiority. The 
greater the intensity of competition as opposed to cooperation in arms 
control, the more likely compellent thinking will be present.
This study will focus only on some illustrative examples and is not 
intended to be a complete review of what is a complex history of detailed 
arms control negotiations. After a brief review of early nuclear arms 
control efforts, this chapter will deal in turn with the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II) and the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START) . The aim of this chapter is to apply the paradigmatic 
framework established in chapters one and two in order to determine, to 
the extent possible, the degree of compellent behaviour in the superpower 
strategic arms control negotiations.
I. EARLY NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
The early arms control efforts are important because they helped 
shape the experiences of those that began the first round of the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks in 1969. These experiences to a degree established 
our paradigmatic frame of reference.
The most prominent example that appeared relevant to arms control 
practitioners was the 1921 Washington Naval Treaty that set the ratio of 
capital ships among the major powers. What the proponents of arms control 
tended to overlook, however, was the degree of political motivation that 
made that treaty possible in the first place and then caused it to fall 
apart. For example, implicit in the agreement was the initial belief that 
Japan would help protect British and American interests in the Western
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Pacific area in return for a certain naval b a l a n c e .^  Thus, the Washington 
Naval Treaty was only really of substantive value as long as the British 
and Japanese naval treaty existed. In retrospect it is clear that 
political factors are of key importance in arms control matters.
History also provides ample evidence of the need for some form of 
arms control to stabilize security relationships and to minimize the 
prospect of surprise attack. One study in 1883 determined that since 
1700, in a sample of about 115 wars, 107 started with fighting rather than 
a declaration of war and, of those, 41 began with a surprise attack.^ 
What happened to the United States and to the Soviet Union in 1941 and in 
Korea in 1950 were therefore not anomalies but rather marked a 
considerable degree of continuity with the past.^
In the 1930's considerable effort was placed on disarmament and arms 
control issues. In the West the theoretical approaches noted in chapter 
two were dominant, but the Soviet Union tended to a more narrow view where 
all arms limitation fell under the "umbrella" of disarmament.^ Stalin, 
however, was more concerned with developing Soviet power:
O
 ^ As Japan expanded her ambitions in China and her naval power to 
support them, that agreement was no longer valid. See Philip Towle, Arms 
Control and East-West Relations (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 172.
-* John Frederick Maurice, Hostilities Without Declaration of War 
cited in Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: Macmillan Press,
1973), p. 170.
^ Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, eds., Strategic Military Surprise: 
Incentives and Opportunities (London: Transaction Books, 1983), pp. 247- 
265. The same conclusion was reached by Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The 
Victim's Perspective (London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 229.
Peter Vigor, The Soviet View of Disarmament (London: Macmillan
Press, 1986), pp. 24-25. The Soviet leaders tend not to use the 
expression "arms control."
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...to slow the tempo means to lag. And laggards are beaten.
The history of old Russia consisted in being beaten 
continually for its backwardness.^
Stalin's determination to build Soviet industrial and military power in
the early 1930's made the Soviet overtures to initiate global disarmament
appear more as political warfare than realistic arms control.^
This theme was repeated as the Soviet Union began to construct a 
strategic nuclear force in the 1950's. At the surprise attack conference 
of 1958, both sides talked past each other, but at least the dialogue had 
started. The right wing of the United States, however, soon accused the
O
Soviet Union of proposing disarmament for political advantage. One of 
the early issues that highlighted these concerns was the proposed test ban 
where the Soviet Union attempted to put pressure on the United States. By 
conducting several large nuclear tests and then declaring a unilateral 
moratorium on all nuclear testing, the Soviet Union undoubtedly hoped to 
curtail the American nuclear testing programme. When the Soviet Union 
resumed nuclear testing in 1961 it was with a 57 megaton device - by far 
the largest nuclear detonation in the world.^ This behaviour clearly 
evidenced a compellent motive, and the Soviet Union did succeed in testing 
large nuclear weapons in the atmosphere that the United States could not
 ^ Stalin speech of 1931 cited in Jerry Hough, "The Soviet View of 
the Strategic Situation," in Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck, eds., Arms 
Control and International Security (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1984), p. 91.
 ^ Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1961), p. 33.
® Barry Goldwater, Why Not Victory? (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), 
pp. 79-85. This author is extremely right wing.
 ^ Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: A Historical
Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 118.
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duplicate after the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed. 1® Soviet
objectives from the 1930's to the 1960's appeared to be primarily directed
at blunting the growth of the West's strategic power in the hope of
minimizing their adversary's strategic advantage.H
The next major attempt to control nuclear weapons was initiated by
the United States when President Johnson proposed a freeze on offensive
and defensive nuclear weapons in January 1964. Like the Baruch Plan of
the 1940's, this proposal if accepted by the Soviet Union would have
established a permanent American dominance, denying the Soviet Union the
ability to match the United States in strategic systems, to harden ICBM
1 9silos or to place SLBM's at sea.  ^ To the Soviet Union the years 1963-
1968 were years of sizable projected increases in their nuclear force
structure whereas the United States force structure was actually 
1 ^decreasing. The nuclear freeze proposal of 1964, from the Soviet
See William H. Kincade, "Arms Control or Arms Coercion," Foreign 
Policy 62 (Spring 1986), p. 34. The advantage of such testing relates to 
being able to measure their electro magnetic effects. See also Werner 
Kaltefleiter, "Structural Problems in Negotiations: A View from Europe,"
in Richard F. Staar, ed. , Arms Control: Myth versus Reality (Stanford,
California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp. 62-63.
H  Roman Kolkowicz, The Role of Disarmament in Soviet Policy: A
Means or an End? (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-2952,
1964), pp. 12-13.
Johan J. Holst, "Missile Defence, the Soviet Union and the Arms 
Race" in Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, eds., Why ABM?: Political
Issues in the Missile Defence Controversy (New York: Pergamon Press,
1969), p. 180. See also David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms 
Race. p. 45.
Nuclear force structure refers to those nuclear capable military 
systems actually deployed and in operational status. In this study it is 
used in reference to those systems identified in SALT negotiations. In 
1965 the U.S. had 2188 Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles against the 
Soviet 475, but by 1970 the U.S. had 2175 against the Soviet 1686. The 
U.S. reductions were due to reductions in bombers. See Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, ABM. MIRV. SALT and the Nuclear 
Arms Race (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1970), pp. 306-308, and Annex H. See 
also Robert Ehrlich, Waging Nuclear Peace: The Technology and Politics of
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perspective, was totally unacceptable in that it clearly demonstrated that 
the United States had little interest in allowing the Soviet Union to 
achieve parity.^
Where the Soviet Union and the United States did reach agreement on 
arms control issues, the resultant treaties had little to do with nuclear 
deterrence as such, but were more properly termed confidence building 
measures.^ In addition to a number of fairly minor treaties, one 
interesting confidence building measure was the "graduated and reciprocal 
initiatives in tension-reduction" initiated by Kennedy and reciprocated by 
Khrushchev in 1963.16 Both leaders were shaken by the Cuban missile 
crisis of the previous year. This period in the mid to late 1960's laid 
the path for what transpired in SALT I. Relations between the superpowers 
gradually improved to the point where serious arms control talks could 
begin, but the political realities that had been revealed by the USSR in 
1961 and by the U.S. in 1964 still lay under the surface.
This section has briefly surveyed some elements that preceded the key 
time frame of this study to demonstrate those traces of continuity with 
the past. Clearly, cooperation must be part of any serious arms control 
dialogue, but prior to the late 1960's it appeared that competition
Nuclear Weapons (Albany, New York: State University of New York, 1985), p. 
291.
1^ Raymond L. Garthoff, Intelligence Assessment and Policymaking: A
Decision Point in the Kennedy Administration (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1984), p. 25. The United States leaders may have felt that 
the Soviet Union had a minimum deterrent in 1964, especially after the 
sobering impact of the Cuban crisis. See Leo Szilard, "Minimal Deterrent 
vs. Saturation Parity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 20 (March 1964), 
p. 7.
1-* Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy 
Since World War II (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 257.
16 Charles E. Osgood, "The GRIT Strategy," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 36 (May 1980), pp. 58-60.
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prevailed.
II. SALT I
The first SALT discussions between the twTo superpowers began in 
November 1969 and the SALT I accord was agreed by mid-summer 1972. This 
section will analyze the apparent aims, the implied threats and the 
correlation of nuclear forces that may have affected the final outcome.
1. Strategic Intentions
In retrospect it appears that the two superpowers held at least some 
different strategic objectives during the SALT negotiation process. The 
United States for the most part seemed intent on educating the Soviet 
Union as to the desirability of a stable and mutually acceptable balance 
of nuclear weapons, but the Soviet Union proved less than receptive to 
these ideas and more interested in protecting its plans to deploy a new 
generation of ICBM's.
The analysis of the United States aims in SALT I is made more 
difficult by the process, in particular the back channel negotiations 
conducted by Henry Kissinger which at times directly contradicted the 
United States position officially tabled at the negotiation sessions in 
Europe.^ This confusion in United States policy helped to lower the 
effectiveness of one of the key U.S. aims in SALT which was to stop Soviet
^  See Gerald Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I (New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1980) , pp. 228-229. In this example Kissinger 
agreed to exclude SLBM's from the SALT negotiations, contrary to the 
official U.S. policy. This resulted in the very high SLBM limits in the 
final accord. See Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-
Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1985), p. 158. Both these works are excellent sources for 
this period.
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1 ftICBM and SLBM launcher construction programmes. The United States, at 
least initially, hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to accept limits 
on strategic launchers that would be in rough numerical equivalence to 
those of the United States. In early 1970 the United States first 
proposed to limit ballistic missiles to 1710 launchers on each side, then 
when that was rejected, urged phased reductions of 100 ballistic missiles 
a year until equal levels of 1000 ballistic missiles were reached.19 
Throughout the SALT I process the United States sought to restrain, albeit 
unsuccessfully, the pace of Soviet ballistic missile deployments.
Although the Soviet Union's primary motive in SALT I appeared to be 
to enshrine global acceptance of Soviet strategic parity, considerable 
doubt over the actual decision making process remains because of the high 
degree of Soviet secrecy that inevitably masks our understanding of true 
Soviet aims.20 According to one very good study, the SALT I agreement 
offered the Soviet Union
a guarantee of their strategic nuclear equality with the
United States and substantial other benefits at the price of
91hampering their pursuit of strategic superiority.
During the negotiations, however, the Soviet representatives also took 
great care to seek an accord that would permit the deployment of their 
newer and more capable ICBM's. Another Soviet objective may also have 
been "to promote circumstances that would allow the Soviet Union to reduce
Gerald Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. p. 156.
19 Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and
the Nuclear Arms Race. 1939 to the Present (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), p. 135. This initial proposal included SLBM's and a ban on 
MIRV's but was tied to on-site verification inspections.
20 Stephen M. Meyer, Soviet Defence Decisionmaking: What Do We Know 
and What Do We Understand? ACIS Working Paper 33 (Los Angeles, California: 
Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 1982), p. 2.
21 Samuel B. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980), p. 10.
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the dimensions of the United States' lead in ABM technology."22 The 
combination of the above points prompted the United States Secretary of 
Defence to doubt that the Soviet Union entered the arms control 
negotiations with a shared deterrence objective. 23 In fact, it is 
probable that Marshal Grechko's good relations with Brezhnev and his 
elevation to Politburo membership gave him the ability in effect to tell 
the United States "to take or leave" SALT I with a three to two ratio of 
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) in favour of the Soviet 
Union.2^ At the very least his power probably allowed the military to 
exert a strong conservative influence in SALT I decision-making. In 
something so fundamental to Soviet security, it is quite likely that the 
Soviet leaders would wish military acceptance for the first SALT 
agreement. That military input may in part explain why the Soviet Union 
clearly rejected any real constraints on its ballistic missile improvement 
programmes in the SALT I accord.
In any event, as a result of Soviet intransigence, the United States 
agreed to establish numerical offensive limits that appeared to permit all 
Soviet and American planned strategic programmes to proceed without 
alteration. For the United States, the acceptance of this accord
22 David S. Yost, European Security and the SALT Process (London: 
Sage Publications, 1981), p. 43.
23 Melvin Laird testimony in Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, ABM. MIRV. SALT and the Nuclear Arms Race, p. 276. 
See also Rebecca V. Strode, "Strategic Issues and Soviet Foreign Policy," 
in Gerrit W. Gong, Angela E. Stent and Rebecca V. Strode, Areas of 
Challenge for Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980's (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 94.
2^ A staff study prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Soviet Disarmament Propaganda and the Strange Case of Marshal Grechko 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974), pp. v-vi. See also Thomas W. Wolfe, The 
SALT Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1979), pp. 75-76.
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demonstrated that the United States military had, in part, lost its fight
9 Sto retain nuclear superiority as a strategic objective. J Thus in SALT I 
both superpowers appeared, at least on the surface, prepared to accept, in 
principle, limitations that would preclude the near term attainment of 
nuclear superiority. The agreement to limit ABM's further indicated that 
the superpowers had accepted a stable nuclear relationship, but doubts 
remained over long-term political objectives. The SALT I accord was the 
first major strategic arms agreement and thus an important precedent. As 
a first step toward controlling and stabilizing what had been an unlimited 
arms competition, it exhibited outwardly many characteristics of the 
deterrent paradigm. Yet, neither superpower compromised anything that it 
was not earlier prepared to give up, and the competitive nature of certain
proposals and objectives suggests that the compellent paradigm may offer
9 6an alternate explanation of political arms control. °
2. The Threat of Force
In an arms control negotiation that depends heavily on mutual 
cooperation, direct nuclear threats clearly have little utility, but 
implicit threats remain embedded in each nation's force structure 
decisions and even in certain arms control proposals. What one nation 
perceives as a reasonable hedge against what the opponent might be capable 
of doing is seen by the other as a threat. Those weapons perceived as
25 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers. Statesmen, and Cold War Crises 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 109.
26 At least one senior Soviet military officer viewed the SALT I 
agreement in terms of achieving a definite success. Major General M.I. 
Cherednichenko, "Military Strategy and Military Technology," Vovennava 
mvsl" (April 1973), p. 42 cited in Raymond Garthoff, "The Tightening 
Frame: Mutual Security and the Future of Strategic Arms Limitations,"
forthcoming. This competitive aspect also underlies Robin Ranger's 
thesis in Arms and Politics 1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing
Political Context (Toronto: Macmillan Press, 1979).
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most threatening are those that the other side tends to hold highest in
their hierarchy of military requirements, particularly in the Soviet
27case. '
During SALT I negotiation the United States viewed the steady Soviet 
ICBM build-up as a significant threat, and the USSR perceived the more 
successful American MIRV and ABM programmes as technological threats. The 
United States in particular felt that the Soviet heavy ICBM's were serious 
potential threats because they could and probably would eventually carry a 
larger number of MIRV's than could smaller American ICBM's. The more 
warheads carried, the greater the probability that counterforce attacks 
could be effectively launched. The Soviet negotiators viewed the American 
forward based nuclear systems (FBS) with equal concern because of their 
proximity to the Soviet Union. Thus, American efforts in 1970 to stop the 
production or reduce the numbers of Soviet heavy ICBM's in conjunction 
with the United States proposals to build more ABM sites for each Soviet 
site or to freeze MIRV technology could be considered as implied 
threats.28 The United States was threatening to outstrip the USSR in MIRV 
and ABM technology.
Thus to a degree, technological competition for strategic advantage 
formed the basis for those threats implicit in the SALT I negotiating 
period. The key Soviet concern centered on the ability of the United 
States to develop quickly and deploy sophisticated weapon systems that
27 Robert Einhorn, Negotiating From Strength: Leverage in U.S.-
Soviet Arms Control Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 1985), p. 38.
2® Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and
the Nuclear Arms Race. 1939 to the Present, pp. 135-137. The United 
States proposed to have four ABM sites at missile fields for one Soviet 
ABM site around Moscow. The result of these various proposals, all 
offered in 1970, would have given the United States a significant military 
advantage.
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would take the Soviet system considerably longer to counter or
9 Qreplicate. The United States had clearly demonstrated the ability to
rapidly build qualitatively and quantitatively superior forces in the 
early 1960's, and the Soviet military feared that the United States could
on
do so again if not constrained by arms control. The opportunity to
limit United States defence programmes to a large extent, therefore, is
what motivated the Soviet leaders to accept negotiated limits on their own
forces. In this manner the Soviet Union probably has seen "considerable
advantage in averting what appeared to be a costly, unpredictable and
disadvantageous competition."
The combination of MIRV and ABM technology could eventually give
significant nuclear strategic advantage to the United States. Soviet
analysts from 1968 to 1974 argued that
the United States military industrial complex redoubled its 
efforts to gain one sided advantages vis-a-vis the USSR, 
especially in MIRVing, when SALT I seemed imminent.32
Soviet and American military officers alike realized that accurate MIRV's
coupled with an effective ABM could result in a credible first strike
capability. According to the chief American negotiator, MIRV's could not
be negotiated in SALT I because the United States preferred to retain its
technological advantage and the USSR saw the enormous downstream potential
29 See Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defence Controversy: 
Strategy. Technology and Politics. 1955-1972 (Lexington, Kentucky: 
University of Kentucky, 1977), pp. 189-195.
30 Raymond Garthoff, "The Soviet Military and SALT," in Jiri Valenta 
and William Potter, eds., Soviet Decision Making for National Security 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 139.
31 Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating from Strength: Leverage in U.S.-
Soviet Arms Control Negotiations, p. 38.
32 Robb in F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet Union and 
Strategic Arms (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 98.
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that MIRV's offered to the Soviet Union with its larger ICBM's.^3
The only feasible means with which the Soviet Union could readily 
counter the American technological lead was to build greater numbers of 
ICBM's and to limit ABM's. According to Gerald Smith, the Soviet 
strategic build-up in 1969-1971 was developing such momentum that 
President Nixon may have felt those years offered the last chance to deal 
with the USSR on equal footing. ^  The United States leaders held a 
certain fear of Soviet intentions. Although the Soviet negotiators had 
been straightforward about their requirement for larger silos to house the 
SS-19 replacement for the SS-11, Kissinger later accused them of duplicity 
and many senior United States leaders believed him.^ The result of this 
kind of behaviour was an increasing perception that the United States 
needed to be strong to negotiate successfully with the Soviet leaders. 
This was evidenced by the decision to accelerate the Trident programme by 
three years in order to present the Soviet Union with an upcoming system 
as a "bargaining chip."J
Because each superpower proceeded cautiously in SALT I, a great deal 
of mutual mistrust prevented the achievement of a more comprehensive 
agreement. Nevertheless, if it is viewed as the first steps toward an
^  Gerald Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. p. 157.
Gerald Smith's remarks are in Michael Charlton's excellent book, 
From Deterrence to Defence: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 32. The 
Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger was also concerned with breaking 
the momentum of Soviet ICBM deployment patterns; see his testimony before 
the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974), p. 3.
^  Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet
Relations from Nixon to Reagan, p. 174.
Gerald Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. pp. 339-340.
Spending on Trident was moved forward to provide the first submarine in 
1978 instead of 1981.
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acceptance of the institutionalizing of MAD, the first SALT accord appears 
to reflect the stable balance characteristic of the deterrent paradigm. 
During the SALT I process, however, each superpower did demonstrate a 
tendency to view each other's strategic arms construction programmes and 
technological developments as threats designed to achieve potential 
advantage, a characteristic of compellent thinking.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
Because the SALT I accord imposed no real constraints on offensive 
force development for either superpower, it really had a marginal effect 
on the offensive balance. It permitted MIRV deployment for the United 
States and allowed the Soviet Union to deploy up to 2568 ballistic 
missiles, a figure they never actually reached. The lasting achievement, 
at least to date, of the SALT I accord, however, was the agreement to 
limit ABM's. This section will analyze the correlation of nuclear forces, 
paying particular attention to the ABM agreement.
The quality of nuclear forces was not a central issue in SALT I, but 
nevertheless it did have a bearing on the negotiations and the final 
accord. The Soviet Union, for example, negotiated with great care to 
avoid interfering with the deployment of its new generation of ICBM's 
which were expected to be technically far superior to the earlier SS-11 
missiles. ^  Critics of SALT I in the United States were extremely 
disappointed to discover that the Soviet replacement ICBM's had about
^  David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 47.
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three times the throw weight of the SS-11. One objective of the United 
States in SALT I was to constrain or reduce Soviet forces so that they 
could only be used effectively against United States population and urban 
centers, but these new missiles appeared designed to eventually carry
O Q
enough MIRV warheads to cover the entire target spectrum. v What made 
this problem even more disturbing was the fact that the SALT I accord 
hampered the United States from developing its own counterforce capability 
because it effectively foreclosed the upgrading of its silos. ^  
Nevertheless, for the United States to agree to Soviet quantitative 
superiority in SALT I, the United States at the time must have had high 
confidence in its qualitative advantage based for the most part on its 
technical lead in MIRV's.
The numerical balance throughout the SALT I process appeared to 
assume increasing importance. One observer noted a shift in emphasis in 
19 72 "from an interest in the character of strategic weapons to an 
interest in numbers."^ The conclusion of SALT I giving a significant 
numerical advantage to the Soviet Union probably contributed a great deal
The SS-11 was partially replaced by the SS-17 and SS-19, both 
considerably larger. See Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Forces and SALT: A
Question of Strategy," Comparative Strategy 2 (Number 2, 1980), p. 127.
Throw weight refers to the ability of a given missile to carry a payload 
over a given distance. The greater it is, the more firepower a missile 
can deliver in either the form of larger or multiple warheads.
39 William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy and SALT," in
Steven Rosefielde, ed. , World Communism at the Crossroads: Military
Ascendancy. Political Economy and Human Welfare (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1980), p. 73 and 56.
The weights of missiles were also limited. See William R. 
Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., SALT: Implications for Arms
Control in the 1970:s (London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), p. 
395.
Thomas C. Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control," in
Oyvind Osterud, ed.. Studies of War and Peace (Oslo: Norwegian University 
Press, 1986), pp. 99-100. This work contains a selection of very good 
articles.
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to this shift. One of the reasons the Soviet negotiators insisted on
greater numbers was to in some way compensate for the United States FBS 
deployed in Europe. Soviet officials repeatedly raised the FBS issue and 
at one point even noted that the equivalent megatonnage of the American 
FBS was greater than that deployed on Soviet SSBN's.^
With respect to combat utility of strategic nuclear weapons, each
superpower in SALT had to accept limitations, but most importantly it was 
the United States that had to accept Soviet numerical parity. The Soviet 
Union in fact refused to discuss qualitative limits on their forces; their 
interest lay, not in sanctioning America's advantages, "but in cancelling 
them by some other m e a n s . T o  obtain the SALT accord the United States 
was compelled to "discount" its strategic advantages and recognize the 
right of the USSR to catch up with the United States.^ This notion, 
however, was not universally acceptable to American leaders and 
strategists. Immediately prior to SALT, President Nixon noted the need 
for a dominant nuclear posture as a check on Soviet expansionism and as a 
source of suasion to encourage moderation and accommodation to Western 
interests.^ One of the key issues that caused a shift in United States 
policy was the difficulty the United States leaders had in satisfactorily
Gerald Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. p. 92. See also
Raymond L. Garthoff, Perspective on the Strategic Balance (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 19-20. FBS were capable of
destroying in one-way attacks 20 per cent of Soviet ICBM/MRBM force or 25 
per cent of Soviet population.
^  John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 174. This is a very good review of its 
subj ect.
^  Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 254.
^  See Michael Krepon, Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and
Arms Control in American Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984),
pp. 29-32. Nixon promised to restore clear cut military superiority in 
his election campaign; see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT,
p. 134.
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explaining their ABM programme, particularly in the climate of SALT and 
detente. The administration even raised the spectre of a future Chinese 
nuclear threat as part of the initial justification for ABM.
The ABM treaty was the most significant aspect of SALT I negotiations 
in that it appeared to herald the acceptance of a stable nuclear balance 
based on mutual assured destruction. The United States probably agreed to 
it because ABM's were not yet acquired or deployed, their efficacy was 
questionable, they were enormously expensive and it was increasingly 
difficult to achieve a consensus on how to handle them - unless they were 
party to an agreement with the Soviet Union.^ Why the Soviets agreed to 
it was more controversial. In 1967 Kosygin had told President Johnson 
that a ban on ballistic missile defences was "the most absurd proposition 
he had ever heard. Even as the ABM Treaty was being signed, Soviet
leaders were according civil defence in the USSR an extremely high 
p r i ority.Because  Soviet military doctrine continued to maintain its 
commitment to strategic defence, it appeared that other considerations may 
have motivated the Soviet Union.
Several analysts have concluded that an important concern of the 
Soviet Union was to place constraints on the more technically advanced 
United States ballistic missile defence activities. The Soviet ABM had 
proved to be a disappointment to the Soviet military, and by 1968 there
^  Bernard Brodie, "On the Objective of Arms Control," International 
Security 1 (Summer 1976), p. 35. The direction to concentrate on an ABM 
agreement stemmed from a joint Nixon/Soviet announcement on May 20, 1971, 
i.e. at the highest levels. See the 11th Annual Report of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1972), p. 6.
^  Benjamin S. Lambeth, The State of Western Research on Military 
Strategy and Policy (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation N-2230-
AF, 1984), p. 25.
George Kolt, "The Soviet Civil Defence Programme," Strategic 
Review 5 (Spring 1977), pp. 59-60.
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was a "sharp drop in the frequency of claims to an effective ABM defence 
of the U S S R . A l t h o u g h  Soviet leaders did appear, after a time, to 
accept the logic that ABMs were a threat to MAD stability, they remained 
skeptical as to its desirability or the United States' acceptance of MAD. 
Thus they probably accepted the ABM Treaty as a second c h o i c e . 5® Henry 
Kissinger was convinced that the Soviet leaders "wanted to stop the only 
strategic programme we were actually building."51
From the Soviet viewpoint, the United States was prepared to 
negotiate SALT because of a fundamental change in the Soviet-United States
co
correlation of nuclear forces. From the official American perspective 
the first SALT agreements were "without question in the American national 
interest" for they "capped" the Soviet strategic construction programmes
c o
and yet allowed an American technological lead. J For the right wing in 
the United States, however,
^  Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet Military and SALT," p. 147.
Jeffrey Richelson, "Ballistic Missile Defence and Soviet 
Strategy," in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds., The 
Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 72. 
See also Carnes Lord, "Taking Soviet Defences Seriously" Washington 
Quarterly 9 (Fall 1986), p. 93.
51 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 547.
52 Lewis Allen Frank, "Soviet Nuclear Planning - A Point of View on 
SALT," in Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie, eds., Nuclear Strategy 
and National Security: Points of View (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 456.
55 Henry Kissinger, "The Permanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy
Toward the Soviet Union," in Robert J. Pranger, ed. , Detente and Defence 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1976), p. 322.
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the Soviets had worked out a highly one-sided concept of 
what the talks should accomplish, and...their goal was an 
agreement that would enhance Soviet power at the expense of 
the U.S.54
Thus, two distinct views exist that roughly parallel the deterrent and 
compellent paradigms, and so far the analysis of SALT I demonstrates that 
compellent thinking was evident in both superpowers.
4. The Paradigmatic Implications of SALT I
Which paradigm dominated the SALT I outcomes is difficult to 
establish. To the extent that the assumptions have changed since the 
1950's and 1960's, arms control has become a more complex process.55 What 
appears one way on the surface may be subtly different in substance.
In the political framework of detente, most analysts focused on the 
United States' acceptance of rather than the Soviet achievement of parity. 
Nowhere was parity defined. What SALT I did do was acknowledge the United 
States acceptance of the Soviet Union as a "political and psychological 
equal."5  ^ What SALT I did not do was establish superpower agreement that 
reflected military equality. It established quantitative not qualitative 
limits, but the technological competition continued.
In SALT I, the two sides were not really addressing a common set of 
problems. Asymmetries in fundamental national assumptions caused the 
United States to view SALT as a process separate from other security 
activities and the Soviet Union to see it as a small part of a much
54 Paul Nitze, cited in Steven L. Rearden, The Evolution of American 
Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 65.
55 G. W. Rathjens, "Changing Perspectives on Arms Control," Daedalus 
(Summer 1975), pp. 201-202.
5  ^ William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., SALT: 
Implications for Arms Control. p. 399.
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broader process. One respected observer also noted that in the United 
States the influence of the military was in decline whereas in the Soviet 
Union it appeared to be in the ascendancy.^  Because the military seem to 
gravitate naturally to a war fighting perspective, increased military 
influence could indicate greater compellent tendencies.
The paradigmatic analysis shows each power had specific objectives 
which could be explained by either paradigm. Both appeared very concerned 
over technological developments to the point of feeling threatened by the 
other. On the surface the ABM Treaty and the apparent acceptance of 
mutual assured destruction with offensive limits appears to indicate a 
dominant deterrent paradigmatic correlation, particularly in the United 
States. But further analysis reveals that a compellent explanation of the 
SALT I process, particularly with respect to Soviet views, is a plausible 
alternative.
III. SALT II
Immediately after SALT I was signed in May 1972, the superpowers 
began a dialogue on SALT II, but they could not agree on a second treaty 
until June 1979. This treaty, signed by President Carter, was never 
ratified by the United States primarily due to the deterioration of 
political relations and the consequent loss of trust between the 
superpowers. This section will analyze the SALT II process using the same 
framework as the preceding section.
Gerald Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. p. 455.
Hedley Bull, "The Scope for Super Power Agreements," in Robert 
O'Neill and David N. Schwartz, eds., Hedley Bull on Arms Control (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 83.
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1. Strategic Intentions
Initially it appeared that superpower arms control objectives did not 
appreciably change, and the SALT I process continued unaltered until the 
autumn of 1974 when the Vladivostok accord was reached. This framework 
was the result of a compromise in which the United States abandoned its 
strong efforts to cut back Soviet throw weights and the Soviet Union 
dropped its insistence that FBS be included. In the United States this 
compromise was never totally accepted; the liberals felt the overall 
limits were set too high, and the conservatives feared that dropping the 
throw weight issue was a fundamental error.^ This compromise was also 
not without controversy in the USSR as Brezhnev reportedly had to "spill 
political blood" to achieve this accord.^0 Beginning in the mid-1970's a 
deterioration in political relations slowly began to erode mutual trust 
and confidence such that the tensions inherent in the arms control process 
began to surface.
In the United States, both the liberals and the conservatives began
to attack the arms control process based on the Vladivostok Accord,
thereby gradually eroding its political support. By 1977 Harold Brown,
the United States Secretary of Defence, had convinced President Carter to
depart from the Vladivostok framework by proposing to cut one-half of
Soviet heavy ICBM's.^ This proposal, if accepted by the Soviet Union,
would have significantly hindered the Soviet pursuit of a hard target kill
f i 9capability against United States ICBM's. Furthermore, the United States
Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and
the Nuclear Arms Race. 1939 to the Present, pp. 151-152.
Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy 
Since World War II. p. 283.
^  Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 804.
David S. Yost, European Security and the SALT Process, p. 44.
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Secretary of State, at least for a time, viewed arms control as a 
manipulative instrument for controlling Soviet behaviour.63 With 
increasing global superpower rivalry, the United States appeared to be 
introducing new objectives in the SALT process.
The Soviet Union continued to regard arms control as a political 
struggle, a protracted test of will, skill and resources.^  Soviet arms 
control proposals, for the most part, continued to appear designed to 
generate tensions among NATO members, to stimulate public concern, and to 
achieve limits on Western forces without reciprocal limits on Soviet 
forces.65 During SALT II the American arms control community began to 
lose their cultural myopia and relinquish their evangelical objectives of 
educating the Soviets as to the virtues of deterrence.66 Throughout the 
SALT II negotiations the Soviet Union appeared primarily concerned with 
limiting the ability of United States nuclear weapons to support American 
foreign policy.
With respect to the degree each superpower was willing to support the 
status quo of the nuclear balance, SALT II saw some shifts in emphasis. 
The Soviet Union clearly stopped well short of endorsing the existing
63 Philip Windsor, "Towards a Hierarchy for Arms Control," 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies (Summer 1986), p. 175. After
a trip to Moscow in 1975, Henry Kissinger finally dropped his efforts to 
link events in Angola, for example, to arms control negotiations. In 1978 
Brezhnev again accused Carter of seeking unilateral leverage via arms 
control. See Strobe Talbot's excellent review of SALT II, End Game: The
Inside Story of SALT II (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 147.
6^ Colin S. Gray, "Soviet-American Strategic Competition: 
Instruments, Doctrines and Purposes," in Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. 
Labrie, eds., Nuclear Strategy and National Security: Points of View, p.
297.
f i S Norman Howard and Colleen Sussman, eds., Security and Arms 
Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, 1984), p. 23.
66 Robin Ranger, Arms and Politics 1958-1978: Arms Control in a
Changing Political Context, pp. 216-217.
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nuclear equilibrium. Rather, the USSR endeavoured to persuade the United 
States to accede to a "fundamental restructuring" of the old international 
order, in large part based on a new correlation of forces. ^  The 
"hawkish" element in the United States became convinced that American 
"renunciatory passivity" in the face of the Soviet nuclear build-up 
compromised the utility of arms control as a respectable tool of strategic
r n
policy. ° Pressure began to build in the United States for a more hard 
line response. In the Carter administration, some arms control 
initiatives were even undermined by Brzezinski and Schlesinger who sought 
to protect the United States' ability to produce nuclear weapons and 
conduct the minimum number of tests necessary for the United States 
nuclear weapons programme. ^  As SALT II progressed, the United States 
negotiators increased their efforts to limit Soviet ICBM's, the 
fundamental objective of which was to reduce Soviet MIRV's.^® The SALT II 
process was only able to consolidate or manage "the more satisfactory 
aspects of the political and military status quo,"^ but other key 
elements remained beyond agreement. An example of the underlying tension 
was that even the signed treaties on the Nuclear Threshold Test Ban (1974) 
and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (1976) had never been submitted for
^  Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 250.
Edward N. Luttwak, "Why Arms Control Has Failed," Commentary 65 
(January 1978), p. 28.
^  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the
National Security Advisor. 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux,
1983), p. 172 and pp. 316-317. Brzezinski only went through the motions 
with respect to the comprehensive test ban because Carter believed in it. 
Brzezinski and Schlesinger were also able in 1978 to block a proposal from 
Vance and Warnke to propose a cutoff on the production of fissionable materials .
Strobe Talbot, End game: The Inside Story of SALT II. p. 127.
^  Lawrence Freedman, Arms Control: Management or Reform (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 70.
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American ratification.^
The last aspect of superpower objectives relates to the notion of 
improving one's international political position with arms control. For 
the Soviet Union in this period, arms control was an adjunct to military 
power and not necessarily the primary means to safeguard Soviet 
security.^ As a result, the USSR avoided presenting concrete proposals 
that involved constraining or restructuring its own nuclear force 
posture.^ The United States on the other hand repeatedly tabled arms 
control proposals that have had the ambitious goal of eliminating 
worrisome force asymmetries that it was not prepared to counter through 
unilateral defence efforts.^ The SALT II process showed that if there 
was any convergence in strategic thinking it may be that the United States 
was beginning to reflect the USSR in strategic theory.^6 The United 
States would not accept Soviet arms control proposals that might preclude 
the deployment of MX or Trident.
Strategic intentions of both superpowers in SALT II suggested that 
each was increasingly inclined to seek some advantage as a tactical goal
Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 265. They may have 
been submitted and withdrawn. See the 1976 Annual Report of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. III.
^  Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G. Hyland, Soviet Perspectives on 
Security. Adelphi Paper 150 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1979), p. 22. See also Arnold L. Horelick, "The Strategic 
Mindset of the Soviet Military," Problems of Communism 26 (March-April 
1977), p. 85.
^  Harold Brown and Lynn Davis, Nuclear Arms Control Choices 
(London: Westview Press, 1984), p. 36. This aspect has changed post 1986.
^  Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating from Strength: Leverage in U.S.-
Soviet Arms Control Negotiations, p. 39.
^  Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., International Arms 
Control: Issues and Agreements (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1984), p. 340.
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in the negotiations. Notwithstanding this tendency, one study determined 
that no arms race existed and that in terms of strategic spending the 
logic of the weapons build-up was internally, not externally, motivated.^7 
One implication is that the motivation for these weapons has less to do 
with pure deterrence than with other objectives, some of which, during the 
SALT II process, were compellent in nature.
2. The Threat of Force
As political tensions increased between the superpowers, it was
perhaps inevitable that at some point explicit threats would be made.
SALT II was marked by at least one overt threat and several implied
threats as the negotiations dragged on.
The one explicit threat was made by the United States in 1977 after
the Soviet Union had totally rejected President Carter's deep reductions
proposals. He declared at a news conference 30 March that
if we feel at the conclusion of a month's discussions that 
the Soviets are not acting in good faith with us and that an 
agreement is unlikely, then I would be forced to consider a 
much more deep commitment to the development and deployment 
of additional weapons.^
This threat implied that the United States would deploy the hard target
capable MX unless the Soviet Union accepted the one-sided United States
"deep cuts" proposals, and this was not well received in Moscow. 79 When
77 Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski with Daniel Fox, "Deterrence and 
the Arms Race: The Impotence of Power," International Security 4 (Spring
1980), pp. 122-130. This is also a theme of Gwyn Prins, Defended to 
Death: A Study of the Nuclear Arms Race (Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books, 
1983), note chart on p . 35.
7^ President Jimmy Carter discusses Strategic Arms Limitation 
Proposals, Department of State Bulletin 76 (April 25, 1977), pp. 409-414.
79 Strobe Talbot, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. p. 74. See
also Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet
Relations from Nixon to Reagan, p. 810.
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Carter received no favourable Soviet response, he used the opportunity to 
authorize the Mark 12A warhead deployment on the Minuteman 3 missile, a 
hard target capable s y s t e m . I n  terms of obtaining an advantage for the 
United States in arms control, this threat was a total failure, but its 
primary impact on Moscow may have been to remind Soviet leaders that the 
United States technological lead still posed a significant threat.
Soviet concerns during SALT II were therefore little different than 
during SALT I. The Soviet Union appeared reluctant to make an arms 
control commitment in any area where the Soviet Union lagged for fear of 
being unable to catch up. New technology and new weapons take years to 
develop and could very easily be subject to arms control if sufficient
O 1
political will existed.0i Arms control for the Soviet Union still tended 
to be primarily a political matter, and therefore it remained unrealistic 
for some Americans to expect that SALT II in itself could alleviate the
Q O
major sources of military instability.^ Nevertheless the underlying
premise in the Carter "deep cuts" proposal seemed to be that
the United States had a compelling technological advantage
and new weapon systems that can force the Russians to accept
fundamental changes in nuclear arsenals or be worse off than 
the United States if there is no agreement.^
One of these new weapons that United States technology had built was 
the strategic cruise missile, and the Soviet SALT negotiators struggled to
^  Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet Union and 
Strategic Arms, pp. 118-119. This was in May, 1977.
Trevor Taylor, "Arms Control: The Bankruptcy of the Strategist's
Approach," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., The Arms Race in the
1980's (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 50.
^  Richard Burt, "... or Half Empty?" Foreign Policy 36 (Fall 1979), 
p. 37. See also William E. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and
Directions," Problems of Communism 34 (July-August 1985), p. 13.
O O
Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic 
Threat (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 198.
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limit its deployment. The cruise missile posed serious arms control 
difficulties because it was small and not readily verifiable, and these 
difficulties were only partially offset by the fact that they are not good 
first strike weapons.^  The United States Department of Defence initially 
concluded that it was possible to add crucial support to this programme by 
calling it a "bargaining chip" in SALT, but during the negotiations with
o c
the Soviet Union the Pentagon was unwilling to give it up.OJ Clearly, 
"new" military systems such as cruise missiles and Trident could only be 
funded for essential military purposes and thus in the final analysis make
O C
poor bargaining chips. In fact, the United States appeared quite
prepared to exploit its cruise missile advantage as a response to the
O  ~ j
expansion of Soviet military power.' The Soviet Union on the other hand 
proposed limits on air launched cruise missiles (ALCM's) that seemed 
calculated "to narrow existing asymmetries between the technologies" of 
the superpowers probably because the ALCM threatened to reverse the trends 
in the power b a l a n c e . T h e  United States response to the perceived
^  Charles A. Sorrels, U.S. Cruise Missile Programmes: Development.
Deployment and Implications for Arms Control (Oxford: Brassey's
Publishers, 1983), p. 178. Cruise missiles are slow and can take several 
hours to reach their targets.
Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some
Lessons from SALT," International Security 1 (Spring 1977), p. 20.
Gerard Smith cited in Harold Brown, "Negotiating with the Soviets 
and Prospects for Arms Control Negotiations," in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen 
Propper Mickiewicz, eds., The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, p. 154.
^  Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma (London: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1984), p. 205. Carter liked the cruise 
missile, and his cancellation of the B-l bomber complicated arms control 
negotiations because the United States military then needed even more 
cruise missiles. See Strobe Talbot, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT
II, p. 104.
See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Jacquelyn K. Davis, Salt II: 
Promise or Precipice? (Miami, Florida: Center for Advanced International 
Studies, 1976), p. 22. See also Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G. Hyland, 
Soviet Perspectives on Security, p. 23.
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Soviet counterforce threat was to rely on its technology to field new 
weapons that were far more sophisticated and could threaten the USSR in 
different ways.
The increased weapon survivability provided by small, mobile cruise 
missiles also complicated arms control because it created verification 
problems. The reliance on national technical means to verify compliance 
with arms control agreements has not been sufficient to satisfy the United
O Q
States Congress.7 Not all tests can be completely monitored and evidence 
of cheating is rarely conclusive even though both superpowers have tacitly 
agreed to act with restraint with respect to interfering with each other's 
satellites.^  Unfortunately the national technical means used by the 
United States to monitor compliance with arms control agreements are the 
same means used to collect intelligence on all Soviet strategic 
activities. ^  Thus much of the verification argument is clouded by the 
concern of the United States not to reveal too much of its true 
intelligence collection capabilities, and it could well be that certain 
Soviet "violations" have been specifically intended to test or confirm
^  No perfect verification is possible and excessive demands for
verification can be used as a smokescreen. See Verification in All its 
Aspects: A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament
Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152 (Ottawa: April, 1986), p.
4. See also Robert Perry, "Verifying SALT in the 1980's in Christoph
Bertram, ed., The Future of Arms Control: Part 1. Beyond SALT II Adelphi
Paper 141 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), 
p. 23, and his The Faces of Verification: Strategic Arms Control for the
1980's (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-5986, 1977), p. 29.
^  Bhupendra Jasani and Frank Barnaby, Verification Technologies:
The Case for Surveillance by Consent (London: Berg Publishers, 1984), p.
10, and Gerald M. Steinburg, Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of
Informal Bargaining (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 3.
^  Congressional Research Service, Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms 
Control Part IV: Treaty Compliance and Nuclear Arms Control (Washington,
D.C.: USGPO, 1985), p. 11. See also Stuart A. Cohen, "The Evolution of 
Soviet Views on SALT Verification: Implications for the Future," in
William C. Potter, ed. , Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic
Deception (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 65.
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Q 9these American capabilities.  ^ The Soviet anti-satellite programme has 
generated a great deal of United States concern, but it has not developed 
into a very capable system. The SALT II agreement, in spite of several 
technical difficulties, made excellent progress in verification and has 
been called "an historic accomplishment" in this field.93
During the SALT II negotiations the Soviets continued to add 
strategic warheads to their nuclear arsenal, and the United States 
continued to rely on superior technology. Carter's overt threat, the 
length of the negotiations and the failure of the United States to ratify 
the treaty all testified to the increased political competition to win a 
more favourable agreement.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
SALT II limits were set at levels only slightly lower than those of 
SALT I, but a series of sub-limits were probably of greater significance. 
Overall, offensive forces were capped at 2400 strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles until 1981 when only 2250 were permitted. The ceilings on MIRVed 
ICBM's, MIRVed ballistic missiles including SLBM's, and all MIRVed ICBM's 
and SLBM's plus ALCM equipped aircraft were set at 850, 1200 and 1320
respectively. Thus in SALT II, some efforts were made to control the 
qualitative aspects of strategic weapons.
During the SALT II process, significant technical progress resulted 
in the deployment of qualitatively superior systems especially in the 
Soviet force structure. In particular, improvements in MIRV technology 
resulted in significant increases in accuracy and lethality during this
92 William C. Potter, Verification and Arms Control (Toronto: 
Lexington Books, 1985), p. 248.
93 ian Bellany and Coit Blacker, ed. , The Verification of Arms 
Control Agreements (London: Frank Cass, 1983), p. 23.
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period. The control of accuracy however was not dealt with by SALT, even 
though the means to do so through testing limitations were available.9^ 
This tendency to avoid limiting the qualitative aspect of nuclear arms is 
the result of a technological competition that neither superpower seemed 
prepared to restrict. The United States sought to maintain its technical 
advantages, and the Soviet Union attempted to contain those American 
advantages without agreeing to any limitations that could substantially 
hinder its own programmes to catch up. 95 By not agreeing to address this 
qualitative competition the superpowers were exhibiting tendencies to 
develop counterforce weapons characteristic of the compellent framework.
The quantitative aspect of SALT II resulted in equality of limits in
deference to the political requirements of the United States but at levels
acceptable to the Soviet Union. Thus, the limits on the United States
nuclear forces were actually higher in SALT II than they were in SALT I.
According to Henry Kissinger in 1974 the only way the United States could
have convinced the Soviet Union to accept lower numerical limits would be
to drastically increase defence spending and to hold the 
increase for a number of years, long enough to convince the 
Soviets that we were going to drive the race through the 
ceiling with t h e m . 96
Such thought creates a danger that arms control can create additional or
9^ Donald MacKenzie, "Missile Accuracy - An Arms Control 
Opportunity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42 (June/July 1986), p. 16.
95 Gerald Segal and John Baylis, "Nuclear Weapons have altered the 
Historical Practice and Rendered the Nuclear Variant of War Useless for 
Practical Policy," in Gerald Segal and John Baylis, Soviet Strategy 
(London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 27. See also Robin Ranger, The 
Implications of Possible U.S. Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defence 
into the North American Air Defence System (Ottawa: Operational Research 
and Analysis Establishment, 1981), p. 19.
96 Cited in Michael Charlton, From Deterrence to Defence: The
Inside Story of Strategic Policy, p. 49. See also Frank Gaffney, "Arms 
Control Negotiations: The Rocky Road to Accord," Defence 84 (Washington,
D.C.: USGPO, 1984), p. 4.
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unnecessary requirements that can distort military planning,97 and to a 
certain degree the United States hoped to use the threat of major cruise 
missile deployments as leverage to obtain lower limits. Carter in March 
1977 went considerably further when he proposed deep cuts that would 
probably have emasculated the projected Soviet five-year plan resulting in 
the dissolution of a number of design bureaus and support i n s t i t u t i o n s . 9 8  
The Soviet Union's outright rejection of this proposal attested to their 
determination not to allow arms control to drive Soviet military 
requirements.
Carter's proposal was also viewed in Moscow as an attempt to channel 
the superpower strategic competition into areas dominated by the United 
States to produce a one-sided advantage.99 Thus, the Soviet leaders 
probably attributed to the Americans the belief that some kind of nuclear 
superiority does matter. Various other analysts also noted that the 
debate in the United States over SALT II was really over how far the 
United States acceptance of nuclear war fighting should be allowed to 
go.-^O The Soviet Union probably would have preferred nuclear superiority 
as well but for the extremely high costs and the unlikelihood of actually 
attaining it. Not having a SALT agreement could allow some temporary 
Soviet advantages but the United States with its superior economic base 
could always overtake the Soviet Union again as it did in the I960's. 
Therefore, the conservative minded Soviet leaders probably accepted some
97 See Lawrence Freedman, Arms Control: Management or Reform, p. 72.
98 William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting and SALT," p. 78-79.
99 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey. 
1977 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 94.
Gary L. Guertner, "Carter's SALT: MAD or SAFE?" Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 35 (October 1979), p. 32. See also John Leyman in "SALT 
and U.S. Defence Policy,": The Washington Quarterly 2 (Winter 1979), p. 40.
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constraints on their force structure to ensure the United States was at 
least equally c o n s t r a i n e d .  Raymond Garthoff, a respected analyst,
insists that the SALT II agreement caused the Soviet Union to cancel 
construction of about 50 SS-17 and 50 SS-19 silos. ^ 2
During the SALT II negotiations each superpower wanted an agreement 
that would at least minimize risks and reduce or limit the levels of 
strategic weapons somewhat. The Soviet military's principal objective in 
SALT was to assure no disadvantage and to retain some advantage if
i rjo
possible. The United States was seriously concerned over the growing
Soviet hard target kill capability that would provide the USSR with war 
fighting advantages. The competitive search for qualitative advantages 
dominated SALT II, and the inability of the superpowers to agree to 
control this phenomena demonstrates strong compellent tendencies.
4. The Paradigmatic Implications of SALT II
As political relations between the Soviet Union and the United States 
deteriorated, tensions over SALT II became exacerbated. At least one 
element in American politics sought to recoup the "losses" of SALT I which 
resulted in more assertive United States behaviour. The Soviet Union's 
approach to SALT II was very similar to that followed in previous 
negotiations; in fact, the Soviet leaders appeared to be quite disturbed
101 nature of the compromise is spelled out in the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980 Annual Report, p. 58. See also 
Samuel B. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT, pp. 77-78.
i n 9 Raymond L. Garthoff, Perspectives on the Strategic Balance 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 15. SALT II forced 
the Soviet Union to dismantle 250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but 
most were obsolete systems. See the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, 1979 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), p. 
2 .
Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet Military and SALT," in Gerald 
Segal and John Baylis, Soviet Strategy, p. 161.
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when Carter attempted to depart radically from the Vladivostok accords, 
which maintained strong continuity with SALT I.
The use of overt threats indicates that the political framework
within which arms control was being negotiated was changing.
Business can no longer be conducted as usual, because the 
basis has changed and a new framework has not yet been 
established....
The ultimate truth of that statement was that the SALT II agreement was a 
reasonably sound agreement that the United States refused to ratify. If 
one were to examine the SALT II treaty on its technical merits, it is
difficult to see how it can be opposed unless one rejects its fundamental
start point. ^ 5  Soviet negotiating behaviour and objectives remained 
fairly constant from SALT I and were not marked by anything 
extraordinary. This deterioration in the political framework appears
to have as much to do with American reactions to Soviet foreign policy in 
the Horn of Africa, Angola and Yemen as with developments in arms control 
itself. The revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
finally made it impossible for any American administration to get SALT II 
ratified. The increased influence of the right wing in the United States 
corresponded with the decrease in American global influence, but the SALT 
II process and treaty became the scapegoats. Because the United States 
had always held high expectations for SALT, its failure and the realities 
of the Soviet strategic build-up proved to be a bitter disappointment.
Christoph Bertram, "Rethinking Arms Control," Foreign Affairs 59 
(Winter 1980/1981), p. 365. Paul Nitze also felt that arms control
negotiations had to be conducted from a position of strength; see his
testimony in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. /Soviet 
Strategic Options. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 62.
Jan Lodal, "SALT II and American Security," Foreign Affairs 59 
(Winter 1978/1979), p. 265.
Christer Jonsson, Soviet Negotiating Behaviour (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 77.
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The Soviet Union in SALT II displayed an understanding of deterrence 
but was not about to give up military advantages if they could be found. 
The United States became more assertive and made several proposals to draw 
down the Soviet forces and even attempted to improve its own military 
position. Stability in SALT II appeared to be a secondary issue in what 
became a technological competition to achieve advantage.
IV. START
The third and most recent phase of the superpower arms control 
negotiations began with the signing of the SALT II treaty and concludes 
with the summit meeting of October, 1986, in Reykjavik, Iceland. This 
period was marked by highly polemical rhetoric particularly from the 
conservative administration of Ronald Reagan. As was increasingly evident 
in SALT II, the worsening political relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union had an increasing impact on arms control and tended 
to shape the START nuclear negotiations.^ ®^
1. Strategic Intentions
From 1979 to 1986 political relations between the superpowers 
continued to deteriorate over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, turmoil 
in Poland and the Soviet destruction of a civilian airliner. No major 
arms control agreement was reached in this timeframe, yet important 
negotiations took place at all levels. Of major concern to the USSR was 
the American commitment to the strategic defence initiative (SDI), and to 
the United States the most significant factor was the growing Soviet 
capability to destroy American ICBM's with only a fraction of Soviet
1®^ Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The United States and
Nuclear Weapons 1946-1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 
200.
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missiles. In this atmosphere, arms control negotiations became in some 
ways more of a propaganda exercise as each side appealed to the public 
media with its proposals.
The Reagan administration had campaigned stridently against the SALT 
II accords calling it a "fatally flawed" agreement. As noted in 
chapter three, the United States appeared to have introduced significant 
compellent objectives that affected its approach to arms control. Critics 
of this administration considered that Reagan had little use for arms 
control, and negotiations were simply a political ploy "to keep United 
States allies reasonably satisfied and United States voters reasonably 
quiescent. But one observer noted a fundamental change in arms
control that amounted to a "paradigm shift" where the degree of strategic 
vulnerability became of paramount importance .-HO Along the lines of 
original arms control theory, this concept accepted the notion of 
competition that has many objectives, not all of which are shared. 
Strategic defences became a central and fundamental objective of Reagan 
that could not be negotiated away in the arms control process.^^
The Soviet Union's view as to the utility of nuclear weapons did not 
change from the earlier SALT process, and during this period, the Soviet 
leaders appeared more genuinely interested in serious arms control
108 Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, 
p. 265.
-^09 Paul Warnke, "The Nuclear Superpower Relationship: Political
and Strategic Implications," in Wolfram F. Hanreider, ed. , Technology. 
Strategy and Arms Control (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p. 24.
Roger K. Smith, "The Separation of Arms Control Talks: The
Reagan Definition of Arms Control and Strategy," Millenium: Journal of
International Studies 15 (Summer 1986), p. 144 and p.161.
m  William M. Arkin, "The New Mix of Defence and Deterrence," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42 (June/July 1986), p. 4. See also W. 
Bruce Weinrod, "Strategic Defence and the ABM Treaty," The Washington 
Quarterly 7 (Summer 1986), p. 86.
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negotiations than their American counterparts. While Soviet political
leaders seemed increasingly prepared to accept mutual vulnerability as an
obvious reality, military officers in the Soviet Union continued to reject
it as a fundamental objective. Although the Soviet Union continued to
assign high priority to missile and space defence, it strenuously opposed
the American SDI in arms control negotiations. This stance probably
reflected Moscow's reservations that it could only lose in a BMD
competition with the United States rather than a broad doctrinal
conviction about the desirability of mutual vulnerability as a long term 
11 9strategy.
Another major Soviet arms control objective was to block the proposed 
American deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles 
(GLCM) to Europe as part of the modernization 6f NATO long range theatre
1 1 O
nuclear forces. -LJ European concerns expressed strenuously by Helmut 
Schmidt in 1977, over maintaining NATO's link to the American nuclear 
deterrent, resulted in NATO adopting in 1979 a twin track plan that 
provided for American deployments of intermediate range nuclear missiles 
beginning in 1983, if an arms control agreement to reduce Soviet theatre 
nuclear power could not be reached. The Soviet Union strenuously opposed 
the introduction of a "new" capability into Europe. Soviet and United 
States efforts to deal with this problem will be discussed in subsequent 
parts of this dissertation.
In this period the Soviet Union also declared a "no first use" policy 
for nuclear weapons that at least on the surface demonstrated increasing
see Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Soviet Union and the Strategic 
Defence Initiative: Preliminary Findings and Impressions (Santa Monica,
California: Rand Corporation N-2482-AF, 1986), p. 18.
113 Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy.
p. 266.
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reliance on deterrence, but it also put considerable political pressure 
that acted as a brake on United States policy to modernize its strategic
forces. The Soviet Union sought to blunt the war fighting orientation of
the Reagan administration that appeared aimed at restoring American 
nuclear superiority.
In terms of the status quo of strategic weapons or arms control 
negotiations, Ronald Reagan's policies signified an important change to 
Soviet leaders. In a "striking departure" from SALT, the United States 
was now rejecting the concept of mutual deterrence or stable balance. 
President Reagan in March, 1983, announced his SDI programme and declared 
his ultimate intention to make nuclear deterrence obsolete. Although one
of his close advisors had no doubts about his deep personal commitment to
significant arms reductions, the United States proposals in START were 
decidedly one-sided.H** Reagan's Eureka College speech in May, 1982, 
unveiled the first American START proposal that would have required the 
Soviet Union to scrap one-half of its modern MIRVed missiles to remain
1 1 f iwithin the proposed limit of 2500 warheads on ICBM's. ^
Although the Soviet Union was beginning to accept the concept of a 
stable balance of nuclear weapons as a possible objective, the Soviet 
military continued to define deterrence in war fighting terms. To a 
Marxist theorist the premise that weapons contribute to the risk of war is
Hedley Bull, "The Classical Approach to Arms Control Twenty 
Three Years After," in Uwe Nerlich, ed. , Soviet Power and Western 
Negotiating Policies. Vol. 2: The Western Panacea: Constraining Soviet
Power Through Negotiation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 
1983), pp. 125-126.
Robert McFarlane, "Effective Arms Control: Challenge of the
1980's," in William T. Parsons, ed., Arms Control and Strategic Stability 
(London: University Press of America, 1986), p. 3.
Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma 
(London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 232-233.
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sophistry - social clashes cause conflict and weapons are but tools of 
p o l i c y . T h e  major Soviet concern with SDI and significant reductions 
had more to do with the fear of United States technology than the concepts 
themselves. Arms control to the Soviet Union is an instrument to 
selectively negotiate certain weapon deployments to attempt "to remain 
technologically competitive with their most innovative opponents. "H8 
Soviet negotiators have sought to block any United States efforts to 
improve its relative strategic position and have been primarily 
interested in containing technological advances in United States nuclear 
capabilities and space based systems that could ultimately threaten Soviet 
ICBM's and compel a costly restructuring of Soviet strategic forces.
The Soviet response to the Eureka College proposal was to call for a 
freeze on all nuclear weapons deployments, the main aim of which was 
probably to halt American technical progress.
In terms of long term political values, the Soviet leaders 
anticipated political conflict with the United States, and their enormous 
investment in strategic forces was intended as a diplomatic as well as a 
military instrument. 120 The major problem for the Soviet Union in the 
1980's, however, was that the high cost of these weapons propelled arms 
control into being an increasingly prominent factor in Soviet politics.
H 2  Barry Blechman, "Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have A Future?"
Foreign Affairs 59 (Fall 1980), p. 106. See also Anne T. Sloan, "Soviet
Propositions on Strategic Arms Control and Arms Policy: A Perspective
Outside the Military Establishment," in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper 
Mickiewicz, eds., The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, p. 121.
H ®  Phillip A. Petersen, "The Modernization of the Soviet Armed 
Forces," NATO's Sixteen Nations 31 (July 1986), p. 33.
H 9  Congressional Research Service, Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms 
Control. Part VI: Soviet Attitudes and Objectives in Negotiations
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), pp. vii-x.
120 Colin S. Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race (Westmead: Gower
Publishing Company, 1981), p. 9.
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Arms control could free important resources which might otherwise be spent 
191on defence. In spite of evident pressures to reduce military spending
on strategic weapons, the Soviet Union has no intention of falling behind
the United States as happened in the 1950's and 1960's. A senior Soviet
negotiator summed up an underlying Soviet objective in START:
Before we had to negotiate from a position of being five 
years behind. Now we're not behind you. Nor do we intend 
to be, ever again. 122
To the United States, the Soviet Union may even have had a margin of 
superiority in 1980 that the Reagan initiated defence build-up intended to 
erase. Allegations that the Soviet Union had violated the 1925 chemical 
weapons protocol raised concerns that the Soviet Union was prepared to 
violate any arms control agreement if those transgressions would serve 
their interests.123 Since the Republican Party platform called for the 
re-establishment of military and technological superiority over the Soviet 
Union, one objective in START appeared to be to effect nothing less than a 
complete overhaul of the Soviet strategic forces and establish major
121 Rebecca Strode, "The Soviet Armed Forces: Adaptation to 
Resource Scarcity," The Washington Quarterly 9 (Spring 1986), p. 67. In 
the 1980's even the Strategic Rocket Forces have suffered budget cutbacks. 
See p. 56. The December 1988 Soviet announcement of conventional force 
reductions was also probably motivated by budgetary considerations.
122 The official was Osadchiyev in 1983 cited by Strobe Talbott's 
excellent book, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the 
Stalemate in Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 298.
123 Mark C. Storella, Poisoning Arms Control: The Soviet Union and
Chemical/Biological Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, 1984), p. X.
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changes in the nuclear balance, with Soviet cooperation or without. 124
In START the objectives of the superpowers were such that no 
agreement was possible in the short term, and it took over 2 1/2 years for 
tzhe first formal negotiations to take place. Although each superpower 
appeared increasingly prepared to reduce strategic weapons, it wanted to 
do so in such a manner that was as advantageous as possible. While arms 
reductions could reflect deterrent thinking, the concept of using these 
reductions to achieve a strategic advantage of any kind more closely 
paralleled the compellent paradigm of strategic thinking.
2. The Threat of Force
The START process particularly in the early 1980's was marked by an 
increased frequency of threats originating from both sides. The lack of 
evident progress and the poor political relations between the superpowers 
further exacerbated the tensions in arms control that to varying degrees 
had been evident throughout SALT I and SALT II.
The Soviet leaders probably felt that the initial Reagan START 
proposals were a serious threat before world opinion. According to a 
senior Soviet official, the Eureka College proposal and the various build- 
down proposals appeared to be designed "to emasculate" Soviet strategic 
f o r c e s . 125 Even the United States Secretary of State felt the Eureka 
College proposal was designed for maximum political advantage; it was a
124 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and
the Stalemate in Arms Control, p. 7. The United States was determined to
reduce Soviet ICBM forces. See the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, 1983 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1984), p. 
6. See also William Kincaide, "The SDI and Arms Control," in Samuel F. 
Wells and Robert S. Sitwak, Strategic Defences and Soviet-American 
Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987),
p. 102.
125 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and
the Stalemate in Arms Control, p. 341.
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19 f\"non-negotiable package" and "a two-faced proposalJ-"1D By encouraging 
more SLBM's and fewer ICBM's, these proposals also appeared designed to 
channel the strategic competition into areas of American technical 
advantage.127
The United States still felt that the growing Soviet technical 
capability to destroy American ICBM's with only a fraction of its 
strategic force posed a serious threat. The Soviet proposal of a nuclear 
freeze, because of its political support in the United States, threatened 
to consolidate this Soviet advantage, and a freeze proposal was only 
narrowly defeated in the United States Congress. The rapid Soviet build­
up of the SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) in Europe was 
also perceived as a threat by the Reagan administration. Richard Perle 
was convinced that the Soviet Union had deliberately deployed more SS-20 
missiles than were really required so as to threaten NATO, to achieve an
i n q
advantageous arms control leverage and to circumvent the SALT limits.
The INF talks also sparked some threats that contributed to the
deterioration of the arms control process. The Soviet leaders clearly 
perceived NATO plans to deploy the Pershing II to the Federal Republic of 
Germany as a serious threat, and in turn Brezhnev threatened in 1982 to 
place the United States in "an analogous position" if the United States
126 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism. Reagan and Foreign Policy (New
York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 223. These comments were from a man who
believed in U.S. superiority; see his testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Strategic 
Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty). PART I (Washington, 
D.C.: USGPO, 1979), p. 359.
127 Edwina Moreton, "Untying the Nuclear Knot," in Gerald Segal et
al. . Nuclear War Nuclear Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p.
60. The extent of this advantage will be made more clear in chapter
seven.
128 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and
the Stalemate in Arms Control, pp. 59-60. See also p. 44 for a discussion
of the link between SS-20 and SALT limits.
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proceeded with NATO INF modernization. The Soviet Union also
threatened to walk out of the INF and START negotiations if American 
deployments began, and to deploy even more missiles to East E u r o p e .  
When the Soviet Union was unable to influence the West German election and 
NATO deployments began, it followed through on each threat by walking out 
on arms control talks, increasing numbers of SSBN's in forward deployment 
areas and moving some extra missiles into East Europe. The public nature 
of the arms control dialogue in INF and START literally forced the Soviet 
Union to follow through in each case even though this was apparently
1 0 1
resisted by the Soviet military.
The START negotiations continued to stumble over specific aspects of 
American technical superiority primarily because these issues were 
perceived as fundamental concerns by the Soviet Union. With increased 
Soviet research into defence technologies in this period, the Soviet 
motivations for opposing the SDI appeared to still be based on the fear 
that the United States was significantly ahead in strategic defensive 
technology.^2 American offers to sell this expensive technology to a 
Soviet Union having economic difficulties would be tantamount to nuclear
129 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 
1982-1983 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983),
p. 22.
1-^ Lawrence T. Caldwell, "Soviet Policy on Nuclear Weapons and Arms 
Control," in Dan Caldwell, ed. , Soviet International Behaviour and United 
States Policy Options (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1985),
pp. 215-216.
1^1 Rose E. Gottesnoeller, "Soviet Arms Control Decision-Making 
Since Brezhnev," in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds. , 
The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, p. 107.
^ 2  Caspar Weinburger, "Why Offence needs Defence," Foreign Policy 
68 (Fall 1987), p. 11. See also D. Goedhuis, "The Importance of 
Preserving and Strengthening the ABM Treaty of 1972," International 
Relations (May 1986), p. 479.
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blackmail, if they were believable. Discussions over when to field
this technology formed the essential sticking point, with the Soviet Union 
insisting on the longest possible timeframe before either side would give 
the requisite six-month notice to abrogate the ABM T r e a t y . T h e  United 
States, however, seemed prepared to use SDI as a lever to bring the Soviet 
leadership face to face with its shortcomings or even as a vehicle to
T O C
degrade party influence. J
Although the Reagan administration did not agree with SALT II, it has 
largely continued to abide by its limits. The Soviet Union also claims to 
be following SALT II limits, but the United States has on several 
occasions charged the Soviet Union with treaty violations. The chief 
American START negotiator, Edward Rowny, finally threatened that unless 
the Soviet leaders stopped violating the SALT II Treaty and "dramatically 
change their behaviour," the United States would proceed with a major 
strategic modernization programme. ~>D
During the START process, the use of threats became much more 
frequent as confrontation and competition increasingly marked the arms 
control process. Each superpower attempted to consolidate its advantages
Tom Gervasi, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 18-19. This work does a good job debunking the 
somewhat alarmist right wing concern over Soviet military power.
Andrei Kokoshin, "A Soviet View on Radical Weapons Cuts," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1988): p. 17. Soviet leaders
view ABM as very destabilizing. See also Philip J. Klass, "Mobile Missile 
Verification Slows START Negotiations," Aviation Week and Space Technology 
(21 December, 1987), p. 25.
James M. McConnell, "SDI, the Soviet Investment Debate and 
Soviet Military Policy," Strategic Review 16 (Winter 1988), p. 47. See 
also Dimitry Mikheyev, The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Defence 
Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
1987), pp. 86-87.
Hugh Lucas, "SALT II has Outlived Its Usefulness," Janes Defence 
Weekly (14 June, 1986), p. 1081.
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and minimize its disadvantages through the medium of arms control. The 
Soviet Union sought to retain its advantage in land-based accurate ICBM 
warheads, and the United States sought to gain maximum leverage to reduce 
Soviet warheads through a strategic build-up of MX, Trident and B-l 
strategic systems. The United States refused to compromise on SDI and 
threatened the USSR with the future achievement of a counterforce and 
damage limiting capability that could facilitate a first strike. The 
nature and frequency of implied and direct strategic threats strongly 
reflected the search for advantage in the compellent paradigm.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
START, at least as of the Reykjavik summit between Reagan and 
Gorbachev, had produced no agreement on strategic arms reductions. The 
proposals and public declarations of each superpower were such that each 
appeared to be seeking an agreement that would provide it a comparative 
advantage over the other.
What in SALT was a quantitative competition in strategic weapons was 
now a qualitative one where criteria such as accuracy, lethality and 
survivability became most important. Although strategic defence was a 
major component of the United States policy towards arms control from 1983 
on, the prospect of trying to defend against a nuclear attack has never 
been absent.137 Even a top Soviet scientist noted that ABM limitations 
had no impact whatsoever on his work on Soviet ballistic missile 
defences.138 The concept of strategic defence including those elements
137 Gary L. Guertner and Donald M. Snow, The Last Frontier: An
Analysis of the Strategic Defence Initiative (Toronto: Lexington Books,
1986), p. 4.
138 The scientist was Anatoly Fedoseyev, cited in Stephen P. 
Adragna, On Guard for Victory: Military Doctrine and Ballistic Missile
Defence in the USSR (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy
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based in space had become so well established that only those who believed 
in mutual assured destruction as a central component of strategic
stability objected to it.^^ The role of strategic defences appeared to 
be increasingly accepted in Moscow and Washington, but the key concerns 
appeared to be over timings and comparative advantage. One very positive 
aspect of defences was that they were easily distinguishable from 
offensive systems, thus precluding an even greater security dilemma.
During the START negotiations each superpower proposed reductions in 
strategic weapons but the quantities of strategic warheads on each side 
actually rose. Clearly, quantitative arms racing is where the Soviet 
Union has a comparative edge, and the Soviet proposal to freeze strategic 
weapons in January, 1983, appeared designed to take advantage of the
recently completed Soviet build-up and limit American strategic 
modernization programmes. The increasing numbers of strategic warheads 
conflicted with the declaratory intentions of each power to reduce nuclear 
arsenals.
Each superpower in this period accused the other of striving for
nuclear superiority. Reagan announced at a press conference "that on
balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority," and 
he felt that that margin created a "window of vulnerability" for the
Analysis, 1987), p. 27.
•^9 Colin S. Gray, American Military Space Policy (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Abt Books, 1983), p. 19.
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World 
Politics 30 (January 1978), p. 211.
Rebecca V. Strode, "Soviet Policy Toward the Freeze in 
Historical Perspective," in Keith Payne and Colin S. Gray, The Nuclear 
Freeze Controversy (New York: University Press of America, 1984), p. 127. 
See also Robert J. Einhorn, Negotiating from Strength: Leverage in U.S.- 
Soviet Arms Control Negotiations, p. 41. See Annex H as well.
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United S t a t e s .  After the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Geneva,
Gorbachev maintained that the United States was trying to achieve nuclear 
superiority. The Soviet Union was particularly alarmed that each
American arms control proposal appeared to rest on the linking of nuclear 
arms reductions to the reduction of Soviet influence, military 
capabilities and "objectionable behaviour. The arms control proposals 
of the Reagan administration offered the Soviet Union little prospect for 
enhancing their strategic position. In particular, the Reagan 
administration has taken a very narrow interpretation of the 1972 ABM 
Treaty that could permit SDI deployment, in spite of its not being a 
broadly held view.-^^ The increasing accuracy and hard target kill 
potential of modern systems when coupled with even a marginally effective 
defence could provide a useful war fighting capability.
The concept of strategic defence imposes a new standard on the 
stability equations. The gradual but steady drift away from mutual 
assured destruction as a central requirement for nuclear stability was 
sanctioned by the Scowcroft commission set up to achieve greater consensus 
in American strategic policy. The combination of some strategic
defence and a policy of deceptive basing (mobile ICBM's) can in fact
■^2 Tom Gervasi, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, p. 75.
Zhores A. Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York: W.N. Norton and
Company, 1986), p. 241.
Corbin Fowler, The Logic of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: A
Philosophical Analysis (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), p. 
218.
145 This interpretation is probably not legally sound. It hinges on 
the use of the expression "other physical principles." See Raymond L. 
Garthoff, Policy Versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 6-18.
146 Brent Scowcroft, comments in Michael Charlton, From Deterrence 
to Defence: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy, p. 105.
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achieve a cost effective degree of ICBM survivability. Both
superpowers in the START timeframe were developing strategic point 
defences and mobile ICBM's to enhance the survivability and therefore the 
combat utility of its nuclear forces. This concept fits much better with 
the broader Soviet approach to stability which depends on renouncing the 
development and deployment of "new” weapon systems, renouncing the first 
use of nuclear weapons, but rejecting the notion of total Soviet 
vulnerability.
During the START negotiations each superpower declared its 
willingness to reduce the quantity of nuclear weapons, but each sought to 
do so on its own terms. The strategic shift toward defences gathered 
increased momentum and served to intensify the arms control competition 
which had become one almost completely based on technology. At least for 
the first seven years of START, this analysis indicates that the United 
States had indeed shifted noticeably into a compellent framework while the 
USSR still displayed some compellent characteristics.
4. The Paradigmatic Implications of START
During the START negotiations political relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States deteriorated even further from those which 
existed in SALT II. Each superpower appeared to be attempting to achieve 
unilateral advantage from its arms control proposals that almost seemed 
reminiscent of their political disarmament efforts in the 1950's. But at 
the same time START was also touching the core of each superpower's
Raymond E. Starsman, Ballistic Missile Defence and Deceptive 
Basing: A New Calculus for the Defence of ICBM's (Washington, D.C.:
National Defence University Press, 1981), p. 53.
Ellen Propper Mickiewicz and Roman Kolkowicz, International 
Security and Arms Control (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1986), p. 158.
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security, and this implied that negotiations would be more difficult and 
concessions more modest than was the case in SALT.^^
In START, the tenuous linkage between INF and strategic weapons that 
was barely containable in SALT II came undone and two levels of nuclear 
negotiations were established.-*-^^ The political campaigns by each 
superpower to "win" its objectives in the NATO theatre nuclear force 
modernization issue had a major impact on START for two reasons. It 
diverted attention from the START process, and it threatened the Soviet 
Union in a way that it considered "strategic." It also became clear that 
since the Soviet Union was unlikely to agree to accept the one-sided 
United States "strategic" deployments, no real progress in START could be 
made until the INF issue was resolved.
In the START negotiations, it appears that each nation sought to 
achieve advantage with each of its proposals. The United States was 
committed to SDI and strategic force modernization of technologically 
advanced weapon systems so it refused a nuclear freeze. The Soviet Union 
had finally reached its strategic force structure objectives in the early 
1980's, and felt that the ICBM advantage it enjoyed was balanced by 
American superiority in SLBM's and bombers. To Soviet leaders the 
prospect of unequal reductions would return the USSR to an inferior 
strategic position. It may also be that the Soviet Union felt much more 
comfortable with a slight quantitative advantage due to its nagging fear 
of American technological momentum. In any event, the Soviet Union in
-*-^9 Congressional Research Service, Fundamentals of Arms Control. 
Part I: Nuclear Arms Control; a Brief Historical Survey (Washington,
D.C.: USGPO, 1985), p. 40. See also United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, 1984 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985), 
pp. 5-11; and, Steven E. Miller, "Politics over Promise," International 
Security (Spring 1984), pp. 88-89.
John Cartwright and Julian Critchley, Cruise. Pershing and SS- 
20 (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), p. 42.
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START would surrender no advantage, and the United States, notwithstanding 
its efforts, did not have the leverage to force them to do so.-'-^
The increased frequency of threats and the one-sided nature of the 
arms control proposals meant that START was increasingly a political 
process. Consequently, it appears that arms control may have been
relegated to a more modest position within the strategic d e b a t e . T h u s ,  
each superpower was able to declare its willingness (and this commitment 
could be genuine) to seek strategic arms reductions while increasing its 
deployments and tabling proposals in public that would result in
unilateral advantages. Consequently, at the Reykjavik summit when 
Gorbachev proposed abolishing nuclear weapons, each leader pursued a
chimera by declaring himself more ready than the other to reduce nuclear
arms, to a degree that their respective strategies could probably never 
accept.
The compellent paradigm, then, offers a useful explanation of the 
thinking behind the START process as each superpower repeatedly evidenced 
a political desire to improve its strategic position through selected arms 
reductions. Each attempted to harness public opinion in its efforts to 
direct arms control onto a course where it could optimize its technical 
advantages in what was an increasingly political competition.
V. CONCLUSION
Even though the arms control process has been subjected to some
William R. Van Cleave, "The Arms Control Record: Successes and
Failures," in Richard F. Staar, ed. , Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality,
p. 19.
1 S 9-LJ  ^ William Bajusz, Deterrence. Technology and Strategic Arms 
Control Adelphi Paper 215 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1987), pp. 48-49. See also Henry W. Schaffer, Nuclear Arms 
Control: The Process of Developing Positions (Washington, D.C.: National
Defence University Press, 1986), p. 82.
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significant political shifts, this review has noted a remarkable 
continuity in strategic arms control assumptions. The Soviet Union 
consistently assumed that the United States would use the negotiations to 
incrementally achieve military advantage, relying on its superior economy 
and open political system to compel the Soviet Union to make
I C O
concessions. •LJJ The Americans, at least initially, had excessive 
confidence that the Soviet Union would eventually, and without criticism, 
accept the concept of strategic stability. After 17 years of strategic
arms control negotiations each side still believed the other was 
attempting to make its strategy unworkable and thereby undermine its 
security. These latter perceptions more closely reflect the attitudes
characteristic of compellent thinking.
Although in arms control theory several different views of arms
control exist, in practice these contending viewpoints can be reduced to
those of strategists and arms control advocates. A strategist seeks
unilateral advantage for his country, often in a competitive sense, while
an arms control advocate wants increased security and decreased risks for
1 S fsall parties, usually through mutual cooperation. Both superpowers have
had people in influential positions who held each of these beliefs, and it 
is worth noting that these views correspond closely with the compellent
Soviet analysts note that the final product of most arms control 
agreements has ended up closer to initial United States positions. See 
Alexei Arbatov, "START: Good, Bad or Neutral," Survival (July/August 1989) 
p. 297. See also Daniel Frei, Perceived Images (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman 
and Allenheld, 1986), p. 280.
154 Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic
Thought," International Security 3 (Fall 1978), pp. 154-5.
David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 72.
Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980's (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 194-197. See also Samuel B. Payne,
The Soviet Union and SALT. Chapters 6 and 7.
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and deterrent paradigms. It is primarily due to the influence of arms
controllers that arms control talks such as SALT I began, but once the
negotiations were underway there appeared to be an inescapable tendency
for each government to use them to maximize its advantages and minimize
its disadvantages.^7 Once a strategic perspective gains the upper hand,
the tendency appears to be towards reinforcing the belief that political
and military gains can be obtained from some advantage in nuclear 
1weapons. J“*JO
When SALT began in 1969, the deterrent paradigm was clearly the 
dominant Western model, and the arms control community in the United 
States expected that, as negotiations continued, the USSR for the most 
part would adopt it. SALT I to a large degree was probably a negotiation 
between people who held fundamentally different paradigmatic views. While 
the final product appeared to have substantiated the expectations of the 
United States arms control community, the Soviet rationale for signing it 
was probably very different. Even in the United States, significant 
evidence of compellent nuclear thinking existed, but many still felt the 
United States forces to be so superior to the Soviet forces that there was 
no major concern over SALT I in an era of detente. As a result of 
different paradigmatic views, however, the United States conceded a 
significant quantitative missile advantage to the USSR and agreed to limit 
its most threatening programme.
It was only after the Soviet Union had continued to modernize and 
improve the qualitative aspects of its ICBM force that the United States
phil Williams, comments in Oyvind Osterud, ed., Studies of War 
and Peace, pp. 110-111.
-LJO Sverre Lodgaard and Frank Blackaby, "Nuclear Weapons and Arms 
Control," in Marek Thee, ed. , Arms and Disarmament: SIPRI Findings
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 329.
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realized that the Soviet Union did not necessarily share the same 
assumptions of deterrence. The United States attempted to use SALT II to 
rectify the perceived imbalance of SALT I, but the Soviet Union insisted 
in maintaining the principles on which SALT I was based. The START 
negotiations continued a struggle for technical advantage through arms 
control as the United States attempted to use strategic reductions to 
reduce the Soviet ICBM force. The United States shift in thinking toward 
strategic defences was particularly worrisome to the USSR, and it 
steadfastly refused to reduce its force structure unless SDI was part of 
the package. Even though Soviet leaders increasingly valued deterrence of 
nuclear was as their most important objective, the sustained emphasis on 
strong forces capable of fighting if necessary indicates that underlying 
Soviet strategic thought appears to have remained fairly constant. The 
United States seems however to have conducted a paradigm shift from 
deterrence to compellence in the period of this review.
Over the period covered, both superpowers expanded their objectives 
to be pursued with strategic arms control but appeared to reduce their 
expectations for success. Because there was little evidence to indicate 
that unilateral restraint by one superpower will induce a positive 
reaction from the other, both sides have continued with force
modernization programmes. The START debate in the Western media was 
probably more directed at the attitudes of Western Europeans than the 
substance of arms control. Increasingly, arms control praxis came to 
reflect the compellent framework as each side carefully protected its best
Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Hass, eds. , Superpower Arms 
Control: Setting the Record Straight (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1987), p. 336.
Karl Kaiser, "The NATO Strategy Debate After Reykjavik," NATO 
Review 6 (December 1986).
war fighting systems and sought to negotiate away those of the opponent.
The notion that the compellent paradigm has come to dominate superpower
strategic arms control parallels the results from the analysis of American 
and Soviet declaratory nuclear strategy in chapters three and four. At
the very least, the compellent paradigm offers an increasingly plausible
explanation for superpower arms control behaviour from 1970 to 1986.
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Chapter Six 
THE COMPETITION IN AT.T.TANCE STRATEGY
As the central alliance for each superpower, NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
have played a pivotal role in the nuclear dimension of Soviet and American 
strategy. When the economies and populations of the various non-Soviet 
European countries are considered together, it becomes evident that a 
politically united Europe could easily compare to either superpower in 
potential power. Thus a political competition for influence in Europe has 
been an inevitable by-product of a bipolar world with the intensity of the 
rivalry exacerbated by the Soviet perception that as a European power, it 
has greater legitimacy in its quest.
The advent of nuclear- weapons has superimposed the risk of nuclear 
war over the political competition in Europe. The bi-polarity of the 
international system from 1970 to 1986 and the power of nuclear weapons 
together appear to have enhanced the utility of alliances.^ To a degree 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact are a medium the two superpowers have adopted to 
manage, legitimize and implement their nuclear strategies. In the 
nuclear era, however, alliances expose their members to such 
unprecedented risks that these weapons have assumed a central role 
affecting alliance relationships. The relationship between alliance 
strategy and superpower nuclear strategy is thus of fundamental
1 Arthur R. Day and Michael W. Doyle, Escalation and Intervention: 
Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1986), pp. 1-3. According to an interesting view, one important 
factor in the cold war was the mutual superpower recognition that a 
carefully managed antagonism actually served their respective interests. 
See Michael Cox, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower 
Detente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War," Journal of Peace Research 
(No. 1, 1990), p. 30.
 ^ Henry T . Nash, Nuclear Weapons and International Behaviour 
(Leyden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1975), p. 55.
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importance, and a knowledge of how the former operates may shed some light 
on the latter.
The role of strategic and theatre nuclear weapons in each alliance is 
ostensibly to deter the other side from initiating a conflict or from
escalating to nuclear first use once war begins. Simply put, it is the
manipulation of strategic risk via the prospect of escalation to seek 
policy objectives. Because Europe is so important to the superpowers, 
each has deployed a vast array of forces that include both conventional 
and nuclear weapons. For much of the period under review in this chapter 
the integration of conventional and nuclear forces in each alliance has 
been so complete that military commanders would be under pressure to use
O
nuclear weapons early in any conflict. It is this integration of nuclear 
weapons into conventional forces that complicates the application of
nuclear strategy and the conclusion of arms control agreements. Since 
conventional forces are commonly understood to have defensive and
offensive utility as described in chapter one, nuclear forces that are 
closely integrated with conventional forces may be expected to have or be 
viewed as having deterrent and compellent utility.
This chapter will analyze the alliance strategy of each superpower 
during the period 1970-1986 to assess which paradigm best reflects their 
nuclear strategies. The first section describes in general the situation 
on the central front of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the second investigates 
NATO strategy and the third examines Warsaw Pact strategy. Detailed 
examination of the United States and Soviet intercontinental forces has 
been left for subsequent chapters.
 ^ Morton H. Halperin and Madalene O'Donnell, "The Nuclear Fallacy", 
Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists 44 (January/February 1988), p. 8.
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I. THE SITUATION ON THE CENTRAL FRONT
The central front of NATO and the Warsaw Pact is the military center 
of gravity of the two alliance systems. The outcome of any future battle 
between these alliances would probably be decided by the results of this 
major contest which would for the most part probably be fought on German 
soil. The partition of Germany and the role of each German state in its 
respective alliance system has served to highlight a delicate political 
situation where a special relationship between each superpower and its 
German ally has been required. Because the role of strategic nuclear 
weapons can only be properly understood if the role of conventional forces 
and other nuclear weapons is clear, this section examines the complete 
spectrum of alliance military forces.
As cold war became fact, NATO and eventually the Warsaw Pact 
developed into effective military organizations that could fight should 
the need arise. From the outset, however, a major asymmetry existed in 
that the Soviet Union had a large numerical advantage of conventional 
forces which the United States tended to offset through its advantage in 
nuclear weapons.^ Early efforts to get the superpowers to withdraw their 
troops from Central and Western Europe faltered primarily due to 
complications for internal relations within the two alliance systems.^ 
The Soviet Union undoubtedly felt more secure with troops in central 
Europe but an equally significant reason may have been Western Europe's
^ For a good summary of the spiral of actions in the 1950's, see 
Richard Ned Lebow, "Provocative Deterrence: A new look at the Cuban
Missile Crisis," Arms Control Today (July-August 1988), pp. 15-16. For an 
early rationale for NATO reliance on nuclear weapons, see T.F. Walkowicz, 
"Counter-Force Strategy," Air Force: The Magazine of American Airpower 38
(February 1955), p. 51.
Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma (London: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1984), p. 133. This work provides a 
very good general review of nuclear weapons issues.
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insistence that the United States maintain troops in Europe as a visible 
link to American strategic nuclear weapons. One of NATO's central 
problems has been maintaining the credibility of American nuclear 
intervention and retaliation in the face of a growing Soviet capability to 
devastate the United States.^
The total balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is best understood 
by examining the alliance force structure from four perspectives: 
conventional forces, short range tactical nuclear weapons, longer range 
theatre nuclear weapons and strategic or intercontinental nuclear systems. 
In the 1950's NATO was clearly superior in all categories of nuclear 
weapons but, even after the rearmament of West Germany, still lacked the 
conventional strength of the Warsaw Pact. By 1967 when NATO adopted a 
flexible response strategy, the- Soviet Union had built an advantage in 
long range theatre nuclear systems to supplement its conventional 
superiority, but the United States retained significant advantages in 
short range and in intercontinental nuclear weapons.^  From 1970 to 1986 
these conditions gradually shifted to the benefit of the Soviet Union as 
it continued to develop its nuclear and conventional force structure.
The conventional advantage of the Warsaw Pact over the NATO forces in 
1986 was in the order of about two to one by most quantitative indicators. 
Two recent Supreme Allied Commanders Europe (SACEUR) have expressed 
concerns that the Soviet Union will continue to widen and manipulate their
 ^ No alliance commitment can be separated from the analysis of the 
immediate balance of forces. See Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and 
the Prevention of War (London: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 215. See 
also Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1979), p . 5.
 ^ Phillip A. Karber, "The Battle of Unengaged Military Strategies, 
in Uwe Nerlich, ed. , The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition 
Over Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1983), p. 228.
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conventional advantage to the point that NATO "will find itself vulnerable
O
to Soviet intimidation and coercion." In fact the Soviet Union increased 
combat power in its existing units such that from 1965 until the late 
1970's about 30 division equivalents were added to Warsaw Pact fo rce s.^  
This force improvement prompted alarms that the Warsaw Pact was close to 
achieving a "decisive conventional military superiority,"-^ but more sober 
judgements noted the improved ability to defend urbanized Europe and 
concluded neither side had, as of 1986, a decisive advantage.H It is 
worth noting however that a two to one numerical advantage, while not in 
itself decisive, provided the Soviet Union with a conventional 
quantitative edge that was about twice as great as that enjoyed by Germany 
over France and Britain in 1940.
One major concern that has always existed but appears to be mounting 
is the potential degradation of nuclear means in conventional war. Soviet 
frontal aviation for example could successfully interdict NATO theatre 
nuclear weapons (TNW) in one to four days if other targets were ignored.
® General Galvin, SACEUR Statement to Brussels Centre for European 
Policy Studies. 30 July 1987. See also Bernard W. Rogers, "NATO's 
Strategy: An Undervalued Currency," Power and Policy: Doctrine. The
Alliance and Arms Control. Adelphi Paper 205 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), p.4.
 ^ Phillip A. Karber, "The Battle of Unengaged Military Strategies," 
p. 215. The Soviet Union has also fielded 7 new weapons for each 
American new weapon. See Phillip A. Karber, "To Lose an Arms Race: The 
Competition in Conventional Forces Developed in Central Europe, 1965- 
1980," in Uwe Nerlich, ed. , The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the
Competition Over Europe, pp. 31-88.
^  Sam Nunn and Dewey Bartlett, NATO and the New Soviet Threat. A 
report to the Senate Committee on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: 
USGPO, 1977), p. 1.
Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West
Military Confrontation (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 260.
1 9 Joshua M. Epstein, Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air
Threat to Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1984), p. 178.
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The pressure in a crisis to disperse nuclear weapons to increase their
survivability to conventional attack is increasing, and thus incentives to
1 ^preempt with nuclear weapons have probably increased. J
Nuclear weapons have been important to each superpower, but NATO has 
relied heavily on tactical nuclear weapons to replace force goals for 
conventional forces that proved unattainable.-^ The Soviet Union also 
deployed tactical nuclear weapons to support its concept of rapid 
offensive operations that required complete integration of nuclear 
firepower into the manoeuvre of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.^  The 
numbers of tactical nuclear weapons expanded significantly until by 1973 
NATO had well in excess of 7,000 warheads, most of which were short range 
artillery s h e l l s . 16 The initial Soviet preference on the other hand was 
for longer range rockets and missiles that had more controllability and 
greater invulnerability. Recently NATO has reduced its European stockpile 
of short range tactical nuclear weapons, but the Soviet Union has 
introduced greater numbers of nuclear capable artillery. The evident 
superiority that NATO held in 1950's and 1960's in battlefield (short
H  Dennis Gormley, "The Impact of NATO Doctrinal Choices on the 
Policies and Strategic Choices of Warsaw Pact States: Part II", Power and 
Policy: Doctrine. The Alliance and Arms Control, pp. 30-31.
1^ Lisbon force goals for NATO were originally set at 96 Divisions 
in 1952. In 1955 a 26 Division force was created and 15,000 nuclear
weapons were required to make up the difference. See Donald R. Cotter,
James H. Hansen and Kirk McConnell, The Nuclear Balance in Europe:
Status. Trends. Implications (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic 
Institute, 1983), p. 4.
1^ A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (Moscow: 1970), translated by
United States Air Force p. 58. See also Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hansen 
and Kirk McConnell, The Nuclear Balance in Europe: Status. Trends.
Implications. p. 8.
16 U.S. Security Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and Offset. MBFR
and Nuclear Weapons. A report for the Subcommittee on U.S. Security 
Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1973), p. 13.
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range) nuclear weapons has eroded until, in the 1980's, the Soviet Union
has reached parity in this area. Improvements in Soviet nuclear force
posture appear deliberately aimed at achieving at least parity at each
level of capability.17
The Soviet Union's propensity to concentrate on missiles had accorded
the Warsaw Pact an advantage in theatre nuclear forces for two reasons.
Firstly the greater range of Soviet systems provided improved and rapid
target coverage of NATO, and secondly any NATO retaliation against several
of these systems would have to be against Soviet territory, a step NATO
may be reluctant to take. These advantages more than compensated the
Soviet Union for the earlier NATO numerical advantage in short range
systems. Furthermore, in long range theatre systems (INF) in the early
1980's the Warsaw Pact was said to have as much as a ten to one
advantage.19 The reason for this asymmetry was the difference in roles.
Whereas NATO INF were designed primarily to provide a link to the United
States strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet Union was planning to destroy
90all NATO TNW as well as support an offensive into Western Europe. u A
17 Edward Luttwak, "The Problems of Extending Deterrence," The
Future of Strategic Deterrence. Adelphi Paper 160 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 35.
1® United States Department of Defence, NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981), p. 46. See also Stephen Meyer's extremely 
useful contribution, Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces. Part II: Capabilities 
and Implications. Adelphi Paper 188 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 147.
Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hansen and Kirk McConnell, The 
Nuclear Balance in Europe: Status. Trends. Implications, p. 3. The Soviet 
Union had enough TNW to cover most of Western Europe with 10 psi 
overpressure from nuclear blasts. Other assessments claim the Soviet 
advantage was not as great, but all assessed a significant Soviet 
advantage in this area. This advantage has been reduced but not 
eliminated by the 1987 INF Treaty.
20 Stephen Meyer, Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces. Part II: 
Capabilities and Implications, p. 48.
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more fundamental problem with INF is that they were designed for first
use, and this probably helped account for the intensity of the Soviet
reaction to the NATO decision in 1979 to deploy long range missiles to 
o 1
Europe. x From 1970 to 1986 the Soviet Union maintained and increased its 
advantage in INF, but it never relented in its efforts to prevent NATO 
deployment, and when that failed, to remove NATO's INF nuclear missiles 
through negotiations.
The final dimension of alliance military strategy refers to the 
intercontinental strategic systems that form the last resort up the ladder 
toward escalation dominance. The most significant event in the years 
1970-1986 was the Soviet achievement of strategic parity in the eyes of
all alliance members. By 1982 senior United States officials accorded the
9 9Soviet Union a three to one advantage in ICBM's. x The impact of this
major shift in the correlation of forces created difficulties for the
United States in NATO and caused it to pay closer attention to its
alliance partners. The general consensus in the 1950's and 1960's that
allowed the United States considerable latitude in handling nuclear
matters had eroded. If nothing else the enhanced radiation warhead
episode demonstrated that the United States could no longer act
9 ^unilaterally in nuclear matters. J NATO strategy under these new 
conditions appeared in a different light:
Particularly the Pershing II. See Michael Mandlebaum,
"Instability and Nuclear Order: The First Nuclear Regime," in David C.
Gompert et al. . Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the 
Future (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), p. 24. For a description of the 
Soviet goal to eliminate all U.S. long range nuclear forces in Europe see 
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985 Annual Report 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), p. 14.
22 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982 Annual 
Report (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1984), p. 5.
23 Alexander Haig, Hearings on Military Posture. Part I, before the 
House Committee on Armed Services, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1979), p. 1384.
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Under conditions of strategic parity and theatre nuclear 
inferiority, a NATO nuclear response to a non-nuclear 
Soviet aggression in Europe would be a questionable 
strategy at best, a self-defeating one at worst.2^
Assessments of the outcome of possible war in central Europe are
still very much dependent on assumptions as to how such a war might start.
In general the more that combat assessments move away from gross numbers
of units or equipments and attempt to portray interactions, constraints
and capabilities, the more even the balance a p p e a r s . 25 The Director of
the United States Defence Intelligence Agency felt that the overall
balance was fairly stable and that the USSR perceives that NATO would be a
9 ficlearly matched opponent. ° Even though the Warsaw Pact has a superior
strategic position, stronger conventional forces, and an offensive
strategy designed to utilize these advantages, NATO has excellent
prospects for a successful defence if it is fully deployed. 2? One
respected analyst believes that Soviet operational research reveals that
9 ftthe Warsaw Pact cannot win under such conditions. The real problem then 
becomes one of how much warning NATO has and whether NATO leaders are
2^ Sam Nunn, NATO: Can the Alliance Be Saved? (Washington, D.C.:
USGPO, 1982), p. 2.
9 S James Blacker and Andrew Hamilton, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw 
Pact Military Balance (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 50.
9 f\ General Tighe, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and 
China - 1979. Part 5. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and 
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, (Washington, D.C.: 
USGPO, 1980), p. 116.
27 John G. Hines and Phillip A. Petersen, Thinking Soviet in 
Defending Europe address to the Conference of Defence Associations, 
Ottawa, 8 May, 1987. See also Desmond Ball et al. . Crisis Stability and 
War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Peace Studies Programme, 1987),
p. 6.
9 ft Christopher Donnelly, The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups: 
The Non Nuclear Threat to NATO. A presentation to Operational Research 
Analysis Establishment Special Seminar, Ottawa, 14 April 1987.
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prepared to deploy their forces based on what would undoubtedly be 
conflicting and partial information. If NATO were about to begin 
mobilization of its forces and dispersal of its nuclear weapons from 
central storage areas, the Soviet leaders would see their military 
advantage receding and would, in such a crisis, be under intense military 
pressure to pre-empt. 7
In such a situation Soviet leaders would probably devote considerable 
effort to convincing NATO leaders that no Soviet attack was imminent. 
This could allow for the defusing of a serious crisis or it could secure 
strategic political surprise for a Soviet attack. The point at which war 
begins will have tremendous consequences on its results. Since some of 
NATO's strongest forces must deploy from the United States and all must 
move forward to their deployment areas, the Soviet Union has less need to 
mobilize prior to a NATO/Warsaw Pact war and even then some Soviet
O A
preparation could begin surreptitiously. In the 1980's a number of
significant Confidence and Security Building Measures have been 
introduced that significantly reduce NATO concerns about the possibility, 
however remote, of a surprise Soviet attack.
One final aspect of an alliance's ability to withstand the rigours of 
war is its social cohesiveness, an often forgotten dimension of
O “1
strategy. NATO and the Warsaw Pact would each experience varying
problems, but the most significant problem in a major crisis may well be
9 Q John M. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in 
Central Europe," International Security 7 (Summer 1982), p. 39. See also 
Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence. The Arms 
Race, and Arms Control (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1983), pp. 
159-160.
About four days warning is needed to prepare NATO sufficiently 
to withstand a Warsaw Pact attack.
Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy", Foreign 
Affairs 57 (Summer 1979), pp. 975-986.
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the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact alliance. The Soviet goal of maintaining 
tight control of its military alliance appears incompatible with the 
equally important goal of maintaining political stability in Eastern
Q O
Europe.  ^ The loyalty of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armed forces in 
combat remains questionable.
From 1970-1986, in addition to strategic arms control discussed in 
the preceding chapter, a number of efforts at conventional and theatre 
nuclear arms control have been made, but no significant breakthrough 
occurred during this period. These arms control efforts, concentrating on 
reducing conventional and INF forces in Europe, encountered no more 
success prior to the Reykjavik summit in 1986 than the START negotiations 
in the same period in spite of strong popular pressure in Western Europe
O O
to reach an agreement. In 1987, however, United States and the Soviet 
Union finally signed an INF Treaty that succeeded in eliminating land 
based long range theatre nuclear missiles from the European confrontation.
During this period prior to 1986 the Soviet Union increased its 
advantage in conventional forces, and it attained at least parity in 
battlefield, intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons. In the 1980's 
the conventional balance has been an increasing concern to NATO
O /
headquarters as confidence in early resort to nuclear weapons recedes. 
This situation does not provide any assurances to Soviet leaders that they
Steven Larrabee, The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern 
Europe (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation R-3190-AF, 1984), p.
118. See also Robert W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defence 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Abt Books, 1984), p. 106.
These efforts included in particular the Stockholm Conference on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and 
the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.
Michael J. Slack, "Alliance Issues," in R.B. Byers and Michael 
J. Slack, eds. , The Canadian Strategic Review 1985-1986 (Toronto: 
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 80-84.
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could win should war occur, but it probably imbues them with an increased 
degree of confidence that the Western European nations may be slightly 
more accommodating to Soviet interests. If war occurs, the outcome would 
be determined by two variables - the degree of NATO preparation, and the 
method in which nuclear weapons are introduced, if they are used at all.
II. PARADIGMATIC ANALYSIS OF NATO STRATEGY
From the outset NATO was conceived as a political alliance designed 
to counter Soviet power and maintain Western European countries as free 
democracies. Although the military dimension of the alliance has steadily 
assumed greater importance, the need to match the Soviet Union's military 
power was evident even before NATO's formation in 1948. The British 
ambassador to France noted in 1947 that had Britain and France maintained 
their military strength after World War I, they could have probably 
prevented World War 11.^5 To counter the array of Soviet armies opposite 
Western Europe, NATO needed the power of the United States; therefore 
Western European and American security were officially coupled in 1948. ° 
This marked the first time that a group of proud and ancient powers became
O *7
dependent on the protection of a government three thousand miles away.
Over a period of about five years, nuclear weapons became the 
foundation of alliance strategy, and massive retaliation called for 
strategic bombing of the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet incursion 
of any sort into Western Europe. The essential difficulty with this
Philip Towle, Europe Without America: Could We Defend Ourselves? 
(London: Alliance Publishers, 1983), p. 41.
^  The agreement to found the NATO alliance. Coit D. Blacker, 
Reluctant Warriors (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1987), p. 69.
Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, Arms and Stability in 
Europe: A British-French-German Enquiry (London: Chatto and Windus,
1963), p. 227.
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strategy was that it called for massive nuclear first use without public
O O
opinion being prepared to support such a step. ° With the advent of a 
Soviet ability to retaliate in kind, at the insistence of the United
O Q
States and over the objections of France, 7 NATO finally agreed in 1967 to 
adopt the strategy of flexible response where NATO would select the 
appropriate response to any Soviet move.
This section will apply the paradigmatic framework to the NATO 
strategy of flexible response, 1970-1986. The NATO political objective, 
the implied threats to use military force, and the correlation of nuclear 
forces guide the following paradigmatic analysis.
1. The Strategic Intentions of NATO
NATO was founded as a defensive alliance to deter further Soviet 
encroachment into Western Europe. As previously noted, the ratio of 
conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact virtually precluded 
any significant offensive capability against the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless the Soviet Union perceives the deterrence policy of NATO as 
an active one "that asserts hostile intent."^ A closer examination of 
NATO's objectives, particularly with respect to the use of nuclear 
weapons, is now in order.
NATO is divided by geographic asymmetry, essentially between the 
United States and Western Europe. From 1970 to 1986 the United States has 
concentrated on enhancing the credibility of using nuclear weapons by
3^ Sir Anthony Buzzard et al. . "On Limiting Atomic War," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientist 13 (June 1957), p. 216.
39 France withdrew its forces from the NATO military command 
structure in 1966, primarily over nuclear strategy.
^  Michael MccGwire, "The Dilemmas and Delusions of Deterrence," in 
Gwyn Prins, ed. , The Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1984), p. 96.
245
introducing limited nuclear war fighting concepts, but the Europeans, who 
appear to see any Soviet move as less probable, insist on rapid escalation 
to intercontinental weapons to avoid the threat of prolonged conventional 
or nuclear war limited to Europe.^ Notwithstanding the differences over 
how to employ nuclear weapons, NATO is united behind the principle of 
nuclear first use, an essential pillar of alliance strategy.^ As the 
capability of non nuclear weapons has steadily improved, however, the 
concept of deterrence has tended to expand to include conventional forces. 
This results in a greater blurring of the nuclear threshold which 
emphasizes the high degree of integration between conventional and nuclear 
weapons in NATO, at least until such time as an all conventional defense 
is considered feasible.^ This tends to exacerbate the tensions between 
Western Europe which seeks the promise of quick escalation to enhance 
deterrence, and the United States which seeks the basis for war fighting 
or war termination functions. ^  Although recent efforts to improve 
conventional defences are significant, they depend on 3% increases in
See Michael Howard, "On Fighting a Nuclear War," International 
Security 5 (Spring 1981), p. 8; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Thresholds 
and Theologies: Time for a Critical Reassessment," in William J. Taylor, 
Steven A. Marranen and Gerrit W. Gong, eds., Strategic Responses to 
Conflict in the 1980's (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 171.
See testimony of Vice Admiral Gerald Miller, former Deputy 
Director of Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, First Use of Nuclear 
Weapons: Preserving Possible Control. Hearings before the Subcommittee of 
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on 
International Relations (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), p. 47.
^  See Carl Builder, The Prospects and Implications of Non Nuclear 
Means for Strategic Conflict. Adelphi Paper 200 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), pp. 29-30. See also Major Dorn 
Crawford, "The Operational Level of Deterrence," Military Review 68 
(January 1987), p. 21.
^  Catherine M. Kelleher, "Nation-State and National Security in 
Post War Western Europe," in Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Matton, 
eds. , Evolving European Defence Policies (Toronto: Lexington Books,
1987), p. 3.
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defence spending for many years, and thus offer no short term solution.^ 
Present NATO strategy is essentially a compromise between the need to 
deter and the need to fight which still depends heavily on the utility of 
nuclear weapons.
The tensions between the strategic objectives of Western European 
countries and those of the United States also extend to some differing 
views of the European status quo. During the 1970-1986 period Western 
Europeans tended to view NATO strictly as an alliance limited to the 
defence of NATO countries, but the United States still tends to see the 
Alliance as the cornerstone of its worldwide network dedicated to the 
containment of Soviet influence.^ The United States aspires to retain 
its "freedom of action" to pursue "world power" in competition with the 
Soviet Union and to maintain the credibility of American national 
strategy. ^  When Zbigniew Brzezinski came to the Carter administration he 
brought with him the notion that the United States should have as its 
objective the undoing of the European partition. The Reagan
administration has also become attracted to the theme of somehow trying to
In 1984 NATO upgraded its conventional force goals in a programme 
called the Convention Defence Improvements effort which was being 
developed into a long term plan (MC 299). See Michael J. Slack, 
"Alliance Issues," in R.B. Byers and Michael J. Slack, eds., The Canadian 
Strategic Review 1985-1988. p. 81.
^  David Charles, Nuclear Planning in NATO: Pitfalls of First Use
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987, p. 9. These
views have shifted somewhat from the I960's. See Leonard Beaton, The 
Western Alliance and The McNamara Doctrine. Adelphi Paper 11 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 6.
^  John M. Collins, United States/Soviet Military Balance. A 
research paper presented to the House Committee on Appropriations, 
Department of Defence Appropriations for 1977. Part 6 (Washington, D.C.: 
USGPO, 1976), p. 42.
^  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe 
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Relations with 
Europe in the Decade of the 1970's (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1970), pp. 
227-229.
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roll the Soviets back from East Europe. To maintain the fundamental tenet 
of NATO alliance cohesion, however, these United States sentiments have 
been downplayed and are not part of NATO's declared strategy.^
Because NATO is made up of several states who inevitably have several 
diverse views, the need for alliance cohesiveness is paramount. There has 
therefore been strong support in NATO for maintaining the status quo that 
essentially stemmed from the bipolar international system and the Federal 
Republic of Germany's tacit acceptance of the maintenance of the division 
of Germany.Nevertheless the inevitable tensions inherent in such a 
diverse alliance have caused some speculation as to the inevitable decline 
of NATO over time. These observations are rooted in the waning belief 
that the United States will continue indefinitely to shield Europe with 
its strategic nuclear weapons in the face of certain destruction.
The underlying political values of NATO are difficult to discern due 
to the fact that the Alliance is made up of different sovereign states who
C O
pursue national interests that are overlapping but are not identical.  ^
In general the West European countries have tended to treat the Soviet 
Union on non-ideological grounds such that trade agreements and relaxed
^  See John Steinbruner, "Alliance Security", p. 201 and David N. 
Schwartz, "A Historical Perspective," p. 19. Both can be found in John 
Steinbruner and Leon Sigal, eds., Alliance Security: NATO and the No 
First Use Question (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983).
See A.W. DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring 
Balance (London: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 187. See also Glenn H. 
Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36 
(July 1984), p. 495.
Gerald Garvey, Strategy and the Defence Dilemma (Toronto: 
Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 17-18. See also Hedley Bull, "The Moscow 
Agreements on Strategic Arms Limitations," in Robert O'Neill and David N. 
Schwartz, eds. Hedley Bull on Arms Control (London: Macmillan Press,
1987), p. 185. The prospect of German reunification in the 1990's will 
accelerate this process.
David Garnham, "Comments to the Editor," International Security 
10 (Spring 1986), p. 205.
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tensions have been a positive experience, contrary to the more distant,
C O
ideological and zero sum view often held in Washington. J Even though 
controversy is at times evident over important values, NATO remains united 
in its support of defending NATO governments from Soviet intimidation and 
NATO territory from Soviet encroachment.
By virtue of the principle of the lowest common denominator, NATO has 
determined its fundamental political objective, deterring aggressive 
Soviet actions. Officially NATO is seeking only what's necessary for its 
military security without striving for superiority or seeking security at 
the expense of the Soviet Union. Senior American officials believed
that their participation in NATO holds their allies together and prevents 
them from seeking greater accommodation with the Soviet U n i o n . T h u s  the
strength of NATO during the period under review has been tied to the
United States and its nuclear weapons. What makes extended deterrence
workable is the basic recognition that defending Western Europe is
essential to the independence and security of the United States.
R.J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet 
Union and Western Europe. Adelphi Paper 119 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 27. See also Karl Kaiser's 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States-Western Europe 
Relations in 1980 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), p. 192. For some
quantitative data see Jack Brougher, "1979-1982: The United States Uses
Trade To Penalize Soviet Aggression and Seeks to Reorder Western Policy," 
in Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and
Prospects Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982), p. 421.
Report on the State of Efforts Towards Arms Control and 
Disarmament and on the Changes in the Balance of Military Power 1985 
(Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1985), pp. 
10-14.
James R. Schlesinger, "The Evolution of American Policy Toward 
the Soviet Union," International Security 1 (Summer 1976), p. 41.
Walter B. Slocombe, "The Future of Extended Deterrence," in 
Richard G. Lugar and Robert E. Hunter, eds., Adapting NATO's Deterrent 
Posture (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, 1985), p. 26.
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In general, NATO strategy is one that from the viewpoint of strategic 
intentions appears to fall within the deterrent paradigm except for the 
high value placed on the utility of nuclear weapons to stop other than 
nuclear provocations. The commitment of NATO to nuclear first use, 
therefore, is a threat that bears closer examination.
2. The NATO Threat of Force
No specific NATO overt threats are known to have taken place, but the
NATO determination to use nuclear weapons to deter non nuclear actions
serves an important if tacit function. NATO strategy as outlined in the
NATO document, MC-14/3, identifies three levels of war all of which could
be fought with nuclear weapons: direct defence with whatever weapons are
authorized, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response against
the Soviet Union.57 Deliberate escalation is defined as the attempt
to defeat an aggressor by deliberately raising, but where 
possible controlling, the scope and intensity of combat, 
making the cost and risk disproportionate to the 
aggressor's objectives and the threat of general nuclear 
response progressively more i m m i n e n t . 58
NATO strategy is based on a triad consisting of conventional forces, 
theatre nuclear forces and United States strategic nuclear forces, but it 
is the deliberate threat to escalate rapidly any conflict to 
intercontinental nuclear war that really underpins the defence of NATO. 
Analysis of this nuclear threat involves a closer look at nuclear 
targeting, the prospects for controlled escalation and the contingency of 
actual use. This section concludes with a look at a specific United
57 United States Security Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and
Offset. MBFR and Nuclear Weapons, p. 19. MC-14/3 is a NATO Military
Committee classified document produced in 1967 that encapsulates the 
current NATO military strategy.
58 Ibid.
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States threat to involve NATO more deeply in its global competition with 
the Soviet Union.
Firstly, the NATO military headquarters has a nuclear planning cell
that identifies actual targets for all of the nuclear weapons under its
control. This cell coordinates closely with the United States Joint
Strategic Targeting Planning Staff, and it concentrates its targeting
efforts on military targets. Because of West German insistence, NATO has
adopted a strategy of forward defence, an attempt to stop the enemy as far
forward as possible. ^  In conditions of only partial mobilization or
deployment prior to the outbreak of war, this strategy would probably
result in a military request to use battlefield nuclear weapons very early
in a conflict to prevent an enemy breakthrough. NATO in fact plans to use
its nuclear weapons on military targets to achieve essential military
fiOobjectives and minimize civilian casualties. u If the weapons are
carefully matched to their targets, as they are planned to be, the extent
of collateral damage can often be limited to the physical boundary of the
target under attack.61 NATO strategy depends heavily on the first use of
counterforce weapons and this tends to influence to a degree American
fi 9nuclear strategy in the same direction.
A second aspect of nuclear strategy that affects NATO nuclear 
planning is the degree to which it is possible to control nuclear weapons
This forward strategy has been applied at sea as well. See John 
F. Leyman, Maritime Strategy in Defence of NATO (Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 7.
6^ General A.J. Goodpaster, testimony before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, To Consider NATO Matters (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975),
p. 2.
61 John W. Cane, "The Technology of Modern Weapons for Limited 
Military Use," Qrbis 22 (Spring 1978), p. 226.
62 Earl C. Ravenal, " Counter force and Alliance: The Ultimate 
Connection," International Security 6 (Spring 1982), p. 26.
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once their use has been initiated. Europeans tend not to embrace the
concept of modern limited nuclear war because it could destroy what it was
f t ^designed to protect, their countries. J The notion of a pause or
firebreak before using nuclear weapons was an American concept that in
European minds simply delayed the needed escalation and pointed out how
difficult it was to construct a strategic and tactical doctrine acceptable
to the alliance. 6^ In the early 1970's when NATO still had some
advantages in battlefield and strategic weapons, NATO strategy specified
"selective employment would be used on a controlled or limited scale"
either for demonstrative or tactical purposes. 65 As NATO's nuclear
advantages dissolved, however, a more stark interpretation appeared:
We will fight with conventional forces until we are 
losing, then we will fight with tactical nuclear weapons 
until we are losing, and then we will blow up the world.66
Nevertheless, NATO plans appear to be based on selective and limited
nuclear first use in an effort to avoid further escalation if at all
possible.
The next paradigmatic variable to be addressed is the degree of 
contingency obtained by the NATO nuclear threats, particularly the
63 Daniel Frei, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War (Geneva: United 
Nations Publications, 1982), p. 107. For an earlier view of the damage 
caused by tactical atomic war see, Richard Goold-Adams, On Limiting 
Atomic War (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), p. 20.
6^ Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1960), pp. 81-86. See also Albert Legault, Deterrence and the 
Atlantic Alliance (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
1966), p. 65.
65 The first public description of NATO's limited options for using 
nuclear weapons cited by Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Capabilities 
and Intentions in Europe (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P- 
5188, 1974), p. 28.
66 Morton Halperin, testimony before the Subcommittee on U.S. 
Security agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
USGPO, 1975), p. 44.
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"extended deterrence" provided by the United States strategic nuclear 
systems. Extended deterrence implies that "deterrent" forces were 
designed for United States defence and then were "extended" to Europe, but 
the reality was that United States nuclear forces were designed to support 
American foreign policy which at the time definitely included the need to 
defend Europe.67 However, to defend Europe NATO can no longer rely, as it 
did in the past, on escalation dominance; it can only threaten general 
first use to cultivate doubt in Soviet minds about what the consequences 
of conflict in Europe might be. 68 This makes NATO strategy of first use 
somewhat more open ended and consequently harder to defend on ethical 
grounds.69 The threat to use nuclear force is however to be triggered 
only in response to a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack in Europe. 
Thus NATO nuclear strategy, if examined in isolation at the time a 
decision were made to use nuclear weapons, would be a very contingent one 
used to persuade an invading enemy "to cease his aggression and 
withdraw."70 Operational NATO nuclear strategy is therefore not
67 Albert Wohlstetter, "The Political and Military Aims of Offence 
and Defence Innovation," in Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter and David
S. Yost, Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR, and New Choices for Long 
Range Offence and Defence (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 30. This 
book contains some excellent articles, including Wohlstetter's.
68 Lawrence Freedman provides a very good treatment of two concepts 
of escalation: dominance and uncertainty, The Price of Peace: Living With 
the Nuclear Dilemma (London: Firethorn Press, 1986), p. 130. See also
Strategic Survey. 1986-1987 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 67.
69 The requirements for just war involve three basic principles. 
The use of force must be discriminate, proportional to the good intended 
and stand a reasonable chance of success. See Bruce M. Russett, "Ethical 
Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence," International Security 8 (Spring 1984), 
p. 52.
70 Lawrence Freedman, "The Wilderness Years," in Jeffrey D. 
Boutwell, Paul Doty and Gregory F. Treverton, The Nuclear Confrontation 
in Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 51. See also Colin S. Gray, "The 
Transition from Offence to Defence," The Washington Quarterly 9 (Summer 
1986), p. 71.
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necessarily the same as NATO political strategy.
The final aspect of NATO nuclear threats relates to the link between 
the United States global plans involving possible nuclear use and those of 
NATO. To the Soviet Union the United States has global interests to 
pursue that require its close connection with extended deterrence and 
compellence concepts.^ The European members of NATO are reluctant to 
support the United States beyond certain limits because of the underlying 
fear that a United States-USSR conflict will drag Europe into a war.^ It 
is precisely that threat that the Reagan administration brought to bear in 
its brief policy of horizontal escalation. After Carter had threatened to
use force to prevent further Soviet encroachment toward the Persian
7 ^Gulf,/J the lack of credibility of United States military action became 
evident. Horizontal escalation was a unilateral American attempt to 
support its policy by threatening to expand any conflict laterally to a 
geographic location of the United States' c h o o s i n g A  policy such as 
this probably served to exacerbate the Soviet concern that the United 
States global ambitions are closely linked to its NATO alliance.
Although NATO declaratory strategy is primarily deterrent, its
^  See Roy Allison, The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non- 
Alignment in the Third World (Cambridge, England: The University Press,
1988), pp. 127-132 for a useful review of Soviet efforts to counter the 
perceived United States threat. See also John Erickson, "The Soviet View 
of Deterrence: A General Survey," Survival 24 (November-December 1982), p. 
245.
79' ^  Lawrence Freedman, The Price of Peace: Living With the Nuclear
Dilemma. p . 96.
7 ^/J Jimmy Carter, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16 
(28 January, 1980), p. 197.
^  Keith A. Dunn and William 0. Staudenmaier, "A NATO Conventional 
Retaliatory Strategy: Strategic and Force Structure Implications," in the 
book by same authors, Military Strategy in Transition: Defence and
Deterrence in the 1980's (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 
196. See also Joshua M. Epstein, "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a 
Recurrent Theme," International Security 8 (Winter 1983-1984), p. 19.
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operational strategy and its nuclear threats have a strong tendency to be 
compel lent in nature. Should war occur, NATO threatens limited and 
controlled nuclear first use against specific counterforce targets which 
implies a desire to change Soviet policy as well as a desire to deter any 
potential Soviet military action.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
NATO nuclear and conventional forces are so interdependent that the
correlation of nuclear forces cannot really be analyzed without first
paying attention to conventional forces. In the 1980's the possibility of
a pure conventional defence of NATO became more promising, and in the
words of one observer the impact of conventional defence would be
to free military strategists and policy makers from the 
mental straitjackets now imposed by outdated deterrent
theory and turn to the more traditional role of strategy: 
success on the battlefield.^-*
The concept of conventional defence has been criticized either for being
unable to provide the requisite degree of security for Western Europe or
for being a "tool of coercion" based on conventional retaliatory
capability against non-Soviet Warsaw Pact territory. ^  Whatever the
prospects for conventional defence, NATO still appears extremely reluctant
to forego the nuclear option.
In spite of the fact that NATO, if it were to defend itself
^  Robert E. Killebrew, Conventional Defence and Total Deterrence:
Assessing NATO's Strategic Options (Washington, D.C.: Scholarly
Resources, 1980), p. 145.
7 fi' Richard Betts feels West Europe would be less secure. See his 
"Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old Choices," International Security 
7 (Spring 1983), p. 162. Dimitri Simes feels that an increased NATO 
capability for manoeuvre would threaten the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe. 
See his "Containment: Choices and Opportunities," in Terry L. Deibel and 
John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Concept and Policy (Washington,
D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1986), p. 674.
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successfully from a conventional attack, would have to resort fairly 
quickly to nuclear weapons, SACEUR has declared that NATO should not seek 
such strong conventional forces that it undermines nuclear first use, the 
pivot of deterrence. ^  A large alliance inevitably has a certain 
structural rigidity when it comes to changing defence policy. The present 
reliance on nuclear weapons has contributed to the rigidity of structure 
and inflexibility of procedure often attributed to NATO.^ While this 
structural rigidity has political benefits with respect to alliance 
cohesion, it can serve to weaken NATO's military posture. The need to 
consider conventional and nuclear defensive operations could result in 
"impure tactics" that are not optimized for either type of warfare.^9 The 
lack of military flexibility could then severely curtail NATO's option of 
controlled escalation as a means of "coercive bargaining" unless extremely 
flexible TNF forces were available.ow
The nuclear forces of NATO, in a paradigmatic context, also require 
analysis as to their quality, quantity and expected combat utility. As 
noted in the first section of this chapter some significant changes mark 
the 1970-1986 period.
^  Bernard W. Rogers cited in Edgar Ulsamer, "The Nuclear- 
Conventional Link," Air Force 70 (June 1987), p. 24. See also Bernard W. 
Rogers, "Greater Flexibility for NATO's Flexible Response," Strategic 
Review 11 (Spring 1983), p. 13.
F.S. Northedge, "The Resort to Arms," in his book, The Use of 
Force in International Relations (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p. 24. 
The need for greater flexibility in NATO is also a theme of Patrick 
Cosgrave and George Richey, NATO's Strategy: A Case of Outdated Priorities 
(London: Alliance Publishers, 1985), pp. 47-48.
^  Lawrence Martin, "Flexibility in Tactical Nuclear Response," in 
John J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich, eds., Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Arms. 
New Aims (New York: Crane and Russak, 1977), p. 257.
on
ou Peter Stratman and Rene Herman, "Limited Options, Escalation and 
the Central Region," in John J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich, eds., Beyond 
Nuclear Deterrence: New Arms. New Aims, pp. 239-254.
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The achievement of strategic nuclear parity by the Soviet Union 
placed much greater reliance on the quality of TNF. NATO nations 
essentially had two options if they were to avoid having to accommodate 
the USSR: to decrease their reliance on nuclear weapons or to construct a 
credible theatre nuclear d e t e r r e n t . I n  the early 1970's, however, NATO 
felt no great desire to either modernize or reduce their dependence on 
nuclear forces even though studies had shown that existing TNW would have
O O
little prospect of turning the tide of a war in E u r o p e . B u t  by 1977, as 
detente was beginning to unravel, Helmut Schmidt openly declared his 
concerns that SALT had led to strategic parity that neutralized the United 
States deterrent nuclear capability and impaired the security of Western
Q O
Europe in the face of Soviet power. J The result of NATO discussions was 
the twin track decision in 1979 to deploy modern long range nuclear 
systems while seeking to negotiate reductions in Soviet theatre nuclear 
power. The intense controversy over the actual deployments of Pershing II 
and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) tended to overshadow the 
increased threat to both the United States and the Soviet Union that these
^  See Walter Slocombe's excellent analysis, The Political 
Implications of Strategic Parity. Adelphi Paper 77 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 20.
^  Lawrence Freedman, "The Wilderness Years," pp. 54-56. Also in 
October, 1977 Secretary of State Vance had testified that no additional 
long range ground or sea based systems were required. See hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, The Modernization of NATO's Long Range Theatre Nuclear 
Force (Washington. D.C.: USGPO, 1981), p. 19.
Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture," 
October 28, 1977 Survival 20 (January-February 1978), pp. 3-4. See also 
Jeffrey D. Boutwell, "NATO Theatre Nuclear Forces: The Third Phase, 1977- 
1985," in Jeffrey D. Boutwell, Paul Doty and Gregory F. Treverton, The 
Nuclear Confrontation in Europe, p. 69. Note Vance's complacency in 
footnote 82, above.
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highly mobile and very lethal weapons posed. These effective and
flexible systems clearly caused serious concern in Moscow for they 
appeared to preclude the possibility of a conflict remaining at the
conventional level. The United States was totally committed to nuclear
war in Europe with high quality nuclear weapons which could strike the
Soviet Union with little or no warning.
With respect to the quantity of nuclear weapons in Europe, NATO has 
actually decreased its number of nuclear warheads by about 2400 following 
decisions taken in 1979 and 1983.®^ As the reductions were limited to
older less useful systems that would have caused a high degree of
collateral damage if used, the impact of these reductions pales in 
significance to that of the INF modernization. The additions of INF were 
established at a quantitative level politically designed to avoid 
presenting too vulnerable a target or posing too provocative a threat to 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet reaction to INF deployments indicated that 
the latter point may have been misjudged.
The final variable in the correlation of nuclear forces analysis is 
the expected combat utility of NATO's nuclear weapons. In spite of the 
increased emphasis on conventional strategies, NATO's reliance on 
deliberate escalation in any conflict implies a high expectation of their 
utility. Follow on forces attack for example is a conventional strategy 
to attack deeply into the enemy rear, but as with much of NATO's 
conventional strategy it relies for the most part on dual capable systems
Lawrence Freedman, "Europe Between the Superpowers," in Gerald
Segal, et al. . Nuclear War. Nuclear Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1983), p. 81. See also Richard K. Betts, NATO Deterrent Doctrine: No Way
Out. ACIS Working Paper 51 (Los Angeles: Center for International and
Strategic Affairs, 1985), p. 10.
Jeffrey D. Boutwell, "NATO Theatre Nuclear Forces: The Third
Phase, 1977-1985," p. 80. If General Roger's recommendations are 
followed, even more reductions of older systems may be made.
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which may be attrited substantially prior to nuclear release. Thus any 
effective use of nuclear weapons will probably require an early decision, 
but that decision may be more difficult given the parity in strategic 
systems.®® United States nuclear weapons in Europe may therefore still 
have the primary function of sustaining political will and generating 
positive psychological perceptions to enhance credibility.®^ Thus the 
NATO INF deployments from 1983 to 1986 filled a significant role in 
enhancing the credibility and utility of nuclear first use.
The correlation of nuclear forces analysis indicates that although 
deterrence remained the dominant consideration certain compellent 
tendencies existed in NATO nuclear strategy, especially from 1979 to 1986. 
The introduction for a time of Pershing II and GLCMs, the high number of 
warheads remaining in Europe, and the expected utility of nuclear first 
use imply that NATO strategy has at least some compellence embedded in its 
policy of deterrence.
4. The Implications of NATO Strategy
Overall, NATO declaratory strategy is essentially defensive in nature 
as its primary focus is to deter war in Europe. The problem for NATO has 
been to avoid crossing two key thresholds that could cause the decoupling 
of U.S. strategic forces from Europe: relying on too few nuclear weapons
in Europe may be inadequate both as a symbol of American power and as an
®® Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Implications of the Nuclear 
Balance and Arms Control," in Richard F. Staar, ed. , Arms Control: Myth 
Versus Reality (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 
36. See also Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: The Debate Moves On,"
Royal United Services Institute 121 (March 1976), p. 49.
®^ Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 350. See also William R. Kintner 
and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., SALT: Implications For Arms Control in
the 1970's (London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), p. 397.
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immediately available reservoir of firepower; relying on too many large 
weapons based outside of Europe (SLBM's and ICBM's) may result in the
O O
United States withholding the use of its ultimate weapons.00 Because in 
the 1970-1986 time frame a defence based on improved conventional
O Q
technologies had not been considered feasible for the alliance,^ NATO has 
endeavoured to find a balance that would make its threat to use nuclear 
weapons believable.
The NATO quest to enhance the credibility of its resort to nuclear 
weapons has placed a great deal of pressure on the United States. 
Timeliness of nuclear authorization remains a critical factor in NATO 
considerations because it is possible that the Soviet Union could 
accomplish its objectives against NATO in time to be essentially 
independent of whatever the result of a US-USSR strategic exchange.90 If 
this were true, American incentives to initiate nuclear action would be 
very low indeed. The NATO Treaty does not force a United States President 
to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons, and such a decision may well 
require, in legal terms, broader congressional support.91 NATO nations 
have long recognized the importance of a timely United States' decision to 
initiate nuclear war; this is a critical point for Germany and in part
Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the 
Stalemate in Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), p. 23. See 
also Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, National Security: Ethics. Strategy and
Politics (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 5.
®9 John Jorgen Holst, "Flexible Options in Alliance Strategy" in 
John J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Arms. New 
Aims, p . 289.
90 S.T. Cohen, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapon Policv-Do We Have One? 
Should There Be One? (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-5127, 
1973), p. 17.
91 Michael J. Glennon, "The NATO Treaty: The Commitment Myth," in 
Peter Raven-Hansen, First Use of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1987), p. 63.
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explains why Britain and France have developed independent nuclear forces. 
In fact France may have deliberately structured its tactical nuclear 
posture to compel employment of United States nuclear weapons on terms 
compatible with the French view of the deterrence r e q u i r e m e n t . ^
With respect to nuclear weapons the NATO strategy of flexible 
response demands the deliberate and controlled first use of small numbers 
of warheads in what has been described as an attempt to exploit the Soviet 
"strategic weakness" of refusing to engage in limited nuclear war.^ 
While the overarching strategic objective is to deter the occurrence of 
war, the actual threat of nuclear first use is really intended to compel a 
change in Soviet conduct through selective nuclear use. Thus NATO 
strategy contains an active component that cuts across nuclear and 
conventional thresholds and goes beyond the conceptual understanding of 
deterrence.^ It appears that as long as the NATO strategy of deterrence 
depends on initiating nuclear war by deliberate escalation, NATO nuclear 
strategy also contains at least some compellent characteristics.
III. PARADIGMATIC ANALYSIS OF WARSAW PACT STRATEGY
The Warsaw Treaty Organization (known in the West as Warsaw Pact) was 
formed in 1955 ostensibly in reaction to the rearmament of West Germany in
q n
Jeffrey Record, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and
Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 33. In 
addition to the French declaratory policy of inflicting maximum pain on 
any aggressor, however, France has also quietly developed operational 
plans in which nuclear weapon use is closely coordinated with the 
counterforce planning of NATO. See Richard Ullman, "The Covert French 
Connection," Foreign Policy (Summer 1989), pp. 3-33.
^  David Charles, Nuclear Planning in NATO: Pitfalls of First Use,
p. 21.
^  R.B. Byers, "Thresholds and Deterrence Credibility: The European 
Perspective," in William Gutteridge and Trevor Taylor, The Dangers of New 
Weapon Systems (London: MacMillan Press, 1983), p. 104.
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NATO, but it did provide a more convenient and more broadly based 
legitimation for the maintenance of Soviet Forces in East Europe. While 
the Warsaw Pact may have began as primarily a paper exercise to sanction 
the hegemonic role of the Soviet Union, it has gradually become an 
institution with a meaningful role to play in Soviet coalition strategy.95 
The exact nature of that strategy however remains clouded behind a veil of 
secrecy, and its interpretation often subject to the view of the 
hermeneutics of Soviet military doctrine.96
The Soviet Union clearly did not urgently require the Warsaw Pact for 
essential military purposes. In the early 1950's the Soviet Union had 
sufficient military control of East Europe by virtue of the fact that 
Soviet troops were stationed there through various bilateral agreements, 
and Soviet general officers commanded non-Soviet armed forces at most 
senior levels.97 Furthermore, in terms of military utility, Soviet senior 
officers have never appeared willing to consider the non-Soviet Warsaw 
Pact troops as being reliable enough to be potential replacements for
QO
Soviet troops. u
If the Warsaw Pact, primarily a military alliance, was not needed for 
purely military reasons, then it must have been needed for political 
reasons important to the politico-military strategy of the Soviet Union.
95 Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 210-211. See also his 
Soviet Military Policy Trends Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin Regime (Santa 
Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-3556, 1967), p. 18.
96 See the interesting and worthwhile contribution of Douglas M. 
Hart, "The Hermeneutics of Soviet Military Doctrine," The Washington 
Quarterly 7 (Spring 1987), pp. 77-88.
97 Viktor Suvarov, Inside the Soviet Army (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1982), pp. 14-16. For example in the early 1950's very few general 
officers in the Polish Army could speak Polish.
98 Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, p. 215.
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The Soviet view of NATO is instructive:
from a Soviet standpoint, NATO as an organization plays a 
major role in protecting American power in Western Europe 
and in limiting West European independence from U.S. 
security interests.99
It is entirely plausible that this view parallels the importance of the
Warsaw Pact in Soviet grand strategy, at least during the period 1970-
1986.
Although the Soviet Union still dominates the Warsaw Pact, as a 
military alliance it has changed considerably since its inception. 
Initially the East European forces had no access to nor training for 
nuclear weapons, making it difficult for them to integrate successfully 
with Soviet forces who were so trained and equipped. By the 1970's
however the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces had begun training for nuclear 
conditions enabling them to integrate more completely with Soviet forces. 
This section will examine the Soviet strategy for the Warsaw Pact 1970- 
1986 by looking in turn at its strategic intentions, the implied threats 
to use force and the correlation of nuclear forces in Europe.
1. The Strategic Intentions of the Warsaw Pact
As the Warsaw Pact alliance is primarily based on the power of 
Soviet military forces, the strategic intentions of the alliance closely 
reflect those of Soviet policy. Europe is the dominant concern to the 
Soviet Union, but East Europe due to ideological and defence
99 Robbin F. Laird, The Soviet Union, the West and the Nuclear Arms 
Race (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p. 37. For a very
typical Soviet account of American efforts to assert itself globally, see 
Sergei Blagovolin and Alexander Buzeyev, "Modern Militarism: Global
Dimensions," Social Sciences 19 (No. 2, 1988), pp. 193-197.
100 Thomas W. Wolfe, The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact (Santa 
Monica, California: The Rand Corporation M-4835-PR, 1965), p. 10.
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considerations clearly holds the most important p r i o r i t y .  ^ 1  According to
one respected expert, Malcolm Macintosh:
as seen from Moscow, Europe is the most important 
peninsula in the Eurasian continent; and the Russians have 
always been drawn to the idea that in any geographical 
grouping of states, the most powerful nation should
naturally assume leadership of the group. Therefore in
the most general terms, the Russians feel that Europe is
part of "their" continent, and that they have the right to 
be politically predominant in the European area. The 
presence of any other superpower, under whatever pretext, 
is regarded, in this broad sense, as an intrusion.
According to its Soviet commander, the Warsaw Pact alliance 
facilitates Soviet strategy by providing a necessary defensive counter to
i no
NATO's "aggressive" posture in Europe. Clearly the Warsaw Pact gives
the Soviet Union an important defensive shield, but the large Soviet
armies have created suspicions that other objectives exist. The Soviet
Union and Warsaw Pact declaration not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons has implied a reduction in the reliance on nuclear weapons to 
support strategic plans. With its previously described conventional
advantage, properly implemented with an offensive military strategy should 
war occur and backed by at least nuclear parity at all levels, the Warsaw
Pact could possibly gain advantage in conventional war. No first use
Angela Stent, "Western Europe and the USSR," in Gerrit W. Gong, 
Angela Stent and Rebecca V. Strode, Areas of Challenge for Soviet Foreign 
Policy in the 1980's (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1984), p. 2.
Malcom Macintosh encapsulates the Russian nationalist view that 
has been more prevalent in the Brezhnev years than in the more recent 
Gorbachev period, post 1986. He is cited in George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. 
Rubenstein, "Finlandization: Soviet Strategy or Geographical Footnote," in 
George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubenstein, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy 
Towards Western Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. 3.
103 Victor Kulikov, "There Has Been and Remains a Threat to the 
Warsaw Treaty Member - Countries from NATO," APN Military Bulletin 
(September 1987), translated in FBIS/JPRS 23 February 1988, p. 5.
From Whence the Threat To Peace (Moscow: Military Publishing
House, 1987), p. 12.
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affords the Warsaw Pact the maximum utility from its conventional 
superiority and thus benefits the USSR to the detriment of Western 
Europe.
In spite of the Soviet declaration of no first use, however, and in 
spite of economic difficulties, it continued to deploy more modern theatre
1 0 finuclear systems. These deployments demonstrated a major Soviet
objective that related closely with the no first use declaration:
to deter NATO's resort to nuclear weapons in war, to deter 
escalation if NATO goes nuclear and to have some chance of 
avoiding destruction on Soviet territory.
The Soviet military and political leaders in fact appear to have a very
good idea how effective nuclear weapons might be, to the point that
military officers probably still prefer preemption. In seeking to negate
NATO's nuclear options, the Warsaw Pact has integrated its nuclear and
conventional forces and is for the most part better prepared than NATO to
1 ORfight a conventional, chemical or nuclear war in Europe. J-uo As the Soviet 
leaders came to realize that theatre war could remain conventional for 
long periods, they began to reorganize their nuclear assets to better
Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mentes and Franz-Joseph 
Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace, Foreign Affairs 
60 (Summer 1982), p. 1157.
106 xhis was not without some controversy in the Soviet Union. See 
Dan L. Strode and Rebecca V. Strode, "Diplomacy and Defence in Soviet 
National Security Strategy", International Security 8 (Fall 1983), p. 
110. Notwithstanding the economic difficulties and increased incentives 
to participate in arms control, defence remained top priority, see G.P. 
Armstrong, Soviet Motivations for Conventional Arms Reductions (Ottawa: 
Operational Research Analysis Establishment, D Strat A 86/16, 1986).
107 Gregory Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe. Adelphi Paper 168 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 9.
1 DR-LUO James L. Martin, "How the Soviet Union Came to Gain Escalation 
Dominance: Trends and Asymmetries in the Theatre Nuclear Balance," in Uwe 
Nerlich, ed. , The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition Over
Europe. p. 89. See also Richard Burt, "NATO and Nuclear Deterrence," in 
Marsha McGraw Olive and Jeffrey Porro, eds., Nuclear Weapons in Europe 
(Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 110.
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protect them, but training for war in nuclear and chemical environments 
remained very high.l^ The general explanation for these military 
preparations is that Moscow hopes to translate its military assets into 
political influence by creating a psychological impact causing a tendency 
toward political accommodation with Soviet interests.
Warsaw Pact strategy, because of its reliance on nuclear coercion to
deter NATO first use, creates risks for the Soviet Union, forcing Soviet
leaders to distinguish carefully between their vital and lesser goals.
The vital Warsaw Pact military objectives appear to involve maintaining
the protective security belt of East European buffer states and retaining
the freedom to seize the strategic initiative in war.-*-^ The former
implies defensive motivations, but the latter requires an offensive
component in Warsaw Pact strategy. The freedom to seize and presumably
retain the strategic initiative in war demands a Warsaw Pact offensive
strategy that implies a willingness to preempt with nuclear weapons
119immediately prior to NATO's first use. ■L^  Soviet military leaders appear 
seriously determined to gain the traditional military objectives of
1 ^  John G. Hines and Phillip A. Petersen, "Changing the Soviet 
System of Control: Focus on Theatre Warfare," International Defence
Review (March 1986), p. 281.
H ®  Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successor's: Leadership. Stability and 
Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 
p. 264. See also Lothar Ruehl, "The Threat Perceived? Leverage of Soviet 
Military Power in Western Europe" in Uwe Nerlich, ed. , The Soviet Asset: 
Military Power in the Competition Over Europe, p. 204.
H I  Jurgen Arbeiter, NATO Strategy: Strengths and Weaknesses.
National Security Series 6/80 (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University
Press, 1980), p. 20.
H 2  Even though new political thinking has emphasized the "new" 
defensive intentions of the Warsaw Pact, the overwhelming majority of 
military leaders believe that it cannot completely renounce the conduct of 
offensive operations. See the excellent article by Aleksander Savelev, 
"Averting War and Deterrence: The Approaches of the Warsaw Pact and NATO," 
Mirovava Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnvve Qstnosheniva (June 1989), translated 
by FBIS/JPRS 5 October 1989, p. 15.
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victory in all forms of war if at all possible.
The Warsaw Pact from 1970 to 1986, in part propelled by Marxist- 
Leninist ideology, challenged the existing status quo by seeking political 
accomodation from Western Europe. The offensive component of Warsaw Pact 
strategy threatened to give the Soviet Union unrestricted access to a 
relatively intact Western Europe, a situation that could reduce the time 
for Soviet economic reconstitution after a nuclear war by half.^^ To the 
degree that Warsaw Pact strategy sought to retain Soviet control in East 
Europe, this offensive capability in the Soviet view probably provided the 
best defence by forcing a defensive strategy upon NATO. The result of an 
offensive strategic orientation however placed pressures on East European 
countries to conform to Soviet policy, thus creating considerable 
instability in the alliance.
This tension faced the Soviet leaders with a fundamental obstacle 
which was only overcome with an extremely high military, political and 
economic commitment to the Warsaw Pact. Unfortunately for the Soviet 
leadership, the Soviet Union's most effective tool, its armed forces, were 
the least suited to defend its most vital stake in Eastern Europe,
Soviet military officers continue to insist that the Armed 
Forces must be prepared for extensive use of any type of weapon. See 
Vice Admiral G. Kostev, "Our Military Doctrine in Light of New Political 
Thinking," Kommunist Vooruzhennvkh Sil (September 1987), translated by 
FBIS/JPRS 23 December 1987, p. 2. See also Warner R. Schilling, "U.S. 
Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1980's: The Search for Sufficiently
Equivalent Countervailing Parity," International Security 6 (Fall 1981), 
p. 76.
See testimony by T.K. Jones in congress, cited by William R. 
Van Cleave and W. Scott Thompson, eds., Strategic Options for the Early 
Eighties: What Can be Done? (New York: National Strategy Information
Center, 1979), pp. 121-122.
Stephen Larrabee, "The View from Moscow," in Stephen Larrabee, 
ed. Two German States and European Security (London: MacMillan Press,
1989), p. 192. See also Avigdor Haselkorn, The Evolution of Soviet 
Strategy 1965-1975 (New York: Crane Russak and Company, 1978), pp. 2-3.
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ideological or political loyalty. East European regimes faced a
serious lack of legitimacy, and the Soviet Union lacked incentives "for 
enticing rather than compelling allegiance" from its Warsaw Pact 
a l l i e s . W a r n i n g s  noted that any Western attempts to take advantage of 
the ferment in East Europe could have dynamic effect on the Soviet
1 1 O
leadership. *-° The Soviet Union has not hesitated to intervene directly 
with military force if necessary to prevent deviant factions from gaining 
the capability to mobilize for armed resistance. The cohesiveness of 
the Warsaw Pact to Soviet policy has perhaps been the most fundamental 
strategic objective of Moscow, at least from 1970 to 1986.
The primary Soviet military objective in Europe appeared therefore to 
be the maintenance of its East European security system with the pursuit 
of Soviet policy goals toward achieving political accommodation from 
Western Europe, an important but lesser order goal. The conventional and 
theatre nuclear forces in the Warsaw Pact supported both goals: the former 
implied a deterrent perspective, but the latter introduced a degree of 
compellence into Warsaw Pact strategy.
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Perceptions of Soviet Power and 
Influence," in James Sherr, Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge
(London: MacMillan Press, 1978), p. 193.
Seweryn Bialer provides an excellent analysis of this issue. 
See his The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion. Internal Decline (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), p. 198, and Stalin's Successors: Leadership. 
Stability and Change in the Soviet Union, p. 296.
Richard Rosecrance, "Deterrence and Vulnerability in the Pre- 
Nuclear Era," in The Future of Strategic Deterrence Adelphi Paper 160
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 29.
Christopher D. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The
Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention," in Erik P.
Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, eds.. The Conduct of Soviet Foreign
Policy (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1980), p. 560.
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2. The Warsaw Pact Threat of Force
Because nuclear forces were so thoroughly integrated into Soviet and, 
to a lesser degree, Warsaw Pact strategy, the major threat to overpower 
Western Europe could not readily be separated into conventional and 
nuclear compartments. The obvious threat was based on powerful 
conventional forces but these were backed up at every level of combat by 
very capable nuclear weapon systems. The application of the paradigmatic 
framework to the Warsaw Pact nuclear threats, so far as they can be
separated from military or conventional threats, is the subject of this 
section.
Although the Warsaw Pact has not used direct threats to NATO, the
Soviet Union has employed more subtle threats on a fairly regular basis.
Mostly these threats pertained to offers to support nuclear free zones or
offers to "spare" regions or countries if they rejected nuclear 
1 90weapons. Soviet leaders may have also regarded active intimidation by
military forces, including manoeuvers, violations of territorial waters
and airspace as politically useful if it made Western Europe more
191receptive to Soviet calls for political and other forms of cooperation. 
Since all such Warsaw Pact military action is ultimately supported by 
Soviet nuclear weapons, a form of coercion is implied that is not far 
removed from nuclear coercion. A more direct nuclear threat was carried 
by the Soviet acceleration of its SS-20 missile production after the 1979
120 John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: 
Objectives. Instruments. Results (Santa Monica, California: Rand 
Corporation R-3310-AF, 1986), p. 49. See also T.B. Millar, The East-West 
Strategic Balance (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 67.
121 John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: 
Objectives. Instruments. Results, p. vi.
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NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM's to Europe.122 This threat 
was amplified by a tremendous propaganda campaign to pressure the Federal 
Republic of Germany to change its stance on accepting the new INF weapons 
onto German s o i l . 123 a s  to the first variable, the Soviet Union appeared 
prepared to imply the threat of force frequently for specific policy 
obj ectives.
Secondly, nuclear targeting in the Warsaw Pact has remained
relatively constant since the Soviet Union first introduced nuclear
weapons in Europe. Soviet nuclear targeting strategy has been designed to
cover military hard and soft targets but not destroy the human social and
economic basis for the socio-economic system that would replace
imperialism.12^ Modern Soviet missiles deployed to Europe are extremely
precise and are now capable of discriminate attacks even with conventional
warheads.125 After degrading NATO's nuclear capabilities in the
conventional phase of war and identifying all remaining nuclear targets,
Soviet military strategy, on the verge of a breakthrough, projected using
1 9 finuclear weapons in a pre-emptive counterforce fashion. The Soviet
military preoccupation with pre-emption, in spite of Soviet declarations
122 William G. Hyland, "The Struggle for Europe: An American View," 
in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., Nuclear Weapons in Europe (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1984), p. 32.
123 Wolfgang Seiffert, "Soviet Political Strategy Toward The 
Federal Republic of Germany," in Ray S. Cline, James A. Miller and Roger
E. Kanst, eds. , Western Europe in Soviet Global Strategy (London: 
Westview Press, 1987), p. 138.
124- William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy," in Desmond 
Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 92.
12^ Anthony Cordesman, "SDI and Europe: Where Does Theatre Defence 
Fit In?" International Defence Review (Number 4, 1987), p. 411.
126 Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Conventional War and 
Escalation: The Soviet View (New York: Crane Russak and Company, 1981),
p. 7.
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of no first use of nuclear weapons, coupled with enhanced military 
capabilities, have probably increased the risks that conventional war in 
Europe will escalate. By 1986, the Warsaw Pact had the force
structure in place to match its earlier doctrine to destroy most of NATO's 
nuclear weapons in one pre-emptive attack. Even the 1987 INF treaty and 
the removal of the SS-20, although outside the time frame of this study, 
did not appreciably change this fact; it only reduced the Soviet 
advantage.
The next variable in the paradigmatic analysis is the degree to which 
the Warsaw Pact expected to control nuclear war once it was initiated. In 
spite of a strong desire to avoid fighting by Western limited war rules, 
the Soviets are probably better prepared to fight a limited war on non- 
Soviet European soil than N A T O . 128 As noted earlier in chapter four, V.D. 
Sokolovsky's third edition of Military Strategy in the mid 1960's did 
introduce the possibility of controlling nuclear war into Soviet military 
doctrine. The Soviet Union does not, however, accept that any nuclear 
attacks on Soviet soil can be "limited". Although Soviet doctrine has 
never considered Western concepts of limited war to be valid, the United 
States Secretary for Defence James Schlesinger has observed that in 
Soviet exercises the Soviet military has indicated great interest in
127 Senior Soviet leaders still insist that escalation once nuclear 
weapons are used is automatic. See Colonel-General Gareyev, "The Revised 
Soviet Military Doctrine," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (December 
1988), p. 30. See also Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Perspectives on the 
Paths to Nuclear War," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph
S. Nye, eds., Hawks. Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1985), p. 204.
128 John R. Thomas, "Limited Nuclear War in Soviet Strategic 
Thinking," Orbis 10 (Spring 1966), pp. 211-212. See also Joseph D. 
Douglas, Soviet Military Strategy in Europe (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1980), p. 200; and, Lawrence D. Freedman, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: 
Symbols, Strategy, and Force Structure," in Andrew J. Pierre, ed., Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe. pp. 62-63.
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notions of controlled nuclear w a r .  ^ 9  non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
countries probably share the concerns of West Europe that any war, let
alone nuclear war limited to Europe, would be an unmitigated disaster, and
this concern may contribute to the Warsaw Pact's official renunciation of
limited war concepts.
The Soviet threats to actually use military force are not open ended,
but are technically contingent on NATO beginning a war in Europe. It
would be logical, however, that if Soviet leaders were to view war as
probable in a crisis, due to the nature of the military balance, the
Warsaw Pact would probably attack prior to NATO completing its deployment
and mobilization. To do otherwise would forfeit the great advantage of
1 ^ 0forces the Soviet Union enjoys along most of its periphery. In fact,
one isolated analyst believed that the Soviet Union maintained enough
strength in Eastern Europe to conduct a conventional attack that could
1^ 1possibly defeat NATO before it could deploy or mobilize its forces. •L J- 
Although this would be most improbable, the amount of Soviet conventional 
forces in Eastern Europe does cause NATO serious concern. Maintaining the 
military capability to attack Western Europe at short notice was therefore 
an essential means by which the Soviet leadership could apply political 
leverage in West Europe.132 The Warsaw Pact, then, performed an essential
1 ^  Testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee of
Foreign Relations, Hearing, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe and US-USSR 
Strategic Doctrines and Policies (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974), p. 183.
Dennis M. Gormley and Douglas M. Hart, "Soviet Views on
Escalation," The Washington Review (Fall 1984), p. 78.
131 Peter H. Vigor, Soviet Blitzkreig Theory (London: MacMillan 
Press, 1983), pp. 1-10. Such an attack would be without any significant 
mobilization to achieve political surprise in NATO, a flaky proposition.
132 Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Union's Strategic and Military 
Stakes in the GDR (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-4549, 
1971), p. 4.
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role in providing the Soviet Union with an acceptable mechanism for 
maintaining significant quantities of Soviet forces in East Europe, East 
Germany in particular, where they could use Warsaw Pact territory as a 
springboard for launching a rapid offensive if n e c e s s a r y . 1-33
There is sufficient indication that in initiating any conflict the 
Warsaw Pact would probably employ deliberate deception and surprise to 
achieve a rapid and decisive advantage. For example, the Soviet led 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 achieved considerable 
surprise and moved 25 divisions into that country within 24 hours. 1-3^  
Since that time Soviet efforts to reorganize their military command 
structure have made it clear that the warning time to NATO of any Warsaw
1 Q C
Pact attack will be further reduced. The Warsaw Pact has acquired
sufficient infrastructure and equipment that mobilization for war will 
likely be more rapid than in N A T O .  1-36 Strategic surprise and deception 
would also likely be part of any Warsaw Pact military operation as they
IO7
were in Czechoslovakia and in Afghanistan. ' It appears that the Warsaw
133 Thomas W. Wolfe, The Role of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet Policy 
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-4973, 1973), p. 5.
1-3^  Phillip A. Karber, "Nuclear Weapons and Flexible Response," 
Orbis 14 (Summer 1970), pp. 284-285.
1-35 John G. Hines and Phillip A. Petersen, "Changing the Soviet 
System of Control: Focus on Theatre Warfare," International Defence Review 
(March 1988), p. 289.
1-36 a s forces are being reduced in the later 1980's, even higher 
standards of combat readiness are being implemented. See Colonel-General 
Gareyev, "The Revised Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 31. See also Robert 
L. Pfaltzgraff, The U.S. Defence Mobilization Infrastructure: Problems and 
Priorities (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, 1981), p. 5.
1-3^  Jiri Valenta, "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention," in Jonathan 
Alford, ed. , The Soviet Union: Security Policies and Constraints (London: 
St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 165. See also Richard K. Betts, Surprise 
Attack: Lessons for Defence Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1982), p. 285.
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Pact need only resort to nuclear weapons if NATO has used or is about to 
employ them.
The advantages of the Warsaw Pact in being able to initiate rapid 
offensive action may help convince Soviet leaders that Europeans will be 
more accommodating to Soviet interests, and this could possibly make 
Moscow believe it has greater freedom of action in a crisis. ^ 9  -phe use 
of threats for political advantage and the focus on counterforce targeting 
support a compellent view, even though other factors are either ambivalent 
or tend to support the deterrent paradigm.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
The Warsaw Pact, like NATO has integrated nuclear and conventional 
forces to a considerable degree, but since the late 1970's greater 
emphasis has been placed on the conventional phase of war. Certain 
operational changes with respect to the control of nuclear weapons have 
caused some concern among Soviet military officers who see them as another 
political constraint on its ability to launch pre-emptive strikes at the 
proper moment. As discussed in chapter four, Soviet military strategy 
holds that nuclear weapons play a decisive role in changing the 
correlation of forces, and thus the role of nuclear weapons in Warsaw Pact 
strategy is extremely important. This section provides a brief look at 
the quantity and quality of Soviet theatre nuclear forces and then
Mark C. Storella, Poisoning Arms Control: The Soviet Union and 
Chemical/Biological Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, 1984), p. X.
Barry Blechman, Rethinking U.S. Strategic Posture (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982), p. 252.
Dennis Ross, "Arms Control Implications of NATO and WP 
Doctrines," in Power and Policy: Doctrine the Alliance and Arms Control. 
Adelphi Paper 206 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1986), pp. 54-55.
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examines the expected utility of these weapons.
The Soviet Union has always given a high priority to covering
regional targets with nuclear weapons, particularly in the early days when
it could not threaten the United States. Once the Soviet Union developed
the ability to strike the United States, intercontinental systems became 
top priority for a time. As soon as these were deployed, however, the 
Soviet Union once again placed increased emphasis on upgrading the earlier 
systems intended for use along the Soviet periphery. The improvements, 
such as SS-20, SS-21, SS-22, SS-23 and advanced fighter and bomber
aircraft, that were deployed in quantity in the 1980's have been 
significant qualitative improvements with increased range, accuracy, 
lethality, payload, survivability and flexibility of employment.-*-^ These 
improvements along with ICBM and SLBM developments show that the Soviet 
Union has produced a sustained effort over several decades to negate the 
reliance of NATO on United States nuclear forces. Soviet nuclear
forces are flexible instruments for war fighting and are specifically 
designed to be operationally effective in combat.
Certainly the Soviet Union appears to believe that nuclear forces 
should be designed for maximum utility, but the remainder of the Warsaw 
Pact has at least some reservations about nuclear weapons. In 1984 when 
the Soviet Union deployed additional quantities of SS-21, SS-22, and SS- 
23 missiles to Eastern Europe in the attempt to intimidate NATO, Eastern
Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: 
Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1982), p. 67.
jn the soviet view, this effort was forced on the Soviet Union 
by United States' efforts to achieve nuclear advantage for its 
political/compellent purposes. See Aleksandr Savelev, "Averting War and 
Deterrence: The Approaches of the Warsaw Pact and NATO," p. 14. See also 
James L. Martin, "How the Soviet Union Came to Gain Escalation Dominance: 
the Trends and Asymmetries in the Theatre Nuclear Balance," p. 101.
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European recipients of these systems expressed their political anger to 
M o s c o w . F r o m  Moscow's perspective, however, coalition warfare of any 
sort can only be conducted successfully through the complete subordination 
of all military components to one supreme command authority, and in the 
Warsaw Pact that means Soviet authority. As the unity of the Warsaw
Pact is of fundamental importance, Soviet war preparations in the Warsaw 
Pact have gone to the extent of molding the alliance into an army modelled 
along Soviet lines. Some measures taken include not only the universal 
use of Russian as the command language, but also of Soviet documentation, 
communication, automation and decision-making procedures. East
European regimes have not had sufficient independence from the Soviet 
Union to take positions analogous to those taken by West Europe vis-a-vis 
the United States. Consequently any difference of views over the expected 
utility of nuclear weapons for intimidation or war fighting purposes have 
been usually kept behind a veil of secrecy.
Recent Warsaw Pact declarations of no nuclear first use imply a heavy
reliance on conventional forces for at least the initial phase of war.
Earlier Soviet doctrinal writings referred to only two escalation
boundaries, between conventional and nuclear war, or between theatre and
1 lxf\general nuclear war. Although it is impossible to determine whether
•^3 John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe:
Objectives. Instruments. Results, p. 50.
D.L. Smith and A.L. Meier, "Ogarkhov's Revolution: Soviet
Military Doctrine for the 1990's," International Defence Review 20 
(Number 7, 1987), p. 872.
John J. Yurechko, "Command and Control for Coalition Warfare: 
The Soviet Approach," S ignal (December 1985), p. 13. The Russian
language is used at formation level; command at unit level is usually in 
the national language, by necessity.
Joseph D. Douglass, The Soviet Theatre Nuclear Offensive 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), p. 5.
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Soviet operational nuclear strategy has in fact changed since the no first 
use declaration, it does appear that the Soviet Union's military officers 
have not lost sight of the immense advantages of nuclear pre-emption. 
Soviet military officers are trained to think differently than their 
Western counterparts, and they may in fact not believe NATO's defensive 
declaratory policy.
The Soviet Union has deployed the quantity and quality of nuclear 
forces that gave the Warsaw Pact the ability to anticipate a reasonable 
chance of success in combat if a pre-emptive strategy was used. The 
Warsaw Pact from 1970 to 1986 was an extension of Soviet forces and took 
military direction from Moscow, including its nuclear strategy. While 
Soviet declaratory nuclear strategy still appears to be primarily a 
deterrent one, the Soviet theatre nuclear force structure supported a 
Warsaw Pact offensive/compellent military strategy at every level.
4. The Implications of Warsaw Pact Strategy
Soviet nuclear strategy heavily influenced the Warsaw Pact's 
predominantly offensive theatre strategy to counter NATO. Should war 
begin then East Europe would be placed in an awkward position with respect 
to nuclear weapons for either NATO or the Soviet Union could escalate to 
nuclear use with little warning to East Europe. In either case it is 
highly likely that the initial use of nuclear weapons would be confined to 
non-Soviet Europe, raising at least the possibility of a limited nuclear 
war. One of the major incentives for the Soviet Union to have adopted a 
no first use declaratory policy may have been to soothe East European 
concerns over nuclear use to facilitate the maintenance of Warsaw Pact
Edgar O'Ballance, Tracks of the Bear: Soviet Imprints in the 
1970's (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 15.
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cohesion.
The Warsaw Pact nations were absolutely essential to Soviet military 
strategy for they provided the firm forward base with which to attack or 
threaten to attack NATO. Alliance cohesion was therefore perhaps even 
more vital to the Soviet military than the hardware at the disposal of the 
two alliances. The force structure of the Warsaw Pact, however,
indicated an improved capability in the 1980's to fight in all significant 
weapons categories. The Warsaw Pact strategy threatened a massive and 
rapid conventional attack should war begin, and nuclear weapons supported 
this strategy. One advantage of strong strategic and theatre nuclear 
forces for the Soviet Union was that Soviet extended deterrence, in terms 
of its credibility, may have extended further than that of the United 
States. Consequently the Soviet Union may have had a potential for
escalation dominance and more flexible options than NATO's strategy of 
flexible response.
In essence the Soviet Union relied on deterrence to protect its East 
European security system, and on compellence to persuade West Europe to be 
more accommodating to Soviet interests or to enforce the former. The 
Soviet use of threats and its force structure clearly indicated compellent 
tendencies within its overarching offensive military strategy. Towards 
the latter part of the 1970's, the Soviet Union adopted a declaratory 
nuclear strategy to deter NATO first use should war occur, but when the
1 L.R■L^ ° Lawrence Freedman, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategy", in Oyvind 
Osterud, ed., Studies of War and Peace (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 
1986), p. 84.
Samuel Huntington, "The Renewal of Strategy," in his The 
Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982), p. 34.
Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Soviet Theatre 
Strategy: Implications for NATO (Washington, D.C. : United States
Strategic Institute, 1978), p. 34.
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actual forces in place are considered, this shift appears to have been one 
of political expediency rather than a fundamental change. Whether the INF 
Treaty or the recent adoption of a defensive Warsaw Pact strategy portend 
further substantive shift to deterrent thinking among Soviet leaders post- 
1986, remains to be seen. In the paradigmatic context, at least in the 
1970-1986 period, the compellent model provides a more complete picture of 
Warsaw Pact strategy.
IV. CONCLUSION
NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances have designed strategies to 
optimize their advantages and minimize their disadvantages in the 
competition for control of Europe. The gravitation of most of Europe into 
these two alliance systems indicates a greater "tightness" or cohesiveness 
in the mid-1980's than the 1950's. Alliances and wars may well be linked, 
especially when accompanied by the tightening of alliance structures,-*-^ 
and therefore the superpower nuclear competition in Europe may have 
enormous implications for the future.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States, to a large degree, 
control their respective alliance's nuclear strategy. The Soviet Union is 
the only nuclear power in the Warsaw Pact and clearly the dominant member,
but the United States, by virtue of its massive power, also has a
predominant influence over NATO, particularly in the area of nuclear 
planning. The ability of each superpower to impose its strategy on its
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Systematic Polarization and the 
Occurrence and Duration of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 22 (June 
1978), pp. 241-268. The fact that the Warsaw Pact has apparently loosened 
post 1986, therefore, should be a positive sign.
1 S9 Robbin F. Laird, The Soviet Union. The West and the Nuclear Arms 
Race. p. 39. See also Daniel Charles, Nuclear Planning in NATO: Pitfalls
of First Use, p. 18.
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respective alliance is tempered, especially in NATO but also in the Warsaw 
Pact, by the political requirement to maintain the cohesion of the
i co
alliance. One researcher suggests that superpower concerns over
cohesion are not misplaced, because alliances between major and minor 
powers usually have the lowest reliability in war of all alliance 
types.
If anything, the smaller alliance members generally exert an 
influence on the alliance as a whole towards deterrent, not compellent, 
thought. The embracing of deterrence by smaller alliance partners has 
functioned to formalize and enforce an underlying political consensus on 
the inviolability of the present East-West b o r d e r s . I n  fact, to the 
extent that each superpower, but particularly the Soviet Union, appears to 
be conscious of the stabilizing value of the bipolar alliance structure, 
this trend to deterrent support for the status quo is reinforced.
The competition in alliance military strategy is consequently 
somewhat constrained by several important political factors. To avoid the 
costs of equal conventional forces, NATO relies heavily on the strategy of 
first use of nuclear weapons to deter the Warsaw Pact from any incursion 
into Western Europe. Soviet nuclear and conventional military doctrine 
appears designed to intimidate and to deter NATO's resort to nuclear
Lawrence Freedman, The Price of Peace: Living With the Nuclear 
Dilemma (London: Firethorn Press, 1986), pp. 281-282.
Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability
and the Expansion of War," in J. David Singer, ed., The Correlates of War 
II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models (New York: The Free Press, 1980),
pp. 196-197.
1-*-^ Barrie Paskins, "Proliferation and the Nature of Deterrence," 
in Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds., Dangers of Deterrence: Philosophers
on Nuclear Strategy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 125.
See Stephen Larrabee, "The View From Moscow," p. 205, and 
Gregory Flynn, "Problems in Paradigm," Foreign Policy (Spring 1989), p.
73.
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weapons should war begin. It is a strategy that takes advantage of NATO's
conventional weakness. 1-*^  According to one account:
it is difficult at times to avoid the impression that both 
nuclear superpowers seek to exploit their nuclear 
strategic predominance to compensate for diplomatic, 
political and even economic infirmities, and to exploit 
their nuclear status for purposes of alliance1 co
management.
The 1987 INF treaty does not invalidate this analysis, because the
treaty "will not fundamentally alter the overall superpower military
balance."159 Soviet military chief of staff stated that the key
Soviet objective in the INF treaty was to eliminate from Europe the United
States ground based ballistic missiles which threatened Soviet 
i finterritory. This rationale demonstrates the seriousness with which
Moscow viewed NATO INF deployments, and the giving up of the SS-20 to 
obtain the dismantling of NATO INF may not necessarily reflect 
paradigmatic change. In the correlation of forces analysis at theatre and 
strategic levels the Soviet Union could be better off after the INF 
Treaty. The Pershing II, for example, threatened automatic nuclear 
escalation and at the same time threatened to prevent the Soviet Union 
from retaining the strategic option of launching its forces upon warning 
of a United States attack. Even if the Soviet Union is increasingly 
embracing deterrent thinking, the legacy of compellence in its strategy is
1-^ Joseph D. Douglass, Soviet Military Strategy in Europe, p. 201.
1^® Wolfram Hanreider, "Arms Control and The Federal Republic of 
Germany," Wolfram F. Hanreider, ed. , Technology. Strategy and Arms 
Control (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p. 60.
159 Michael R. Gordon, "Dateline Washington: INF: A Hollow
Victory?" Foreign Policy 68 (Fall 1987), p. 160. Other Soviet systems 
can cover European targets. Key hard targets will probably be covered by 
ICBM warheads that would otherwise be in reserve.
1 ^  Leon Goure, "The Soviet Strategic View," Strategic Review 16 
(Winter 1988), p. 79.
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still cause for NATO concern.
NATO grand strategy seeks to deter a Soviet invasion, but NATO 
declaratory and operational nuclear strategy seeks to compel a change in 
Soviet behaviour if war should occur. The Soviet Union's longstanding 
objectives have been primarily to maintain control in East Europe and to 
compel greater accommodation to Soviet interests in West Europe, but its 
nuclear declaratory strategy still clearly seeks to deter any NATO use of 
nuclear weapons. The operational strategy of the Soviet Union, however, 
appears designed to ensure deterrence by the threat of conducting 
conventional offensive operations supported by the implied threat of 
preemptive nuclear war should NATO attempt nuclear first use. In both 
alliance strategies, deterrence and compellence appear so deeply 
intertwined that their separation becomes extremely artificial and 
awkward.
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Chapter Seven 
THE NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
So far in this inquiry, the focus on nuclear strategy has been to
analyze the objectives and threats that underpin the superpower's 
declared intentions. This study now begins to narrow this focus to the 
analysis of the actual strategic nuclear force structures. The United 
States nuclear forces are dealt with in this chapter, the Soviet nuclear 
forces follow in chapter eight, and then the trends of the correlation of 
nuclear forces between the two nuclear powers form the theme of chapter 
nine.
Only by examining the capabilities of the respective strategic 
forces can the actual operational strategy be determined with any 
reliability. As has been elaborated in chapter one, the deterrent and 
compellent paradigms require different force structures. These next 
chapters therefore seek to identify, to the extent possible, how closely 
each superpower's strategic forces conform to the respective paradigms. 
If deterrent thinking were dominant, one would expect that a given force
structure would simply be designed to absorb a first strike and still be
capable of inflicting assured destruction on its rival. If compellent 
thinking were dominant, one would expect that a given force structure 
would seek an advantage in a potential counterforce exchange such that 
greater residual nuclear forces could be held for subsequent threats or 
war fighting purposes.
This chapter begins with the explanation of the correlation of 
nuclear forces model that applies to the following chapters as a 
heuristic device in the analysis of nuclear force structure. Following 
this explanation, the analysis utilizes the now familiar correlation of
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nuclear forces framework that examines in turn the quantity, the quality 
and the expected combat utility of these forces.
I. THE CORRELATION OF NUCLEAR FORCES MODEL
To a Soviet strategic analyst in the Brezhnev era, the concept of the 
correlation of forces was a fundamental baseline that determined his 
approach and methodology. The correlation of nuclear forces is simply a 
subset of this broader concept that was explained in chapter four. This 
section seeks first to explain the model used in this study and then 
account for its use in spite of certain criticisms. Inevitably, some 
caveats are necessary to avoid oversimplifying and distorting what is in 
reality an extremely complex issue.
Any model that purports to analyze the correlation of forces must 
therefore be a relatively complex one that accounts for many diverse 
factors. The degree of complexity can be even further compounded by the 
fact that many factors have changing significance and are capable of 
behaving in an unpredictable manner.^ Nevertheless, the concept of 
somehow assessing the correlation of forces is one of the few remaining 
standards that stems from Lenin's concept of revolution, and it has 
triggered many modelling efforts designed to accomplish this task.^ In 
1967 one of these efforts by Major General Anureyev, a highly respected 
and influential professor at a senior Soviet military academy, produced a 
correlation of nuclear forces model that provided an interesting 
conceptual and analytical foundation for dynamic modelling of central or
1 Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Assessment of the Correlation of 
World Forces: Implications for American Foreign Policy," Orbis 20 (Fall
1980), p. 628.
O
Richard E. Porter, "Correlation of Forces: Revolutionary
Legacy," Air University Review 28 (March-April 1977), pp. 26-27.
o
theatre nuclear war. This model is as follows:
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Si x Pi x 
C - CG ----------------
2j uj x pj x sj
where C is the correlation of nuclear forces, CQ is the initial 
correlation of nuclear forces (defined by dividing the total equivalent 
megatonnage, EMT, of country i by that for country j), U is the fraction 
of EMT by type of a given weapon system, P is the probability of 
penetration of a given weapons system and S is the probability of survival 
of a given weapons system. While this model presents an interesting 
conceptualization of how to assess the correlation of nuclear forces, 
Stephen Meyer's version contains a serious error of mathematical logic in 
that he appears to have confused the total megatonnage value with 
equivalent metagonnage and thus misrepresents the original formulation.^ 
Another way of expressing this equation where n simply represents the 
number of a given weapon system is as follows:
n^ (EMT-l) x P-l x
C = --------------------------------
Sj nj (EMTj) x Pj x Sj
O
I. Anureyev, "Determining the Correlation of Forces in Terms of 
Nuclear Weapons," Military Thought 6 (1967), in Selected Readings From
Military Thought. 1963-1973. Vol. 5, Part 1 (Washington: USGPO, 1982), pp. 
164-165. See also Stephen M. Meyer, Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces. PART 
I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives. Adelphi Paper 187 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), pp. 35-38.
^ This methodology has been validated by Ed Edmond of the 
Directorate of Mathematics and Statistics and by Dr. J.S. Finan, the 
Director of Strategic Analysis, at the Operational Research Analysis 
Establishment in Ottawa, February, 1988. See Annex A for the formula and 
methodology used to generate data for this study.
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For each given weapon system, detailed and separate calculations are 
required to determine its probability of penetration and its probability 
of survival in combat. These additional calculations are also very 
complex and inevitably must rely on certain assumptions as to how these 
systems will perform when the time comes. What this expression represents 
is a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors that, to a 
degree, account for the relative utility of various weapons systems that 
are or become residuals in combat.
As is the case for any such model, this one can be criticized as an 
inaccurate or inappropriate expression of complex reality. Strategic 
analysis faces several major constraints, most of which have to do with 
the limitations of human intuitive inferential abilities in coping with 
massive amounts of information or with the limitations of science and 
formal methods in accounting for complexity without unduly truncating the 
analytical process. Clearly with any such means of analysis, one runs 
the risk of providing "a machinery for producing phoney corroborations" 
that only gives a semblance of scientific validity.^ Operational research 
in World War Two, for example, tended in retrospect to be in error by a 
factor of three.^ In the Vietnam conflict, systems analysis also failed 
to reveal that Vietnamese troops who fought well defending their homes in 
the Mekong Delta would desert rather than fight when sent to the
 ^ See Albert Clarkson, Toward Effective Strategic Analysis 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 81-83.
Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge. p. 176.
 ^ Philip Morse conducted operational research in World War Two. He 
felt that more recent projections could be even less accurate and said so 
in a letter to the United States Senate, Congressional Record (17 
February, 1972), p. S-1938. See Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon. (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) p. 355.
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demilitarized zone. Models are simply the tools of analysis and 
therefore still require judicious application by people with a broad 
knowledge of history and politics who at exactly the same time understand 
technical detail.
Relation of nuclear analysis, as a result of the total lack of any 
operational experience, depends very heavily on various models and games. 
Notwithstanding the criticisms, no effective analysis of strategic nuclear 
weapons can occur without making extensive use of mathematical models to 
create an "artificial reality" that is an important first step in
developing useful and flexible models. ^ To conduct any meaningful
analysis, some simplification is necessary. The Soviet Union made 
considerable progress along these lines in the 1960's while the Western 
analysts tended to focus on the games of Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma, 
tailored for the rational analysis of deterrence. The selection of a 
Soviet model for use in this analysis is for the most part because of its
greater applicability to the paradigmatic mode of analysis.
The correlation of nuclear forces model is designed to demonstrate 
the residual ability of nuclear force structures to inflict damage on the 
other side. That is undoubtedly why EMT was selected as the unit of 
measure for the power of the weapons. Those weapons with which one
attacks must be deliverable and reliable, and those weapons withheld must
be survivable. These weapons can be used for counterforce or countervalue
Q
° Eliot Cohen, "Guessing Game: A Reappraisal of Systems Analysis,"
in Samuel Huntingdon, ed. , The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for
American Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 
1982), p. 183.
 ^ Thomas L. Saaty, Mathematical Models of Arms Control and
Disarmament (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), pp. 160-1.
Ibid. The latter games are generally felt to be more 
appropriate for deterrence analysis and less useful for analysis of compellence.
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attacks; however, it has been accepted that counterforce nuclear warfare 
is the upper limit of rational, politically purposive military action.^ 
Impressive increases in weapon system accuracy now mean that collateral 
civilian casualties in a counterforce attack could conceivably be reduced 
by as much as 96%.-^ Nevertheless, the most accepted measure of one's 
ability to inflict strategic defeat is EMT, and as long as a given 
superpower can deliver about 400 EMT, it can reasonably be expected to 
have a capacity to defeat strategically an opponent.
Technical analysis and mathematical modelling in the Soviet Union
complements the ideological commitment to finding a scientific basis to
confirm the actual correlation of forces, but the problems of accurately
identifying the relative power of adversary countries affects all states.
In the past, serious errors in calculating the correlation of forces have
led to disastrous political and military consequences. For example, when
Germany cautiously sent three battalions to re-occupy the Rhineland in
1936, Britain estimated 30 battalions were involved and the French thought
1300 battalions moved in. J It is also possible that a real advantage in 
forces will not necessarily lead to a favourable result. One Soviet 
analyst has noted carefully that
^  Paul Ramsay, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility
(New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1968), p. 215. More recent
assessments also accept that the final retaliation implicit in deterrence 
is not morally justified. See John Finnis, Joseph Boyle and Germain 
Grisey, Nuclear Deterrence. Morality and Realism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988), pp. 159-161.
1 9 Henry S. Rowen and Albert Wohstetter, "Varying Response with 
Circumstance," in Johan J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich," eds., Beyond Nuclear 
Deterrence: New Aims. New Arms, pp. 232-233.
1° Herbert Goldhammer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A
First Draft (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation R-2448-NA, 1979), 
P- 2.
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a superiority in forces must not be over simplified. Even 
a significant superiority is merely a favourable 
opportunity. Its conversion into actuality is a complex 
and contradictory process.^
In the United States, a parallel to this notion is found in the realist
model of interstate conflict.
In a world where power counts, the supreme virtue is 
prudence, that is, a rational calculation of the 
advantages of alternative courses of action. Such a 
calculation requires a judgement of the relative power of 
adversary nations and one's ability to influence their 
actions. -1--3
Detailed calculations of force structure and mathematical models are the 
key tools for modern military analysis, necessary to avoid perceptions 
that on occasion can be opposite to reality. The Soviet success of 
Sputnik and the American Apollo successes are examples that helped 
convince many people that a given superpower was considerably more 
powerful relative to the other than it actually was.^
Both the Soviet Union and the United States rely heavily on various 
forms of modelling to assist in developing nuclear strategy and force 
structure. In the Soviet Union, the main utility of these models appears 
to be the provision of a mathematical basis for the most effective methods 
for conducting combat. It forms a logical strictness of thought that
Stephan A. Tyushkevich, "The Methodology for the Correlation of 
Forces in War," in Joseph D. Douglas Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber, eds., 
Selected Readings From Military Thought 1963-1973. Vol. 5, Part 2, 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1983), p. 64. The Soviet invasion of Finland in 
1939/40 is a pertinent example.
Russel J. Lang, "Influence Strategies and Interstate Conflict," 
in David Singer, ed., The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik
Models (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 127. See also Hans
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 5th Edition, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1965), p. 10 and p. 27.
^  Herbert Goldhammer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs, p.
1. Although such examples are most evident in forming mass opinion, they 
are also important in shaping beliefs of political, economic and military 
elites.
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disciplines the mind and serves as an aid to better strategic decisions. ^
In this process, mathematical forecasting and operational research are
linked, and the main purpose of this effort is to provide information and
1 ftdata needed for better Soviet decision-making. In the United States a 
similar but more diverse strategic community has had an equally 
significant role in aiding the decision-making process. Not only have 
defence officials conducted extensive research and analysis, but they have 
been assisted by many outside agencies. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, 
the Rand Corporation in particular had a major impact on United States 
nuclear analysis. In general, the American analysts have observed the 
same fundamental variables, but have not put them together in the same 
comprehensive and numerate fashion. One independent analyst, for
example, produced a dynamic model with some similarity to that produced by
90General Anureyev, but it dealt only with ICBM's.
The correlation of nuclear forces model used by this study is simply 
a tool that has application to the analysis of the nuclear force structure
N. A. Lomov, Scientific - Technical Progress and the Revolution 
in Military Affairs (Moscow: translated and reprinted by the United
States Air Force, 1973), p. 244.
I** Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military 
Affairs (Moscow: translated by Secretary of State Department, Canada and
reprinted by USGPO, 1975), p. 224.
^9 American methodologies include "Relative Force Size Comparison" 
(Department of Defence) and "Discretionary Force Potential" (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff). See Christopher I. Branch, Fighting a Long Nuclear War: A
Strategy. Force. Policy Mismatch (Washington: National Defence University 
Press, 1984), pp. 57-66. See also testimony of Dr. William J. Perry 
before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, "Research 
and Development," Department of Defence Authorizations for FY 1981 Part 5 
(Washington: USGPO, 1980), p. 2721.
^  Michael Intiligator, "The Debate Over Missile Strategy: Targets
and Rates of Fire," Orbis 11 (Winter 1968), p. 1159. Another United 
States model, purportedly similar to a Soviet one, is the Arsenal 
Exchange Model. See Michael May, George Bing and John Steinbruner, 
Strategic Arms Reductions (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1988), pp. 30-31.
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of each superpower. It provides a relative measure of nuclear forces that 
allows a comparative analysis of nuclear systems which includes at least 
some of the dynamic factors critical in the event of war. Although it is 
a necessary simplification, its application to the existing nuclear force 
structure over time should clearly show any significant trends. More 
importantly, this model is probably representative of the type of analysis 
that routinely takes place in Moscow and even possibly in Washington with 
the aid of highly classified data and sophisticated computers. 
Consequently the model's results will yield an insight into nuclear 
strategic thinking that will greatly assist the paradigmatic analysis.
II. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES - QUANTITATIVE FACTORS
As a first step in the quantitative analytical process, one must
decide on the applicable data base, a task made all the more difficult
when dealing with strategic weapons systems between the Soviet Union and
the United States who do not acknowledge the same definition of
"strategic." To the United States, strategic nuclear systems have
intercontinental range, but to the Soviet Union any weapon that can strike
at the heart of Soviet power (within the boundaries of the Soviet Union)
must be judged strategic regardless of where it is based. In the
subsequent analysis, the systems agreed to by the Soviet Union and the
United States throughout the SALT negotiations form the analytical 
91baseline. Thus, several potent weapon systems are immediately excluded 
from analysis, and some inclusions may not necessarily reflect their 
intended utility in war. For example, all theatre nuclear forces 
including Backfire bomber and attack aircraft carriers are excluded as are
911 The only exception is the inclusion of the SS-N-5 missile, done 
only for greater ease of counting SLBM's. This addition has minimal 
influence on the overall results, and all were taken out of service by 1980.
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British, French and Chinese nuclear forces. The exclusions, however, are
partially offset by the inclusions of the Polaris/Poseidon SSBN's
allocated to NATO and those Soviet ballistic missiles, including the
variable range SS-ll's and their replacements, that are probably intended
9 9to threaten peripheral targets.  ^ By limiting this study to the systems 
covered by the SALT accords, the huge task of analyzing strategic nuclear 
systems becomes more manageable without seriously affecting the 
correlation of nuclear forces model results.
Assessing the United States nuclear force structure in a paradigmatic 
context requires the application once more of the correlation of nuclear 
forces component of the previously established framework. This framework 
contains three aspects of analysis: quantitative factors, qualitative
factors and dynamic processes. This section will delve into the 
quantitative aspects of United States force structure, and the two
following sections will address the qualitative and dynamic factors. The
major focus of this analysis is on the period 1970-1986, the third period 
of United States nuclear strategy that was analyzed in chapter three.
Because of the fact that most of the decisions that shaped the 
numbers of United States nuclear strategic systems took place in the
McNamara years (1960's), the quantitative section can be fairly brief. 
Compared to previous periods, from 1970 to 1986 the numbers of major 
strategic systems of the United States have been relatively stable. For 
the most part, the major quantitative or static indicators are held to be 
the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV's), the number of
22 in 1963, NATO identified a requirement for and was allocated
five SSBN's to threaten theatre targets in East Europe, and the USSR has 
probably allocated over 100 SS-11 replaced by an equal number of SS-17 
ICBM's to threaten key targets in Europe and China. See Robert P. Berman 
and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 59.
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nuclear warheads or re-entry vehicles, and the equivalent megatonnage
values of the strategic nuclear force as a whole.^
From the years 1970 to 1986, the United States total of SNDV's
decreased from 2175 to 1910, the lowest level being 1849, reached in the
year 1983.^ It had been long predicted that the United States could
reduce its strategic forces without jeopardizing its retaliatory
capability and without adverse political consequences for the United
States, 25 but this SNDV reduction may no longer be the most significant
factor in assessing strategic power. While the number of ICBM's and
SLBM's dipped somewhat in the early 1980's the major change during this
period for the United States was the cut in the number of operational
bombers. Several bombers remain in long term storage, but their use in
modern combat would require a great deal of preparation time. A few
additional ICBM's have also been acquired for testing purposes, but
without warheads and re-usable silos their use would also require a great
9 f\deal of preparation time. ° As the United States has no known plans to 
reconstitute its strategic forces in the event of war, for the purposes of 
analyzing the American nuclear forces ready for combat, only those 
presently in operational units are counted.
9 ^ Donald M. Snow, Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American
Policy in the 1980's (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press,
1981), p. 108.
^  See Annex B for details of the U.S. SNDV totals 1970-1986.
9 S See Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman, Strategic Forces: 
Issues for the Mid Seventies (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1973), p. 68.
9 ft For example, 108 MX missiles were acquired to field a force of 50 
missiles. The additional missiles are for both initial and subsequent 
testing. See David M. North, "New Soviet Weapons and Strategy Shape U.S. 
Deterrence Efforts," Aviation Week and Space Technology (March 10, 1986), 
p . 25.
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A more significant variable is perhaps the total number of warheads
or re-entry vehicles fielded in the strategic nuclear force. In 1970, the
United States had 4079 strategic warheads, but by 1986 this number had
grown to 11,772, almost a threefold increase. Most of this increase was
attributable to the Poseidon and Trident weapon systems, but the
Minuteman 3 and the air launched cruise missile (ALCM) have also
contributed to this growth.27 The MIRVing of strategic missiles in the
1970's was the most important factor that increased the number of warheads
available, and it was quite clear during this period that more warheads
9 Qwere required to cover additional targets. ° In terms of striking hard 
targets, it is considered feasible to send at most two warheads; the 
first, an airburst to maximize overpressure and immediate radiation and to 
minimize the debris in the air that could interfere with the passage of 
subsequent warheads, and the second, a ground burst to create maximum 
shock and crater ing.29 MIRV's facilitate striking hard targets by 
allowing RV's from separate missiles to attack a given target, hereby 
increasing the probability that at least one will arrive. By 1977, 
according to an assessment by the Congressional Budget Office, the
27 On the average, strategic target lists have grown 10% per year. 
See Richard Lee Walker, Strategic Target Planning: Bridging the Gap
Between Theory and Practice (Washington: National Defence University
Press, 1983) p. 11. See Annex C for details of U.S. warhead totals 1970- 
1986.
28 Although no single factor adequately explains the MIRV decision, 
the impetus for its acceptance derived from budgetary constraints on 
rational military target analysis. See Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A
Study in Defence Decision Making (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1975), p. 142.
29 Robert C. Aldridge, First Strike: The Pentagon's Strategy for 
Nuclear War (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1983), p. 61. This 
book provides some excellent detail on American technologies and their war 
fighting or counterforce applications.
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strategy of essential equivalence would require about 16,000 w a r h e a d s . ^  
Over this time period, an evident increase in targets, at least in part 
due to the requirement to attack hard targets, appears related to this 
growth in strategic warheads.
The total nuclear force structure is also a function of strategic 
programme funding, and clearly funding realities constrain the ability of 
the United States government to fulfill all of its strategic goals. A 
case in point is the MX, 200 of which were to be acquired in part to 
improve the United States position in arms control talks, but by 1986 only 
50 were funded. ^  From the early 1950's to the early 1970's the United 
States has been able to gradually reduce its spending on strategic systems 
in constant dollars to about half of its previous level. This reduction 
in strategic spending was reversed in the mid 1970's primarily due to 
concerns over Soviet strategic construction. Between 1981 and 1985 the 
United States defence spending grew by 32% in real terms, as President 
Reagan launched the largest United States military build-up since the 
Korean War.^ This increased defence spending in part accounts for the 
sharp increases in warheads available in the 1980's.
United States Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Strategic
Nuclear Forces: Deterrence Policies and Procurement Issues (Washington,
D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 32. This number of warheads is that needed by the 
proposed or "required" strategic force.
Leon V. Sigal, "Stable Deterrence or Nuclear War - Fighting:
All Unclear on the Nuclear Front," in R. B. Byers ed. , Deterrence in the 
1980's: Crisis and Dilemma (Bechenham: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 108.
Q 0
Henry S. Rowen, "The Need for a New Analytical Framework,"
International Security 1 (Fall 1976), p. 130. Rowen's data refutes the
notion of an arms race in strategic systems prior to 1976.
O O
Barry R. Posen and Stephan W. Van Evera, "Reagan Administration 
Defence Policy: Departure from Containment," in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert
J. Lieber and Donald Rothschild, eds., Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era
in American Foreign Policy (Boston, Massachusetts: Little Brown and
Company, 1987), p. 75.
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The final quantitative variable used as a strategic yardstick is the 
summation of EMT, the measure of destructive power. Although the total 
EMT available to the United States dropped by 10.8 percent over the 
period, this ignores the significant increase in the United States totals 
after 1981.-^ In fact, the total EMT in United States strategic forces 
dropped until 1976 when it more or less levelled off. The significant 
increases in the 1980's, however, are directly attributable to ALCM and 
Trident, but even modest increases in the number of MX missiles or B-l 
bombers in subsequent years could return the EMT available to the 1970 
level.
EMT is a variable that is often directly related to another common 
indicator used to measure strategic power, that of throw weight. The two 
are somewhat linked by Kent's rule which claims that the size of a nuclear
O C
warhead is proportional to its yield to the two-thirds power. J 
Therefore, the greater the throw weight, the greater the number of 
warheads, total yield and total EMT. Since the power of a ballistic 
missile is proportional to its fuel load and since its fuel load is 
proportional to its volume, assuming its range to be constant, analysts 
can make reasonably accurate estimates of missile throw weight. Not all 
analysts, however, believe that throw weight is a meaningful indicator of 
strategic power.^ This study considers EMT a more useful indicator
See Annex D for details of EMT totals for the United States.
See the very good article by Thomas A. Brown, "Number, Mysticism, 
Rationality and the Strategic Balance," Orbis 21 (Fall 1977), p. 485. See 
also Ian Bellany, "More Arithmetic of Deterrence: Throw Weight,
Radioactivity and Limited Nuclear War," RUSI Journal 124 (June 1979), pp. 
35-36.
For a positive view see Paul H. Nitze's influential article, 
"Assuring Strategic Stability," Foreign Affairs 54 (January 1976), p. 230. 
For a dissenting view see Jan Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An
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because it alone measures the actual pattern of destruction on the ground, 
reducing yields of various sizes to an equivalent standard.37
The measure of the quantitative factors of SNDV's, warheads and EMT 
tends to show a fairly stable United States nuclear force structure over 
the period 1970-1986. While two indicators, the SNDV and EMT, show an 
overall decrease during this period, both have shown increases in the 
1980's. The number of warheads, however, has increased almost threefold 
with about 2500 being added in the 1980's. Overall, the quantitative 
indicators in the 1970's seems to fall within what might be expected in a 
deterrent paradigm, but the significant increases in the 1980's especially 
in numbers of warheads when coupled with the already high levels of 
nuclear weapons indicates that deeper analysis is necessary.
III. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES - QUALITATIVE FACTORS
During this period, 1970-1986, a technological competition to field 
"better" strategic systems appears to have accelerated in conjunction with 
the levelling off of the numbers of strategic nuclear systems. 
Qualitative factors that make a given system more effective include 
increasing the availability, the reliability, the accuracy, the precision, 
the yield, the penetration ability, the hardness or the survivability of 
each individual weapon. 38 For the United States, these variables have 
steadily improved during this period of analysis as newer systems and
Alternate View," Foreign Affairs 54 (April 1976), p. 480.
37 a nuclear fireball creates three dimensional damage but most 
target areas are measured in two dimensions. EMT for yields under one 
Megaton are proportional to the yield to the two-thirds power and yields 
over one megaton are proportional to the square root of the yield. See 
Ian Bellany, "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence," RUSI Journal 118 
(March 1973), p. 28.
9 0
Accuracy does not equal precision. The measure of accuracy is 
Circular Error Probable and the measure of precision is bias.
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O Q
modifications to existing systems have been fielded. y
1. Overall Availability and Reliability
Weapon availability is a function of routine maintenance and alert 
posture. The United States in peacetime normally has about 90% of its 
ICBM's available for immediate launch, about 25% of the strategic bomber 
force on alert, and about 50% of its SSBN's at sea or on patrol.^ This 
study, however, rejects the concept of an "out of the blue" strategic 
attack as a practical policy option and accepts the notion that strategic 
combat is far more likely to occur after a serious political crisis or 
after a period of conventional war. Thus, what is most important to this 
analysis is what the United States forces would look like in a fully 
alerted or generated posture. If such a generated posture were to be 
maintained for a significant period of time, however, it would degrade as 
the effect of reduced training and maintenance would be felt. This study 
assumes that generated posture may have to be held for up to 30 days and 
that the strategic forces may degrade slightly from a fully generated 
condition. It is also assumed that ICBM's are close to 100% available, 
that 85% of SSBN's are at sea and that 80% of bombers are on alert status. 
Even in a fully generated condition, however, the United States could 
possibly be able to deliver as few as 38% of its nuclear strategic weapons
See Annex E for data on U.S. ballistic missiles. This annex 
summarizes the key variables that will be addressed in this section.
^  William C. Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic Nuclear War: 
What the Superpowers Target and Why (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 
28-30. This book is a major contribution to nuclear targeting.
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on their targets.^
The second major qualitative factor is closely related to 
availability; it is the overall reliability (OAR) of a given weapon 
system, including the probability that first the missile then the warhead 
will function properly. The OAR is normally expressed as a figure from 
zero to one, where one is total reliability. As weapon systems get more 
complex, the number of parts increases, and for example, a given weapon 
system with one million parts, each with a reliability of .999999 for 
performing its mission, could have an overall probability of success that 
could be less than .4.^ Because reliability errors are multiplicative, 
the actual reliability of a given system is difficult to determine; 
however, modern ballistic missile reliabilities are generally assessed at 
between .7 and .9.^ One way of determining OAR is to monitor actual 
missile tests; from 1965-1983, however, only three United States ICBM's 
have been launched from operational silos, and none worked properly.^ 
Others have simply assumed that the United States, with its great 
industrial and technological strength, has ICBM's and SLBM's that are
Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence. Adelphi Paper 
185 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 26. 
It is not possible to sustain troops and equipment in a generated state 
for prolonged periods. See Ellen P. Stern, The Limits of Military
Intervention (London: Sage Publication, 1977), p. 84.
^  The example used was the Nike Hercules Air Defence System cited 
in Norman R. Augustine, Augustine's Laws (New York: American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1982), p. 59. If any one part fails, the 
whole mission may fail. The same principle applies to all systems.
^  Kosta Tsipis provides an excellent review of nuclear weapons 
technologies in his, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 114. OAR of .6 means that a
given system will operate as planned 60% of the time.
^  Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence.
The Arms Race and Arms Control, p. 29. Even those launched from test
facilities have not been much more successful.
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extremely reliable. ^  At the beginning of the 1970's reliabilities
appeared to be lower than in the 1980's. One analysis of a possible 
Soviet counterforce attack postulated that the OAR including availability 
would be as low as .57.^ According to a senior defence official, in 1968 
the average OAR of Minuteman 1 and 2, and the three Polaris variants was 
.66.^ When the availability factor is withdrawn, assuming it to be .9, 
then the OAR averages out to be .73.
This study has selected OAR's for the United States systems that are 
more or less based on these averages in the early years and projected 
reliability improvements into the 1980's. United States B-52/B-1B bombers 
are assessed as having an overall system reliabilities of .8/.85 
respectively that includes all warheads, missiles and the aircraft itself.
2. Lethality
The next major qualitative factor includes the variables of accuracy, 
precision and yield to measure the lethality of a given weapon system 
against hard targets. This factor is also known as counter military 
potential (CMP or K) and is expressed mathematically as:
y 2/3
CMP = K = ----
CEP2
Dietrich Schroeer, Science. Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1984), p. 157.
^  Albert Wohlstetter, "The Case for Strategic Force Defence," in 
Johan J. Holst and Wilham Schneider Jr. eds., Why ABM?: Political Issues
in the Missile Defence Controversy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1969), p.
133. Wohlstetter, using some classified data, concluded that the Soviets 
could destroy all but 8.7% of Minuteman, but that 5% of the Minuteman 
force could effectively retaliate.
^  Ian Bellany, "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence," p. 31.
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where yield (Y) is expressed in megatons of TNT explosive power and
circular error probable (CEP) is expressed in nautical m i l e s . C M P  is a
concept that loses some of its meaning at very high or very low
accuracies, but it is nevertheless an accurate measure of technical
sophistication. The higher the K value, the higher the probability of
destroying a given hard target.^ The probability of destroying a target
of H hardness or the single shot kill probability (SSj^ p) is sometimes
SOexpressed as follows.
K
SSKP - 1 - ,05<H/16>2/3
This equation assumes a simplified lethal radius of a nuclear weapon that,
of course, varies with each particular weapon, target, weather and soil
condition, but normally can destroy a silo type structure at a distance of
SI1 1/4 times the crater radius. A-
When a more precise measure of lethal radius is introduced, such as 
that computed by a General Electric calculator, the following formula is
Dietrich Schroeer, Science. Technology and the Nuclear Arms 
Race. p. 202. See also Barry Schneider, Colin Gray and Keith Payne, 
Missiles for the Nineties: ICBM's and Strategic Policy (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 49-52. This CMP value is valid for 
targets over 300 psi in hardness.
^  CMP is useful until CEP is equal to or less than the radius of 
the crater the explosion excavates. See Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal. p. 307. 
The highest useful value of CMP is therefore about 100-125. The crater 
radius can be determined by the following formula: (yield)®-x 60 feet
per kiloton. A one Kt groundburst will create a 60 foot radius crater. 
See Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons 
3rd edition (London: Castle House Publications, 1980), pp. 233-236. This 
work is the best reference for technical details of nuclear weapons.
“*® See Barry Schneider, Colin Gray and Keith Payne, Missiles for 
the Nineties: ICBM's and Strategic Policy, p. 52.
■*1 Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons. p. 267.
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c o
derived: ~)/L
8.41 Y2/3 
SSKP - 1 - .5 H '7 (CEP)2
This is the formula for SSj^ p used in this study.
The final calculation of the ability to destroy a given target is the
terminal kill probability (Tjq>) which is the SSj^ p times the OAR. Should
more than one RV of different yields be used per silo, then the overall
C O
T]£p can be expressed as.
overall TKP - TKP1 + (1 - TKP1) TKP2
These formulae, that will be used throughout this study, place a premium 
on both yield and accuracy, but clearly increased accuracy results in a 
greater payoff in the ability to destroy hard targets.
The United States from 1970 to 1986 has consistently pursued 
increased accuracy, but has a mixed record with respect to increasing 
warhead yields. In the early 1970's the older Minutemen 1 were replaced 
with lower yield Minutemen 3 missiles. Even though the Minuteman 3 was 
MIRVed, it was "expressly designed to be effective only against soft 
targets."3^ When the Minuteman 3 was re-equipped with the Mark 12A
c o
See Lynn E. Davis and Warner R. Schilling, "All You Ever Wanted 
to Know about MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared to Ask," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (June 1973), p. 211. More accurate 
SSKP formulae exist for specific purposes, but this is considered the 
best general purpose expression by Dr. J. S. Finan, the Director of 
Strategic Analysis, of ORAE, Ottawa (Interview: 18 March, 1988).
53 Ibid.. p. 127.
William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Military Policy 
Since World War II. p. 78.
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warhead system in the early 1980's, however, the yield was doubled and the 
accuracy improved such that the lethality of the Minuteman 3 in the 1980's 
was six times its K value in the early 1970's . G e n e r a l l y  speaking, the 
yields on SLBM and bomber carried warheads decreased slightly over the 
period, at least until the Trident missile was deployed. Flexibility has 
also been enhanced by deploying selectable yield warheads on cruise 
missiles, Pershing II and gravity bombs. For the most part the United 
States has attempted to increase its strategic force lethality by 
increasing the numbers of its warheads and making them more accurate.
Overall accuracy is enhanced by having a lower CEP and a small bias. 
Bias is the distance between the centre of the target and the centre of 
distribution of RV impact points, and as it is normally less than one 
third of the CEP, it is usually ignored. The less the bias, the more
precise a weapon system is said to be, but one of the unknown quantities 
in a missile exchange would be that ballistic missiles have never been 
tested in a polar trajectory so that real systemic bias is uncertain. The 
standard measure of accuracy is CEP, that radius within which there is a 
.5 probability that a given RV will impact. Even though these values are 
regularly tested, these tests tend to occur over shorter ranges and in 
placid conditions such that real CEP's could be overstated by as much as 
10%.57 This study has used the CEP's as published in unclassified sources
Thomas J. Downey, "How to Avoid Monad - and Disaster," Foreisn 
Policy 24 (Fall 1976), p. 177.
Michael Pentz, "New Weapons and Strategies for their Use," in 
Thomas L. Perry and Dianne DeMille, eds., Nuclear War: The Search for
Solutions, p. 59. See also contrary view, see General Robert T. Marsh, 
"Strategic Missiles Debated: Missile Accuracy - We Do Know," Strategic
Review 10 (Spring 1982), pp. 36-37. Marsh stresses that bias is a 
relatively minor error, even on polar trajectories. This study assumes 
bias can be ignored. See Annex A for further support.
^7 Matthew Bunn and Kosta Tsipis, "The Uncertainties of a Pre­
emptive Nuclear Attack," Scientific American 249 (November 1983), p. 42.
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as being the most reasonable data available, but several uncertainties 
inevitably remain.
The United States has made great efforts to improve the accuracy of 
its nuclear weapon delivery systems and has made considerable progress 
during the 1970-1986 period. As early as 1969, the defence department 
renewed its effort to improve the accuracy of strategic systems, but it 
was not until fiscal year 197 5 that bureaucratic and philosophical 
resistance eroded to the point that an Improved Accuracy Programme was 
funded.^® Every United States strategic nuclear delivery system produced 
has had better accuracy than its predecessor and, in general, ICBM 
accuracy has doubled every seven y e a r s . T h e  quiet retrofitting of all
Minuteman 3 missiles with the NS-20 guidance system has also increased
fiOaccuracy considerably, enabling it to attack hard targets. u Guidance 
systems for nuclear delivery systems have improved by using better 
inertial and stellar navigation devices to update the delivery bus on its 
trajectory. To obtain greater accuracy by taking advantage of more 
precise navigation aids, manoeuvering re-entry vehicles (MARV's) are under 
active development. ^  If the RV could take advantage of updated
Joel S. Wit, "American SLBM: Counterforce Options and Strategic
Implications," Survival 24 (July/August 1982), p. 164. Early attempts to 
find increased accuracy for Poseidon were turned down in 1969, 1970 and 1971.
Dietrich Schroeer, Science. Technology and the Nuclear Arms 
Race. p. 148.
^  Thomas Cochran, William M. Arkin and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear 
Weapons Databook: United States Nuclear Forces and Capabilities Vol. 1
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984), p. 113.
This is a good source for nuclear weapon data.
^  Global Positioning System is replacing Transit satellite 
navigation system in the mid-1980's. All ballistic missiles will be more 
accurate with this system. Even without MARV, GPS will allow accuracies 
to be increased by 1/2. See Robert C. Aldridge, First Strike: The
Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War, p. 93 and p. 118. See also Jonathan 
Alford ed., The Impact of New Military Technology (Farnborough: Gower and 
Allanhead, Osmun, 1981), p. 118.
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navigational information for longer along its trajectory, it would be more 
accurate. MARV's will permit theoretical accuracies as low as 30 feet
r o
without the RV having to sense the target.^- This accuracy, when coupled 
with an earth penetrating warhead, will give such increased lethality 
against hard targets that one such warhead would be the equivalent of two 
present MX warheads.63 Clearly, the United States considers increased 
accuracy as an important factor in strategic weapon development and, since 
1975, has vigorously pursued more accurate delivery systems.
3. Penetration
Another key variable remains the probability that the strategic
weapons systems can penetrate to their targets. The United States deploys
a number of penetration aids to facilitate the penetration of its SLBM's
and ICBM's against the Soviet missile defences. Soviet ballistic missile
defences have been strengthened and modernized over the past years, so
that missile penetration will probably be less than unity. Even though
American bomber tactics have called for low level penetration since the
1960's, the Soviet Union has expanded and improved its high altitude air
defence to the degree that many feel it has some ABM capability. 6^ In
this study, the United States missile penetration of the USSR is based on
f i Sthe OAR times a defence factor that varies from .9 to unity. J Soviet
62 Robert C. Aldridge, First Strike: The Pentagon's Strategy for 
Nuclear War, p. 118.
63 Attributed to John Pike, Assistant Director Space Policy for the 
Federation of American Scientists, in "Air Force Readies Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator," Defence News. 17 August, 1987.
6^ John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and 
Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), p. 169.
63 in this study, unity was used for the defence factor from 1970- 
1972, .98 from 1973-1975, .95 from 1976-1982, and .9 from 1983-1986.
Many modern Soviet surface to air missiles are given some capability
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ballistic missile defences are judged unable to provide any meaningful 
area defence, but have some ability to defend point targets.
As the United States maintains a large percentage of its EMT in its 
strategic bomber forces, the ability of those aircraft to penetrate Soviet 
defences is a very important variable. The United States strategic bomber 
force can attack a formidable number of aim points, even without the 
assistance of missiles, in a target set more closely tailored to an 
assured retaliation mission where both hard and soft military targets can 
be destroyed.^ Average bomb loads of four bombs plus missiles have been 
assumed in this study. ^  To attack well defended military targets, 
however, will require that the United States bomber force penetrate what 
is probably the most in-depth air defence system ever created. Historical 
loss rates in conventional combat have been in the order of two to three 
percent, giving very high penetration rates. ^  In 1972 over North 
Vietnam, the United States directed 700 sorties of B-52 bombers into the 
heavily defended Hanoi-Haiphong area yet lost only 15 aircraft, a little 
over 2 percent.^ Because the ability of the bomber to penetrate
against ballistic missiles. The efficacy of these systems remains 
controversial. See John M. Collins, U.S. - Soviet Military Balance. 
1980-1985 (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's , 1985), p. 56. John 
Collins provides excellent data on Soviet and United States nuclear 
forces.
^  Francis P. Hoeber, Slow to Take Offence: Bombers. Cruise
Missiles and Prudent Deterrence, pp. 33-36.
^  John M. Collins, U.S. - Soviet Military Balance. 1980-1985. p. 
180. See also Norman Polmar, Strategic Weapons: An Introduction (New
York: Crane Rusak, 1982), p. 145.
Average allied bomber losses in World War Two were 2.8%. See 
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War) 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1945), p. 1.
^  Norman Polmar, Strategic Air Command: People. Aircraft and
Missiles (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Patrick Stevens, 1979), p. 127. See 
also Bill Yenne, SAC: A Primer of Modern Strategic Airpower (Novato,
California: Presidio Press, 1985), pp. 101-119. Of these, Polmar's book
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sophisticated air defence systems has become primarily a function of 
complex electronic "gadgetry",70 and that gadgetry is susceptible to EMP, 
trying to penetrate Soviet defences in conditions of nuclear war is an 
unknown quantity. Generally speaking, the United States bomber force is 
intended to conduct follow up attacks on Soviet hard and soft targets 
after ICBM and SLBM attacks have blasted approach corridors and weakened 
the air defence system. Soviet defences consist of 10,000-12,000 surface 
to air missiles, 1200-2600 interceptors, up to 10,000 radars, and a 
sophisticated warning and communication system. 71
The United States estimates that its attempts to penetrate Soviet 
defences with nuclear bombers will be .75 effective. In 1979, the 
Commander Strategic Air Command (SAC), General Ellis, anticipated a .75 
penetration ability for 1985.72 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have apparently 
assumed that in the present SIOP the probability of arrival to enemy 
targets for weapons carried on penetrating bombers is about 77 percent for 
ALCM's, 72 percent for short range attack missiles (SRAM's) and 60 percent 
for bombs.73 In 1975, however, a former senior SAC pilot estimated that 
the B-52's ability to penetrate to Soviet targets at that time at about
is the more detailed and the more useful.
70 Ronald W. Clark, The Role of the Bomber (London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson, 1977), p. 130.
71 See Herbert York, Does Strategic Defence Breed Offence? (London: 
University Press of America, 1987), p. 8; and, Dietrich Schroeer, Science 
Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race, p. 127.
72 Cited by Defence Secretary Harold Brown in John M. Collins, U.S.
- Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities. 1960-1980
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), p. 146.
73 William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: 
Global Links in the Arms Race (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger 
Publishing Company, 1985), p. 91. This book is quite useful.
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60-75 percent, somewhat lower than official estimates.^ Each year the 
Soviets have increased the effectiveness of their air defences such that 
from the early 1960's on the United States was forced to adopt low level 
penetration tactics. The penetration data of Soviet air defences by SAC 
in this study is based on interpolation of the above information, 
including a .8/.85 OAR for B-52/B-1B bombers and their weapons.^
The penetration of United States nuclear systems to Soviet targets 
from 1970-1986 has remained relatively constant. As older B-52 models 
could no longer effectively penetrate, they were replaced by newer more 
effective versions, and as they in turn degraded they were augmented with 
SRAM and ALCM. Most recently the B-1B and ALCM have given the United 
States bomber force an effective ability to penetrate Soviet defences. 
The ballistic missile systems do not face effective defences so that their 
penetration is relatively high.
4. Survivab i1i tv
Each leg of the United States triad faces a different survivability 
problem which will be affected in different ways by crisis and war. The 
land based ICBM's are threatened by Soviet ICBM's that could impact within 
20 minutes of the United States receiving reliable strategic warning. The 
United States bomber force is threatened by SLBM's that could possibly 
reduce their reaction time to as little as 9 minutes. The SSBN's if in
^  Dr. Bob Brereton, Director of Air Operational Research in ORAE, 
Ottawa, (Interview: 12 January, 1988).
^  See Annex F. Bomber Penetration Data. Soviet defence against 
American penetration is plotted linearly for reasons of simplifying a 
complex issue. The lines on the chart are meant to be a plausible 
relative explanation of continual increases in Soviet air defences 
relative to United States abilities to counter it, over the life of a 
weapon system. This Annex is considered a plausible explanation of 
unclassified data by Dr. Bob Brereton, the director of DAOR, ORAE, Ottawa.
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port are very vulnerable to any nuclear missile attack and at sea are 
threatened by Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The survivability of 
the United States strategic nuclear forces is important because it is a 
central qualitative variable contributing to the correlation nuclear 
forces analysis. Each leg of the triad will be examined in turn.
The standard measure of ICBM resistance to an attack is the hardness
of its silo against the shock of a nuclear detonation. A typical nuclear
weapon expends its energy as follows: 50% blast, 40-45% thermal and 5-10%
in exited nuclei.^ A standard missile silo can shield a missile from
thermal and radiation effects from detonations that are fairly close;
thus, the challenge for silo hardness is to protect a delicate missile
from damage due to shock and blast.^ A silo's resistance to such a blast
is usually expressed in pounds per square inch overpressure that the
structure is predicted to withstand. Because no silo has ever been
exposed to a nuclear weapon test, however, uncertainty in silo hardness
7 Rcalculations is in the order of about 20 percent. Most silo attacks
involve 2 warheads, one airburst and the other groundburst, but it is the 
ground burst weapon that will cause the most d a m a g e T h e  expression for 
silo survivability used in this study, where Pg is the probability of 
survival, is as follows:
PS = 1 " tKP
^  Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear
Age, p. 46.
^  Ibid.. p. 135.
Matthew Bunn and Kosta Tsipis, "The Uncertainties of a 
Preemptive Nuclear Attack," p. 44.
^  Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear
Age, p. 271. See also Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects
of Nuclear Weapons. p. 24.
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Unless a nuclear weapon detonates close enough to a silo, so that the 
silo is visibly destroyed, the attacker will not know if his attack was 
successful or not. It is plausible that the silo would withstand far more 
shock than the relatively delicate missile contained within. It is 
considered possible now to construct underground shelters that can 
reasonably be expected to withstand overpressures greater than 6000 psi.®® 
The United States ICBM force has had two overt hardening programmes 
during the 1970-1986 period. The first began in the 1960's and was 
completed by 1972, thereby placing all American ICBM's in silos protected
Q *1
to a value of about 900 psi. From about 1974 to 1978 a silo hardening 
programme was implemented at the same time as the Command Data Buffer 
System was installed on United States Minuteman ICBM's that would allow 
rapid r e t a r g e t i n g . This study has assumed that the Minuteman hardness 
achieved during this programme approximates 2000 psi, the hardness value
O  O
attributed to reinforced concrete. J
One problem with United States force structure is its reliance on 
launch control centres (LCC's) to execute launch orders when received. In
®® Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Nuclear 
Weapons (London: Frances Pinter, 1981), p. 46.
Lynn E. Davis and Warner R. Schilling, "All You Ever Wanted to
Know about MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared to Ask," p.
231 Cites the figure 900 psi. William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, 
Soviet Military Policy Since World War II. p. 81 note that programme
ended in 1972. This study notes that data from Kosta Tsipis cited in
Dietrich Schroeer, Science. Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race, p. 202 
and p. 157 corroborate the figure 900 rather than the 2000 suggested by 
Lee and Staar.
The Military Balance. 1974-1975 and subsequent years.
Analysis of Shifting 
Press, 1978), p. 51.
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the United States, there appears to be no ground based means of launching 
an ICBM if its LCC is destroyed, and there are only 100 LCC's controlling 
the 1000 Minutemen missiles. This situation has led one analyst to 
conclude that the Soviets must plan on attacking the United States command
OA
and control at the first opportunity. In this study, it has been
assumed that if the LCC's are destroyed those ICBM's within its direct 
control are effectively lost.
Bomber survivability is primarily a function of warning time for 
those aircraft on alert. Those aircraft not on alert are assumed 
destroyed by attacks on the forty or so bomber bases. With nine minutes 
of warning, a B-52 can fly out as far as 46 nautical miles from its base,
Q C
sufficient to render a barrage attack statistically u s e l e s s . S i n c e  the 
bomber itself cannot withstand much more than 1-2 psi overpressure, speed 
is its only means of survival. This study assumes that for an extended 
period such as 30 days, less than 80 percent of the bomber force can be 
maintained on continuous alert and that 90 percent of that number survive 
a nuclear attack. Therefore, in a generated posture 70 percent of the 
United States B-52's can probably survive a nuclear attack. Because 
B-lB's are somewhat faster and slightly harder, 80 percent are assumed to 
survive an attack.
The survival of SSBN's represents an important component of the 
correlation of nuclear forces model as applied to the United States 
because about half of its strategic warheads are on SLBM's. This study 
assumes that in a generated condition, about 15% of these assets will be
Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the
Nuclear Threat, p. 284. This study has assumed that LCC's are as hard as 
ICBM silos, even though they are not as deep. See R.T. Pretty, ed. Jane's 
Weapon Systems (London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1988-1989).
Roger Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980's (Stanford, 
California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 145.
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required to be in port at any given time and that the remaining 85% are at 
sea.00 Those in port are quite vulnerable to strategic attack and are 
assumed destroyed when attacked. Those SSBN's at sea are more survivable, 
but still are subject to attack by several means, all of which involve a 
capability by the Soviet Union to locate, identify and destroy them. As 
the SSN is widely viewed as the best counter to a submarine, ^  the Soviet 
Union has invested a great deal into producing SSN's capable of countering 
SSBN's. Nevertheless, any SSBN on patrol is extremely quiet, and superior 
United States submarine technology allows for American submarine operation 
to be more silent than their Soviet counterparts. Generally speaking,
United States submarines can proceed at higher speeds without being
O Q
detected, while still detecting and tracking Soviet submarines.00 In the 
1980's, however, this American advantage was decreasing.
The survivability of SSBN's is also a function of the amount of sea 
room in which they have to operate. As SLBM ranges are extended, the 
amount of sea that must be searched is expanded geometrically, and this 
clearly increases SSBN survivability. If an SSBN remains deep, it is hard 
to detect but cannot readily communicate and, if found, can be destroyed
on
easily due to the propagation of shock in deep water. 7 In this study,
William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear
Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race, p. 83.
^  Robert E. Kuenne, The Attack Submarine: A Study in Strategy
(London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 188-192. SSN's are nuclear
powered attack submarines.
Vice Admiral Nils Thunman provides interesting testimony on 
American submarine advantages, Hearings before the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, Department of Defence Authorization 
for Appropriations for FY 1986. Part 3 (Washington: USGPO, 1985), p. 163.
^  A nuclear submarine at sea can probably withstand pressures in
excess of 14,000 psi. See Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons
in the Nuclear Age, p. 71. The increased water pressures at greater
depths make it feasible to conduct barrage attacks on SSBN's operating 
below 300 meters.
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survivability of SSBN was based on the amount of sea space available and 
the relative effectiveness of Soviet ASW in those waters. ^  In this 
analysis, the Ohio class submarine was accepted as the most survivable 
SSBN at sea during the period.91 In general, the United States appears to 
have very survivable SSBN's that have, at a minimum, kept pace with Soviet 
ASW improvements by virtue of adding longer range missiles.
The United States from 1970 to 1986 has taken serious efforts to 
improve the survivability of its strategic delivery systems against 
developing threats. In a sense, the hardening of ICBM silos, the 
dispersal of bombers, and construction of survivable SSBN's are measures
Q O
of passive strategic defence.  ^ These are measures that serve to enhance 
both deterrent and war fighting aspects of the United States strategic 
force structure.
5. The Implications of the Qualitative Analysis
From 1970 to 1986 the United States appears to have sought overall 
improvements in the qualitative aspect of its strategic nuclear forces, 
but the major effort has been to improve accuracies of all strategic 
systems. Qualitative improvements have contributed to an ongoing 
competition with the Soviet Union in all strategic areas, and Annexes F 
and G display that competition graphically. The application of the
Annex G, SSBN Survivability Data, portrays the survivability 
factors used in subsequent calculations. This data has been reviewed by 
Fraser Bolton, the Director of Maritime Operational Research, ORAE 
(Ottawa) and is considered a plausible explanation of SSBN survivability 
based on unclassified data.
91 D. Douglas Dalgleish and Larry Schwiekart, Trident (Carbondale, 
Illinois: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), see chapter eight.
9^ Lawrence Freedman, Strategic Defence in the Nuclear Age. Adelphi 
Paper 224 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987),
p . 64.
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correlation of nuclear forces model requires that plausible assessments of 
all these variables be made to calculate a given correlation. The 
qualitative analysis highlights strenuous United States efforts to improve 
the lethality of its strategic systems that implies a bias to achieving a 
hard target kill capability that the compellent paradigm explains quite 
well.
IV. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES - COMBAT UTILITY
The dynamic factors of nuclear force structure are perhaps the most 
difficult to assess because the interaction of weapon systems in combat 
depends on what decisions are taken and when. Many of these decisions are 
simply not taken in advance, and there is no way of knowing for certain 
what choices a United States president will make. This section will 
analyze the general capability of the United States intercontinental 
nuclear forces to influence the outcome of strategic combat from 1970 to 
1986. Certain elements or choices available in the United States force 
structure should reflect any tendency toward a given strategy. Since 
force structure is purportedly a reflection of strategy, one would expect 
that the United States force structure should parallel the declared 
strategy discussed in chapter three.
The quantitative and qualitative analyses are useful and necessary 
but not themselves sufficient indicators of paradigmatic thinking. These 
numbers and qualities must be related to actual results or outcomes before
Q O
they can be said to have any meaning. This section will first examine 
the methodology necessary to generate the correlation of nuclear forces 
data, then note some command control factors that may serve to constrain
^  Warner R. Schilling, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 
1970's: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity,"
International Security 6 (Fall 1981), p. 52.
314
some options, follow with a review of some key combat variables, and 
finally describe some results from the correlation of nuclear forces 
model.
As has been alluded to earlier, the correlation of nuclear forces
model requires several calculations, all of which to one degree or another
must rely on certain assumptions as to the operation and effectiveness of
nuclear weapons. The quantitative and qualitative analyses have for the
most part completed the data base, but now further conceptual assumptions
are required prior to actually "running" the formula. These assumptions
are necessary to decide which systems to withhold and which to use against
what Soviet targets. In this process, the lethality value K provides a
useful indicator to calculate the effectiveness of one force against
another, but to do this correctly one must
match up specific missile types and target types, carry 
out a detailed calculation of the kill probabilities of 
each combination, and then calculate the overall 
results.^
Thus to determine the survivability of a given ICBM type, an exchange 
model must be created for each situation and year that must, by necessity, 
be independently calculated.
Since nuclear weapons appear to exist primarily for coercing one's 
opponent, ^  the relative ability to conduct a counterforce exchange 
reflects one means of measuring one's potential advantage. This is 
certainly the view of Paul Nitze who claims that the post nuclear exchange 
relationship most clearly brings out the stability or potential
^  Thomas A. Brown, "Missile Accuracy and Strategic Lethality," 
Survival 18 (March/April 1976), p. 58. Brown provides excellent analysis 
of the accuracy/lethality problem.
^  Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 302.
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instability of the strategic r e l a t i o n s h i p .96 Obtaining a favourable post 
exchange correlation of nuclear forces may have more to do with who 
strikes first than how the balance may have looked beforehand, but it is 
obvious that survivability of strategic forces is central to the post 
exchange outcome. During the beginning of this period, the United States 
began to express concern about the pre-launch survivability of its 
I C B M ' s.9 7  Within a few years a senior defence official was advocating 
high survivability to support national decision making "during and after
Q O
nuclear attacks."yo
The initial correlation of nuclear forces exchange model involved 
matching the more lethal American and Soviet strategic missiles against 
the most lucrative targets in the opponent's inventory, to facilitate 
creating specific survivability values.99 Subsequently, the remaining 
United States and Soviet missiles were targeted in a similar manner until 
all of the opponent's targets were covered, including bomber capable 
airfields, SSBN bases and critical nuclear command and control targets. 
Soft targets were covered with less lethal SLBM's wherever possible. All 
targets were covered at least once every model, but the optimum number of
96 Paul Nitze, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on International 
Relations, House of Representatives, U.S.-USSR Relations and the 
Strategic Balance (August 31 and September 2, 1976), p. 29.
97 Melvin Laird in his FY 1973 Defence Annual Report cited in Lynn 
E. Davis and Warner R. Schilling, "All You Ever Wanted to Know about MIRV 
and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared to Ask," p. 208.
9® Malcolm Currie, Director of Research and Engineering, in 
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House 
of Representatives, Department of Defence Appropriations for 1978 Part 3, 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 236.
99 William C. Martel used the same basic logic to construct his 
exchange model in "Exchange Calculus of Strategic Nuclear War," in 
Stephen J. Cimbala, ed. , Strategic War Termination (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1986), p. 11.
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RV's per target was two. Once targeting was complete, SSj^ p and Tj^ p were
calculated for each type of weapon targeted against each type of target.
Then, the potential survivability of ICBM type was calculated and adjusted
by a factor to account for incapacitated weapons due to destruction of
command and control links.100 The resultant survivability, expressed a
figure from 0 to 1, became S^, the final figure required to calculate the
correlation of nuclear forces formula. This procedure was repeated for
each year under study, with all forces regarded as residuals, to establish
a correlation of nuclear forces baseline (C-l) from which to compare
subsequent models.
For the United States force structure, the impact of nuclear command
and control bears further analysis. Not only would the loss of the LCC's
affect the survivability of ICBM's, but the entire United States strategic
command control system appears to be unable to survive for more than a few
hours and thus may be "unable to control the nuclear forces. "101
United States nuclear forces may be more robust than the command and
control structure that supports it, creating a potentially severe penalty
1 09for delay in releasing nuclear weapons.^ According to an unpublished
Pentagon analysis, the present strategic system could be effectively
1 fHdisabled by as few as fifty Soviet weapons. J In terms of actual overall
100 commanci control centers were allowed the same hardness as
the ICBM's under its control, and they were attacked in the same manner 
as ICBM's.
Paul Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Forces. p. 212. 
The only survivable component is that small portion which can remain 
airborne and even that may be vulnerable to Electromagnetic Pulse effects 
(EMP).
102 BruCe G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the
Nuclear Threat, p. 209.
103 Daniel Ford, The Button: The Nuclear Trigger - Does It Work?
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 228.
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strategic force structure, it appears that the United States is simply not 
prepared to ride out a Soviet first strike. The common operating premise 
among United States war planners appears to be that "the United States 
would never permit itself to be hit first" and that Strategic Air Command 
"does not intend to be in a retaliatory m o d e . "104 These deep command and 
control problems are only reflected in the correlation of nuclear forces 
analysis with respect to significantly increased ICBM vulnerability, but 
they raise serious questions as to why the official policy of being able 
to absorb a Soviet first strike and still retaliate effectively has not 
been translated into a more survivable command and control structure. At 
a minimum this anomaly indicates a dichotomy between the declaratory 
policy and what may be operational policy as well as providing incentives 
to adopt a launch on warning strategy in war.
Launch on warning is a situation in which strategic nuclear forces 
are launched on corroborated strategic warning that the other side has 
launched a nuclear attack and, if planned from the outset, can be a 
strategy. A variant of this strategy occurs when one does not receive 
adequate warning or when one plans to wait a little longer for reasons of 
stability, to ensure that in fact an actual attack is in progress, and 
then launch under attack.105 It is highly probable that the United States 
would, in a generated posture, during a major crisis, launch under attack 
if not on warning. Notwithstanding the emphasis on survivability, the 
risks of absorbing a nuclear attack are simply too great.
The execution of a SIOP war plan is also a complex phenomenon that is 
plagued with multiple uncertainties. Although increased options have been
104 Ibid.. p. 234.
See Richard L. Garwin, "Launch Under Attack to Redress Minuteman 
Vulnerability," International Security 4 (Winter 1979/1980) p. 117.
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introduced into operation planning, the real variable in determining which 
options are open may depend on the time required either to decide or to 
reprogramme the missile inventory. From 1970 to 1986, great efforts have 
undoubtedly been made to provide real-time information to assist decision­
making and to speed up missile reprogramming in the event the option 
selected is not one already programmed. Prior to the Command Data Buffer 
System, it appeared to take 36 minutes to re-target a Minuteman 3, more 
than the time of flight of an ICBM.10^ By 1978, each ICBM and SLBM in the 
United States had 100-200 target plans available in computer memories and 
presumably could be re-programmed to at least some options much more 
quickly. 107 Not only do these improvements provide greater operational 
flexibility in crisis situations, but they also permit the possibility of 
launching a reprogrammed counter force attack. The advantage of this 
option is that any missile that is discovered unreliable during the 
initial part of its launch can be immediately replaced, thereby increasing 
the overall Tj^ p. Although the increased reprogramming capabilities have 
not been factored into the correlation of nuclear forces model, the 1980's 
offer United States leaders far more flexible options for nuclear use than 
existed in the 1970's.
A successful reprogramming attack in a counter silo role, however, 
requires overcoming the debris from previous nuclear detonations. To 
avoid this interference, the timing of each RV's arrival is very 
important. Unless CEP's were better than .018 nautical miles, those RV's
106 John F. McCarthy, Jr., "The Case for the B-l Bomber,"
International Security 1 (Fall 1976), p. 82.
107 John M. Collins and Anthony Cordesman, Balance of Power:
Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strengths, p. 71. There are also two modes
of launch, one of which takes less time but may not have its INS fully 
realigned; therefore, it would be less accurate. See Desmond Ball,
Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, p. 27.
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arriving a few minutes after the initial explosions would encounter
sufficient debris to cause significant errors in accuracy or even
1 ORdestruction of the incoming warhead. uo One way to gain more time to 
conduct a more precise counter silo attack is to decapitate the Soviet 
command and control system. This study excludes, for example, the lethal 
Pershing II that in Soviet eyes could strike Moscow in only a few minutes, 
rendering the Soviet system incapacitated for about the length of time it 
would take an ICBM to reach the Soviet U n i o n . T o  a Soviet planner, the 
fast and accurate Pershing II would therefore probably be considered a 
strategic system that had a direct impact on the strategic correlation of 
nuclear forces. In general, the faster and more accurate weapon systems 
of the 1980's give American decision makers more flexibility to strike the 
Soviet Union's nuclear power.
To augment even more an attacker's flexibility and to further 
complicate the defender's problem, SSBN's can approach the Soviet Union 
from any direction in order to maximize accuracy and reduce the warning 
time of an attack. The closer to the Soviet Union that an SSBN operates, 
however, the greater the risk that Soviet ASW forces will detect it.^^ 
To account for this increased risk, this study subtracted .05 from the 
survivability of those SSBN's operating relatively close to Soviet 
territory. What makes this increased risk worthwhile is the ability to
108 This is known as fratricide: one's own detonations destroy one's 
subsequent warheads that must travel through the nuclear cloud. John D. 
Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, "Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance 
Between Prudence and Paranoia," International Security 1 (Summer 1976), p. 
160.
109 Michael Forster, "Strategie des ersten Schlages Nach Dem Aufbau 
eines Systems der Raketenabwehr," European Military Science (February
1986), p. 71.
Joel S. Wit, "American SLBM: Counterforce Options and
Strategic Implications," pp. 172-173.
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fire certain SLBM's against targets at distances significantly less than 
the maximum range. Since the CEP is measured at maximum range from a 
fixed point, the accuracy will be better when the missile strikes targets 
at shortened ranges. SLBM accuracy is a product of missile accuracy (CEP) 
and SSBN navigation error (E) , as follows
SLBM CEP = r^ EP) + E2 
R
where r is the distance from the SSBN to the centre of the target and R is
the total range of the missile. In this study some United States SLBM's
have been targeted at reduced ranges to increase their hard target kill 
119potential. American SLBM's have also been targeted in their usual role
which is to destroy bomber and SSBN bases quickly and to create corridors 
for subsequent bomber penetration.
Another potential requirement calling for rapid delivery of warheads 
is the notion of "pin down." By using a series of high altitude
detonations over ICBM fields at 10-15 minute intervals the EMP generated
1 1 O
can possibly prevent ICBM's from being successfully launched. ■LJ Because 
it takes about five minutes for a Soviet ICBM to leave the atmosphere and 
because the missile and its guidance system are highly susceptible to 
electro-magnetic induction damage, it is possible to prevent successful
Desmond Ball, "The Counterforce Potential of American SLBM
Systems," Journal of Peace Research 14 (No. 1, 1977). pp. 30-31.
P^2 This use was limited to Poseidon and Trident systems. See
Annex E for adjusted CEP's.
1 1 O
Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear
Age. p. 61.
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launch with It may, therefore, be possible to use SSBN's close to
Soviet coasts to deliver "pin down" attacks on Soviet missile fields which 
could significantly reduce the time available for the Soviet leaders to 
launch their ICBM's and avoid a launch under attack situation. This "pin 
down" need last only until the incoming ICBM RV's strike their targets; 
non-manoeuvering warheads are not susceptible to EMP related damage and 
nuclear detonations at altitude raise no debris. It is possible that such 
an attack strategy could significantly degrade the Soviet response. This 
option would not have made practical sense in the 1970's because most 
SLBM's carried one warhead, and a "pin down" strategy would disarm the 
United States faster than the Soviet Union. But in the 1980's, more 
survivable SSBN's with multiple warheads, when coupled with hard target 
kill capable ICBM's, does give the United States a far more effective 
damage limiting capability.
The counter silo potential of United States strategic missiles is 
true damage limitation; it is "the ability to destroy enemy offensive 
weapons before they can be fired and thus diminish retaliatory damage.
The United States clearly prefers prompt counterforce capability as the 
best option for the United States strategic nuclear force structure.
In the correlation of nuclear forces model, the one obvious deficiency 
that appeared in the United States force structure is that after a 
counterforce exchange, the only nuclear forces remaining are not capable 
of prompt hard target kill. Nuclear reserves or withholds from an initial
Francis P. Hoeber, Slow to Take Offence: Bombers. Cruise
Missiles and Prudent Deterrence, p. 22.
Donald M. Snow, Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American
Policy in the 1980's. p. 213.
1 1 f i-1-0 See Congressional Budget Office, Counterforce Issues for the 
United States Strategic Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1978). 
This document endorsed counterforce in spite of its greater cost.
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nuclear exchange can play a significant role in the subsequent war or
bargaining process. This need was recognized in the Nixon
administration; however, the force structure to fully implement it is not
yet in place. Nation Security Decision Memorandum 242 stated a need for
strategic reserves that would be important for "protection and coercion"
118during and after major nuclear conflict. x
The impact of the modernization of the United States strategic 
nuclear forces has been to increase greatly the flexibility and range of 
American strategic options in 1986 over those available in 1970. Although 
this is reflected to a degree in the correlation of nuclear forces model, 
the Soviet Union has expanded its flexibility as well. From 1970 to 1975 
the United States held a clear advantage in nuclear forces, and the Soviet 
Union's position would actually deteriorate markedly if it launched a 
counterforce strike on the United S t a t e s . I n  fact, until 1978, the 
United States' correlation would improve after a Soviet first strike, but 
from 1975 on the trend has been in the Soviet favour. This is primarily 
due to Soviet survivability measures and the relative lack of United 
States hard target kill capability, especially in the residuals from the 
first strike. From 1980 onwards, the improvements to the United States 
force structure have resulted in the C-l curve peaking and then moving 
slowly in favour of the United States.
The dynamic elements of United States force structure include many 
variables that together have assisted the American leadership of 1980 in 
reversing the increasing Soviet advantage in the correlation of nuclear
See Michael D. Intriligator, "The Debate Over Missile Strategy: 
Targets and Rates of Fire," p. 1152.
Desmond Ball, Targeting For Strategic Deterrence, p. 35.
See Chart 1. Line C-2 shows the correlation of nuclear forces 
results after a Soviet first strike. (Below unity is U.S. Advantage).
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forces. The key elements, however, have been prompt hard target kill 
capability and targeting flexibility that will significantly enhance war 
fighting capabilities and "constitute a highly visible symbol of power and 
intent."120 This focus on counterforce is not new and has been a central 
part of each war plan or SIOP since the 1950' s .121 In spite of 
considerable rhetoric that all of this capability is necessary to deter 
the Soviet Union, the fact remains that if one is going to shoot at 
missiles, one is talking about first strike capability.122 The capability 
to destroy hard targets on a time sensitive basis and increased real 
nuclear options appears to better fit the intent of the compellent 
paradigm.
Future developments planned by the United States include more MX, 
Midgetman, Trident II, SDI, "stealth" bombers and sea launched cruise 
missiles (SLCM's) all of which will enhance the United States nuclear 
force structure in the correlation of nuclear forces model. Trident II 
will especially provide a secure and flexible hard target kill vehicle 
that will be capable of destroying Soviet ICBM's within 15 minutes of 
launch from virtually any direction.123 Land attack SLCM's will also have 
a hard target kill capability and will be almost totally unverifiable from 
an arms control perspective. 12^ Midgetman will also be capable of hard
120 Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: 
Deterrence Policies and Procurement Issues, p. xii. The citation 
referred to nuclear weapons required to support a strategy of "essential 
equivalence."
121 Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, p. 4.
122 Robert McNamara, cited in Henry L. Trewhitt, McNamara: His 
Ordeal in the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 115.
123 See Robert S. Norris, "Counterforce at Sea: The Trident 2 
Missile," Arms Control Today (September 1985).
124- John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance. 1980-1985. p. 58.
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target kill, and the MX warhead, already very lethal, is upgradable from 
300 to 475 Kt giving it even greater lethality. 125 jf sdj research
results in the United States deploying even a partially effective shield 
against RV's aimed at counterforce targets, it could significantly 
contribute to the survivability of American ICBM's and may even provide 
some protection for bomber bases. Force structure improvements to United 
States strategic nuclear weapons appear clearly intended to enhance its 
war fighting posture, and the proclivity in the late 1960's to avoid
producing weapons systems designed to achieve strategic advantage has been 
reversed.-*-^ Although increased deterrence will be one result of these 
proposed changes, enhanced compellent capabilities may well be the prime 
result.
V. FORCE STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS
The correlation of nuclear forces model provides a useful adjunct to 
the paradigmatic framework and allows deeper analysis of force postures.
Not only can it provide a more meaningful comparison of nuclear forces,
but it allows for greater analysis of arms control implications for
various arms control proposals. The United States force structure has 
undergone significant improvement from 1970 to 1986, but the C-l line on 
Chart 1 indicates that it lagged improvements in the Soviet Union.
In the early 1970's, however, the development of new United States
strategic systems was relatively slow, possibly because the United States
held a significant correlation of nuclear forces advantage. The
125 Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin and Milton M. Hoenig, 
Nuclear Weapons Databook: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities. Vol. 1.
p. 126.
126 Edward Luttwak, "Strategic - Nuclear Parity Versus the Military 
Priorities of the Reagan Administration," in Keith A. Dunn and William 0. 
Staudenmaier, eds., Alternative Military Strategies for the Future, p. 154.
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quantitative analysis in particular brings out a gradual decline in most 
static indicators that display a certain American satisfaction or 
complacency with the status of their intercontinental nuclear arsenal. 
This does not mean, however, that qualitative or dynamic improvements did 
not happen, only that their implementation did not appear to keep pace 
with those occurring on the Soviet side.
The mid to late 1970's saw the correlation of nuclear forces baseline 
move steadily from a position of relative American advantage to a position 
showing a clear Soviet advantage. Although little immediate change took 
place among the quantitative indicators, significant improvements began 
among the qualitative and dynamic measures. The most significant 
improvements were in ICBM hardening, improved accuracy in missile guidance 
systems and improved ability to rapidly re-target or re-select options. 
The dip in the C-l trend line in 1981 and 1982 reflects the introduction 
of the Mark 12A warhead and the NS-20 guidance system on the Minuteman 3. 
By 1983 the Soviets had achieved an almost 3 to 1 advantage in the 
correlation of nuclear forces baseline, a reversal from the 2 to 1 
advantage that the United States held in 1970.127
In the 1980's the United States was clearly moving to rectify their 
deteriorating strategic position. During this period, virtually every 
indicator of potential strategic power climbed as did the United States 
defence budget. Numbers of nuclear warheads increased almost threefold 
after 1970, accuracy was increased about fourfold after 1970, and 
increased flexibility, reliability, lethability and survivability combined
127 Military officers in the United States were alarmed at these 
shifts and noted the 4 to 1 Soviet advantage in throw weight. See 
testimony of Lieutenant General Thomas Stafford before the Committee on 
Armed Services, United States Senate, Department of Defence Authorization 
for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980. Part 5 (Washington: USGPO, 1979), 
p. 2471.
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to give the United States a significantly greater war fighting posture.
From 1983 to 1988 the trend of the C-l baseline was toward a decreasing
Soviet advantage, and future American strategic programmes make it likely
that this trend will continue at least into the near future.
These recent trends appear to reflect the choice of the United States
to increase its available options to a number significantly greater than
those implied by the deterrent paradigm. They more closely reflect a
desire to take more initiative to ensure the long term well being of the
United States rather than rely on retaliation to protect its national
survival. Clearly, these notions extend beyond the concept of
deterrence toward what one author has described as "dynamic containment"
where strategic nuclear weapons are targeted on Soviet military forces
1 9 Q"wherever the dynamic exchange ratio is substantially positive. " The 
trend in the United States in the 1980's has been toward measuring the 
security of the West by its freedom to conduct more vigorous policies 
without fear.-^^ The recent improvements to the United States force
structure appear to be increasingly optimised to the compellent model 
rather than the deterrent.
Since the declaratory policy of the United States remains essentially 
one of deterrence, a force structure designed to optimize compellence begs 
an explanation. The obvious conclusion reached by John Collins is that
1-2® See Carl. H. Builder, A Conceptual Framework for a National 
Strategy on Nuclear Arms (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation R-
2598-AF, 1980), p. 8. Builder's conceptualization of strategy parallels
that of compellence. Nuclear weapons are useful for more than just deterrence.
1-29 Max Singer, "Dynamic Containment," in Aaron Wildavsky, ed. , 
Beyond Containment: Alternative American Policies Toward the Soviet
Union (San Francisco, California: Institute for Contemporary Studies,
1983), p. 197.
d v. Anderson, Peace is War (Toronto: Lerna Press, 1987), p. 
360. This right wing book lives up to its title.
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declaratory policy is different from operational nuclear policy.
De.smond Ball also reaches this conclusion, noting that debates on nuclear
strategy are often hampered by the failure to differentiate between
the substance of action policy... from the rhetoric of
declaratory policy which is generally designed for a
variety of strategic and bureaucratic-political purposes
sometimes quite unrelated to the demands of extant action 
1 19policy. ■LJ^
Desmond Ball traces the separation of United States action and declaratory 
policies to 1963 when Defence Secretary McNamara began to use strategic 
do>ctrine as a weapon in "intramural bureaucratic battles over military
1 9 0
programmes, defence and service budgets." J-“>J Since that time, various 
SIOP's and Nuclear Weapons Employment Policies (NUWEP's) have constantly 
maintained a counter military targeting philosophy while "public officials 
have learned to talk in public only about deterrence and city attacks."134 
Assured destruction had no real impact on SIOP design. For thirty years, 
"American operational strategy has been heavily dedicated to 
counterforce," at least as much as the capability of United States 
strategic nuclear assets would permit. 133 It may also be true that for 
major powers, a degree of strategic uncertainty is an advantage, and 
therefore operational and declaratory nuclear policies may "seldom
131 John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance. 1980-1985. p. 60.
132 Desmond Ball, "Toward a Critique of Strategic Nuclear 
Targeting," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds. , Strategic 
Nuclear Targeting (London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 18.
133 Desmond Ball, "The Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983," in 
Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting, p. 
68. This is a well researched article.
13^ Ibid.. p. 70.
133 Colin Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American
Experience. p. 133.
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coincide."136
This analysis of United States force structure reinforces the view 
that operational nuclear strategic forces have been based on military 
realities of war fighting rather than political requirements for assured 
destruction.
Force structures should reflect military realities, and it 
is thus unwise to encourage the view that much can be read 
into them by way of underlying political objectives.1^
United States intercontinental nuclear forces have been improved
significantly to increase the United States flexibility to respond
forcefully in many diverse situations.
The additions to the American strategic inventory from 1970 to 1986 
have provided a force structure that appears to be in a qualitative 
competition with the Soviet Union. The United States forces, both in 
existence and planned, have an operational capability well in excess of 
that required for deterrence. If these strategic forces have been 
designed to support a strategy, that strategy would more closely resemble 
the theoretical requirements called for by the compellent paradigm.
1-^ Desmond Ball, "Counterforce Targeting: How New? How Viable?"
In Robert Travis Scott, ed. , The Race for Security: Arms and Arms
Control in the Reagan Years (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 122.
137 Lawrence Freedman, Strategic Defence in the Nuclear Age, p. 6.
The author intended to indicate that military force structures do not
necessarily determine policy, but if the military "reality" does require 
nuclear warfighting capability, then the deterrent policy it is designed 
to support more closely resembles the compellent paradigm than the
deterrent, at least in its logic.
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Chapter Eight 
THE NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION
The previous chapter introduced the correlation of nuclear forces 
model and then applied it to the United States nuclear force structure for 
central war. Since this model is essentially a Soviet concept, its 
utility in demonstrating how Soviet nuclear analysts might approach the 
nuclear question is also extremely important. Not only can this model 
help indicate the paradigmatic logic behind the Soviet long range nuclear 
force structure, but it can also provide additional insight into how 
Soviet decision-makers might understand nuclear strategy and its utility 
to support Soviet foreign policy.
This chapter begins with an explanation of the significance of this 
Soviet perspective to Western analysts. Following this explanation, the 
chapter continues the paradigmatic force structure analysis by focusing on 
the quantitative, qualitative and dynamic variables incorporated into the 
correlation of nuclear forces model.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CORRELATION OF NUCLEAR FORCES MODEL
Since most nuclear analysts in the West have had limited experience 
with the Soviet Union and were not able to translate those few Soviet 
sources that became available in the West, Western views of Soviet 
nuclear strategy tended to be somewhat diverse and even controversial. 
Thus, the correlation of nuclear forces model, since it is a Soviet model, 
offers a unique insight into Soviet nuclear thinking. As the modern 
Soviet nuclear force structure was for the most part built in the late 
1970's, given the time required to implement major construction projects, 
this strategic development probably had its roots in decisions taken in
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the late 1960's.^ With the complexity of modern weapons it is common to 
take about ten years from a decision to proceed until force structure 
implementation. Thus, the fact that this model was published in 1967 
makes it a very appropriate indicator of strategic thought in the Soviet 
Union when at least some key decisions were made. The correlation of 
nuclear forces model as presented in this study appears to be a 
particularly useful tool for analyzing the construction of Soviet nuclear 
forces in the 1970-1986 time p e r i o d . ^
According to a respected expert, Marxist-Leninist ideology holds that 
historical progress is governed by discoverable and permanent laws, the
O
pursuit of which equates to knowledge. Thus, it follows that certain 
laws must exist that determine the outcome of war. In fact, Soviet 
formulations of the laws of war are a major endeavour on the part of 
several Soviet scholars, but in spite of their efforts over the years they 
have yet to complete a coherent system to explain and account for war.^ 
Nevertheless, several iterations of the laws of war have been produced, 
the latest of which makes very specific reference to the correlation of 
military forces as follows:
1 Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 235. By use of "wave" 
theory of tracing Soviet decisions, MccGwire convincingly identifies some 
key Soviet strategic decisions which took place about December 1966.
O
 ^ Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov were key individuals who 
believed in the military component of the correlation of forces as a major 
factor in Soviet foreign policy. See Charles Gati, "Eastern Europe on its 
own," Foreign Affairs 68 (No 1, 1989), p. 103, and David Holloway,
"Gorbachev's New Thinking," Foreign Affairs 68 (No. 1, 1989), p. 67.
O
Julian Lider, The Political and Military Laws of War: An Analysis
of Marxist-Leninist Concepts (London: Saxon House, 1979), p. v. See also 
William P. Baxter, "Soviet Perceptions of the Laws of War," in Graham D. 
Vernon, ed. , Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defence University Press, 1981), p. 17.
^ Julian Lider, The Political and Military Laws of War: An Analysis
of Marxist-Leninist Concepts, p. 206.
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Victory and defeat in war and its length and final results 
are defined by the relative power of the armed forces and 
the mobilization potential of the warring sides.
The correlation of forces appears to be a fundamental concept that 
underpinned the creation of Soviet military force structure. Although the 
military was technically only one facet of the total correlation of world 
forces, during the Brezhnev era it was probably the most important 
variable.^ Any change in Soviet military power was held to create a 
change in the correlation of world forces that, in the Soviet view, must 
have an effect on or even alter world events. As a consequence of this 
belief, Soviet leaders probably felt that gains could be won without the 
use of force and that the availability of military power would be crucial 
to those "victories. This line of argument implied a strong Soviet 
conviction that a positive shift in the correlation of military forces 
would be of fundamental importance because "military power confers
Q
political advantage."0
It logically follows that the concept of the correlation of military
Law of War 5 in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia cited in William 
P. Baxter, "Soviet Perceptions of the Laws of War," p. 22.
 ^ Julian Lider, Military Force: An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist
Concepts (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants: Gower Publishing Company, 1981), 
p. 208. For the view that military force is the single most important
factor, see Michael J. Deane, "Soviet Perceptions of the Military Factor 
in the Correlation of World Forces," in Donald C. Daniel, ed. 
International Perceptions of the Superpower Military Balance (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. 88.
 ^ Roger E. Kanet and David R. Kempton, "Global Correlation of
Forces," in Ray S. Cline, James Arnold Miller and Roger E. Kanet, eds., 
Western Europe in Soviet Global Strategy (London: Westview Press, 1987), 
p. 93. See also Robert Levgold, "Military Power in International
Politics: Soviet Doctrine on its Centrality and Instrumentality," in Uwe
Nerlich, The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition over Europe
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 129- 
130.
® R. W. Barnett, "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Navy," in
Kenneth M. Currie and Gregory Varhall, eds., The Soviet Union: What Lies
Ahead? (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1984), p. 585.
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forces gave the Soviet military an important ideological tool with which
to justify fairly open ended force structure requests to Soviet leaders.
Given the Soviet strategic inferiority with respect to the United States
prior to the Soviet achievement of parity, Soviet military analysis
appeared extremely concerned with the detailed planning of a nuclear war.^
If the correlation of forces concept had any specific part 
to play in the postwar development of strategic thought, 
it was in assessing the overall strategic relationship in 
favour of the United States and providing the Soviets with 
an overriding goal: the immediate rectification of their
strategic weakness.^
The key problem for Soviet leaders in defining the necessary force
structure is the fact that the correlation of forces can change extremely
fast, depending on who strikes first.^ Notwithstanding the limitations
and difficulties in such analysis, there appears little doubt that in the
Soviet Union, the correlation of forces concept has at least influenced,
1 O
if not determined, the present nuclear force structure. *■
As noted in the preceding chapter, the correlation of nuclear forces 
modelling allows a scientific basis for strategic decision making that
 ^ Julian Lider, The Political and Military Laws of War: An Analysis
of Marxist-Leninist Concepts, p. 208.
Richard E. Porter, "Correlation of Forces: Revolutionary Legacy,"
Air University Review 28 (March/April 1977), p. 29.
^  Stephan A. Tyushkevich, "The Methodology for the Correlation of 
Forces in War," in Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber, eds., 
Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973 (Washington: USGPO,
1983), p. 65.
1 9 Post 1986, however, it has become evident that Gorbachev believes 
that increased Soviet military power has also increased American fears as 
to their security. Vyacheslav Dashichev, a Soviet historian, notes that 
the Soviet Union erred by relying so heavily on correlation of forces 
analysis. See David Halloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," p. 68.
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provides a means of objective analysis that has assisted the Soviet Union 
to manage its strategic affairs with appropriate prudence.H Even 
Khrushchev insisted, one must "always calculate, calculate, calculate" to 
ensure success.^ In conducting these force calculations in the modern 
Soviet military, a great deal of emphasis is placed on operational 
research. Not only does every significant Soviet institution that studies 
military practice, including the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations, conduct its own computer analysis, but all major 
Soviet military academies and colleges have their own operational 
research sections.^
Increasingly, Western observers have come to attribute greater import 
to the Soviet views with respect to nuclear use. The correlation of 
nuclear forces model is a fundamentally important means to help ascertain 
true Soviet objectives. Soviet literature has repeatedly acknowledged that 
if central nuclear war occurs, it will not be caused by mechanistic 
instabilities in force structure, but "rather from real and enduring 
differences between competing political systems and national interests." 
Soviet nuclear force structure has been developed for reasons only clear
H  The correlation of forces model can be used for detailed nuclear 
mission planning. B. Khabarov, et al. "Methodology for Determining the 
Correlation of Nuclear Forces," translated and reprinted in Selected 
Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973. Vol. 5, Part 1 (Washington: 
USGPO, 1982), p. 240. See also James Sherr, Soviet Power: The Continuing
Challenge (London: MacMillan Press, 1987), p. 170.
1^ Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War (New York: Crane Russak,
1982), p. 378.
Alexei Arbatov, "START: Good, Bad or Neutral," Survival
(July/August 1989), p. 296. See also John Erickson, "Soviet Military 
Operational Research: Objectives and Methods," Strategic Review 5 (Spring
1977), pp. 69-70.
16 Richart Burt, "Arms Control and Soviet Strategic Forces: The
Risks of Asking SALT to do Too Much," The Washington Review 1 (January
1978), p. 22.
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to the Soviet leadership, but to a degree these decisions have probably 
been based on detailed correlation of forces analysis. The use of a 
Soviet correlation of nuclear forces model thus allows this study to 
present a unique Soviet view of what the West calls the nuclear balance.
II. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES - QUANTITATIVE FACTORS
The paradigmatic analysis of the Soviet nuclear force structure from 
1970-1986 reflects the same methodology and mathematical models used in 
chapter seven. ^  This section will address the quantitative factors while 
subsequent sections will deal with the qualitative and dynamic attributes 
of the Soviet nuclear forces.
The first level of the paradigmatic framework, the quantitative 
analysis, not only includes the same static indicators as those used to 
assess the United States nuclear force structure, but some mention must 
also be made of the Soviet efforts to create strategic defences. This 
section therefore will analyze the number of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles (SNDV's), the number of nuclear warheads or reentry vehicles, the 
equivalent megatonnage values for Soviet intercontinental forces and a 
static measurement of Soviet strategic defence efforts.
In the Soviet Union, it is likely that quantitative analysis may have 
more impact due to the fact that the ground forces, with their emphasis on 
mass, are so predominant. This influence is evident in the key Soviet 
military academies to the degree that John Erickson, a highly respected 
analyst of the Soviet military, concludes that the ground forces have had 
"a persistent influence on Soviet military policy and organization."-^ To
^  See Annex A for a review of the methodology used throughout this 
s tudy.
John Erickson, "The Ground Forces in Soviet Military Policy," 
Strategic Review 6 (Winter 1978), p. 78.
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the ground forces, numbers matter perhaps more so than in the other 
services , and thus it is reasonable to expect that the numbers of 
intercontinental nuclear systems may tend to be higher than in the United 
States.
From the years 1970 to 1986 the Soviet total of SNDV's increased from
1686 to 2541 although most of this growth occurred by 1976 when the Soviet
force structure appeared to level off.l^ Of this SNDV total, the Soviet
bomber force contribution has increased only slightly over the period
while the SLBM force increased markedly from 1970 to 1978 and since that
time has more or less levelled off. The main component of the Soviet
strategic nuclear forces remains its ICBM's; these forces increased from
only 400 ICBM's in 1964 to over 1600 ICBM's in 1976, but have since
90stabilized at about 1400 ICBM's in 1978. u Although at one time as many 
as 240 ICBM's may have had targets in China or in Europe, many of these 
could have been available for intercontinental use, especially in the 
1980's when the SS-20 could have covered these targets.21 Some ICBM's not 
intended for intercontinental use may, however, partially be offset by 
Soviet efforts at nuclear force reconstruction in the event of war.
Some Soviet ICBM's use cold launch procedures which create less 
damage to the launching silo, thereby allowing the silo to be re-used in 
about two days. Extra ICBM's have been stocked in the USSR, and the 
United States Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) considers that these
1^ See Annex H for details on SNDV deployments for the Soviet Union.
20 See Myron J. Smith, The Soviet Air and Strategic Rocket Forces. 
1939-1980 (Oxford: Clio Press, 1981), p. xxiv.
21 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American Soviet
Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
1985), pp. 873-875.
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99"hidden reserves" are at a significant level. Senior American officials
are convinced that the Soviet Union has a reload capability which allows
9 ^a degree of nuclear force reconstitution. J There is some concern in the
West that Soviet strategic reserves (at sea and on land) could be crucial
to the determination of a victor in war."^ Most Soviet analysts indeed
recognize the operational requirement for strategic reserves, but realize
that the outcome of nuclear war will depend primarily on the available
9 Sforces at the beginning of the war. Since no quantitative data is
available, this study deals only with those forces available for combat 
in operational units.
If the number of Soviet SNDV's has leveled off somewhat after 1976, 
the total number of intercontinental capable warheads has not. From 1970 
to 1986 the total number of warheads the Soviet Union could use against 
the United States has increased by a factor of six, from 1686 to 10,139.26 
From the years 1976 to 1986 they have increased by a factor of three. To 
some degree the Soviet force planners must have realized that to stay in 
strategic competition with the United States, at least in terms of SNDV's, 
the minimum size of the Soviet response was "pretty well dictated by the
22 Soviet Military Power. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985), p. 28.
For the DIA assessment see Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. , The Soviet Defence 
Enigma: Estimating Costs and Burdens (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987), p. 5.
23 See Dean Rusk's comments in Michael Charlton, From Deterrence to 
Defence: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 12.
2^ R. W. Barnett, "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy," 
in Kenneth M. Currie and Gregory Varhall, eds., The Soviet Union: What
Lies Ahead?. p. 581.
23 Y. E. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics
(Moscow: Ministry of Defence Publishing House, 1972) translated and
published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, pp. 89-92.
26 See Annex J. Soviet Warhead Totals.
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U.S. programmes which levelled out at fixed ceilings by the mid- 
1960 's."27 Thus it may be that Soviet leaders viewed the American 
cdecision to deploy MIRV, before the Soviet Union could establish numerical 
equivalence in ICBM's, as a deliberate escalation of the strategic arms
O O
race. ° In any event, the first Soviet MIRV tests took place in 1973, and 
ithe first Soviet MIRV operational deployments began in 1975 and continued 
until 1986.29 This massive MIRV programme more than any other factor 
accounts for the sharp rise in warheads throughout this period, as first 
ICBM's and then SLBM's were converted to MIRV systems. The number of 
warheads available to the strategic bomber force also appears to have 
increased over this period as additional bombs, air to surface missiles,
on
and cruise missiles were quietly introduced. w
This substantial increase in nuclear strategic warheads appears for 
the most part the result of Soviet funding decisions taken either prior to 
or during this period. From 1968 to 1978 Soviet funding to strategic 
programmes increased about threefold. Since that time, however, Soviet
military spending has levelled off and major programmes appear to have
27 Thomas W. Wolfe, The Global Strategic Perspective from Moscow
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-4978, 1973), pp. 7-8.
2® Harland B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity: The United
States and the Strategic Arms Race (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1973), p. 293.
29 Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American Soviet
Relations from Nixon to Reagan, p. 793.
See data in Annex J. The main source is John M. Collins, U. S. - 
Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985. p. 180, and by the same author, 
Imbalance of Power: An Analysis of Shifting U.S .-Soviet Military
Strengths. p. 59. Average bomb loads were used in this study. See 
Phillip A. Petersen, Soviet Air Power and the Pursuit of New Military
Options (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1978), p. 24, and Kenneth R. Whiting,
Soviet Air Power (London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 108.
William T. Lee, Soviet Defence Expenditures in an Era of SALT
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Report 79-1, 1979), p. 5.
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been "stretched out" over longer time periods. The fact that the
numbers of strategic warheads steadily increased reflected the continuing 
and cost effective MIRV installation that demonstrated a continuing Soviet 
priority on central nuclear systems. Another important and often 
overlooked facet of Soviet strategic resource allocation is that which is 
spent on strategic defence. At least one informed analyst has determined 
that from 1970 to 1985, the Soviet Union has spent about as much on 
defence as on offence.^
The next major quantitative variable used to measure strategic 
nuclear forces is the summation of Equivalent Megatonnage (EMT). From 
1970 to 1986 the Soviet Union increased its EMT total by about 250 
percent, adding more firepower in every year but one. ^  The ability to 
put several MIRV's on the larger Soviet ICBM's allowed Soviet totals to 
grow throughout this period and helps explain the Soviet military's
o c
unwillingness to negotiate large Soviet ICBM's in SALT. As the scope of 
the Soviet ability to translate its significant throw weight advantage 
into greater numbers of warheads and higher EMT totals became apparent in 
the late 1970's, those that criticized throw weight as a meaningless value
O fl
seemed to lose some influence. D During the period 1970 to 1986 it
Richard F. Kaufman, "Causes of the Slowdown in Soviet Defence," 
Survival (July/August 1985), p. 181.
^  Paul Nitze, SDI: The Soviet Programme. Current Policy No. 717
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 28 June, 1985), p. 1.
See Annex K. The exception was 1980-1981 when EMT totals 
declined slightly, primarily due to the MIRVing of ICBM's with lower yield 
warheads.
Paul Nitze cited in Michael Charlton, From Deterrence to Defence: 
The Inside Story of Strategic Policy, p. 67.
o rr
The Committee on the Present Danger made much use of these facts 
to discredit the idea that throw weights did not matter. For one critic 
of throw weight see Les Aspin, "How to Look at the Soviet American 
Balance," Foreign Policy 22 (Spring 1976), p. 103.
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appeared as if steady Soviet efforts were dedicated to increasing the
Soviet EMT totals.
The last quantitative variable relates to strategic defence of the 
Soviet Union from American nuclear attack. Although ballistic missile 
defence deployment is regulated by treaty, within the Soviet military and 
political community there has not been any significant questioning of the 
theoretical desirability of missile defence. ^  If the Soviets did accept 
assured destruction logic, one would have expected the Soviet Union to 
have quickly built to an assured destruction level and then stopped
O Q
building warheads, let alone defences. Since the Soviet Union had an
assured ability to destroy the United States in 1970 and still continued 
massive force structure improvements into the 1980's, it appears that 
assured destruction in itself did not motivate this build up. This fact, 
along with the considerable ambiguity over the degree of Soviet commitment 
to strategic defences, raised serious concerns in the West over Soviet
long term intentions. The continued Soviet emphasis on strategic 
defences, active and passive, throughout this period seems to indicate
that mutual assured destruction was not necessarily the most valued
o q
product of Soviet strategy. v
Although strategic defence against nuclear attack is an extremely
^  Michael J. Deane, Strategic Defence in Soviet Strategy (Miami: 
Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980), p. 107. See also William 
T. Lee, Rationale Underlying Soviet Strategic Forces (Washington, D.C.: 
Stanford Research Institute, 1969), p. 22.
O Q
Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 120.
oq
For an assessment of Soviet ballistic missile defence efforts see 
testimony of Dr. Robert Cooper, Director of the Defence Advanced Research 
Project Agency before the Committee on Armed Services, United States 
Senate, Department of Defence Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985 
(Washington: USGPO, 1984), p. 2974. See also George Kolt, "The Soviet
Civil Defence Programme," Strategic Review 5 (Spring 1977), p. 54.
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difficult objective to achieve, the USSR has seemingly devoted 
considerable efforts to that end.^® Soviet programmes to protect the 
essential elements for the preservation of their system and major 
industrial dispersion to reduce strategic vulnerability attest to Soviet 
seriousness.^ While Soviet active missile defences may not have overtly 
exceeded treaty limits, the United States fears that the Soviet Union has 
given about 2000 SA-5 surface to air missiles a limited ABM capability in 
the 1980's.^ When all these efforts are combined with improvements in 
radars and more capable ABM missiles, a picture appears of a general 
improvement in Soviet strategic defence from 1970 to 1986. Soviet 
journals display three levels of strategic defence: exoatmospheric,
endoatmospheric and point defence.^ Slowly but surely, a comprehensive 
Soviet strategic defence system has been improved to achieve this end. 
Operational research data shows the impracticality of defending the whole 
country but does demonstrate the feasibility of successful point 
defence.^ From data of this ilk, it appears that Soviet defences are
^  Fred Ikle suggests that the uncertainties of nuclear attack and 
defence are so great that it is not really possible to predict under what 
circumstances a nation might survive. See his "Nether World of Nuclear 
Megatonnage," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 1975), pp. 20-25.
Leon Goure, War Survival in Soviet Strategy--USSR Civil Defence 
(Miami, Florida: University of Miami Centre for Advanced International
Studies, 1976), p. 138.
^  Admiral Elmo Zumwalt in testimony before the Committee on 
Appropriations, United States Senate, SALT 2 Violations. 28 March 1984 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1984), pp. 68-69.
^  David S. Yost, "Strategic Defences in Soviet Doctrine and Force 
Posture," in Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter and David S. Yost, Swords 
and Shields: NATO, the USSR and New Choices for Long Range Offence and
Defence (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 125.
^  Gordon MacDonald, Jack Ruina and Mark Balaschak, "Soviet 
Strategic Air Defence," in Richard K. Betts, ed. , Cruise Missiles: 
Technology. Strategy. Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1981), pp. 78-79.
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being gradually optimized to provide at least some protection for point 
targets from strategic attack.
The measure of Soviet quantitative factors tends to show a stable 
number of SNDV's by the mid 1970's, but significant improvements to those 
systems have steadily increased the numbers of warheads and EMT totals 
throughout this period. The steady growth in the number of warheads and 
total EMT have occurred in spite of reduced growth in military funding. 
When taken in conjunction with a possible bias toward strategic defence, 
this growth appears to exhibit the quantitative characteristics of 
compellence.
III. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES - QUALITATIVE FACTORS
From 1970 to 1986, not only did the Soviet leaders increase their
quantitative measures of strategic power, but they also pursued
qualitative improvements. Increasingly over the period, Moscow perceived
that upgrading the quality of Soviet weapon systems was a critical factor
in determining the correlation of forces.^
Now that the quality of weapons is assuming increasing 
significance, it is becoming more difficult to determine 
the correlation of forces on the basis of traditional 
quantitative calculations alone. The role of technology 
is growing steadily and the interdependence of the 
qualitative and quantitative factors is becoming more 
complex. Therefore, it is the analysis of the qualitative 
aspect which is increasingly coming to the fore in 
calculating the correlation of forces. °
The qualitative factors that make a long range nuclear delivery system
more effective include improving the availability, the reliability, the
^  Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Soviet Theatre 
Strategy: Implications for NATO (Washington, D.C.: United States
Strategic Institute, 1978), p. 5.
A C
D. M. Proektor, "Qualitative Aspect of Forces Stressed," Novove 
Vremva. 18 March 1977 reprinted in FBIS, Soviet Union, 22 March 1977, pp. 
AAl-2.
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accuracy, the precision, the yield, the penetration ability, the hardness 
and the survivability of each individual weapon. During the period 1970 
to 1986, the Soviet leaders appeared to have taken a rather systemic 
approach to the introduction of new technology that included coping with 
its impact on force development where a continual dialectic process takes 
place between science and the political-military leadership. ^  This 
longer term view helps to explain the steady improvements to the 
qualitative variables in Soviet nuclear force posture during this period 
of analysis.
1. Overall Availability and Reliability
The availability of Soviet nuclear forces in peacetime is generally 
felt to be lower than that of the United States. Early Soviet liquid fuel 
ICBM's were so unstable that they were not routinely held on alert and 
took a great deal of time to generate due to the fueling process. Early 
Soviet missiles also lacked strong enough ball bearings to allow the 
guidance system to be run continuously and maintain i£s alignments, a 
requirement for ICBM's on alert status.^ Very few bombers, if any, 
appear to be held on peacetime alert status and only about 15% of Soviet
^  Phillip A. Petersen, "The Modernization of the Soviet Armed 
Forces," NATO's Sixteen Nations 31 (July 1986), p. 32. For a view that 
science is driving technological developments not the military, see V. M. 
Bondarenko's comments cited in Jerry F. Hough, "The Historical Legacy of 
Soviet Weapons Development," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds. , 
Soviet Decision Making for National Security (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1984), pp. 108-109.
^  See Annex M for data on Soviet ballistic missiles. This annex 
summarizes the key variables that will be addressed in this section.
^  Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: 
Requirements and Responses. p. 88. This issue became a significant factor 
in the United States decision to reduce trade with the Soviet Union. It 
was claimed that the Soviet Union had imported this technology from the West.
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S&BN's are at sea at any given time.^O The low levels of peacetime alert 
nuiclear forces, however, probably reflect the Soviet view of how such a 
war might start rather than any serious shortcomings in wartime 
availability. The Soviet Union appears to consider that nuclear war, if 
it occurs at all, will be the result of a serious political crisis or a 
conventional war. In a generated condition, this study assumes that about 
100% of Soviet ICBM's are available, 80% of SSBN's are at sea and that 80% 
of strategic bombers are on alert status.
The second major qualitative aspect is the overall reliability (OAR), 
the probability that a given weapon system and its nuclear warhead will 
perform as designed. Due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate data on 
Soviet intercontinental nuclear systems, Western assessments of Soviet 
reliabilities are quite variable. Earlier Soviet missiles such as the 
SS-7 and SS-8 were assessed as having reliabilities that averaged about .6 
by the early 1970's. The SS-9 and subsequent ICBM's appeared to have 
increasingly better OAR's as Soviet engineers improved their products.
By the 1980's, Soviet ballistic missile reliabilities appeared to have 
reached a level comparable to the United States, and this improvement was 
reflected in actual missile tests in the USSR. The SS-18 had only seven
See William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear 
Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), p. 41. But some other SSBN's 
probably remain on alert status.
Barton Wright, World Weapon Database: Volume 1. Soviet Missiles
(Toronto: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 200-291. This study reviews the
literature and provides reliability data reported in various sources. The 
reliabilities of Soviet ballistic missiles vary from .2 to .95.
Edward Luttwak The US-USSR Nuclear Weapons Balance (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1974), p. 58. A
reliability of .6 means that a given system will be 60% reliable.
C O
For example the SS-9 was given an OAR of .76 by Lynn E. Davis and 
Warner R. Schilling, "All you ever wanted to know about MIRV and ICBM 
Calculations But were not Cleared to Ask," p. 233.
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failures in its first 29 test flights, and the SS-19 had only two failures 
out of 27 tests. The relatively modern family of SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 
ICBM's are thought to be highly reliable and not suffer from serious 
availability problems associated with earlier systems. The United States 
Department of Defence reportedly considers these ICBM's to be .8 to .85 
reliable.
This study has selected OAR's for Soviet intercontinental nuclear 
delivery systems based on average projected improvements over time. The 
OAR's for ICBM's range from .6 for the SS-7 to .85 for the more recent 
modifications on the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19. The OAR for SLBM's is
slightly lower than those for ICBM's due to the added variable of SSBN 
reliability. The Soviet long range aviation forces are assessed as having 
an overall system reliability of .7/. 8 for the Bear/Bison bombers 
including all warheads, missiles and the aircraft.
2. Lethality
The variables of accuracy, precision and yield combine to make up the 
lethality or counter military potential (K) of a given system against hard 
targets. Annex M indicates that the K value for certain Soviet ICBM's has 
been consistently high throughout this period of analysis, but the total 
ncmber of hard target capable systems has significantly increased.
As early as 1962, the USSR appeared to begin a project aimed at 
acquiring a highly accurate missile force to destroy United States ICBM's
Barry R. Schneider, Colin Gray and Keith Payne, Missiles for the 
Nineties: ICBM's and Strategic Policy, p. 122.
Andrew Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine
(lew York: Random House, 1983), p. 198.
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on the g r o u n d . B e c a u s e  missile accuracies were poor, the SS-9 was 
probably built large enough to carry a sufficiently large warhead so that 
its yield/accuracy combination would guarantee a hard target kill 
capability. ^  By the time the United States began to harden its ICBM 
silos beyond 300 PSI such that the SS-9 kill probability became 
significantly reduced, the Soviet Union began testing more accurate 
missiles. It appeared that the Soviet Union was making a determined 
effort to construct and maintain a hard target kill strategic capability. 
From 1975 to 1984 a series of improved ICBM's entered the Soviet nuclear 
force structure, each with an improved CEP over its immediate
co
predecessor. Although United States intelligence may have overestimated 
the Soviet accuracy in some years, ^  the overall accuracy improvements to 
Soviet ICBM's indicates a conscious drive on the part of Soviet military 
leaders to increase the lethality of their intercontinental weapons.
As Soviet ICBM's began to carry MIRV's, the average yield per warhead 
became smaller. Although the total megatonnage was reduced with smaller 
warheads, this was more than offset by the accuracy improvements such that
The SS-9. See John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: 
Concepts and Capabilities. 1960-1980 (Washington, D.C. : McGraw Hill,
1980), p. 118. See also John Van Oudenaren, Deterrence. Warfighting and 
Soviet Military Doctrine. Adelphi Paper 210 (London: International
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 28.
-*7 Ian Bellany, "More Arithmetic of Deterrence: Throw Weight,
Radioactivity and Limited Nuclear War," RUSI Journal (June 1979), p. 37. 
Design contracts for the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 were let in 1966. Both 
the SS-18 and SS-19 were designed to destroy hard targets. See Rolf 
Engel, a leading German missile expert, "The SS-18 Weapon System," and 
"The SS-19 Weapon System," Military Technology 13 (March 1989) and (June 
1989), pp. 112-114 and p. 77.
Some solid researach by Donald Mackenzie concludes that greater 
accuracy has been a deliberate Soviet goal, "Soviet Union and Strategic 
Missile Guidance," International Security (Fall 1989), p. 45.
Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic 
Threat. 2nd edition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1986), p . xx.
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overall lethality increased. By 1983, about 80% of warheads on ICBM's
appeared designed for counterforce applications, and the remainder
appeared tailored for attacking soft targets.^  The Soviet ICBM force
clearly reflected the tendency of Soviet nuclear strategy toward war
fighting that fueled hawkish fears over Soviet intentions.
Soviet nuclear targeting strategy is consistent with the 
Soviet objective to fight and win a nuclear war. This 
strategy rejects all premises of U.S. assured destruction 
targeting and most of the premises of U.S. countervalue 
targeting strategies. 61-
Overall, the Soviet Union has increased its nuclear force lethality 
by striving for accuracy improvements, even if at the expense of yield. 
Early during this period, the intensity and scope of the SS-18 and SS-19 
testing raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might have in mind 
the use of its strategic arsenal for purposes other than for deterrence.^  
Towards the close of this period, the Soviet Union began MIRVing SLBM's, 
and although accuracy and lethality have increased, Soviet SLBM's are not 
yet hard target capable. Beginning in 1984, the Soviet Union has also 
deployed air launched cruise missiles on its new Bear H bombers, giving 
its bomber force a renewed flexibility in its ability to strike accurately 
the United States.
The Soviet Union appears to have pursued a minimum level of lethality 
as a principle objective in its nuclear force development. As targets 
increased in hardness, the lethality of Soviet ICBM's increased to 
compensate, and the Soviet Union appears to have dedicated most of its
^  The SS-18 Mod 4 and SS-19 Mod 3 warheads are hard target capable. 
They total 5240 warheads out of 6420. See Annex J.
William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy," in Desmond 
Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting (London: Cornell
University Press, 1986), p. 107.
fi 9 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy 
Since World War II (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 282.
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ICBM warheads to this combat task. These improvements reflect a nuclear 
force structure designed to fight in a flexible and traditional manner.
3. Penetration
To be effective, a given weapon system must be able to penetrate to 
its target. Since the United States has not deployed any significant 
defences, the Soviet ability to penetrate is relatively high. Since the 
withdrawal of Safeguard in the mid-1970's, the United States has had no 
ballistic missile defence beyond strategic warning. Given that Safeguard 
covered so few strategic targets in the United States for such a short 
time, it has been ignored; therefore this study has used a Soviet missile 
penetration factor equal to the missile OAR for the whole period.
To defend against bomber penetration, the United States and Canada 
have formed a combined North American Air Defence system. From 1970 to 
1986, however, this system remained relatively thin and vulnerable to
C O
nuclear attack, an essential component of modern penetration. J According 
to Dr. Bob Brereton, the Director of Air Operational Research, in the 
Operational Research and Analysis Establishment in Ottawa, Soviet bombers 
in such a situation would likely experience a penetration probability of 
95 64 This study has therefore used a flat .95 penetration rate from 
1970 to 1980 when new fighters with pulse dopier radars and airborne 
command and control aircraft began to introduce more defensive 
capability. ^  The Soviet bombers are relatively old and are only
^  James N. Constant, Fundamentals of Strategic Weapons: Offence
and Defence Systems (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 97.
^  Interview: 12 Jan. 88.
^  See Annex F.
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f t  f \beginning to be replaced in the mid 1980's. Eventually, the Bear H and 
the Blackjack, a new high speed long range strategic bomber, will replace 
the current bombers, and ALCM will be their major weapon. ^
The United States has fielded no effective defence against strategic
attack, but in the 1980's it began devoting significant research and
development efforts toward strategic defence. It appears that the United 
States, at least since 1983 when the Strategic Defence Initiative was 
launched, does not regard its defencelessness as a strategic asset. But 
from 1970 to 1986, to all intents and purposes, the Soviet offensive 
nuclear forces enjoyed extremely high penetration rates.
4. Survivability
Because most of the Soviet nuclear force is based on ICBM's, the 
Soviet Union faces the prospect that a greater percentage of its nuclear 
strike force could eventually become vulnerable to attack. In 1970, 80% 
of Soviet EMT was carried by ICBM, and although over this period many more 
SLBM's were added, by 1986, 60% of the Soviet EMT was still mounted on
ICBM's.^ The reasons for this strategic reliance on ICBM's mostly stem 
from the historical development of the Strategic Rocket Forces. It was 
formed from, and still wears the uniform of, elite artillery troops and 
has always enjoyed a special position in the Soviet military with its
^  Soviet sources acknowledge shortcomings in the Bear and Bison 
fleets. See B. A. Vasil'yev, Long Range Missile Equipped (Moscow, 1972) 
translated by DGIS Multilingual Section, Secretary of State Department, 
Ottawa, under the auspices of the U.S.A.F. P. 70 notes the heavy fuel 
consumption, and p. 77 refers to how even tested and reliable equipment 
does not always stand up.
^  David Wragg, The Offensive Weapon: The Strategy of Bombing
(London: Robert Hale, 1986), p. 184.
^  See Annex K. As a percentage of total force in 1970 SLBM's 
comprised less than 10% of the Soviet long range nuclear force, and by 
1986, it made up 25%.
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heavy emphasis on ground forces.^ As discussed in chapter seven, each 
component of the strategic nuclear forces faces a different survivability 
problem, and each Soviet nuclear "leg" will be addressed in turn.
The standard measure of Soviet ICBM ability to survive an attack is 
silo hardness, but determining the hardness of Soviet ICBM silos is 
difficult. Estimates in open sources vary considerably, from the SS-7 
"coffins" which were considered soft targets to super hard silos that 
theoretically could survive up to 50,000 lbs. of o v e r p r e s s u r e.7® No 
specific silo hardening programmes in the Soviet Union have appeared in 
open sources, but over the years each Soviet modification to its ICBM 
fleet often included new silos or other efforts to improve silo hardness.
In the 1960's, for example, most Soviet ICBM's were considered soft
targets, but gradually those missiles were separated and placed in 
hardened silos. By 1970 most Soviet ICBM's were hardened to a level 
estimated to be able to withstand about 300 psi.71 In this study, all of 
the SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM's are considered soft targets even though a small 
number were reportedly placed in silos. The large SS-9 which was being
upgraded in the early 1970's is assessed at 400 psi.72 As the Soviet
Union modernized its ICBM force, new silos were being increasingly 
hardened, and improved SS-11 silos in this study are assessed at about
^  Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the 
USSR, third edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 145.
7® Barton Wright, World Weapon Database: Volume 1. Soviet Missiles, 
pp. 200-222. Testing of scale models Soviet modern silos indicated that 
they could survive 50,000 psi with only moderate damage. See also David 
R. Jones, Soviet Armed Forces Review. Annual (Gulf Breeze, Florida: 
Academic International Press, 1983-1984), p. 100.
71 Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: 
Requirements and Responses. p. 91. See Annex M for the various hardnesses 
used for Soviet ICBM's.
72 Barton Wright, World Weapon Database: Volume 1. Soviet Missiles, 
p. 133.
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1000 psi. In 1975, the fourth generation Soviet ICBM's (SS-17, SS-18, SS- 
19) were being introduced into service, and concurrent with their 
introduction, existing silos were totally replaced by massive 
i m p r o v e m e n t s .73 By 1976, there were reports that these large Soviet silos 
were being upgraded to withstand 3000 p s i , 7^ and by 1985 John Collins 
reported that new Soviet silos could withstand 4000 p s i . 75 By 1986, one 
study reasoned that the USSR was attempting to harden its silos to 5000- 
7000 p s i . 7 6  The United States has openly acknowledged that the Soviet 
silos housing the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are the world's hardest 
operational silos.77 This study has selected hardness values for these 
silos that vary from 2000 psi for the first silos deployed in 1975 to 3000 
psi for the latest modifications in 1983.
These values remain conservative due to the tremendous uncertainty of 
attempting to measure the resistance to a nuclear blast. Not only is it 
extremely difficult to provide a comparable degree of shock protection for 
the ICBM within its hard silo, but the traditional method of SSj^ p 
calculation does not account for nuclear pulse duration, the time that a
73 Roger Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980's (Stanford, 
California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 141.
7^ Ray Bonds, The Soviet War Machine (New York: Chartwell Books, 
1976), p. 210.
75 John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance. 1980-1985. p. 57. 
See also Aviation Week and Space Technology. 16 June 1980, p. 67.
76 William C. Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic Nuclear War: 
What the Superpowers Target and Why (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 
42. See also Doug Richardson, "World Missile Directory," Flight 
International (1 October 1980), p. 35.
77 Soviet Military Power (1987), p. 27. See also Caspar Weinberger, 
statement to the House Committee on Armed Services, Strategic Programmes. 
Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5968 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO,
1982), pp. 83-85.
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given overpressure lasts on a target.78 Both these variables suggest 
that a conservative hardness level is warranted. Although calculations 
based on open source data have tended to produce smaller estimates of 
surviving silos than classified official estimates, this variance is 
mostly attributable to reliability, yield, accuracy and fratricide 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s . 7 9  The key point in this analysis is the inherent physical 
limitation of the capacity to harden a target, which ultimately means that 
a fixed silo will always be vulnerable once the attacking ICBM force can
Of]
achieve the requisite combination of numbers, accuracy and yield.
The Soviet Union has striven to improve its ICBM hardness and 
survivability continuously over the time frame of this study. Not only 
have the silos been progressively hardened, but Soviet leaders have 
invested heavily in providing for the survivability of strategic command,
O 1
control, and communication systems.OJ- Launch control centres in the 
Soviet Union are to a significant degree interconnected so that there is 
high confidence that most of the Soviet ICBM force could be responsive in 
the event of a nuclear a t t a c k . T h i s  study assumes that decapitation
78 Bruce Bennett, How to Assess the Survivability of ICBM's (Santa
Monica, California: Rand Corporation R-2577-FF, 1980), p. 10. To obtain 
more accurate results, a lognormal damage density function can be used, 
but to be meaningful it required very accurate data not generally 
available, even in classified sources. The traditional or "cookie cutter" 
method was described in chapter seven.
79 John D. Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, "Strategic
Vulnerability: The Balance Between Prudence and Paranoia," pp. 145-148.
Fratracide was described in chapter seven.
Of]
Robin Ranger, The Implications of the Possible U.S. Introduction 
of Ballistic Missile Defence into the North American Air Defence System
(Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1981), p. 17.
Soviet Military Power (1987), p. 27.
O O
oz- William C. Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic Nuclear War: 
What the Superpowers Target and Why, p. 197. See also David R. Jones, 
Soviet Armed Forces Review. Annual, p. 95.
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strategy on the part of the United States would render 50% of those ICBM's 
inoperable should its LCC be destroyed. As some LCC's are sited in 
hardened silos, the LCC's are assessed as having the same hardness as the 
ICBM it controls.
Although the Soviet Union does not have a significant amount of its 
nuclear weapons on its bomber force, it appears prepared to increase its 
reliance on bombers in the future. Long range bombers are flexible tools 
of war fighting, but they are expensive to acquire and operate. From 1970 
to 1986 the amount of Soviet EMT carried by bombers has climbed slightly 
from about 11% to 14%. Soviet bombers can only survive if they are on 
alert status and receive adequate warning of attack. Soviet bombers not 
on alert are assumed destroyed on the ground at the few Soviet bomber 
bases. This study has assumed that Soviet bombers have a survivability 
factor of .7 in a generated alert condition.
The survival of Soviet SSBN's represents a far more critical 
component in the correlation of forces model. This study assumes that in 
a fully generated condition, about 80% of Soviet SSBN's can be kept at 
sea. Those in port are vulnerable to strategic attack and are assumed 
destroyed, even though some may be somewhat protected in bases where
0  9
tunnels have been constructed for their concealment and protection. The 
survivability of Soviet SSBN's is a function of several factors, but the 
most important appears to be Soviet naval deployments that appear designed 
to protect their SSBN's against the United States ASW threat.
The Soviet navy regards its SSBN's as its most important strategic 
assets, and since the 1960's the Soviet Navy has contemplated using the
Ray Bonds, The Illustrated Directory of Modern Soviet Weapons 
(New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1986), p. 173. See also Soviet Military 
Power ,p . 28.
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fleet to protect its SSBN f o r c e . T h e s e  SSBN's form an important 
strategic reserve in war, one of the navy's most important national 
defence tasks. Soviet naval policy therefore appears directed at
establishing "bastions" within which these submarines can operate in 
wartime, and the bulk of the Soviet surface fleet has been tasked to 
defend them^^ Major Soviet efforts are required primarily because the 
United States has significant naval advantages, specifically, its free 
access to open oceans and its lead in ASW and submarine technology. 
According to ASW experts, the survivability of Soviet SSBN's is at best 
one-half that of those of the United States.
In the early 1970's all Soviet SSBN's were compelled to transit 
constricted waters controlled by the United States or its allies in order 
to threaten the United States. Not only were these submarines relatively 
noisy, but they were vulnerable to attack for a considerable period of
O O
time prior to reaching a strategic launch position.00 In 1973, however,
The mission of countering U.S. SSBN's and protecting Soviet
SSBN's are top priority according to Michael MccGwire, "Naval Power and 
Soviet Global Strategy," International Security 3 (Spring 1979), pp. 167- 
169. See also R. W. Barnett, "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet 
Navy," p. 592.
Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, Soviet Naval Diplomacy 
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 285. This book is very useful.
^  Michael MccGwire, "The Changing Role of the Soviet Navy,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist (September 1987), pp. 34-39. See also 
Anthony Preston, "U.S. Strategy and ASW," Defence Weekly 6 (29 November, 
1986), p. 1274.
^  Edward Luttwak, The U.S.-USSR Nuclear Weapons Balance, p. 11. 
This is a conservative assessment. See Vice Admiral DeMars testimony in 
hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services, Defence Department 
Authorization and Oversight (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), pp. 79-82.
Vice Admiral DeMars expects a 5 or 6 to 1 kill ratio in favour of the
United States in war (reflects SSN versus SSN combat).
See Annex G, SSBN Survivability. The very low survivability of 
SS-N-4, SS-N-5 and SS-N-6 is attributable to the long SSBN transit period 
through NATO-controlled waters.
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the first long range SS-N-8 equipped SSBN of the DELTA class came into 
Soviet service. From this point on, as more longer range SLBM's joined 
the fleet, Soviet SSBN's could be made more survivable by holding them in 
defended seas close to Soviet coasts.
Anti-submarine warfare capability in the West has advanced steadily 
from 1970 to 1986 and threatens Soviet SSBN's significantly. Soviet 
efforts to increase the survivability of their new SSBN's include building 
faster and quieter designs, degaussing prior to each patrol, coating 
submarine hulls with anechoic tiles to minimize sonar reflections, and 
building double hull SSBN's to reduce damage due to attack. ^  Each 
generation of Soviet SSBN's has been getting more survivable and in some 
respects been catching up to the United States.90
To counter Soviet efforts at enhancing SSBN survivability, American 
SSN's routinely attempt to locate and trail Soviet SSBN's within their 
defended "bastions." Since the Soviets must send their best SSN's to 
attempt to locate and trail United States SSBN's, only their older models 
are available to protect their SSBN's.91 Recently, the United States has 
adopted a "forward strategy" where it would seek to penetrate Soviet 
bastions with surface units including carriers and destroy Soviet nuclear
®9 Donald C. Daniel, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic 
Stability (Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp.
100-102. See comments by William Perry, Carter's undersecretary for 
Defence Research and Engineering. See also David Underwood, "The Eyes and 
Ears of NSA," Canadian Aviation 60 (December 1987), p. 23.
90 Admiral Rickover before Congress, cited in Norman Polmar, "Soviet 
Nuclear Submarines," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 107 (July
1981), pp. 36-37. See also John E. Moore and R. Compton-Hall, Submarine 
Warfare: Today and Tomorrow (London: Michael Joseph, 1986), pp. 151-153.
91 Derek da Cunha, "The Growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's 
Submarine Force," International Defence Review 21 (No. 2, 1988), p. 129.
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Q 9submarines even in a conventional conflict.  ^ To increase SSBN 
survivability against these threats, the Soviet Navy has begun deploying 
SSBN's under the Arctic ice for greater protection of their strategic 
reserves.^ The latest Soviet SSBN has apparently been designed with a 
top structure engineered to facilitate breaking ice to allow it to launch 
its SLBM's from under parts of the ice pack.^
The Soviet Union has pursued every reasonable means of making their 
strategic forces more survivable, but the hardening of ICBM silos and the 
defending of their SSBN's in particular demonstrate a Soviet dedication to 
the enhancement of its nuclear combat effectiveness. These survivability 
measures enhance both deterrent and war fighting aspects of the Soviet 
nuclear force posture.
5. Strategic Defence
Closely linked to the concept of making one's force structure 
survivable is the notion of defending it against direct attack. In 
Anureyev's correlation of nuclear forces model, defences are vital. The 
correlation of nuclear forces can be drastically changed to one's 
advantage "by means of the mass application of nuclear weapons with the 
simultaneous repulsing of a sudden attack by the air-space means of the
Q O
This strategy was announced in December, 1985. See Michio Kaku 
and Daniel Axelrod, To Win A Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans
(London: Zed Books, 1987), p. 311. Even before this announcement, United 
States policy was to attack SSBN's; see James Schlesinger's testimony 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Nuclear 
Arms Reduction Proposals (Washington: USGPO, 1982), p. 82.
^  Carl G. Jacobsen, "The Central Balance in the 1980's - No Longer 
Central," in William Gutteridge, European Security. Nuclear Weapons and 
Public Confidence (London: MacMillan Press, 1982), p. 28.
^  David R. Jones, Soviet Armed Forces Review (1983-1984), p. 167.
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e n e m y . " 9 5  Thus offensive and defensive forces together are essential to 
the achievement of an advantageous correlation of nuclear forces.
From 1970 to 1986 the Soviet Union has slowly but deliberately 
improved its strategic defences. As early as 1955, air defence was 
elevated to a separate branch equal to the three traditional services in 
order to counter the massive United States bomber threat.96 By 1970, the 
USSR had already deployed an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and made 
improvements to it, indicating an unwillingness to allow its security to 
depend solely on the combat value of its offensive forces. 97 These 
defensive forces were part of PVO Strany, the Soviet air defence branch, 
whose mission was "to repel enemy attack from the air and from outer 
space."98 In the early 1970rs the Soviet Union constructed the Tallin 
line across the ballistic missile approaches to Moscow. It was equipped 
with long range high altitude surface to air missiles that were then 
tested 50-60 times in an ABM r o l e . 99 By the 1980's the number of SA-5 
high altitude air defence missiles deployed in the Soviet Union doubled, 
even though the bomber threat at high altitude was significantly reduced.
9^ I. Anureyev, "Determining the Correlation of Forces in Terms of 
Nuclear Weapons," p. 164. See also William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, 
Soviet Military Policy Since World War II. p. 211.
96 J. M. Macintosh, "The Development of Soviet Military Doctrine," 
in Michael Howard, ed. , The Theory and Practice of War (London: Cassell 
and Company, 1965), p. 264.
97 David R. Jones, ed. , The Military-Naval Encyclopedia of Russia 
and the Soviet Union (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 
1978), p. 82.
98 V. Kruchinin, "Contemporary Strategic Theory on the Goals and 
Missions of Armed Conflict," in Selected Readings From Military Thought 
1963-1973. Vol. 5, Part 1 (Washington: USGPO, 1982), p. 9. See also 
Kenneth R. Whiting, Soviet Air Power, p. 141.
99 Carnes Lord, "Taking Soviet Defences Seriously," Washington 
Quarterly 9 (Fall 1986), p. 90. See also Robert Jastrow, "Reagan vs the 
Scientists," Commentary (January 1983), p. 24.
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The defences around Moscow appear designed to protect a significant 
part of European USSR from any form of aerospace attack. This area
encompasses the strategic leadership of the USSR as well as about 300 
ICBM's. 100 The Soviet development of large phased array and other modern 
radars, including the one at Krasnoyarsk that allegedly violates the ABM 
Treaty, has given the Soviet leadership some ability in the 1980's to 
protect this core area from ballistic missile attack from any
direction. 101 Modern surface to air missiles also appear to have some
capability against ballistic reentry vehicles, and it appears evident that 
the USSR is maintaining some form of near term ballistic missile defence 
capability. 102
This study has already introduced a penetration factor that slightly 
degrades United States ballistic missile attack against point targets.
This Soviet ABM capability, however, would likely be far more effective 
against SLBM RV's than against ICBM RV's. The latter, because of their 
speed and reentry angle, tend to be faster, smaller and are often 
accompanied by several penetration aids. SLBM RV's, on the other hand, 
tend to be slower, larger, more rounded and unable to carry as many 
penetration aids, making it easier for ABM systems to track and engage 
them.101 Thus the Soviet defensive force structure, whatever its real
100 Desmond Ball, "Soviet ICBM Deployments," Survival 22 (July/August
1980), p. 168.
101 Geoffrey Manners, "If Krasnoyarsk begins to bleep...," Janes 
Defence Weekly (8 November 1986), p. 1097.
102 William Davis Jr. Asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet Strategic 
Defence Programmes: Implications for Near Term American Deployment 
Options (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. vi.
101 Carnes Lord, "Taking Soviet Defences Seriously," p. 92. Some 
feel that Soviet defences are designed primarily to neutralize the sea 
based component of the U.S. strategic triad. See Jacquelyn K. Davis, et 
al, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defence (Washington: Institute 
for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980), p. 31.
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capability, will probably be more effective against a ragged retaliation, 
primarily from SSBN's than be able to defend against a massive and 
coordinated first strike.
6. The Implications of the Qualitative Analysis
From 1970 to 1986 the Soviet Union has continuously improved the 
quality of its long range nuclear forces. During the early 1970's the 
Soviet Union was still in the process of building its nuclear force 
structure, but significant quantitative improvements in reliability, 
lethality, hardening and strategic defence occurred regularly. Throughout 
the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Soviet leaders improved their 
strategic nuclear force structure each year, making it more accurate, 
flexible and combat capable. The Soviet Union has methodically developed 
and deployed a comprehensive hard target kill capability and an impressive 
damage limiting ability. There can be little doubt that this Soviet force 
structure is primarily designed to fight wars in the traditional sense and 
not simply to retaliate against American urban industrial strength. The 
Soviet Union's strategic force posture appears to reflect a compellent 
approach to qualitative improvements that was designed primarily to 
optimize a Soviet correlation of nuclear forces advantage.
IV. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE - COMBAT UTILITY
While the quantitative and qualitative aspects of Soviet strategic 
nuclear weapons have a bearing on how these various forces will interact 
in actual combat, perhaps the most important variable and the most 
difficult to determine is the operational policy. The dynamic analysis 
helps reveal any differences between operational and declaratory strategy. 
This section will briefly review the methodology used to create the
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requisite data, some important command and control considerations, some 
plausible Soviet combat options and finally describe the major outcomes 
of the correlation of forces model.
This study used the same method of analysis for the Soviet force 
structure as it did for the analysis of the American force structure. 
The more lethal Soviet systems were targeted on the American targets that 
provided the greatest payoff in terms of the correlation of forces 
baseline. 104-
The Soviet force structure in 1970, as demonstrated by the C-l 
correlation of forces baseline, suffered from an obviously inferior 
position. The threat of United States nuclear attack forced the Soviet 
military leadership to place a significant emphasis on their very survival 
in a possible war. During this period of analysis, at least 75 hardened 
shelters for senior Soviet leaders were constructed around Moscow 
a l o n e . 105 Major Soviet efforts were also made to provide a high 
confidence level that the strategic force structure could be controlled in 
war, and to that end nine major headquarters and about 300 launch control 
centers are now highly interconnected. 106 The Soviet Union has also 
provided excellent early warning facilities that enable a launch on 
warning option. One other aspect which the USSR has developed is an anti- 
satellite capability that threatens American "low" reconnaissance
10^ See Chart 2. The C-l line is the same on each chart.
105 Desmond Ball, "Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of 
Nuclear War," in Roman Kolkowitz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, eds., The 
Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, p. 64.
106 William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear 
Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race, pp. 86-88. See also William
C. Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic Nuclear War: What the Superpowers
Target and Why, p. 197.
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satellites.107 This could seriously degrade American attempts to assess 
the damage created by nuclear attack in war.
Given the rapid buildup of Soviet warheads in the 1970's, one assumes 
that in the early 1970's the Soviet force structure was simply not able to 
cover its full array of major potential targets. The primary target, 
according to the commander of the SRF, Marshal Krylov, was the American 
nuclear delivery systems in a prioritized target set as follows:108
1. Nuclear delivery systems (weapons storage/fabrication sites)
2. Armed forces (Military Installations)
3. Military Industries
4. Centres of Politico-Military Administration
To handle this target set, Soviet ICBM's appeared designed for specific 
missions; heavy, medium and light ICBM's were developed.109 The SS-9, the 
first heavy ICBM, and the SS-18, its replacement, were most surely 
intended for counterforce and command structure attacks. In particular, 
the very high yield modifications were probably targeted against the 
command structure.^® To cover all of the critical strategic weapons 
targets in the United States, about 3000 warheads would probably have been 
required.m
107 George Salsky, Disparity in Space Programmes of the Two 
Superpowers (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment,
1981), p. 22.
Cited in William T. Lee, Rationale Underlying Soviet Strategic 
Forces. p. 24. See also Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Theory: An
Additional Source of Insight into its Development (Santa Monica, 
California: Rand Corporation P-3258, 1965), p. 12.
109 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capability and
Political Utility (Washington, D.C.: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 21.
H O  Paul Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, p. 235. 
The SS-9 in the early 1970's had to be used to target command and control 
(LCC's) to degrade American strategic response.
H I  Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal. pp. 78-79. His list of targets excludes 
command and control, military and military industrial targets, but he does 
include specific counter recovery industries.
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The Soviet Union has placed considerable importance on the 
withholding of combat reserves, even in terms of nuclear strategic 
warheads. Since this role falls primarily to the SSBN force, one must
address how it will be used in combat. The Soviet Union does not maintain
two crews per submarine as does the United States, but some SSBN's may be 
on alert in port, probably to enhance their survivability. As the Soviets 
intend to attack American SSBN's in the conventional phase of combat, they 
have undoubtedly attributed a similar strategy to the United States.
One unique aspect of the Soviet SSBN fleet is the possibility that the 
Yankee, with its shorter range SS-N-6 missile, may also have had a counter 
SSBN or counter aircraft carrier role.^^ It is in keeping with Soviet 
conceptualization of war fighting to use nuclear missiles in flexible and 
imaginative ways to accomplish combat related tasks.
In terms of actually conducting a nuclear war plan, very little is
known about Soviet specific intentions. What is clear is that the Soviet
experience in 1941 has fostered the determination never to be caught
ITSunprepared and to seize the initiative as soon as possible. -LJ As a
consequence of this sentiment, the Soviet Union has absolutely no
John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The
Interaction of Theory and Practice (New York: Crane Russak and Co., 1981), 
pp. 27-28.
ITS Donald C. Daniel, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower 
Strategic Stability, p. 154.
Richard T. Ackley, "The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBN's," United 
States Naval Institute Proceedings 104 (June 1978), pp. 34-42. See also 
Carl H. Clawson, "The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBN's - Round Two," United 
States Naval Institute Proceedings 106 (March 1980), pp. 64-71.
T T c
John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military Political
History 1918-1941 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. xix. See 
also S. P. Ivanov, The Initial Period of War (Moscow, 1974) translated and 
published under the auspices of the USAF (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), 
p. 307.
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1 1 fiintention of absorbing a first strike. J--LD Thus Soviet efforts to improve 
their early warning systems and missile alert rates probably reflect a
willingness to launch under attack if not on warning. What interests 
the Soviet military most is being allowed to deliver the first "mass" or 
major nuclear strike, although close reading of the literature reveals
that "mass" nuclear strikes could describe a number as low as 50
I I O
weapons. -LJ-°
The Soviet declaratory strategy has consistently denied the
feasibility of conducting a limited nuclear war, yet the Soviet force
structure may be increasingly designed to fight one. According to one
hard line analyst, this denial is merely a psychological device to
manipulate Western behaviour, since the Soviet nuclear deployments provide
Moscow with a variety of its own "flexible responses. Secretary of
Defence James Schlesinger noted that the Soviet military, in their
exercises, have indicated far greater interest in the notions of
1 9 0controlled nuclear war than has ever been reflected in Soviet doctrine. 
Others have also concluded that Soviet leaders "almost certainly envision
Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War, p. 376.
Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces:
Requirements and Responses, p. 68. See also David R. Jones, Soviet Armed 
Forces Review, p. 100.
Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Conventional War and 
Escalation: The Soviet View (New York: Crane and Russak, 1981), p. 43.
Richard Pipes, Survival is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and
America's Future (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 66.
■*-20 James Schlesinger, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe and U.S.-USSR 
Strategic Doctrines and Policies. Hearings before the Subcommittee on U.S. 
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad and the Subcommittee on Arms
Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, (Washington: USGPO, 1974), p. 183.
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the conduct of limited nuclear operations. 121 Operational strategy 
appears to contradict declaratory strategy in this case.
The rationale for this dichotomy probably relates to the overall
Soviet objective of deterring Western first use of nuclear weapons in
Europe. If this were the case, Soviet declaratory policy and Soviet
action policy would seek the same objective: military and political
199advantage in Europe. ^  A solid analysis indicates that the Soviet 
leaders realized that stalemate at the global nuclear level means that war 
can be realistically confined to "lower levels of intensity."123 ^
the Soviet interest to maximize the value of its conventional advantage by 
accepting no first use and by confining any war to a level below the 
nuclear threshold. 12^ In short, the Soviet planners do not intend to 
engage the United States where the United States is stronger, in the more 
flexible realm of nuclear war fighting, but they must plan to be able to 
fight such a war and survive should it be forced upon them.
The Soviet nuclear strategic force structure thus contradicts the 
Soviet declaratory strategy of not seeking military advantage or 
superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. Rather, it implies that the 
USSR is deliberately seeking the ability to disarm the United States, or 
at least it gives the Soviet Union the ability to have the last move in
121 Notra Trulock, "Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear Warfare," 
in Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter and David S. Yost, Swords and 
Shields: NATO, the USSR, and New Choices for Long Range Offence and 
Defence. p . 76 .
122 Dennis M. Gormley and Douglas M. Hart, "Soviet Views on 
Escalation," The Washington Review (Fall 1984), p. 81.
12^ John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock, "Soviet 
Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," Washington
Quarterly 9 (Fall 1986), p. 126. This is a very useful article.
12^ Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Has Soviet Nuclear Strategy Changed?", in 
Roman Kolkowicz, ed. The Logic of Nuclear Terror (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1987), p. 218.
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any limited nuclear exchange since only they can retain effective 
strategic reserves. ^ 5  <phe Soviet emphasis on military offensive and 
defensive hardware is complemented by its emphasis on civil defence that
1 9 f iexposes school children to its principles as early as the second grade.
The Soviet Union, through the quantitative and qualitative 
improvement of its nuclear force posture, has achieved a very balanced and 
robust war fighting capability. Such information as is freely available 
on the Soviet forces indicates that the USSR is able to field modern 
equipment as fast as the United States. It is thus plausible to expect 
that the USSR in the 1980's has built a reprogramming and retargeting 
capability into its missile force. In the early 1970's, the Soviet Union 
had a poor correlation of nuclear forces and could not even improve it 
with a nuclear first strike; the American forces were too strong.127 gy 
1979, however, the new ICBM's gave the Soviet Union an advantage after 
such a strike. From 1979 to 1986 the Soviet Union managed to increase its 
C-2 advantage, primarily due to qualitative improvements in Soviet 
offensive and defensive forces. As the Soviet Union deployed greater 
numbers of land mobile ICBM's, it remained competitive with improvements 
in United States strategic systems. The effort to maintain the combat 
capability of the Soviet nuclear forces implied a determination on the 
part of the Soviet military leadership to maintain at least the objective
*1 OO
possibility of achieving some success in war. *-
125 Victor Utgoff, "In Defence of Counterforce," International 
Security 6 (Spring 1982), p. 58.
126 Herbert Goldhammer, The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military 
Management at the Troop Level (London: Leo Cooper, 1975), p. 75.
127 See Chart 1.
128 n . V. Ogarkhov, "Military Strategy," in Harriet Fast Scott and 
William F. Scott, eds., The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine. Strategy. 
Tactics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 247.
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V. FORCE STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Soviet correlation of nuclear forces model is particularly
illuminating when viewed from the Soviet perspective. The graphic
portrayal in Charts 1 and 2 of the relative nuclear force posture
development provides a clear rationale for the massive Soviet force
construction that took place in the 1970's and early 1980's.
In the early 1970's, the Soviet disadvantage was far greater than
reflected by static indicators, and this fact helps account for the
magnitude of new Soviet nuclear construction. The Soviet Union was
undoubtedly trying to improve an evidently unsatisfactory correlation of
nuclear forces. The mid 1970 's saw the Soviet Union catch up in
quantitative terms. However, the post Soviet first strike correlation of
nuclear forces was still not to the Soviet advantage.
By the late 1970's the qualitative improvements to the Soviet nuclear
force posture were sufficient to finally give the Soviet Union a
correlation of nuclear forces advantage both before and after a Soviet
first strike. Additional warheads and improvements in ICBM lethality and
hardening were the key factors that provided the Soviet leaders with an
almost 3 to 1 correlation of nuclear forces advantage by 1983, a
significant improvement from the 1 to 2 disadvantage in 1970. There
appears no doubt that the Soviet leaders aspired to achieve this
1 9Qimprovement in the nuclear correlation of forces. To them the earlier
American nuclear construction probably indicated a desire on the part of 
the United States to develop capabilities well beyond those needed for
The Soviet decision-making system is set up to ensure the 
application of political judgement to technical issues. See Mathew P. 
Gallagher and Karl F. Speilman Jr., Soviet Decision-Making for Defence: A 
Critique of the U.S. Perspective on the Arms Race (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1972), p. 79.
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deterrence by punishment.130 The Soviet strategic elite had never thought 
that a situation of mutual deterrence through the threat of assured
1 o-i
destruction was "the highest theoretical achievement.
That is not to say that the Soviet leadership intend war, far from 
it. The Soviet leaders have no desire for war unless it can permanently 
advance their interests without significant risk, and in the nuclear age 
the risk is simply unacceptable.132 Yet, the Soviet ideological framework 
admits that an antagonistic class relationship could spark war due to 
fundamental political conflict. Should war ever occur, the Soviet Union 
requires an ability to protect its revolutionary gains in all possible 
conditions. Consequently, for most of this period, the Soviet system has 
sought powerful military forces that reduced the risk of attack and,
perhaps more importantly, provided coercive leverage by shifting the 
correlation of forces toward the USSR.133 The Soviet Union therefore 
constructed an impressive nuclear force structure that gave it a 
substantial ability to fight and a possible chance, however remote, to 
survive and recover from nuclear war.-*-^ There is ample evidence that the 
Soviet political leadership authorized the military to pursue a damage
130 John Erickson, "The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General 
Survey," Survival 24 (November/December 1982), p. 249.
131 Henry Trofimenko, "Counterforce: Illusion of a Panacea,"
International Security 5 (Spring 1981), p. 35.
132 George F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American
Relations in the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 129.
133 gy i9g6f however, the correlation of forces appears to have been
implicitly downgraded by Gorbachev's emphasis on interdependence. For a 
good analysis, see Stephen Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament: 
Explorations in Soviet Ideology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 
pp. 70-71.
13^ William R. Van Cleave, "The Requirement for and Purpose of Quick 
Fixes to American Strategic Nuclear Forces," in William R. Van Cleave and 
W. Scott Thompson, eds., Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What
Can be Done (New York: National Strategy Information Centre, 1979), p. 3.
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limiting strategy, combining strategic offence with passive and active
I O C
defence.
Since Brezhnev altered Soviet declaratory policy in 1977,3-36 Soviet 
action policy, at least until 1986, appeared to have remained the same. 
Although force structure changes take several years to implement when 
additions are needed, deletions from force structure can happen more 
quickly. Between 1977 and 1986, however, Soviet force structure continued 
to grow, if at a decreasing rate. There was no hard evidence among 
visible Soviet force structure decisions that indicated any significant 
change in operational policy. The Soviet long term objectives appeared to 
be the same as those stipulated in the 1928 Five Year Plan, to achieve 
"quantitative and qualitative technological superiority. "137 ^ey
barriers to achieving these goals included financial constraints and the 
determination of the United States to compete.
From 1970 to 1986 Soviet nuclear force planners have manifested a 
consistency that can be readily explained by the correlation of nuclear 
forces model. The quantitative competition has been limited by agreement 
with the United States, but qualitative competition has not. The Soviet 
Union has developed forces well in excess of those required for 
deterrence; the Soviet nuclear force structure is fully capable of 
supporting compellent as well as deterrent threats.
■*-35 Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Strategic Programmes and the U.S. 
SDI," Survival 27 (November/December 1985), p. 278.
■*-36 Leonid Brezhnev, Peace. Detente and Soviet American Relations 
(London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), p. 190.
■*-37 John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The
Interaction of Theory and Practice, p. 28.
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Chapter Nine 
THE CORRELATION OF SUPERPOWER NUCLEAR FORCES
In the previous two chapters the actual nuclear force structure of 
each superpower has been analyzed in isolation to determine to what degree 
nuclear procurement and force structure reflect paradigmatic models or 
match declaratory policy. What complicates the analysis of military 
policy, however, is the degree to which the opponent's strategic actions 
create perceptions and reactions that highlight the dynamic nature of 
strength comparisons. How this dynamic reaction would result in an actual 
outcome in war is a tremendous intellectual challenge which the 
correlation of nuclear forces model approximates in a very rudimentary 
fashion. Even though the military aspect is the most quantifiable factor 
of the correlation of forces, its calculations are only meaningful as a 
rough order of magnitude indication of potential advantage.-*- This 
chapter compares the Soviet and American trends in nuclear force 
structure during the 1970-1986 period, and then analyzes them from the 
paradigmatic perspectives of deterrence and compellence.
I. COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES - SOVIET TRENDS
To a perceptible degree the nuclear strategy of each superpower 
appears to have been at least influenced by that of its major rival. 
Certainly both the United States and the Soviet Union very carefully 
monitor the trends evidenced by each other's nuclear construction 
programmes, and advocates of specific policies seem prepared to use these 
trends to aid in achieving their objectives in internal political
Julian Lider, Military Force: An Analysis of Marxist Leninist
Concepts (Westmead, Farnborough: Gower Publishing, 1981), p. 215.
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struggles. This section will examine those trends highlighted by the 
correlation of nuclear forces model.
1. Strategic Intentions
While each superpower appears to have changed its declaratory 
strategic intentions over time, the results of the correlation of forces 
model do not fully reflect these changes. Rather, in both the Soviet 
Union and the United States the results of nuclear force structure 
analysis demonstrate strong continuity in force development. As a 
consequence, each superpower has sufficient evidence to support the belief 
in at least some quarters that the other's "real" strategic intentions are 
not reflected by its declaratory policy. Confidence in using declaratory 
policy as a guide to interpreting nuclear strategy is thereby reduced.
The United States political elite has always had serious reservations 
about Soviet intentions. President Kennedy expressed concern that "Soviet 
missile power" would provide the Soviet Union with a shield behind which 
it could intensify pressure on the free world through "Sputnik" 
d i p l o m a c y .  ^  Such rhetoric inherently assumes that the Soviet Union 
continually seeks, through a variety of means, to expand its circle of 
'friendly' regimes. Given this underlying political objective often 
ascribed to the Soviet Union, it is not unreasonable that at least some 
American leaders tend to link this political goal to the expanding
O
capability displayed in Soviet military force structure. To explain 
Soviet military doctrine, which is primarily a political doctrine, the
 ^ Cited in Michael Charlton, From Deterrence to Defence: The Inside
Story of Strategic Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1987), p. 38.
O
J Christopher D. Jones, "Just Wars and Unlimited Wars," World 
Politics 28 (October 1975), p. 59.
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more 'hawkish' United States leaders, in particular, have pointed to the 
growing Soviet nuclear force structure.^ Although this link is considered 
tenuous by some, it is nevertheless apparent that a strong segment of the 
United States leadership is suspicious of actual Soviet intentions.
The Soviet Union appears equally suspicious that 'real' American 
objectives include something beyond deterrence. That suspicion can hardly 
be alleviated by important official documents such as the 1957 Gaither 
Committee report (declassified in 1973), which recommended negotiating 
from strength with the Soviet Union.^ A significant segment of the Soviet 
hierarchy still appears convinced that the United States has not abandoned
f.~
its goal of world leadership. For Soviet analysts, the American 
political elite has aggressive global political and economic interests 
that influence United States foreign policy and require substantial 
military backing.^ These interests play an important part in determining 
perceptions of resolve, but they are perceived to have a distinct anti- 
Soviet bias.^ In this context, United States force structure improvements
^ Soviet discussions of nuclear war fighting are really in the realm 
of "theory of military art," part of the subfield of "military science" 
which is one component of military doctrine. See Christopher D. Jones, 
"Soviet Military Doctrine: The Political Dimension," in William Kincaide
and Jeffery D. Porro, eds., Negotiating Security (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1979), p. 114.
Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: 
USGPO, 1976), p. 24 or p. 13 in the original.
 ^ Colonel General G.V. Sredin, "The Problems of War and Peace 
Today," The Soviet Review 24 (Summer 1983), p. 10. See also Sh. 
Sanakoyev, "The World Today: Problem of the Correlation of Forces,"
International Affairs 11 (1974), p. 45.
 ^ Timur Dmitrichev, "Today's Realities and the Nuclear Deterrence 
Doctrine," International Affairs (No. 5, 1986), p. 63. Even Gorbachev at 
the 27th party congress took a firm anti-West line. See Zhores Medvedev, 
Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1986), p. 247.
® Sh. Sanakoyev, "The Revolutionary Renewal of the World and the 
Militaristic Policy of Imperialism," International Affairs (No. 5, 1985),
p. 120.
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and especially the Reagan administration's efforts to strengthen strategic 
forces take on more sinister overtones, at least from the Soviet 
perspective.
Mutual suspiciousness thus marks the superpower attitudes toward 
their opponent's declaratory nuclear strategy, fueled to a large degree by 
each other's intelligence assessments of the other's nuclear force 
construction. Determining real superpower strategic intentions then may 
hinge on the degree to which the nuclear force postures are really 
responsive to political direction or to what degree military bureaucracy 
can actually influence that direction.
2. The Use of Threats
The dynamic of explicit or implicit nuclear threats provides the link 
between a declared strategy and the actual force structure. A state's use 
of nuclear threats signifies a certain belief in the utility of nuclear 
strategic military forces to support foreign policy. One very good review 
of past nuclear threats indicates a trend toward more general rather than 
specific threats, but those that were considered most seriously were 
specifically designed to coerce another state.^ That same study, however, 
also concluded that the impact of nuclear threats has been consistently 
misinterpreted by bureaucratic elites who have consequently tended to 
overvalue their effects.-^
From the military perspective, for a threat to have any credibility 
it must be capable of implementation with a reasonable chance of success. 
Once engaged in combat, however, the military has its own special needs
 ^ Morton H. Halperin, Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of
Nuclear Strategy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 
1987), see chapter two, pp. 23-47.
10 Ibid.
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affecting implementation options and cannot be simply the "neutral
executor of diplomatic policy" that some theory prescribes.H  Military
forces therefore place considerable emphasis on obtaining the requisite
resources from their political systems often to the point of overstating
1 9their requirements.  ^ Since the dominant weapons of the age are offensive
missiles, a dangerous situation may well be exacerbated by military
1 ^efforts to enhance offensive nuclear force structures. J Military forces 
in each superpower place a high value on flexible systems which contribute 
to the war fighting potential of their country.
While most nuclear threats were made at a time of nuclear or conven­
tional advantage in a specific area, Carter's threat to use force in the 
Persian Gulf area in 1980 was an exception. The Soviet leaders reacted 
harshly to the "brainless" threats to use any means to control the
Persian Gulf.^ The American fundamental policy objective in the region
was to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and to 
make the Soviet Union "pay" for this "brutal" i n v a s i o n . T h e  Soviet
reaction to this threat may have been as strong as it was in part because 
they perceived the military correlation of forces in the region to have
^  Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited 
War," International Security 7 (Fall 1982), pp. 112-113.
12 See David Packard, "A Quest for Excellence," Final Report to the 
President by The Presidents Blue Ribbon Commission on Defence Management 
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), p. xxiii.
George H. Quester, Offence and Defence in the International
System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), p. 213.
1^ Leonid Brezhnev, cited in Albert Wohlstetter, "Meeting the Threat 
In the Persian Gulf," Survey 25 (Spring 1980), p. 139.
15 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign
Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 389.
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1 f \been much to their advantage. °
The Soviet military have been able to construct an impressive force
structure that could support a flexible range of threats. Kissinger
noted that this flexibility gave the Soviet Union an advantage in that it
had more military options and could force the United States into the
position of initiating the destruction of civilian targets. ^  This
flexibility gave the Soviet leaders the option to respond to limited
American attacks in a parallel fashion or to threaten intercontinental
exchanges in the hope of deterring the United States or NATO from resort-
1 8ing to nuclear weapons during a conventional war.
To support foreign policy with credible forces that could back 
potential threats, both superpowers have steadily improved the accuracy 
and survivability of their nuclear weapons as well as their ability to 
penetrate to proposed targets. Military forces can probably be expected 
to demand a force structure consonant with the compellent paradigm as long 
as their leaders task them to support their state's global policy.
3. The Correlation of Nuclear Forces
The efforts of each superpower to improve the combat effectiveness of 
its strategic nuclear systems provide an indication of a competition to 
achieve a more favourable correlation of nuclear forces. These trends 
imply a belief by superpower elites that "military force can be used for
^  The events in this era may have also prompted the Soviet Union to 
reconsider its military strategy of launching a major offensive into 
Europe at the onset of war. See Michael MccGwire, "Rethinking War: The
Soviet and European Security," The Brookings Review (Spring 1989), p. 7.
See Michael Charlton, From Deterrence to Defence: The Inside
Story of Strategic Policy, p. 54.
Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Soviet Strategic Doctrine and Limited 
Nuclear Operations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 25 (June 1975), p. 
336.
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coercive purposes in ways that the countervailing threat of massive city 
attack is totally incapable of counteracting."^ This section will 
examine those trends in nuclear force structure development that indicate 
that each superpower has a growing propensity to measure the value of its 
nuclear forces by its ability to engage successfully in combat.
Major indications of this competition surfaced very early in the 
1970-1986 period. Melvin Laird, the United States Secretary of Defence, 
declared that if the new SS-9 follow-on had accurate MIRV's, the utility 
of the United States Minuteman force would be virtually nil by the late 
1970s.20 Not only did the Soviet Union deploy accurate MIRV's on the SS- 
18, but Soviet leaders also upgraded other ICBM's and SLBM's in 
significant ways that indicated a conscious determination to maximize a 
strategic advantage.21 This competition also extends to the attempts of 
each side to trail SSBN's with SSN's, a competition in which the United 
States appears to hold a significant edge. Although the Soviets 
invariably attempt to trail each American SSBN as it leaves its home port 
to conduct a patrol, the Soviet Navy apparently "has never successfully 
tracked a United States submarine"; the United States however is 
approaching the capability to track Soviet submarines and even bottle them 
up at crucial choke points.22 The oft expressed concerns over strategic 
stability that permeated the early 1970s are no longer heard in the 1980s,
1^ Amoretta M. and Francis P. Hoeber, The Fallacies of Sherman's 
Arguments Against Counter Force. Unpublished paper (June 1975), p. 3.
20 Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Deterrence in the MIRV Era," World Politics 
24 (January 1972), p. 225.
21 Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 31.
22 This point may have been somewhat overstated by the physicists, 
Michio Kaku and Daniel Axlerod, in their biased but interesting book, To 
Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans (London: Zed Books, 
1987), p. 311.
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and SSBN's appear to have become acceptable targets early in any conflict.
Another important aspect of the strategic competition is that of 
strategic defences. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have 
conducted extensive research in strategic defence technologies 
notwithstanding the agreement to limit the deployment of strategic 
defences. While most deployed defences in the 1970-1986 time frame in the 
Soviet Union were directed primarily toward the United States bombers, the 
United States has continually sought some form of effective defence 
against Soviet ICBM's. It is worth noting that each superpower has 
emphasized defences to counter the opponent's strategic system that 
threatens to deliver the greatest amount of megatonage and thus can be 
explained as a means to enhance its correlation of forces ratio.23
The Soviet Union continues to view strategic defence as a means of 
seizing the strategic initiative, not unlike what occurred during the 1941 
Battle for Moscow.^ This same concept applies to modern strategic 
defence which would initially not be capable of assuring survival under
all conditions, but could provide one power the ability to survive a
9 Sragged retaliation after its own first strike. J Such an intermediate
level of ballistic missile defence would probably favour the Soviet Union
9 fibecause of its advantage in hard target capable RV's. a If United States 
defences, however, could be made more effective than Soviet defences, then
23 Robert York, Does Strategic Defence Breed Offence? (London: 
University Press of America, 1987), p. 35.
2^ Stephen R. Covington, The Role of Defence in Soviet Military 
Thinking (Sandhurst: Soviet Studies Research Center, 1987), p. 68.
23 Glenn A. Kent and Randall J. DeValk, Strategic Defences and the 
Transition to Assured Survival (Santa Monica, California: Rand
Corporation, R-3369-AF, 1986), pp. v-viii
26 Ibid.. pp. 11-12. See also Warner R. Schilling, "U.S. Strategic 
Nuclear Concepts in the 1970's: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent
Countervailing Parity," International Security 6 (Fall 1981), p. 72.
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the Soviet strategic problem could be significantly worsened. For
example, a 50% effective American defence against ballistic missiles in
the 1990s could possibly degrade the correlation of nuclear forces to less
than unity.27 Such a result would seriously undermine Soviet objectives
and probably render Soviet war plans operationally i n e f f e c t i v e .28
Consequently, even though the Soviet Union is actively engaged in defence
research and may even have a lead in deployed systems, the United States'
SDI programme in the 1980s has become symbolic of a fundamental challenge
that involves the political, economic, industrial, scientific,
9 Qtechnological, and military potentials of the superpowers. ^
Perhaps the most frequently used method of comparing the strategic 
balance is to determine the probable results after an international 
strategic exchange. In chapters seven and eight the correlation of 
nuclear forces baseline was compared to what would occur if either
superpower launched an unanswered first strike, acknowledging that
on
initiators of wars tend to emerge victorious more often than not. u In 
today's reality, however, neither side can risk being caught by surprise 
and a true reflection of relative combat utility may be the changed
O 1
correlation of nuclear forces after a nuclear exchange. Chart three
27 Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Strategic Programmes and the U.S. SDI,"
Survival 27 (November/December 1985), p. 284. See also Chart 3.
28 Colin S. Gray, "SDI's Effects on East-West Relations," in Dorinda
G. Dallmeyer, The Strategic Defence Initiative: New Perspectives on
Deterrence (London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 86.
29 Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Strategic Programmes and the U.S. SDI,"
p. 290.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New York: Yale University 
Press, 1981), p. 22.
I. Anureyev, "Determining the Correlation of Forces in Terms of 
Nuclear Weapons," Vovennava Mysi 6 (June 1967), in Selected Readings from 
Military Thought. 1963-1973: Studies in Communist Affairs. Vol. 5. Part 1
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982), p. 166. For a critique of American
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demonstrates the trend in the residual correlation of nuclear forces in 
the event of a mutual exchange using the previously described exchange 
model. It is apparent that the Soviet Union was at a serious disadvantage 
prior to 1978 when the correlation sharply changed to its advantage, an 
edge lasting until 1981 when the effects of the Mark 12A warhead and Ohio 
SSBN's are noted. This chart clearly supports the contention that the 
Soviet Union methodically constructed a combat effective ICBM force during 
the period of detente in the 1970's probably with the express purpose of 
enhancing their prospective outcomes in a nuclear exchange.
Even though the overall correlation of nuclear forces ratio still 
remains in favour of the Soviet Union, the impact of the United States 
strategic modernization programme in the 1980s can also be clearly seen on 
chart three. In spite of any possible advantage, however, neither the 
Soviet Union nor the United States military are keen to be in a 
retaliatory mode, and a major feature of modern strategic systems is that
O O
they are continuously programmed for first strikes.  ^ Thus the pressure
to launch on warning or launch under attack to minimize one's disadvantage
would be extremely high; otherwise the correlation of nuclear forces could
be adversely affected. The trends in each superpower to improve the
quality of their strategic forces implies that
each is striving with incredible resources to cut holes in 
the security blanket of the other, to produce more bombs 
of greater accuracy which would permit a preemptive first
exchange model assessments see Garry D. Brewer and Bruce G. Blair, "War 
Games and National Security with a Grain of SALT," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 35 (June 1979), pp. 20-21.
Daniel Ford, The Button: The Nuclear Trigger - Does It Work?
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 240. See also Thomas C.
Schelling, "Confidence in Crisis," International Security 8 (Spring 1984), 
p . 65.
Raymond L. Garthoff, Perspectives on the Strategic Balance 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 10.
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strike, despite pious foreswearing of such an objective by 
each. ^
Another interesting aspect of the mutual exchange analysis is the 
fact that even after a counterforce exchange, each side from 1970-1986 
retained at least 400 EMT, the approximate EMT required to cause assured 
destruction of the other side. Thus any initiator cannot expect to 
completely disarm his opponent, and the impact of uncertainty in any 
proposed attack against the diverse and robust strategic forces that now 
exist means that one's confidence in achieving victory without sustaining
O C
major and probably unacceptable damage would remain fairly low. J 
Nevertheless , each superpower has demonstrated a propensity to seek 
relative advantage from its nuclear force structure.
While the dominant trend of the correlation of nuclear forces from 
1970 to 1986 has been in favour of the Soviet Union, the C-4 slope from 
1974-1980 dramatically demonstrates the potentially decisive impact of the 
Soviet deployment of the third generation ICBM's. As the Soviet 
construction programme was completed and new American strategic 
construction began, the correlation of nuclear forces has more or less 
stabilized and even moved to reflect a decrease in the Soviet advantage in 
1984-1986. The key findings in the 1970-1986 period, however, supported 
by another detailed study, is that the Soviet Union has neutralized the 
previous United States advantage in the development and deployment of
^  Richard L. Ottinger, First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving
Responsible Control. Hearings before the Subcommittee of International 
Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International 
Relations, United States House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: 
USGPO, 1976), p. 11.
o c
Stanley Sienkiewicz, "Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty 
in Strategic Analysis," World Politics 32 (October 1979), p. 98. See also 
Maxwell D. Taylor, "The United States - A Military Power Second to None?" 
International Security 1 (Summer 1976), p. 50.
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sophisticated nuclear weapons.^ This fact appears to have been 
recognized by the Reagan administration which deliberately sought to 
improve the United States' strategic forces so the United States could 
"stand tall."37 If these strategic programmes continue, and if there is 
no comparable Soviet response, the projected correlation of nuclear forces
O O
will probably continue to move toward unity. °
4. Implications of the Force Structure Analysis
As long as both sides, regardless of what the other does, are capable 
or appear to be capable of destroying their opponent, a situation of 
mutual deterrence probably exists. Until it can be proven, however, that 
the achievement of victory is futile, there appears little likelihood of
O Q
abolishing the possibility of war, even nuclear war. 7 As long as the 
possibility of nuclear war, however remote, appears to exist, then the 
possibility of using the threat of such a war, even though it includes a 
strong possibility of mutual destruction, has enough credibility for it to 
be taken seriously. Given that some form of victory cannot be discounted 
as a theoretical possibility and that the threat of war exists, there is 
strong logical or deductive support for attempting to use the threat of 
nuclear war to political advantage.
36 See James H. Hansen, Correlation of Forces: Four Decades of 
Soviet Military Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), p. xvii.
37 Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus, "Reagan and the Russians: 
American Foreign Policy Toward the Soviet Union," in Kenneth A. Oye, 
Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild, eds., Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan 
Era in American Foreign Policy (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1987), p. 238.
33 For one projection, see Edward Luttwak, On the Meaning of 
Victory: Essays on Strategy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 185.
See also charts on pp. 205-206.
39 Edward N. Luttwak, "On the Meaning of Victory," The Washington 
Quarterly 5 (Autumn 1982), p. 17.
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Both the deterrent and the compellent paradigms are based on such 
logic; the compellent simply seeks to obtain advantage while the deterrent 
seeks to avoid disadvantage. The key factor central to the success of 
either a deterrent or compellent nuclear strategy is having the will or 
appearing to have the will to follow through with nuclear threats if 
necessary. Perceptions are thus extremely important and may in part 
account for the difference between the amount of strategic force necessary 
to assure the opponent's destruction and the tremendous scale of nuclear 
forces presently deployed by the superpowers.^^ To the extent that 
nuclear weapons are specifically designed to complement one another in a 
given combat situation and are clearly tailored to fight if required, the 
notion of nuclear symbolism by itself may not be a sufficient explanation. 
Each level of combat (strategic, theatre, tactical) is closely 
interrelated, but for the superpowers it is the intercontinental nuclear 
forces that provides the "fulcrum upon which all other means of influence, 
coercion or deterrence depend.
The comparison of the strategic nuclear force structure of the 
superpowers reveals a competitive process. The massive change in the 
correlation of nuclear forces 1974-1980 thus has probably been quite 
deliberate and may have even contributed to increased Soviet confidence in 
the use of force in the third world.^ To the Soviet Union, powerful 
nuclear forces guarantee that the United States will never again compel
^  Philip A.G. Sabin, Shadow or Substance? Perceptions and 
Symbolism in Nuclear Force Planning. Adelphi Paper 222 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 12.
Paul Nitze, "The Relationship of Strategic and Theatre Nuclear 
Forces," International Security 2 (Fall 1977), p. 123.
J.J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Toronto: 
Lexington Books, 1986), p. 171.
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the USSR to retreat under a nuclear threat as it had to do in Cuba.^ 
Because of a natural inclination or dynamic in military planning to 
conservatively resolve uncertainty, there is a tendency to be suspicious 
of the other side's force structure improvements and to search for 
absolute security.^ This military imperative creates a powerful 
rationale for a war fighting orientation and may well contribute to both 
the United States' and Soviet Union's propensity to engage in a nuclear 
force structure competition.
The degree of superpower competition in nuclear force construction 
from 1970-1986 strongly implies, but does not prove, that compellent 
thinking has influenced this process. Deterrent requirements could also 
be made subject to a competitive process, either to maintain an assured 
ability to destroy the other or to ensure that the threat is credible. A 
paradigmatic assessment of the force structure dynamic is now in order.
II. THE DETERRENT PARADIGM AS AN EXPLANATION
Both superpowers officially insist that their respective strategic 
nuclear forces are necessary simply to deter the other side from starting 
a war, and describe improvements in their force structures in terms of the 
requirement to maintain the efficiency or credibility of deterrence. 
According to this logic, more capable weapons systems and increased 
numbers of nuclear weapons on the other side justify one's own weapon 
programmes. Yet the analysis in chapters seven and eight indicates that 
in both the Soviet Union and the United States, this explanation is
^  Richard Pipes, Survival is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and
America's Future (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 91.
^  Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet
Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1985), pp. 1070-1071.
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insufficient to account for all major weapons equipment decisions.
What may be happening is that the definition of deterrence has become 
so elastic that all potentially coercive uses of nuclear weapons are 
described as instances of deterrence. ^  If this is so, perhaps the 
analysis of the nuclear force structure competition can provide the 
"detailed factual observations" necessary to conduct a more rigorous 
analysis of deterrence.^  In the deterrent paradigm, strategic 
competition should follow directions that would enhance deterrence without 
at the same time increasing the prospects for compellence.
A reasonable first step in this analysis is to examine the very 
nature of the strategic competition that many have called an arms race. 
Although arms races themselves are not necessarily causal to war, they are 
symptomatic of conditions that could lead to war.^ While several 
analysts have described the growth of strategic nuclear weapons as an arms 
race, some important research has included that no "arms race" per se 
exists and that in terms of strategic spending neither country has been 
reacting to the o t h e r . E a c h  superpower could spend far more on its 
strategic forces as a percentage of its defence spending if it so wished. 
The strategic competition evidenced by the trends in Soviet and American 
nuclear force construction appears to be different than in previous arms
^  Adam M. Garfinkle, "The Attack on Deterrence: Reflections on
Morality and Strategic Praxis," Journal of Strategic Studies (March 1989), 
p. 169. See also Jeff McMahan, "Nuclear Blackmail," in Nigel Blake and 
Kay Pole, eds., Dangers of Deterrence: Philosophers on Nuclear Strategy
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 86.
^  Edward N. Luttwak, "SALT and the Meaning of Strategy," The 
Washington Review 1 (April 1978), p. 27.
^  Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing
Hypothesis," International Studies Quarterly 26 (March 1982), pp. 37-56.
^  A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 199-216.
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races which could easily be quantified on the basis of spending.
Another frequently proposed theory posits that the construction of 
massive military force is based primarily on the internal dynamics of the 
arms procurement process in each superpower. ^  This could well be the 
case, but even if it were, the linking of this internal process to 
deterrent or compellent thinking would probably greatly facilitate the 
transcending of military, political, industrial and academic boundaries by 
providing an overarching direction to force development. The notion that 
a strategic weapons competition is necessary for purely internal reasons 
to sustain deterrence remains unconvincing, especially when each strategic 
force already retains an assured retaliatory capability.
Deterrence rests ultimately on the ability to destroy countervalue 
targets, hence a counterforce nuclear force posture which threatens to 
destroy the other side's retaliatory capability appears at first glance to 
be inimical to d e t e r r e n c e . 5 0  Yet, even as early as 1970 an informed 
strategic assessment declared that both superpowers have capabilities 
which, at least in theory, went beyond reciprocal deterrence. 51 Since 
that time the efforts of the superpowers to enhance their hard target kill 
capability has led a 1986 study to conclude that the strategic nuclear 
doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union have "converged at a
^  See Richard Ned Lebow, "Malign Analysis or Evil Empire," 
International Journal 44 (Winter 1988-1989), p. 32.
50 George Quester, "Some Basic Tensions in Nuclear Deterrence," in 
George E. Thibault, ed. , The Art and Practice of Military Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defence University, 1984), pp. 640-642. See 
also W.F. Biddle, Weapons Technology and Arms Control (New York: Praeger 
Publishing, 1972), p. 193.
The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 1.
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startling r a t e .  "-*2 To a large degree these trends toward counterforce 
targeting are fully supported by the correlation of nuclear forces model 
and the analysis in chapters seven and eight.
The competitive nature of counterforce targeting has propelled the
superpowers to seek counter-military advantages that seem to have played a
significant role in force acquisition. According to the United States
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
As we look at the Soviet Union, we see a target structure 
that is about twice as large as the one the Soviet Union 
looks at when they look at us. We also see one that is
roughly _____ times as hard when it comes to attacking the
target with nuclear weapons.
This testimony was intended to gain committee support for hard target
capable United States programmes, ostensibly to enhance deterrence. If
the deterrent paradigm is operating, the distinction between counterforce,
damage limitation, and war fighting on the one hand and deterrence on the
other, may be clearer in theory than in practice. The recent emphasis
on strategic defence in the United States, however, implies "an impending
C C
American cultural rejection of a strategy of deterrence. The nature of
William C. Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic Nuclear War: 
What the Superpowers Target and Why (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 
181.
General Vessey, Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, 
United States House of Representatives, Department of Defence 
Appropriations for 1984 Part 8 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1983), p. 257. 
Although the figure amplifying hardness has been deleted, other open 
sources indicate that Soviet silos are at least two and quite possibly 
three times as hard as American silos.
Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Doctrine, 
1945 to 1981," in Samuel Huntingdon, ed. , The Strategic Imperative: New
Policies for American Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1982), p. 84.
Michael Vlahos, Strategic Defence and the American Ethos (London: 
Westview Press, 1986), p. 4. For the United States to defend ICBM's does 
not significantly enhance stability when over 50% of its nuclear power is
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nuclear threats generated by strategic defence postures of the superpowers 
makes it difficult to support a deterrent explanation. To the extent that 
deterrence does provide a reasonable explanation, it is in the realm of 
perception, demonstration of will, and determination to deter.
A more convincing argument to account for massive nuclear forces 
within the deterrent paradigm explicitly links combat utility to 
deterrence. In this explanation, strategic nuclear forces can deter only 
to the extent that they provide an adequate war fighting capability. 
What is an "adequate” war fighting capability, however, remains undefined, 
and what one superpower may regard as a prudent hedge against the failure 
of deterrence, the other interprets as evidence of at least a lingering or 
implicit interest in strategic superiority.*^ This view of a war fighting 
requirement for deterrence is not shared universally, and some maintain 
that much of the present nuclear arsenals could be scrapped without any 
loss of national security. *^ Nevertheless a frequently heard argument 
insists that powerful nuclear arsenals are necessary to sustain deterrence 
"at all levels."
From 1970 to 1986, each superpower clearly manifested a distinct 
strategic doctrine. Throughout this period the United States held a 
fairly consistent attitude with respect to the overriding relevance of
in SSBN's. This author's thinking is close to the compellent paradigm.
Robert W. Komer, "Thinking About Strategy: A Practitioner's
Perspective," in Keith A. Dunn and William 0. Staudenmaier, eds. , 
Alternative Military Strategies for the Future (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985), p. xii.
-*7 Coit D. Blacker, Reluctant Warriors (New York: W.H. Freeman and 
Company, 1987), p. 126.
William G. Shepherd, The Ultimate Deterrent: Foundations of US-
USSR Security Under Stable Competition (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1986), p. 51.
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deterrence.^  Thus the United States initially constructed nuclear forces 
up to a certain level and then stopped. As long as the United States 
military policy was based on deterrence and its foreign policy based on 
the status quo, then having nuclear weapons beyond parity did not seem to 
matter.60 This same logic, however, no longer seemed sufficient when the 
USSR not only reached strategic parity, but continued building strategic 
weapons and improving them.61 The Soviet military doctrine in the 1970's 
contrasted with that of the United States in that it called for forces 
capable of fighting a nuclear war. Although the Soviet and American 
military establishments appear to share a war fighting approach, American 
strategy has been dominated by a cost avoiding civilian deterrent 
approach and Soviet strategy by more open ended military requirements for 
war fighting.62 The qualitative competition in force structure 
improvements in the 1980's implied that the United States military has had 
a greater impact on the Reagan administration's strategic policies than it 
has had on any other American administration.
In contrast, the Soviet political elite's adherence to war fighting, 
possibly due to funding difficulties, has begun to slip somewhat in the 
1980's. While some observers feel that the Soviet Union may not have 
changed its long term objectives and will continue to push for military
^  Harold Brown, Strategic Forces and Deterrence. ACIS Working 
Paper 42 (Los Angeles, California: Center for International and Strategic 
Affairs, 1983), pp. 2-3.
60 Bruce D. Hamlett, "SALT: The Illusion or the Reality," Strategic 
Review 3 (Summer 1975), p. 76.
61 One right wing author labelled American doctrine incorrect. See 
Daniel 0. Graham, A New Strategy for the West (Washington, D.C.: The 
Heritage Foundation, 1977), p. 66.
62 Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," 
International Security 2 (Spring 1978), pp. 92-97. To a degree, however, 
these stereotypic roles may have reversed by the late 1980's.
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improvements "to the limit drawn by Soviet resources and United States 
forbearance, others note that the key element in this dynamic is 
Soviet "adherence to deterrence as a primary v a l u e . T h e  correlation of 
nuclear forces analysis indicates that the Soviet leaders built an 
approximate 3:1 nuclear strategic advantage and then stopped. While it is 
possible that the Soviet military did not feel they had an adequate
deterrent posture against the United States unless they had such an
advantage, this explanation is weak.
Deterrence appears to rely on creating the perception of strength;
the greater the strength of one's nuclear forces, the less likely they are
to be challenged. Deterrence also has a punitive tone and an active
nature in that it threatens wholesale destruction should an undesired act 
ft stake place.OJ Because it would be psychologically easier to use nuclear 
weapons in response to a nuclear attack on one's own territory, extended 
deterrence requires more effort. To deter other lessor acts or to protect 
allies, appears to demand far more "deterrent" forces and raises the
requirement to at least match the opponent's nuclear forces at each level 
of potential conflict. If one side had a dominant or superior strategic 
nuclear force, it could in theory enjoy sufficient escalation dominance to 
render its deterrence more credible than the other's. To make extended 
deterrence more believable, the most logical step is to then consider what
^  liana Kass and Fred Clark Boli, "Dangerous Terrain: Gorbachev's
New Thinking," Signal (December 1988), p. 71, and Benjamin S. Lambeth, 
"The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," International Security 4 
(Fall 1979), p. 39. See also Paul Dibb, "Is Soviet Military Strategy 
Changing," The Changing Strategic Landscape Adelphi Paper 235 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 35-47.
rr
^  Donald M. Snow, Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American
Policy in the 1980's (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press,
1981), p. 222.
^  Michael MccGwire, "The Insidious Dogma of Deterrence," Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists 42 (December 1986), p. 25.
391
forces would be required to fight and hopefully win should deterrence 
fail. Thus, war fighting and damage limitation are defined as enhancing 
deterrence.
Clearly these expressions of extended deterrence have called up force 
requirements far in excess of those required to deter a direct nuclear 
attack. Yet the conceptual basis of deterrence remains essentially 
dyadic, and its abstract deductions apply to a very narrow range of 
specific circumstances, more appropriate in many ways to that of deterring 
a direct nuclear attack than to any version of extended deterrence.^  
Deterrence has thus been theoretically expanded and applied to grand 
strategy and military strategy. Notwithstanding the deterrent assertions 
of the superpowers, they have constructed massive and competitive nuclear 
arsenals more appropriate to fighting wars than simply deterring a direct
nuclear attack. The real operational basis of nuclear strategy appears
f i 7well out of line with the generally accepted concepts of deterrence. '
By enhancing deterrence at all levels and in all situations, the 
superpowers have so stretched the conceptual definition of deterrence that 
it bears little resemblance to the original deterrent paradigm. While 
increased numbers of more capable systems have undoubtedly enhanced their 
ability to deter, they have also perhaps enhanced their ability to compel. 
The reality that each superpower can guarantee the destruction of the 
other at least in the 1980's may have more to do with the limitations of
^  See the useful discussion of this point in Alexander L. George 
and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 71.
^  R.B. Byers, "Thresholds and Deterrence Credibility: The European 
Perspective," in William Gutteridge and Trevor Taylor, eds., The Dangers 
of New Weapon Systems (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), pp. 109-110.
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technology than deliberate policy choice.
III. THE COMPELLENT PARADIGM AS AN EXPLANATION
The correlation of strategic nuclear forces method of analysis 
reveals a competitive aspect to force structure that may be more 
appropriate to the compellent paradigm. The problem of isolating 
compellence from deterrence however is not as easily done in practice as 
it is in theory because each side may have deterrent and compellent 
motives at the same time.^9 Thus one side can claim to be making a 
deterrent threat while the other side may see it as a compellent threat. 
Some observers genuinely believe that nuclear weapons have major 
"deterrent-compellent duties that extend far beyond the elementary 
function of deterring."^ This section will examine the suitability of 
the compellent paradigm as an explanation for the superpower nuclear force 
structures.
Both superpowers are pursuing competitive foreign policy objectives 
that could plausibly at some point require military support. Although 
many American observers have not fully agreed on what means the Soviet 
leaders would employ to pursue their aims, there was general agreement 
that the "leitmotif" of Soviet attitudes toward international relations 
hinged on its belief that the Soviet Union's ability to achieve an 
objective was determined by its power relative to that of other
Glen C. Buchan, "The Anti-MAD Mythology," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 37 (April 1981), pp. 13-17.
C Q
y Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 139. This book 
combines a thorough review of nuclear threats with very good analysis.
^  Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, " Nuclear Strategy: Is There a
Future?" Washington Quarterly 6 (Summer 1983), p. 66.
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countries.^ Although power is a multi-faceted concept, a major 
determinant is military power, and clearly strategic nuclear weapons 
provide its fundamental backbone.
The Soviet assessment of American strategy of nuclear deterrence
indeed places it in the context of its links with foreign policy
objectives such as containment and thus portrays it as having a
substantial offensive component that makes it synonymous with
c o m p e l l e n c e .^2 Even those Soviet analysts that assess the United States
nuclear strategy in terms of deterrence use a description that more
closely resembles compellence.73 On one hand the Soviet leaders express
great pride in the achievement of at least parity in strategic systems,
but on the other hand they express serious reservations about future
developments in terms of technological competition. In this context many
Russians believe, and were repeatedly told,
that the Americans do not accept the position of the USSR 
as a co-equal superpower and that they are trying to 
destroy the source of its power.7^
Even in the United States arms control community the notion surfaced that
the United States must have a comprehensive strategy "to achieve"
peace,73 the implication being that peace did not obtain. The concept of
7^ - Samuel B. Payne, The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980), p. 106.
77- Henry Trofimenko, Changing Attitudes Toward Deterrence. ACIS 
Working Paper 25 (Los Angeles, California: Center for International and 
Strategic Affairs, 1980), p. 5.
73 See Vitaly V. Zhurkin, comments on USSR in Barry Buzan, ed., The 
International Politics of Deterrence (London: Francis Pinter, 1987), p.
114.
7^ G.P. Armstrong, The Soviet Reaction to the Strategic Defence 
Initiative (Ottawa: Operational Research Analysis Establishment, PR304,
1985), p. 14.
73 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981 Annual 
Report (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982), p. 17.
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strategic competition pervades relations between the superpowers and 
implies powerful compellent tendencies.
Massive nuclear force structure construction also creates potential 
threats that may imply a degree of political posturing in an attempt to
achieve some advantage. When the concepts of nuclear deterrence and
compellence were originally defined, decision making was assumed to be 
rational such that a coercive response strategy could be closely 
controlled.76 This conceptualization implied that the threat projected 
would be understood by the opposite side in exactly the manner intended, 
and a precise response would be carefully formulated. This notion of 
rationality is increasingly considered implausible, but other theoretical 
approaches to decision making produce significantly different outcomes 
that raise questions about the advisability of coercive bargaining at that 
level.77 Some observers have attempted to account for the accumulation of 
nuclear weapons as an example of "posturing" or "swaggering," a phenomenon
readily observable in the animal world.78 In this sense nuclear weapons
imply potential threats that create an image of strength, thus enhancing a 
given state's impression of power. An example of this concern is American 
fears that the Soviet strategic build up creates an image of ascendancy 
that may undermine United States political influence in crisis
76 Thomas C. Shelling, Controlled Response and Strategic Warfare. 
Adelphi Paper 19 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 965), p. 11.
77 John Steinbruner, "Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for
New Conceptions," World Politics 28 (January 1976), pp. 234-237. The
ability to control nuclear war is less when command and control centers 
are targets. See Stephen J. Cimbala, "Strategic Vulnerability: A
Conceptual Reassessment," Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1988), p. 200, 
and Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled. Adelphi Paper 169 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 37.
78 Kosta Tsipis, "The Arms Race as Posturing," in David Carlton and 
Carlo Schaerf, eds. , The Dynamics of the Arms Race (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1975), p. 78. See also Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military
Power," International Security 4 (Spring 1980), p. 10.
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situations.^  This notion of posturing in theoretical terms lies between 
simple deterrence and outright compellence; unhedged compellent threats 
are simply too dangerous, due to the fact that one side must openly back
Q  A
down to avoid wa r . u
Another observation that impacts greatly on the nature of the 
strategic competition is the geographical and cultural asymmetry of the 
two superpowers. Each is faced with a significantly different strategic 
problem and, over the years, has developed significantly different means 
to ensure its security. While the United States has tended to rely on its 
geographic isolation and its maritime power, the Soviet Union and Russia 
have a long history of close involvement along the periphery and have 
traditionally relied on large armies. Consequently the Soviet Union is 
extremely sensitive to American nuclear involvement in Europe and 
practically paranoid in its concern over the American rapprochement with 
China in the 1970s with its immediate impact on the correlation of 
forces.
Strategic asymmetry in effect means that nuclear weapons may serve 
slightly different functions in the arsenals of the superpowers, 
particularly with respect to their potential in Europe. As early as 1946 
William Borden noted that the USSR may be tempted to do away with nuclear 
weapons once it has its own nuclear arsenal because the "Red Army would
^  Barry Blechman, et al.. The Soviet Military Buildup and United 
States Defence Spending (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1977), pp. 20-21.
Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power," pp. 20-23.
See comments by Valentin Falin, a Soviet Central Committee 
official, on Moscow Domestic Television, March 1, in FBIS Soviet Union. 14 
March 1980.
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count for a great deal more if atomic weapons could be e l i m i n a t e d . " ^  
This option remains plausible because the Soviet Union need only have 
sufficient nuclear forces to make American nuclear threats unbelievable to 
recover the invasion potential of its armies, thus restoring Soviet power
O O
to intimidate Western E u r o p e . I n  this sense the superpower strategic
forces do not have the same task. This notion becomes more significant if
one doubts, as many do, that nuclear advantages which do not reach the
level of first strike superiority
affect significantly the practical ability of one nation 
to threaten to impose its will on another or to shape the 
outcome of political crises, other than those in which the 
continued existence of the nation is at stake.
Thus if the credibility of using nuclear weapons may be reduced, a
primary obstacle to the Soviet military's preferred form of war, the
O C
conventional offensive, would be removed.
At the strategic level, neither superpower appears content with 
nuclear parity, and both have made efforts to achieve an advantage in 
actual forces. Those of the American right wing that focus on the Soviet 
nuclear construction of the late 1970's, calling it a build up "without 
precedent in history," have overlooked the American strategic arms build 
up in the I960's . T h e  American strategic nuclear construction programme
William L. Borden, There Will Be No Time: The Revolution in
Strategy (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946), p. 224.
Edward N. Luttwak, "Delusions of Soviet Weakness," Commentary 
(January 1985), pp. 37-38.
Walter Slocombe, The Political Implications of Strategic Parity. 
Adelphi Paper 77 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1971), p. 2.
Yossef Bodansky, "Nuclear Strike: A Soviet View," Jane's Defence
Weekly. 28 November 1987, p. 1278.
Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," 
International Security 2 (Spring 1978), p. 75.
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resulted in the United States fielding an advantage of about 8:1 by 1970, 
the first year portrayed by the C-4 line on chart three. The Soviet Union 
could not equalize this ratio until 1978. The implication of these 
massive construction programmes is that perhaps domination is, in theory, 
a more promising route to the disappearance of nuclear w e a p o n s . T h e  
extremely large numbers of nuclear weapons that make up the American and 
Soviet strategic forces probably result from the requirement to increase 
war termination options and maintain freedom to conduct limited coercive
OO
action, in spite of combat losses.00
The strategic competition is also clearly evidenced by the marked 
increases in warheads and their increasing counterforce capability from 
1970 to 1986. The Soviet advantage after 1978 may have given the Soviet 
Union a political edge in compellent scenarios in the sense that they 
would have greater wartime reserves and have the "last strategic move. 
Because the Soviet Union has shown in the past a propensity to value 
force, many American observers have expressed concerns that the Soviet 
Union would at some point expect to be able to achieve political 
objectives without overt military activities. 90 Implicit in these 
concerns is the belief that decision makers in Moscow and Washington are
Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International
Politics Before and After Hiroshima (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), p. 49.
See Leon Sloss and Paolo Stoppa Liebl, "War Termination: 
Targeting Objectives and Problems," in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Strategic 
War Termination (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 118.
^9 Victor Utgoff, "In Defence of Counter force," International 
Security 6 (Spring 1982), p. 51.
Amoretta M. Hoeber, "Soviet Strategic Intentions," in Kenneth M. 
Currie and Gregory Varhaul, eds., The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead?
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1984), p. 669. See also Edward N. Luttwak,
"Strategies of the Nuclear Age," a book review of Fred Kaplan's The 
Wizards of Armageddon: Strategists of the Nuclear Age. Commentary (August
1983) .
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convinced that political gains can be achieved through the manipulation of 
nuclear risks and that the nuclear "balance" can affect outcomes.^
Many analysts however also feel that to achieve political objectives 
requires an inherent superiority in either the will to fight or the 
capability to win. In the realm of strategic nuclear weapons, each 
superpower has in practice adopted a war fighting strategy through 
counterforce or first strike capability that considerably exceeds the 
requirements for d e t e r r e n c e .92 Although the United States strategic 
arsenal did reflect some deterrent restrictions in the early 1970s, by the 
1980s the United States nuclear weapons as well as those of the Soviet 
Union were being increasingly improved to enhance counterforce and war 
fighting.93 Both superpowers were engaged in a qualitative competition to 
field precise and flexible nuclear weapons that could provide selective 
nuclear options in war fighting scenarios. To support such options each 
superpower also sought an expanded mobilization potential, a feature of 
central importance in conventional or limited nuclear war.^
The nature of strategic competition also reveals a propensity for 
each superpower to construct its force structure in such a way as to 
improve its prospects for success against the other's strategy. In the 
United States this process has been called "competitive strategies," and
91 Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, p. 132 
and p. 214.
92 Albert Langer, "Accurate Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
and Nuclear Strategy," Journal of Peace Research 14 (November 1977), pp. 
41-58.
93 p. Edward Haley, David M. Keithly and Jack Merritt, Nuclear
Strategy. Arms Control and the Future (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1985), p. 31. Annexes E and M also show increasing CMP capability of 
modern weapons.
9^ Paul Bracken, "Mobilization in the Nuclear Age," International
Security 3 (Winter 1978/1979), pp. 91-92.
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the United States Secretary for Defence claims that its objective is to 
align Western strengths against persistent Soviet weakness in order to 
influence Moscow to allocate defence resources to purposes that are less 
threatening toward the United S t a t e s . 95 The United States has long taken 
advantage of its maritime strength by placing a high percentage of its 
strategic firepower at sea and, through arms control proposals, by 
attempting to encourage the Soviet Union to do likewise. The Soviet Union 
has attempted to maximize its potential leverage over Western Europe by 
building a nuclear force completely capable of exercising limited options, 
yet it denies its willingness to engage in limited nuclear war. The 
Soviet adoption of the pledge to not be the first to use nuclear weapons 
also serves to maximize the utility of its conventional army without 
really diminishing the impact of its nuclear weapons. Recent Soviet
defence policy, which appears increasingly defensive in orientation, may
Q f iin reality be an attack on NATO strategy. °
The implications of strategic competition seem to support the 
compellent paradigm as an appropriate explanation. Both superpowers have 
strategic belief systems that hold apparently different orthodoxies, but 
when analyzed from a force structure perspective, they may not be as 
mutually exclusive as many have assumed. 97 As long as the Soviet Union
95 Frank Carlucci, cited by Paul Mann, "Competitive Strategies 
Doctrine Pushed by Defence Department for Post-INF Planning," Aviation 
Week and Space Technology. 1 February 1988, p. 25.
96 See Christopher Bellamy, "What the Warsaw-Pact Doctrine Means for 
the West," Jane's Defence Weekly. 5 December 1987, p. 1310. Soviet Army 
General Peter G. Lushev, in an address in London, emphasized the 
restructuring underway to render the Warsaw Pact incapable of conducting 
large scale offensive operations, "Soviet and Warsaw Pact Goals and 
Developments," RUSI Journal (Autumn 1989), p. 5.
97 See Roman Kolkowicz, "Military Strategy and Political Interests: 
The Soviet Union and the United States," in Bernard Brodie, Michael D. 
Intriligator and Roman Kolkowicz, eds. , National Security and 
International Stability (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn
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and the United States have deployed a variety of comparable nuclear 
weapons systems, it may be that the asymmetry in conventional forces in
n o
Europe may be the most important military factor. ° Each nation appears 
to have methodically and deliberately constructed a nuclear force posture 
that optimizes counterforce targeting for war fighting objectives. 
Although the Soviet Union and the United States define the requirement for 
nuclear forces in terms of deterrence, the actual nuclear forces lend 
themselves well to compellent objectives should deterrence fail. In fact 
these massive forces would make little sense in retaliation, but they 
could further national objectives prior to, during and subsequent to war 
in significant ways.^ In terms of competitive strategies, the major
consequence of a strategic advantage and the natural home of compellence 
is not so much war as the domain of crisis-management.
Compellence is not new to the history of international diplomacy. A 
widely respected study of force as an instrument of foreign policy 
determined that since World War Two, armed force, including strategic 
weapons, has been used more frequently to compel than to d e t e r . 1®® This 
same study further noted that when the use of force was backed with strong 
strategic forces, whether or not nuclear force was threatened, the 
outcomes tended to be more favourable.1®1 Clearly such evidence supports
and Hain, 1983), p. 285.
John G. Hines, Phillip A. Peterson and Notra Trulock, "Soviet 
Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," Washington
Quarterly 9 (Fall 1986), pp. 133-134.
^  Michael M. May, "Some Advantages of a Counter Force Deterrence," 
Orbis 14 (Summer 1970), p. 271.
I®® Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 85. From a sample of 
79 cases, force was used to compel 31 times, about 27%.
101 Ibid.. p. 531.
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not only the notion that strategic forces can support foreign policy, but
also that nuclear threats undoubtedly can at times support specific
political interests quite successfully. This belief possibly underlay
Kissinger's deliberate attempts to magnify the symbolic importance of, and
to use threats to moderate Soviet policy in, what many considered to be
1 09non vital "outposts."
The belief that the correlation of nuclear forces matters is
fundamental to the compellent process. The competition in nuclear force
construction demonstrates that the two strategic rivals from 1970 to 1986
seemed genuinely interested in achieving any possible advantages that
could be achieved without triggering an unwanted reaction on the other
side. Although nuclear parity may have encouraged increased correlation
of force competition in the political, economic and ideological "fronts,"
the military competition for strategic advantage was quite strong
1 0 ^notwithstanding occasional thaws in political relations. J 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Each superpower from 1970-1986 has built a massive nuclear force 
structure on what appears to be a competitive basis, ostensibly to deter 
the other from initiating a war which neither power wants. This strategic 
competition has focused on qualitative improvements primarily designed to 
enhance hard target kill, damage limitation and nuclear war fighting 
capabilities.
102 Alexander L. George, Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of
Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 387.
For example, Kissinger tended to view events in a global geopolitical 
perspective when he attempted to link American arms control negotiating 
behaviour to Soviet political behaviour in Angola.
103 Michael Deane, "The Soviet Assessment of the Correlation of 
World Forces: Implications for American Foreign Policy," Orbis 20 (Fall
1976), p. 630.
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At the start of the period, the United States enjoyed approximately 
an 8:1 correlation of nuclear forces advantage in the event of nuclear 
counterforce exchange. Ten years later however, the Soviet Union had 
constructed a force that completely reversed this correlation and provided 
the USSR with a 3:1 ratio over the United States. Since that time the 
United States has struggled with limited success to reduce the Soviet's 
correlation of nuclear force lead. This enduring and long term 
competitive process to achieve military advantages in strategic force 
structure seems to contradict the declaratory strategic policies of both 
superpowers which imply less not greater reliance on nuclear power.
The deterrent explanation for such massive nuclear forces and intense 
strategic competition relate directly to the concepts of demonstrating 
superior will, extending deterrence, war fighting as deterrence and being 
in a position to win should deterrence fail. These concepts have 
drastically stretched if not departed from the theoretical basis of 
deterrence established in the deterrent paradigm. While it is likely true 
that these massive nuclear arsenals have enhanced the superpowers' ability 
to deter, they have also given them a concurrent capability to compel.
The compellent explanation provides a coherent rationale for these 
massive nuclear arsenals which are increasingly characterized by hard 
target kill capability, strategic defences and flexible counterforce 
targeting. Compared to nuclear forces that existed in 1970, those forces 
accumulated as of 1986 more closely represent those required to support 
the compellent paradigm. It also seems highly possible that the military 
leadership of each superpower has contributed to the continuity of force 
structure development in order to achieve war fighting objectives. That 
these tendencies have been allowed to succeed in bureaucratic battles in 
Washington or Moscow may well be in large part due to the wider belief
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that a favourable correlation of nuclear force is better than an 
unfavourable one; in other words, it matters.
For the compellent paradigm to obtain, however, the possibility of
some form of advantage through nuclear war must clearly exist. Even in
1946, Bernard Brodie placed a caveat on his belief that the chief purpose
of military forces in the nuclear age must now "almost" be to avert or
deter wars. When Albert Wohlstetter published his famous 1959 article
noting the vulnerability of United States bombers to a surprise attack, he
also demonstrated that victory in a nuclear war was still a significant
possibility.^-* Because the Soviet Union has consistently demonstrated an
unsentimental rigour in matching means to ends, it is highly probable
that a compellent view has influenced Soviet force structure decisions.
If the Soviet and the American nuclear strategic force structures are
increasingly similar in their war fighting orientation and the Soviet
force structure rigorously matches their operational doctrine, then the
concept of deterrence appears to have had far less impact on United States
1 07nuclear strategic force structure than has been commonly understood. ^
The correlation of nuclear forces model is particularly useful in
Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World
Order (New York: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946), p. 76. 
See chapter one, footnote 32 where Brodie says "It can have almost no 
other purpose."
Henry Kissinger, "American Strategic Doctrine and Diplomacy," in 
Michael Howard, ed. , The Theory and Practice of War (London: Cassell and 
Company, 1965), p. 280.
James Sherr, Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge (London:
Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 5.
Desmond Ball, "The Role of Strategic Concepts and Doctrine in 
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Development," in Bernard Brodie, Michael 
Intriligator and Roman Kolkowicz, eds. , National Security and 
International Stability, p. 39. See also Desmond Ball, Developments in 
United States Strategic Nuclear Policy Under the Carter Administration. 
ACIS Working Paper 21. (Los Angeles: Center for International and
Strategic Affairs, 1980), p. 16.
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highlighting the competition in superpower strategic force construction 
programmes during 1970-1986. The competition to obtain military 
advantages beyond parity implies that compellence has been a significant 
factor in justifying strategic programmes, more so than deterrence. In 
spite of the ultimate requirement to deter, it appears that operational 
nuclear strategies are, at least in part, based on compellent thinking.
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Chapter 10 
CONCLUSIONS: STRATEGY OF AMBIGUITY
This dissertation has postulated that superpower nuclear strategy 
from 1970 to 1986 can no longer be adequately described by deterrence, 
that a significant degree of compellence exists in what are nominally 
deterrent strategies, and that a compellent paradigm may therefore also be 
necessary for the analysis of intercontinental nuclear strategy. Chapters 
one and two established deterrent and compellent paradigms based on the 
theoretical literature of the nuclear dilemma. To distinguish between the 
two paradigms, a framework for analysis was created which provided the 
tool used in chapters three to six for analyzing the declaratory strategy 
of the superpowers. To analyze the operational nuclear strategies more 
deeply, a Soviet designed correlation of nuclear forces model provided the 
necessary data for chapters seven to nine. This chapter will attempt to 
place this research into some historical perspective and present its major 
findings.
Warfare is not new to mankind, nor has it been made obsolete by the
invention of nuclear weapons. Thus the possibility of nuclear war makes
the degree to which nuclear weapons can be used to support foreign policy
initiatives highly contentious and problematic. Michael Howard notes that
most of mankind, throughout most of its history, "has lived in a condition
of approximating more closely to war than to peace. This view is
supported by Lynn Montross who goes so far as to say that
if the experience of the centuries teaches any enduring 
lesson about war, it is that the heart of man has nevero
been changed by any weapon his mind has conceived.
1 Michael Howard, "The Causes of War," in Oyvind Osterud, ed. 
Studies of War and Peace (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), p. 18. 
This is an excellent article.
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Because the superpowers see each other as primary rivals, political, 
economic and military competition punctuates their mutual relationship, 
and therefore the risk of conflict escalating to war is very real. As no 
country (or alliance) facing the possibility of war can consider itself 
adequately defended against any other country (or alliance) "unless it has 
a range of capabilities matching those available to its opponents,"'* both 
the Soviet Union and the United States have developed a nuclear weapons 
capability that can fight at various levels of intensity. When the degree 
of superpower political competition degenerates, however, to the point of 
questioning the legitimacy or sovereignty of a given regime (and each 
superpower has questioned the other's legitimacy), one is in fact 
challenging the basic organizing principle of international society.^ The 
fundamental question underlying superpower nuclear strategy is to what 
extent can nuclear weapons be used to support political strategy, even in 
the state-centric or realist school of international relations.
I. TWO COMPETING PARADIGMS
The deterrent and compellent paradigms differ significantly as to 
the degree that nuclear weapons can be used to support policy in the same 
way that other weapons do. Essentially, the deterrent paradigm accepts 
the premise that deterrence has replaced the traditional theory of war 
because nuclear weapons have created a revolution in security policy. 
Nuclear war is simply not a realistic policy option because it is
 ^ Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages. Third Edition (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. xiii.
Frank Kitson, Warfare as a Whole (London: Faber and Faber, 1987),
p. 9.
^ Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International
Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 25.
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uncontrollable and results in mutual devastation. The compellent 
paradigm, on the other hand, reflects more traditional strategy in that 
war, even nuclear war, is still a policy option that could occur and must 
therefore be prepared for in strategic planning. A compellent strategy 
therefore would seek any nuclear advantage possible to ensure deterrence 
or to engage in compellence through the medium of threats, the aim of 
which is to encourage political accommodation to one's interests without 
fighting.
The deterrent paradigm gained a very influential position in the West 
during the 1960's due to the confluence of a number of factors, but one 
important factor was the intellectual power and eloquence of its 
proponents.^ Primarily civilian, these proponents of deterrence at the 
time received widespread acceptance as providing "solid intellectual fare 
that has served us well"^, but during the period 1970 to 1986 their view 
of international politics "has come increasingly to be challenged."^ Some 
have supported deterrence by maintaining that "strategy must be 
reconceptualized in the era of nuclear weapons", but others have insisted 
that deterrence is flawed and pre-nuclear strategy continues to have great 
relevance. ® Thus the Western consensus favouring deterrence as the
 ^ Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31 
(January 1979), p. 289.
 ^ Hedley Bull, "Strategic Studies and its Critics," World Politics 
20 (July 1968), p. 605.
 ^ Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American 
Experience (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982), p. 188.
® For the citation see Morris Janowitz, "Towards a Redefinition of 
Military Strategy in International Relations," World Politics 26 (July 
1974), p. 474. See also Hans Morgenthau, "The Fallacy of Thinking 
Conventionally About Nuclear Weapons," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, 
eds. Arms Control and Technological Innovation (New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, 1976), p. 256. For the opposite view see Colin S. Gray, "Across the 
Nuclear Divide - Strategic Studies, Past and Present," International 
Security 2 (Summer 1977), p. 46.
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dominant paradigm has begun to unravel, helped by a growing belief in the 
1970's that the Soviet Union did not necessarily share the assumptions of 
deterrence.
The modern proponents of deterrence, however, still rely heavily on 
previous works. Donald Snow, for example, believes that there is a 
growing consensus that Bernard Brodie was correct in 1946 in saying that 
the role of armed force in the nuclear age must be to avoid wars. ^ To 
Snow, nuclear weapons are only useful for deterring nuclear first use. 
Others feel that the traditional confluence of "realism" and 
"prudentialsm" have been undermined by the awesome destructive power of 
nuclear weapons.^® Deterrence is becoming increasingly understood to imply 
no first use such that the utility of nuclear weapons according to the 
deterrent paradigm appears to be decreasing in international politics.
Although deterrence has a powerful appeal as a coherent rationale 
for nuclear weapons, it falls short in heuristic terms in that it cannot 
explain the resort to force in many cases. ^  Thus a big problem for 
deterrence is its inability to delineate the conditions under which it 
will succeed unless one's opponent is extremely "risk adverse".^  por the 
United States, the fact that the Soviet Union had adopted a "risk 
minimizing" attitude for much of the period under discussion meant that
 ^ Donald M. Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems of United
States Defence Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 176.
^  Avner Cohen and Steven Lee, "The Nuclear Predicament," in their 
Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions
(Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1986), p. 29.
Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, 
Psychology and Deterrence (London: John Hopkins Press, 1985) p. 203. See 
also Michael E. Brown, Deterrence Failures and Deterrence Strategies 
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation P-5842, 1977), pp. 1-2.
1 9■L^  Frank C. Zagare offers a very good analysis in The Dynamics of 
Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 7 and p. 76.
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deterrence advocates continued to believe that deterrence "worked." For 
the Soviet Union, however, the "risk maximizing" attitude of the United 
States probably minimized the influence of deterrent advocates in the 
Soviet Union or at least made them define deterrence in significantly 
different ways.^ The confusion and ambiguity surrounding the appropriate 
uses of nuclear weapons in each superpower have served to mask the 
compellent aspects of what were nominally deterrent strategies.^
The compellent paradigm accounts for offensive strategy in the 
nuclear era; it is to conventional offence as deterrence is to 
conventional defence. As soon as deterrence strategy inherits the 
requirement to fight should deterrence ever fail, then from a theoretical 
viewpoint, it confuses the conceptual paradigm of deterrence with the 
necessities of fighting a war.^^ The compellent paradigm accounts for 
these war fighting necessities. It removes much of the distinction 
between aggressor and defender as it is available to either side.-^ It 
involves accepting risks to force the opponent to act in a certain manner. 
Even though the probability of compellent success when the stakes are 
extremely high may actually be relatively low,^ the compellent paradigm
For a discussion of risk minimizing and risk maximizing 
approaches see Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and the Nuclear
Balance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 213-214.
See Edward A. Kolodziej, "Nuclear Weapons in Search of a Role: 
Evolution of Recent American Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Policy," in 
Paul R. Viotti, ed. , Conflict and Arms Control: An Uncertain Agenda
(London: Westview Press, 1985), p. 16.
1** William C. Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic Nuclear War: 
What the Superpowers Target and Why? (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 
12.
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1982), p. 222.
^  Walter J. Petersen, "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical
Assessment of Conventional Wisdom," International Studies Quarterly 30 
(September 1986), p. 284.
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provides for optimizing the chances of success through the medium of 
perceived advantage wherever possible.
Compellent thought thus encompasses the traditional meaning of 
strategy. It implies a continuity in the operating principles of 
international politics in that the traditional meaning of power still has 
some relevance. During the period 1970 to 1986 at least one observer, 
in his criticism of minimum deterrence, noted that it is through the 
medium of perceptions that strategic arsenals generate political power; 
thus nuclear suasion exists, whether we recognize it or not.^
Although the deterrent and compellent paradigms stem from the same 
original theory, "the diplomacy of violence",^0 they separate quickly 
into distinct patterns of thinking. The fundamental problem with the 
rather loose label of deterrence theory is that neither its proponents nor 
its assailants have fully recognized these distinct thought patterns. 
This may have a great deal to do with the fact that declaratory strategy 
has been overly focused on deterrence, not compellence. These two ways of 
thinking are sufficiently different to warrant being placed into 
paradigmatic constructs, but only the compellent paradigm provides an 
explanation to account for the co-existence of deterrent and compellent 
motivations in nuclear strategy.
II. THE PARADIGMATIC FRAMEWORK
The framework used in this thesis seeks to differentiate deterrent
1 8 Ian Clark, Reform and Resistance in the International Order 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 174.
Edward N. Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and
Political Utility (Washington, D.C.: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 7.
9 0 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (London: Yale University 
Press, 1965), pp. 2-18.
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from compellent thought, based on discussions found in contemporary 
theoretical literature. It is simply a heuristic tool to assist in 
organizing the large quantity of material available and to guide the 
analysis in such a way as to distinguish those elements of compellence 
that may be found in modern nuclear strategies. Table One presents this 
framework in summary form.
TABLE 1
FRAMEWORK FOR PARADIGMATIC ANALYSIS
Deterrence
STRATEGIC INTENTIONS
Utility of Nuclear Weapons 
Status Quo
Political Values at Stake
Compellence
Limited
Supports
Core
Expanded
Attacks
Peripheral
THE THREAT TO USE FORCE
Frequency of Threats 
Nuclear Targeting 
Limited Nuclear War? 
Contingency
Perceptions of Other's Threat
CORRELATION OF NUCLEAR FORCES
Lower
Countervalue
No
General 
To Deter
Higher
Counterforce
Yes
Specific 
To Compel
Quality of Nuclear Systems 
Quantity of Nuclear Systems 
Expected combat ability 
(in relation to opponent)
Lower
Lower
Low
Higher
Higher
High
This section will review some key elements that surfaced from the 
paradigmatic analysis of superpower nuclear strategy. It will conclude 
with a net assessment of that framework for future applications.
1. The Strategic Intentions
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have demonstrated 
deterrence and compellence in their nuclear strategies during the period
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in question. In terms of superpower strategic intentions from 1970 to 
1986, declaratory policy tended to stress deterrence, but acquisition and 
operational policies tended to indicate the presence of significant 
compellent thinking.
With respect to the utility of nuclear weapons in supporting foreign 
policy, both superpowers have shown tendencies that engender the belief 
that nuclear weapons do have an impact. The relevance of force in the
O 1
world is not necessarily diminishing, and the United States and the 
Soviet Union have created tens of thousands of nuclear warheads in the 
belief that their existence matters.
In general the United States supported the status quo on a broad 
basis, but the Soviet Union limited its support for the status quo for 
the most part to Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union sought greater 
political accommodation from Western Europe while the United States 
pursued a policy that sought to modify Soviet behaviour. To the extent 
that nuclear weapons support any threat of military action and to the 
extent that each superpower's foreign policy is at times clearly backed 
by its military power, those aims that seek a change in the opponent's 
foreign, military or domestic policies imply a degree of compellence. One 
observer even felt that the intensity of the superpower competition was 
comparable to a war.^ In this competition, reliance on deterrence alone 
to achieve one's aims, according to recent research, "can be difficult if 
not impossible". 23 An additional variable from 1970 to 1986 appeared to
2^ Andrew P. Rasilius, On the Utility of War in the Nuclear Age 
Wellesley Paper 8/1981 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, 1981), p. 86.
22 Brian Crozier, Strategy of Survival (London: Temple Smith, 1978),
p. 9.
23 Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International 
Security 7 (Winter 1982/1983), pp. 29-30.
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be the fact that the Soviet Union as a newly powerful state has felt that 
its growing military strength was not matched by the appropriate degree of 
recognition.^
Even though political relations between the superpowers are at times 
good, the contest between them is clearly based on a difference of 
fundamental values. Not only did Marxism-Leninism question the 
legitimacy of the American regime, but Western morality also questioned 
the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. ^  The prospect that these 
fundamental beliefs will moderate sufficiently to end political conflict 
appear illusory. In spite of the improvement in Soviet-American 
relations, the United States recognized the fundamental fact that the 
American-Soviet relationship is essentially adversarial and will likely 
remain so for the foreseeable future. ^  Gorbachev reflected the same tone 
when he noted that there is an intense class struggle with sharp clashes 
between two dramatically opposed approaches to international relations.^7
A key finding from the analysis of strategic intentions is the 
degree of ambiguity in superpower objectives. The ambiguity appears 
deliberate, and it allows compellence to exist in what are nominally 
deterrent policies. All three variables assessed in this section proved 
useful in this paradigmatic analysis but the degree to which policy
^  Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence. 
The Arms Race and Arms Control (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1983), 
p. 64. This may in part be due to the structure of the international 
system. See William R. Thompson, On Global War: Historical-Structural
Approaches to World Politics (Columbia, South Carolina: University of
South Carolina Press, 1988), p. 14.
9 S John Lenczowski, Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 274.
9 f\ Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States: 
The White House (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1987), p. 17.
9 7 Mikhail Gorbachev, A Time for Peace (New York: Richardson and 
Steirman, 1985), p. 23.
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supports or rejects the status quo is perhaps the clearest indicator.
2. The Threat to Use Force
During 1970 to 1986 the threat to use force, especially nuclear
weapons, remained primarily covert and indirect. In fact no nuclear power
has ever openly used a direct nuclear threat against another nuclear power
9 Qto force it to retreat from a given position. ° Due to the hedged or
uncertain nature of most superpower threats to use force, the same
ambiguity as noted in the previous section surrounds nuclear strategy.
Although there is increasing support that a revolution in strategic
warfare may be beginning and that nuclear weapons may eventually be
9 Qreplaced by conventional weapons, 7 from 1970 to 1986 no decrease in 
superpower reliance on nuclear force was evident. If anything, increased 
counterforce targeting strategies and the enhanced flexibility of modern 
nuclear weapon systems appeared to increase reliance on credible nuclear 
threats to support conventional forces. In the 1960's deterrence and 
defence were defined as being substantially antithetical, but by the 
1980's it appeared that the defence and deterrent functions were being 
viewed as complementary.-^® Throughout this period, war fighting at levels 
far short of striking countervalue targets seemed to be the driving force 
behind nuclear strategy.
2® Patrick M. Morgan, "New Directions in Deterrence Theory," in 
Avner Cohen and Steven Lee, eds., Nuclear Weapons and The Future of 
Humanity: The Fundamental Questions, p. 178.
29 Barry M. Blechman, U.S. Security in the Twenty First Century 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 19, and Carl H. Builder, 
Strategic Conflict Without Nuclear Weapons (Santa Monica, California: 
Rand Corporation R-2980-FF/RC, 1983), p. 9.
^® Donald M. Snow, "Deterrence and Ballistic Missile Defence: 
Complements or Antagonists," in Alvin M. Weinburg and Jack N. Barkenbus, 
eds. Strategic Defences and Arms Control (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1988), p. 190.
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Even though each superpower professes deterrent motivations, it tends 
to perceive the other's nuclear strategy as being particularly dangerous. 
When the United States and NATO emphasize their deterrent aspirations, the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact likewise emphasize the priority need to 
use "political measures as the means of first resort" in pursuit of
O  “I
foreign policy objectives. In spite of this,
American politicians perceive the Soviet doctrine of 
preemption as clear evidence of malign intent, while 
Soviet leaders feel threatened by American tacticalO O
nuclear deployments close to Soviet borders. z 
As long as each perceives the other as a dangerous rival seeking some 
form of strategic advantage to support its quest for increased global 
influence, the prospects for strategic arms control are poor. 
Furthermore, these perceptions demonstrate the possibility that certain 
people tend to ascribe compellent tendencies to the rival superpower 
because they themselves tend to view the world from such a paradigm.
Whenever political relations deteriorate between the superpowers, as 
inevitably they will from time to time, the spectre of nuclear war looms 
larger, and this fuels public fear that in some ways parallel the British
O O
fears of German bombing in the 1930's. The Soviet Union has been
particularly adept at using these fears to political advantage by 
offering to "spare" certain NATO countries if they renounce nuclear 
weapons. The Soviet suggestion that they would respect a Nordic nuclear 
weapons free zone in Norway which lies adjacent to the Kola Peninsula
Lev Yudovich, "Warsaw Pact's New Military Doctrine: More Velvet 
Glove, Less Iron Fist," Armed Forces Journal 125 (February 1988), p. 38. 
See also article by Marshal Kulikov cited in footnote 103, chapter six.
Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 
pp. 277-278.
Uri Bialer, Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and 
British Politics 1932-1939 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1980) , p.
151.
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(perhaps the most heavily armed area in the world) is a case in point.
Among the variables used to analyze the threat to use force, the 
nature of nuclear targeting, the flexibility of nuclear forces to engage 
in limited war and the perceptions of the other superpower's threats 
appear the most promising as paradigmatic indicators. On balance the 
years 1970 to 1986 show a significant presence of compellence in these key 
areas.
3. Correlation of Nuclear Forces
The analysis of the correlation of nuclear forces reflects a belief 
in each superpower that the balance of forces does in fact matter, perhaps 
to a significant degree. If the nuclear future continues to offer neither 
use of nuclear weapons nor disarmament as has been the case during this 
period, then both deterrence and compellence will probably continue as 
determinants of nuclear strategy. Through the medium of the correlation 
of nuclear forces model in chapters seven to nine, the compellent paradigm 
clearly explained more fully the development of superpower nuclear force 
structure from 1970 to 1986. The quantity, quality and the expected 
combat ability of nuclear strategic systems all proved useful aids to the 
identification of compellence.
Deterrence does not require a power advantage as a necessary nor 
sufficient condition to work, but to be successful compellence usually 
does.^-* Should a clear nuclear disparity arise, it became increasingly 
accepted that the stronger would be able to act strongly and the weaker
Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Future (London: Cornell
University Press, 1983), p. 121.
Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence, p. 176.
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must act with great circumspection.-^ The correlation of nuclear forces 
model, therefore, not only represents a significant Soviet view at an 
important time, but it also graphically illustrates, albeit in a rough 
order-of-magnitude fashion, the tendency of each superpower to enhance its 
strategic position vis-a-vis the other.
What this model in fact demonstrates is a tendency for each 
superpower to accept the combat utility of a given weapon system as 
apparent justification for its construction. This process has also been 
labelled "nuclear ism" by one author who further describes it as a 
commitment to possess large numbers of increasingly refined nuclear 
weapons that is "rooted in the statist politics of the survival of the 
fittest. Although this whole evolution has been for the most part
justified under the rubric of deterrence, according to Colin Gray, the 
concept of mutual deterrence has not been the primary determinant of 
nuclear strategy in either superpower.^ The evidence from the 
correlation of nuclear forces model tends to support the contention that a 
situation of mutual deterrence through assured destruction exists in spite 
of the superpower competition to find strategic advantage.
4. Implications of The Paradigmatic Analysis
Although significant ambiguity exists in declaratory nuclear
David C. Gompert, "Strategic Deterioration: Prospects,
Dimensions and Responses in a Fourth Nuclear Regime," in David C. 
Gompert, et al.. Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the 
Future (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), p. 297.
^  Philip K. Lawrence, Preparing For Armageddon: A Critique of
Western Strategy (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), p. 12. This author is 
in the deterrent paradigm and is highly critical of Reagan's strategy.
Colin S. Gray, "SDI's Effects on East-West Relations," in 
Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, The Strategic Defence Initiative: New Perspectives 
on Deterrence. (London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 83. Gray is highly
critical of deterrence strategy.
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strategy, the operational nuclear strategies, as evidenced by superpower 
nuclear force structures, appear specifically designed to support 
compellent as well as deterrent policies. Notwithstanding the strong 
comp ellent tendencies from 1970 to 1986, however, there remains some 
evidence that the strategic competition was being conducted within certain 
limits to avoid provoking a rival superpower reaction.
The notion of restraint is evidenced by the relatively small 
percentage of funds, in relation to overall defence budgets, spent on 
strategic forces. Each could devote much more funding to its strategic 
forces if it wished to do so. There are also clear limits to the feasible 
degree of flexibility in strategic war planning, which may have already 
been reached.39 There are still serious arms control negotiations on 
strategic weapons that to some degree imply a desire to stabilize this 
nuclear competition. These negotiations and restraints do modify the 
strategic competition somewhat such that neither pure deterrence nor pure 
compellence determines the strategic interaction.
One key finding that helps account for the discrepancy between 
declaratory and operational nuclear strategy is the fact that military 
officers tend to reflect the compellent thought process in each 
superpower. Military officers appear to consistently value war fighting 
systems in order to obtain the advantages necessary to enforce one's will 
in combat. It may be that political leaders tend to deterrent 
explanations and rationalizations, but the military officers who 
eventually may be required to use these weapons have been consistently 
trained to seek victory in war. During the SALT process Kissinger 
commented that
39 Stephen J. Cimbala, "The SIOP: What Kind of War Plan?" Air Power 
Journal (Summer 1988), pp. 8-9.
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both sides have to convince their military establishments 
of the benefits of [arms control] restraint, and that is 
not a thought that comes naturally to military people on 
either side.^®
It may be that some individuals see nuclear strategy from a perspective 
more accurately described by the deterrent paradigm, but others view it 
from a compellent perspective. Thus it is possible that some military, 
industrial and other elites with a primarily compellent perspective could 
exert significant influence on military requirements, the resultant 
procurement decisions, and ultimately the implementation of nuclear 
strategy. This hypothesis warrants future research, but there are 
significant indications that to some degree, this may be the case.
Another explanation for the ambiguity in nuclear strategy is that it 
is designed to conceal something. In the United States various 
administrations have established the present nuclear forces to ensure 
deterrence of a Soviet threat, thereby perhaps deliberately downplaying 
their offensive or compellent functions.^ The Soviet Union appears to 
have made a significant shift in declaratory strategy towards deterrence, 
but it has not yet let up in any strategic nuclear construction programmes 
that tend to give it a compellent advantage.
The ambiguity in strategy fuels the suspicions of the other side,
and arms control becomes a political forum wherein it becomes exceedingly
difficult to establish accepted rules of behaviour. The paradigmatic 
framework provides sufficient tools of analysis to identify the extent of 
compellence in nuclear strategy, and it can be applied to statements, 
acts, policies or even arms control proposals. The clear evidence of
^  Henry Kissinger, "News Conference at Moscow, July 3," Department
of State Bulletin vol. 71 (July 29, 1974), p. 216.
Edward A. Kolodziej, "Nuclear Weapons in Search of a Role: 
Evolution of Recent American Strategic Arms Control Policy", p. 7.
420
compellent thinking indicates that compellent and deterrent motivations 
exist in each superpower's nuclear strategy, making the compellent 
paradigm the more appropriate explanation.
III. SUPERPOWER NUCLEAR STRATEGY - AN ASSESSMENT
Each superpower has displayed tendencies to compellence that are
difficult to explain by the accepted or dominant deterrent paradigm. This 
section will review the key findings and conclusions of this dissertation 
with respect to the United States and the Soviet Union 1970 to 1986.
1. The United States
In the early 1970's the United States had a significant correlation 
of nuclear forces advantage, but the deterrent paradigm seemed to dominate 
nuclear strategy. Arms control talks and detente appeared to many to be 
leading to a better world where mutual vulnerability would provide a 
stable strategic relationship. At that time the American operational
nuclear planning envisaged the use of tactical nuclear weapons and the 
consequent threat of uncontrolled escalation as the primary means of 
deterring the Soviet Union, but at the strategic level no significant
flexibility existed. Any American resort to strategic nuclear weapons, 
its ultimate deterrent, would be massive in scale to guarantee assured 
destruction of the Soviet Union.
As soon as Nixon came into office as president, he realized the 
appalling nature of the American choice and began work on more selective 
options. By 1974, National Security Decision Memorandum 242 provided for 
a greater variety of options for retaliation using the existing nuclear 
forces . The trend toward greater flexibility of strategic targeting
continued under Carter, and his Presidential Directive 59 sanctioned the
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growing desire to build counterforce capable weapons to defeat hardened 
Soviet ICBM silos and underground command bunkers. Reagan's National 
Security Decision Document 13 went even further by seeking to prevail in a 
protracted nuclear war, and by 1986 arms control had almost degenerated 
into a propaganda exercise for political purposes. Throughout this 
evolution from deterrence toward compellence, American nuclear targeting 
strategy focused primarily on military targets, but it was not until the 
late 1970's that the American technical efforts permitted immediate 
counterforce applications.
American strategic culture not only permitted but may in fact have 
encouraged the embracing of technology as the most appropriate means of 
solving strategic problems. According to one Soviet analyst, the United 
States' acceptance of nuclear weapons was equivalent to a theology, and 
this belief drove the United States to seek a more active nuclear 
strategy in the attempt to solve political problems.^ Although the 
United States was clearly disturbed by Soviet strategic construction 
programmes, a certain degree of technological momentum marked American 
acceptance of increasingly sophisticated nuclear systems.^ To support 
this greater degree of sophistication, defence spending on strategic 
systems increased steadily and significantly from 1976 to 1986.
Increasing the sophistication of weapon systems created greater 
obstacles for arms control negotiators, and from SALT I through SALT II
Henry Trofimenko, "The Theology of Strategy," Orbis 21 (Fall
1977), p. 497.
^  Technological progress on both sides has been steady, incremental 
and symmetrical. Although it is an important factor, it does not appear 
sufficient in itself to account for the degree of compellence in 
superpower strategy. See Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "The Technological Factors 
Shaping East-West Relations," in Stephen F. Larrabee, ed., Technology and 
Change in East-West relations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), 
p. 36.
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to START, the United States placed great faith in its technology, refused
to negotiate away its advantages and pressed for Soviet concessions in
areas that would improve the correlation of nuclear forces from an
American perspective. The deterioration of political relations helped
fuel the American drive to regain its previous nuclear advantage, and it
contributed toward significantly increased compellent tendencies. The
steady shift in the correlation of nuclear forces to a significant Soviet
advantage occurred from the mid 1970's until the early 1980's, and it
probably contributed to the United States' decision to undertake new
strategic programmes. In 1970, when the United States had an eight to one
correlation advantage (C-4), its forces appeared designed to attack only
soft targets. By 1986, however, the United States had fielded a larger
and more flexible nuclear force structure that was increasingly hard
target capable and appeared designed to support compellence, not
deterrence. Harold Brown offers an explanation:
behaviour in periods of tension can be (and in my 
judgement is) influenced by the nature of the strategic 
capabilities and the relative balance of strategic forces, 
even if the use of those strategic forces is very 
unlikely.
The NATO alliance appears to have had a marginal impact on American 
strategic weapons procurement, but the influence it does exert appears 
mixed. NATO strategy 19 70-1986 was to deter any Soviet attack by 
threatening first use of nuclear weapons to compel a change in Soviet 
behaviour. In Europe, the major concern is to maintain a credible link to 
American strategic weapons so that deterrence is maintained and the threat 
of limited war in Europe is minimized. Nuclear weapons in the Alliance 
are mostly American and are targeted on military forces such that they
^  Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security: Defence and
Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1983), p. 51.
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also have a war fighting function. In operational strategy the NATO 
situation thus creates a requirement for compellent war fighting systems 
even though the primary objective of the Alliance is deterrence.
Overall, United States nuclear strategy from 1970 to 1986 displays 
many characteristics of both deterrence and compellence, but in particular 
the analysis of arms control negotiations and actual nuclear force 
structure improvements display a significant and steadily increasing 
propensity to compellent thinking throughout this period. United States 
leaders, according to George Kennan, have established a self fulfilling 
prophecy by talking and acting for years "as though the balance of 
military power was the only significant factor determining the future of 
Soviet-American relations. Although American declaratory strategy
continues to emphasize its deterrent aspects, the compellent paradigm 
appears to offer an increasingly appropriate account of American 
operational nuclear policy and deployment. In 1986 the United States 
appears to have a significantly greater number of leaders who may find 
themselves intellectually more comfortable with the compellent paradigm 
than it had in 1970.
2. The Soviet Union
Soviet nuclear strategy in 1970 appeared to be based on achieving 
deterrence through defence, and senior military leaders appeared to 
entertain the notion that nuclear war, as any war, could be won or lost. 
The primary Soviet strategic requirement was to deter the United States 
from resorting to nuclear weapons in spite of a significant American 
correlation of nuclear forces advantage and at the same time to support an
^  George F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American
Relations in the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. xxvi.
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ideologically motivated and assertive Soviet foreign policy.
The analysis of Soviet strategic culture shows strong support for 
the war fighting function in nuclear strategy not because it is felt that 
nuclear war can easily be won, but because the possibility of fighting 
with nuclear weapons does exist and therefore must be accounted for in 
strategic planning. Soviet strategy included maintaining an offensive 
capability supported by a favourable conventional correlation of forces in 
Europe in order to maintain political control of East Europe, to apply 
some pressure to encourage greater West European accommodation to Soviet 
interests, and to ensure that should war occur that it would not be 
fought again on Soviet soil. Nuclear weapons supported this strategy and 
the regarding of nuclear war as another form of traditional war implied 
significant elements of compellent thinking in Soviet strategy in spite of 
its poor correlation of nuclear forces at the time.
Soviet operational and declaratory nuclear strategy evolved from
1970 to 1986, but, contrary to the American experience where both
declaratory and operational strategy drifted to varying degrees towards
compellence, in the Soviet Union they took contradictory paths. Soviet
declaratory strategy has drifted increasingly towards using deterrent
rhetoric in spite of the fact that the
qualitative change in the correlation of forces has 
granted a new primacy to the Soviet Union, not only in the 
communist movement, but in world politics generally.^
Since Brezhnev's speech at Tula in 1977, the year Brezhnev was appointed
Marshal of the Soviet Union and a civilian made Soviet minister of
defence, Soviet political leaders have emphasized the fact that nuclear
war would have no winner, only losers. By 1982 the Soviet Union
^  R. Judson Mitchell, Ideology: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on
International Relations (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1982), p. 116.
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officially affirmed that it would never be the first to use nuclear 
weapons and in 1983 the Soviet military chief of staff who had objected to 
these pronouncements was removed from Moscow. The events of the Reykjavik 
conference and the INF Treaty provided further indications that Soviet 
nuclear strategy may in fact be changing. Other indications that could 
support a deterrent explanation to Soviet strategy included the slowing of 
growth in Soviet defence spending and the apparent rejection of limited 
nuclear war.^
Other indications, however, demonstrated that significant compellent 
tendencies remained. In arms control, while it appeared on the surface 
that the Soviet Union had accepted mutual vulnerability and stability by 
accepting SALT I and agreeing to curtail strategic defences, the Soviet 
motives were probably quite different. SALT I sanctioned a significant 
quantitative Soviet offensive advantage and appeared to permit every 
strategic force structure improvement that the Soviet Union had planned. 
During SALT II and START the Soviet Union significantly improved its 
nuclear forces while insisting on a political arms control agreement that 
would continue to allow an advantageous correlation of nuclear forces.
Warsaw Pact, or rather Soviet, strategy in Europe also had 
significant compellent aspects. Although the primary objective of Soviet 
nuclear strategy in Europe was to deter NATO from resorting to nuclear 
weapons, operationally, the Soviet military long considered pre-emption as 
the best way to fight with nuclear weapons. Consequently Soviet nuclear 
strategy sought first effective use of nuclear weapons in war. From 1970
^  After 1988, Soviet defence spending has actually been cut, and in 
1987 the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact adopted the defensive doctrine of 
"reasonable sufficiency." See "The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity 
of the USSR" (April 1985 - October 1989)," International Affairs (January 
1990), pp. 18-26. So far these changes have not had any effect on 
strategic weapons.
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to 1986 the Soviet military held and increased a significant advantage in 
long range theatre nuclear weapons which implied Soviet escalation 
dominance and at the same time supported a pre-emptive strategy. The 1987 
INF Treaty has only reduced this advantage not eliminated it, but at the 
same time it removed a major threat to the Soviet strategic correlation of 
nuclear forces.
NATO Pershing II missiles were judged by the Soviet Union to be 
capable of destroying hard targets in Moscow within ten minutes of 
launch, giving the Soviet leadership less than five minutes warning time 
of a nuclear attack. Given that the SRF and the KGB appear to have a dual 
key launch arrangement, a good possibility existed that the central 
leadership could be effectively, if temporarily, incapacitated or
AO
destroyed. ° This spectre could result in an American first strike being 
able to neutralize most if not all Soviet strategic defences, attack 
Soviet ICBM's in their silos and allow superior American submarines a 
period of time to destroy those SSBN's at sea. In short the Pershing II, 
in conjunction with MX, Trident II and SDI threatened to alter 
drastically the correlation of nuclear forces to the detriment of the 
Soviet Union. 7
In the Brezhnev era, it is highly probable that correlation of forces 
analysis of some sort drove Soviet strategic thinking. The correlation of 
nuclear forces analysis suggests that Soviet operational nuclear strategy, 
as opposed to declaratory policy, was designed primarily to fight. From
AO
° The Pershing II threatened to destroy the preferred Soviet launch 
on warning strategy. See Robert S. McNamara, The Military Role of Nuclear 
Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions. ACIS Working Paper 45 (Los
Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 1984), p. 35.
^  Soviet military lealders remain concerned over U.S. objectives. 
See Major General Alexei Slobodenko, "The U.S. Military Doctrine: Reliance 
on Force," International Affairs (September 1987), pp. 38-46.
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1970 to 1986 strategic nuclear forces have gained a tremendous degree of 
hard target kill capability, targeting flexibility and survivability. By 
deliberate policy the Soviet Union designed, developed and deployed a 
nuclear force structure that completely reversed the correlation of 
nuclear forces within ten years.
While Soviet declaratory nuclear strategy appeared increasingly 
deterrent in nature, Soviet operational strategy remained primarily 
compellent. Even so at least one analyst believes that Soviet strategic 
policy can be explained in terms of deterrence in spite of the fact that 
Soviet strategy seeks to achieve deterrence through war fighting and 
damage limitation concepts. The Soviet Union appears increasingly able 
to accept the fact that mutual deterrence obtains, but it does not embrace 
it as a firm foundation for strategy. The powerful Soviet force 
construction and significant compellent tendencies in all aspects of 
strategic policy demonstrated that, although deterrence was important, the 
compellent paradigm better described Soviet nuclear strategy.
3. The Competition of Unengaged Military Strategies
The deterrent and compellent paradigms are artificial constructs 
that have different requirements in theory to effect their desired 
consequences. The preceding analysis demonstrated that significant 
elements of deterrence and compellence appeared in superpower nuclear 
strategy as it was practised from 1970 to 1986. As compellence generally 
requires a significant advantage and its demands for nuclear forces are 
theoretically higher, a force structure designed to compel can also 
deter, whereas a force structure designed to deter may not necessarily and
Dennis Ross, "Rethinking Soviet Strategies Policy: Inputs and
Implications," in Wolfram F. Hanreider, ed. Arms Control and Security: 
Current Issues (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 138-146.
428
probably will not be able to compel. Therefore it seems clear that the 
compellent paradigm and the correlation of nuclear forces model provide 
far more suitable tools to analyze nuclear strategy.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States appear to have paid 
close attention to the correlation of nuclear forces in one way or 
another. The compellent paradigm offers a powerful explanation of each 
superpower's calls for a nuclear freeze and the Soviet official 
declaration of no first use. Each initiative occurred at a time when the 
initiator had recently achieved what appeared to be the most advantageous 
correlation of nuclear forces in years and faced the prospect of a 
declining correlation of nuclear forces in subsequent y e a r s . E a c h  
superpower also appears to hold a slightly more relaxed attitude toward 
the other power when it has a significant correlation of forces advantage; 
ie. the United States in the early 1970's and perhaps the Soviet Union in 
the late 1980's. But when each superpower sees the other developing 
nuclear systems that threaten to give them a significant correlation of 
forces advantage, each tends to assume the worst of its opponent.
The increasing competition in arms control from 1970 to 1986 
demonstrated that, even in what is designed to be a cooperative forum, 
each superpower was engaged in a competition of unengaged military 
strategies. Deterrence simply cannot properly account for this process, 
but compellence does. The difference between declaratory and operational 
nuclear strategy confuses the issue by creating significant ambiguity as 
real capability and apparent intentions diverge. The correlation of 
forces model reveals these tendencies in a comprehensive and dramatic 
fashion, and the compellent paradigm more accurately portrays the reality
For the United States the date was 1963 and for the Soviet Union 
the date was 1982.
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of superpower nuclear strategy.
IV. FUTURE APPLICATIONS
The powerful degree to which compellent thinking appears to have 
penetrated superpower nuclear strategy raises important and fundamental 
questions that time and space limitations have precluded from this 
dissertation. It implies a paradigm of domination that could lead to a 
dangerous diversion of potential resources from investment or even to
c o
violence.  ^ To determine how and why this has occurred requires further 
research. The most important question however may be to what degree 
compellent thinking would affect a superpower crisis.
In periods of extreme tension, the way leaders and their key advisors 
think will to a large extent determine how a given crisis unfolds. In the 
Cuban missile crisis, for example, it now appears that the top American 
politicians and military leaders held significantly different views as to 
how to proceed. Kennedy and McNamara appeared to reflect primarily 
deterrent thinking, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff tended to mirror
C O
compellent thought "to rub in Soviet inferiority. The more that
leaders and their advisors share a compellent view of the world, the more 
prone that nation may be to compellent action in a crisis. The degree of 
compellence evident in superpower strategy has grave implications for 
crisis stability, especially considering that nuclear strategy has not 
accounted for war termination.
The disturbing nature of these implications may have already been
5^ See Lloyd J. Dumas, "The Promise of Economic Conversion," in 
Lloyd J . Dumas and Marek Thee, eds., Making Peace Possible: The Promise
of Economic Conversion (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989), p. 253. See also 
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random
House, 1987), pp. xvi - xxiii.
53 See New York Times Magazine. 30 August 1987, pp. 24-61.
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recognized, and they may in part account for the increasing momentum 
toward using conventional weapons only. After the shock of Cuba, the 
frequency and the severity of nuclear threats has been less, and a 
general decline in actual nuclear coercion may have occurred. Because 
this tendency is not reflected in nuclear force construction in either 
superpower, its meaning is not yet clear.
Perhaps technological momentum is still a major force behind the 
degree of compellence found in nuclear strategy. Technology is seldom 
questioned for it has become the organizing principle of our age.^^ In 
fact many believe that in the realm of strategy, we tend to focus unduly 
on the technological aspects rather than on those regions of human 
understanding based on our knowledge of social development, cultural 
diversity and patterns of behaviour.
The correlation of nuclear forces model certainly focuses on the 
technological nature of modern strategy, but it also highlights an 
important pattern of human behaviour. It provides a more comprehensive 
standard to measure the nuclear relationship, and it can be extremely 
useful in revealing or assessing the thinking behind proposed additions 
to nuclear forces or specific arms control proposals. The potential 
impact of a given arms control proposal could in fact be plotted on the 
various correlation of nuclear forces charts, and thus its real impact 
could be more readily demonstrated. This model could also be used to 
conduct mathematical sensitivity analysis to determine the most important
Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, pp.
180-181.
Tom Darby, "Reflections on Technology," in Tom Darby, ed. 
Sojourns in the New World (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1986), p.
20.
Michael Howard, "The Future of Deterrence," RUSI Journal 131 
(June 1986), p. 10.
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strategic variables in a given situation. In this way strategic force 
improvements can be optimized to obtain the best pay off in terms of the 
correlation of forces. No doubt a version of this model was probably used 
in the Soviet Union, 1970-1986.
Compellence is probably playing a much larger role in shaping 
reality than heretofore recognized, and knowledge of that fact will allow 
analysts to better deal with the nuclear dilemma. As long as nuclear 
weapons are considered military weapons and dispersed throughout armed 
forces , and those armed forces are increasingly capable of fighting 
nuclear wars, the operating strategic paradigm is critically important. 
Deterrence and compellence may not be as distinct as theory once 
postulated. Their subtle interrelationship means that, in practice, all 
those working within the deterrent paradigm may share an incomplete view 
of a fundamental problem confronting man. As compared to the deterrent 
paradigm, the compellent paradigm better explains the reality of nuclear 
force construction, the ambiguity in current nuclear strategy and the 
imbroglio in strategic arms control during the late 1970's and 1980's.
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Annex A The Methodology Used in Calculating the
Correlation of Nuclear Forces
I. THE CORRELATION OF NUCLEAR FORCES MODEL
The correlation of nuclear forces calculations needed in this study 
are based on Anureyev's equation:
S. U. x P. x S.
1 1____ l_____l
° E. U. x P. x S.
J J J J
where
C = the correlation of nuclear forces,
CQ = the initial ratio of total EMT of country i over the total EMT
of country j with all weapon systems summated,
U = the fraction of a given country's EMT that is carried by a
given type of weapon system,
P = the probability that a given type of weapon system will
successfully penetrate the other country's defences and reach 
its target, and
S = the probability that a given type of weapon system would
survive an attack upon it.
Since CQ in itself is not terribly important other than for 
historical reference, this equation can usefully be reduced and expressed 
as follows:
(n. + n., ...) [U. x P. x S. + U., x P., x S., ... la_lb  la la la____lb____lb____ lb___
(n. + n. . ...) [U. xP. xS. + U . , x P . J x S . J ... jc Jd jc jc jc jd jd jd
433
or
S. n .(EMT.) x P. x S.
= 1 1 1  i i
2. n .(EMT.) x P. x S.
J J J J J
where n represents the number of a given weapon system, and a, b, c, d 
represent specific types of weapon systems in each country. Each weapon
system for each country must be calculated independently as each will
have different values. Within each country the resultants for each weapon 
systems are added and the final ratio expresses the correlation of nuclear 
forces. This formula can be derived from Anureyev's original formula, or 
it can be derived from first principles.
Since ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers all have different strategic 
problems to overcome, the calculations for each vary somewhat. ICBM 
survivability is a function of the opposing side's prompt hard target 
kill capability, thus bomber or ALCM attacks could not be used
effectively against ICBM silos. Bombers have the largest difficulty in
penetrating to their targets, but depend on adequate early warning for 
their survivability. SSBN's must be able to withstand specific enemy ASW 
operations in their patrol areas to survive in combat. Differentiated and 
detailed calculations are therefore necessary to determine reasonable 
probabilities of penetration and survival for each specific weapon type. 
As noted in chapters seven and eight, in this study many judgments had to 
be made based on the unclassified evidence.
II. ASSUMPTIONS
1. The numbers of weapons systems and their respective yields were 
derived from standard open sources, the major sources being listed at the
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end of this Annex. Reliability, availability and accuracy were also 
compiled or interpolated from the same open sources.
2. Bias is assumed to not be a significant factor. As noted in chapter 
seven, because polar trajectories have never been actually attempted, this 
assumption is not without controversy.^  Complex mathematical formulae 
have been developed that defence experts believe result in a rough order 
of magnitude error of about 15 feet, an error of minimal strategic 
s i g n i f i c a n c e .^  Both the United States and the Soviet Union have invested 
a great deal of effort to make ICBMs as accurate and as precise as 
possible, and recent technical studies have indicated that bias is not a 
serious problem.^ One factor that mitigates accelerometer errors (bias) 
is the increased ability to update INS systems after the boost phase. 
Thus for the modern missiles fielded in the late 1970's and 1980's, 
midcourse updates can correct most bias errors. For older systems, their 
counterforce potential was so low that even if the bias error was 
significant, the impact on the correlation of nuclear forces calculations 
would be negligible.
3. New systems or modifications were introduced over a span of 3 years 
unless more specific information was available.
4. All command and control targets in missile fields were hardened to 
at least that of the hardest missile silo in that field.
1 See J. Edward Anderson, "First Strike: Myth or Reality," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists 37 (November 1981), pp. 6-11.
 ^ General Robert T. Marsh, "Strategic Missile Accuracy: We Do Know," 
Strategic Review 10 (Spring 1982), pp. 35-37.
 ^ For a scientific assessment, see T.M. Eubanks, "Developments in 
Geodesy and the Accuracy of Strategic Weapons," in Dietrich Schrooer and 
David Hafemeister, eds. Nuclear Arms Technologies in the 1990's (New 
York: AIP Conference Proceedings 178, 1989), pp. 316-340. For a useful 
assessment of Soviet developments, see Donald Mackenzie, "Soviet Union and 
Strategic Missile Guidance," International Security (Fall 1988), pp. 5-54.
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5. The respective bomber and SSBN forces could be covered by attacking 
50 American targets, or 20 Soviet targets.
6. The Soviet Union has 330 nuclear command and control targets and 
attacks on them are .5 effective due to interconnectivity and redundancy.
7. The United States has 110 nuclear command and control targets and 
attacks on them are 1.0 effective due to fragility of ground based 
command and control systems.
8. To calculate exchange models, the highest CMP or K value was targeted 
on highest overall K value SNDV to optimize counterforce exchange rates.
9. The SS-N-18 warhead yields were undetermined at the time of 
calculation. This study used those yields allocated by John M. Collins.
10. Since SSBN's can launch independently, the destruction of 
communications to them in nuclear war had no immediate impact on the 
correlation of nuclear forces.
11. The scientific revelations of nuclear winter have had no significant 
bearing on superpower nuclear strategy 1970-1986. Since the nuclear 
winter theory was only introduced in 1984, it could have had no impact 
whatsoever prior to that date.1^ In fact this theory initially was met 
with certain skepticism, and considerable debate ensued as to the degree 
of its likely veracity. After intense scientific review and after the 
1987 disaster at Chernobyl, however, there is now general acceptance that 
even a controlled intercontinental nuclear exchange would contaminate vast 
areas and result in at least some major climatic effects that together
^ R.P. Turco , et al, "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of 
Multiple Nuclear Explosions," Science 222 (23 December 1983), pp. 1283- 
1292. This is the original article referred to as TTAPS after the first 
letter of the authors names. By fall of 1984 this concept had been given 
"some" attention in both superpowers. See Carl Sagan, "We Can Prevent
Nuclear Winter," Parade Magazine (30 September 1984), p. 35.
would cause a significant reduction in world food production.-*
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III. METHODOLOGY
1. Data collection. The first step was to compile all data available
from open sources on Soviet and American delivery systems for a given
year (annexes B, C, D, E, H, J and K).
2. Lethality. SSKP and survivability probabilities are calculated to 
indicate which system could best destroy which target. To determine ICBM 
survivability or lethality against various hard targets, the formula 
derived from the General Electric calculator described in chapter seven 
was used.
3. Exchange model. An exchange model was created whereby each side 
covered the opposing target array with at least one but optimally two 
warheads per target. Some SNDV's were to be launched, others to be held 
in reserve.
4. Overall T^p for each missile target was calculated using the above 
data. OAR and SSKP values were used to determine T^p as follows:
overall TKP = TKP;L + (l-TKPl> TK?2.
5. Survivability, penetration and command and control factors were
calculated, and these factors were used to determine the adjusted number 
of surviving systems on each side should an exchange take place.
6. The EMT that would remain as surviving residuals was calculated.
 ^ See Michael C. MacCracken, "The Environmental Effects of Nuclear 
War," in Dietrich Schrooer and David Hafemeister, eds. Nuclear Arms 
Technologies in the 1990's, pp. 1-18. Soviet scientists also support this 
conclusion. See Alexander Bovin's, very good article "New Thinking is the 
Imperative in the Nuclear Age," Social Sciences 18 (No 3, 1987), p. 166.
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7. The correlation of nuclear forces baseline C-l was completed using 
Anureyev's formula, assuming the exchange model would be actioned on both
sides simultaneously. All forces are treated as residuals for the C-l
calculation.
8. Calculate USSR first strike. Soviet portion of exchange model is 
actioned while United States forces are withheld. Remaining Soviet forces 
and surviving American forces are determined. A new exchange model is 
calculated as steps 2-7 are repeated, and a new correlation of nuclear 
forces after a Soviet attack is calculated (C-2).
9. Calculate U.S. first strike. The United States portion of the
initial exchange model was actioned while Soviet forces were withheld. 
Remaining American forces and surviving Soviet forces were determined. A 
new exchange model was created and steps 2-7 were repeated. The new 
correlation of nuclear forces after an American first strike was 
calculated (C-3).
10. Calculate mutual exchange. The initial exchange model was actioned 
by each superpower simultaneously. Surviving weapons on each side were
then determined and a new exchange model was created. Once more, steps 2-
7 were repeated to produce the new correlation of nuclear forces that 
would exist after a mutual strategic exchange (C-4).
11. This procedure was repeated for each year 1970-1986.
IV. KEY SOURCES FOR DATA
In many respects, data for this study has been based on most of the 
bibliography. A wide variety of sources have therefore been used for the 
compilation of all data in the following annexes. Only the most important 
sources are listed below:
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William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global 
Links in the Arms Race (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1985).
Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements 
and Responses (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982).
Thomas Cochran, William Arkin and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons 
Databook: United States Nuclear Forces and Capabilities Vol. 1
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984).
John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance. 1980-1985 (Washington: 
Pergamon Press, 1985).
John M. Collins, U.S. -Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and
Capabilities. 1960-1980 (Washington: USGPO, 1980).
John M. Collins, Imbalance of Power: An Analysis of Shifting U.S.-
Soviet Military Strengths (London: Presido Press, 1978).
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, various
years).
William Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic Nuclear War: What the
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NOTE: Due to the rounding off process some of the totals in some of the 
charts do not appear to add up. All figures were originally 
calculated to two decimal places and then rounded off to the 
nearest whole number to simplify presentation.
ANNEX B: UNITED STATES STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES 1970*1966
[YEAR 70 71 72 73 74 7S 76 77 78 79 60 81 82 63 84 8S 86l
ICBM t
TITAN 2 54
MM 1 490
MM 2 500
MM 3 10
MM 3 (12A)
MX
54 54 54 54
300 290 140 21
500 500 510 450
110 210 350 529
54 54 54 54
450 450 450 450
550 550 550 550
54 52 52 40
450 450 450 450
550 473 364 257
77 186 293
40 30 24
450 450 450 450
250 250 250 240
300 300 300 300
10
ITOTAL 1 054 1 0 5 4 1 054 1 054 1054 1054 1054 1 0 5 4 1 054 1054 1 0 5 2 1 0 5 2 1 0 4 9 1 0 4 0 1 0 3 0 1 024 1 oool
SLBM 1 
POLARIS A2 
POLARIS A3 
POGEDON 
TRIDENT 1 
TRIDENT 2
128
512
16
128
416
112
128
336
192
128
176
352
64
208
384
32
176
448
208
448
160
496
160
496
160
480
16
60
416
80
16
384
112
320
200
304
264
304
288
304
336
256
384
ITOTAL 656 6 5 6 6 5 6 656 656 656 656 6 5 6 6 56 656 5 7 6 3 1 2 5 2 0 5 6 8 5 92 6 40 6 4 Ol
BOMBERS 1
B-52 C/F/D 
B-52 G 
B-52 H 
B-1
315
150
225
180
30
157
180
60
157
160
60
117
180
75
75
165
90
75
152
90
75
151
90
75
151
90
75
151
90
75
151
90
75
151
90
58
151
90
151
90
151
90
151
90
151
90
19
ITOTAL 4 6 5 4 3 5 3 9 7 3 9 7 372 3 30 3 17 3 16 316 316 3 1 6 3 1 6 2 9 9 241 241 241 2 6 Ol
ITOTAL ALL ?17S  214S  2 1 0 7  2 1 0 7  2082  2 0 4 0  2 0 2 7  2 0 2 6  2 0 2 6  2026 1 9 4 4  1 8 9 0  1 1 6 9  1 9 4 9  1 8 6 3  1 9 0 5  1 9001
SOURCESAME AS ANNEX A
6 
£*
7
ANNEX C: UNITED STATES STRATEGIC WARHEAD TOTALS 1970-1986
(YEAR 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 61 82 83 84 85
ICBM 1
TITAN 2 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 52 52 49 40 30 24
MM 1 490 390 290 140 21
MM 2 500 500 500 510 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
MM 3 30 330 630 1050 1587 1650 1650 1650 1650 1650 1419 1092 771 750 750 750 720
MM 3 (12A) 231 556 879 900 900 900 900
MX 100
ITOTAL 1074 1274 1 4 7 4 1 754 2 1 1 2 21 54 21 54 2 154 2154 21 54 2 1 5 2 2 1 5 2 2 1 4 9 2140 2 1 3 0 2124 21 7 0|
SLBM
POLARIS A2 
POLARIS A3 
POGEDON 
TRDENTl 
TRIDENT 2
128 128 128 128 64 32
512 416 336 176 208 176
160 1120 1920 3520 3840 4480
128 640 896 1600 2112 2304 2688 3072
It o t a l 8 00  1664 2 3 8 4  3 8 2 4  41 12 4 6 8 8  4 8 6 6  S120 5 120  S088 4 8 8 0  4 7 S 2  4 8 0 0  S1S2 S 3 4 4  5 728  56321
BOMBERS | 
B-52 C/F/D 1405 1040 766 444 361 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 116
B-52 G 800 920 920 980 980 1092 870 884 684 884 684 684 802 802 802 802 802
B-52 H 
B-52 ALCM G 
B-52 ALCM H 
B-1
120 300 480 900 1080 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260
240
1260
600
1260
1008
1260
1080
200
1260
1080
600
228
It o t a l 2 205  2080  1 9 8 6  1 8 0 4  2241 2 3 2 2  2280  2 2 9 4  2294  2 2 9 4  2 2 9 4  2 2 9 4  2 4 1 8  2662  3 0 7 0  3 3 4 2  397C>1
Ito ta l  all" 40 7 9  5016  5 8 4 4  7 4 6 2  8 4 6 5  0 1 6 4  0122  0 5 6 6  0566  9 5 3 6  0 3 2 6  9 1 9 8  9 3 6 7  9954  1 0 5 4 4  1 1 1 9 4  117721
SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A
ANNEX D: UNITED STATES EMT TOTALS 1070-1986
[YEAR 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 60 81 62 83 64 85 ' 66)
ICBM I
TITAN 2 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 156 156 147 120 90 72
MM 1 490 390 290 140 21
MM 2 610 610 610 622 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549
MM 3 9 102 195 326 492 512 512 512 512 512 440 339 239 233 233 233 223
MM 3 (12A) 111 268 422 432 432 432 432
MX______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 45
{TOTAL 1271  1 2 6 4  1 2 5 7  1 2 5 0  1 2 2 4  12'23 1 223  1 2 2 3  1223  1 2 2 3  1 2 5 6  1311 1 3 5 7  1 3 3 4  1 3 0 4  1 2 8 6  H 4 0 |
SLBM I " ’
POLARIS A2 110 110 110 110 55 28
POLARIS A3 527 428 346 161 214 181 214 165 165 165 82 16
POGEDON 19 134 230 422 461 538 536 595 595 576 499 461 384 365 365 365 307
TRIDENT 1 28 141 197 352 465 507 591 676
TRtOENT 2___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
It o t a l  6 5 7  6 7 3  6 8 7  7 1 4  7 3 0  7 4 6  7 5 2  7 6 0  760  7 6 9  7 2 2  6 7 4  7 3 6  6 2 9  972  9 5 6  983]
BOMBERS I
B-52 C/F/D 1405 1040 766 644 561 217 150 150 150 150 150 150 116
B-52 G 800 920 920 661 661 698 540 554 554 554 554 554 472 472 472 472 472
B-52 H 120 260 322 504 605 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
B-52 ALCM G 48 120 202 216 216
B-52 ALCM H 40 120
B-1 128
I t o t a l  2 2 0 5  i o s o  1 9 4 9  1 6 2 7  1 7 2 6  1 5 2 0  1 3 5 6  1 3 7 0  1 37 0 1 3 7 0  1 3 7 0  1 3 7 0  1 3 0 2  i 2 sa 1 3 4 0  1 3 9 4  1 6 0 2 I
It o t a l  ALL 4 1 3 3  4 0 1 7  3 8 9 0  3 5 9 0  3 6 8 0  3469  3330  3 3 5 3  3353 3 3 6 2  3 3 4 6  3 3 5 6  3 3 9 5  3421 3 5 1 5  3 1 3 6  3934)
SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A
ANNEX E: UNITED STATES BALLISTIC MISSILE DATA
1 EMT I YIELD (MT) I CEP (NM) I OAR I CMP lTKP (2000 PSI)I
TITAN 2 3.00 9.00 0.80 0.60 6.76 0.09
MM 1 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.70 4.00 0.08
MM 2 1.22 1.50 0.34 0.75 11.34 0.21
MM 3 0.93 ( 3MIRV) .17 0.24 0.80 5.33 0.11
MM 3 (NS-20) 0.93 ( 3MIRV) .17 0.12 0.80 21.31 0.36
MM 3 (12A) 1.44 ( 3MIRV) .34 0.12 0.80 33.48 0.49
MX 4.50 ( 10 MIRV) .30 0.05 0.85 179.26 0.85
POLARIS A2 0.86 0.80 0.50 0.70 3.45 0.07
POLARIS A3 1.03 0.20 0.50 0.70 1.37 0.03
POSEIDON C-3 1.20 0.04 0.25 0.75 1.87 0.03
•POSEIDON C-3 1.20 0.04 0.18 0.75 5.20 0.07
TRIDENT 1 1.76 0.10 0.25 0.80 3.45 0.08
•TRIDENT C-4 1.76 0.10 0.15 0.80 9.58 0.19
PERSHING 2 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.85 339.30 0.85
GLCM 0.34 0.20 0.01 0.85 3419.95 0.85
* SLBMS FIRED AT REDUCED RANGE HAVE GREATER ACCURACY SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A
ANNEX -F; BOMBER PENETRATION, PAT A
50 55 60 7565 70 80 85 90
100
AS-15 ALCM
BEARH
BEAR/BISON
95
90
85
ALCMS B-1-B
80
75 BOMBS B-1-B
70 ALCM B-52
65
SRAM B-52 HUS OAR SYSTEMS « .80/.85 (B-1-B *  .85 )60
55 USSR OAR SYSTEMS -  .70 /.80 (BEAR ) ( BISON /BEAR H ) iOMBS B-52 H
BOMBS B-52 O50
BOMBS B-52 G
BOMBER SURVIVABILITY DATAO,
U. S. - ALERT 30% NON GENERATED USSR - ALERT 0%  NON GENERATED
80%  GENERATED 80%  GENERATED
SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A
AMHEX..G LAS W... SURY1Y ABILITY, DATA
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 W
100
TRIDENT (OHIO)
A2
8 0 - TRIDENT - 1
7 0 -
SS-N-20 (TYPHOON)
6 0 .
A3/POSEIDON
SS-N-8/18/23 
( DELTA)
40 -
30-
20-
SS-N-6 (YANKEE)
SS-N-4/5
00 - SSBN SURV. = FORCES AT SEA X ASW SURV.
%  US- GENERATED *  .85 AT SEA USSR GENERATED *.80 AT SEA
NON GENERATED *  .60 AT SEA NON GENERATED *  .13 AT SEA
SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A
ANNEX H: SOVET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES 1970-1986
I YEAR 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 76 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86|
ICBM |
SS-7 180 190 190 190 190 190 190 80
SS-8 1 9 19 19 1 9 19 19 19 9
SS-9 228 270 288 288 288 288 272 208 132 68
SS-11 800 950 970 970 1018 960 910 "8 5 0 750 650 640 580 550 520 520 520 448
SS-13 20 40 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
SS-17-1 10 20 50 80 120 130 130 30
SS-17-2 20 20 20 20 10
SS-17-3 110 150 150 150 150
SS-1 8*1/3 10 36 60 36 36 26 26 16
SS-18-2 40 140 154 162 162 92
SS-18-4 50 120 120 200 308 308 308 308
SS-19-1 60 100 100 120 160 180 160 80
SS-19-2 20 60 60 40 40 10
SS-19-3 20 60 240 360 360 360 360
SS-25 72
SS-24
TOTAL 1257 1 469 1527 1 5 2 7 1575 1 5 9 7 1607 1 4 7 7 1398 1 396 1396 1 3 9 6 1 396 1 399 1 3 9 8 1 398 1 3 9 8
SLBM I
SS-N-4 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 57 57 57 57 45 42 39 39
SS-N-5 21 21 21 21 21 21 15 12 9 3
SS-N-6 208 320 416 496 528 528 548 532 500 484 466 448 384 368 336 336 304
SS-N-6 1 2 60 156 220 286 286 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292
SS-N-17 1 2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
SS-N-18 64 128 150 160 208 224 224 224 224 224
SS-N-20 20 40 60 80
SS-N-23 16 32
TOTAL 289 401 497 5 8 9 669 765 643 9 6 6 995 9 9 8 999 1 0 1 7 9 6 9 961 946 9 7 9 9 9 3
BOMBERS I
BISON
BEAR-D
BEAR-H
40
100
40
100
40
100
40
100
40
100
45
100
45
100
45
100
45
100
45
100
45
100
45
100
45
100
45
100
45
100
25
45
100
25
20
100
40
TOTAL 140 1 4 0 140 1 4 0 140 1 45 145 14 5 145 145 145 1 4 5 1 4 5 1 4 5 1 70 1 70 1 6 0
ITOTAL ALL 1666 2 0 1 0 2164 2 2 5 6 2384 2 5 0 7 2595 2 5 9 6 2 538 2541 2532 2 5 6 0 2 5 1 2 2504 2 514 2 5 4 7 25411
SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A. 445
ANNEX J: USSR STRATEGIC WARHEAD TOTALS 1970-1966 
1 YEAH 70 7l ' 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 65 86l
ICBM I
SS-7 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 80
SS-8 19 19 1 9 19 19 19 19 9
SS-9 228 270 288 288 288 288 272 208 132 68
SS-11 800 950 970 970 1018 960 910 850 750 650 640 580 550 520 520 520 448
SS-13 20 40 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
SS-17-1 40 80 200 320 480 520 520 120
SS-17-2 20 20 20 20 10
SS-17-3 440 600 600 600 600
SS-18-1/3 10 36 60 36 36 26 26 16
SS-18-2 320 1120 1232 1296 1296 736
SS-18-4 500 1200 1200 2000 9080 3080 3080 3080
SS-19-1 360 600 600 720 1080 1060 1080 480
SS-19-2 20 60 60 40 40 10
SS-19-3 120 480 1440 2160 2160 2160 2160
SS-2S 72
SS-24
TOTAL 1 2 5 7 1480 1527 1 5 2 7 1575 1 9 2 7 2 167 2 4 0 7 3216 4 1 6 6 5 0 0 2 5302
SLBM |
SS-N-4 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 57 57 57 57 45 42 39 39
SS-N-5 21 21 21 21 21 21 15 12 9 3
SS-N-6 208 320 416 496 528 528 546 532 500 464 466 448 384 368 336 336 304
SS-N-8 12 60 156 220 286 286 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292
SS-N-17 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
SS-N-18/2 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192
SS-N-18/5 448 602 672 1008 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120
SS-N-20 160 320 480 640
SS-N-23 160 320
TOTAL 2 89 401 407 5 69 6 6 9 7 65 043 1 0 9 4 1 5 0 7 1 6 4 2 1 6 9 3 2 0 0 9 2 0 5 7 2 1 8 9 2 3 1 4 2 631 2 9 1 9
BOMBERS I
BISON 40 40 40 40 40 45 45 45 45 45 45 90 90 160 160 180 80
BEAR-D
BEAR-H
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 200 200 400 400
200
400
200
400
320
TOTAL 1 40 140 140 1 4 0 140 1 4 5 145 14 5 145 1 45 145 2 9 0 2 9 0 5 80 7 80 7 8 0 6 0 0
(TOTAL ALL 1 6 8 6 *  2 010  7164 2 2 5 6  2 384  2 6 3 7  ' 31 55 3 6 4 6  4 8 7 0  5 9 7 3  6 8 4 0  7601 > 2 0 9  9 1 6 9  9 51 4 9 » 3 1 1  013 0l
SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A.
ANNEX K: USSR - EMT TOTALS 1970-1986
YEAR 70 71 7 2 7 3 74 7 5 76 7 7 7 9 79 60 8 1 6 2 63 6 4 6 5 86 ]
ICBM
SS-7 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 170
SS-8 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 16
SS-9 1019 1207 1321 1515 1616 1616 1526 1167 741 381
SS-11 776 903 922 922 1263 1483 1720 1607 1418 1229 1210 1096 1040 983 983 983 847
SS-13 14 28 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
SS-17-1 28 66 166 266 398 432 432 100
SS-17-2 40 40 40 40 20
SS-17-3 277 378 378 378 3 78
SS-18-1/3 45 161 294 176 176 127 127 78
SS-18-2 298 1042 1146 1205 1205 684
SS-16-4 315 756 756 1260 1940 1940 1940 1940
SS-19-1 241 402 402 482 724 724 724 328
SS-19-2 49 147 147 98 98 25
SS-19-3 60 322 965 1447 1447 1447 1447
SS-2S 48
SS-24
TOTAL 2 24 S 2 S 74 2721 291 5 33S7 3891 4 3 5 3 4 2 1 0 43 5 4 4599 4 7 1 4 4 8 4 2 4 8 1 9 4791 4 791 4791 4 7 0 3
SLBM |
SS-N-4 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 57 57 57 57 45 42 39 39
SS-N-5 26 26 26 26 26 26 18 15 11 4
SS-N-6 173 266 345 412 481 567 690 670 630 610 590 564 484 464 423 423 363
SS-N-6 10 50 129 182 236 236 241 241 241 241 241 241 241 241
SS-N-17 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 8
SS-N-18 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 156 156
SS-N-18-3 153 206 230 345 383 383 383 383 383
SS-N-20 35 70 106 141
SS-N-23 35 70
TOTAL 258 351 431 5 0 7 616 782 0 5 0 1 1 4 7 1256 1226 1 2 8 3 1 373 1331 1334 1 3 2 6 1393 1 4 2 3
BOMBERS I
BISON 90 90 90 90 90 101 101 101 101 101 101 146 146 292 292 292 130
BEARD 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 324 324 648 648 646 648
BEAR-H 80 80 128
TOTAL 314 314 3 1 4 3 14 314 325 3 2 5 325 325 325 3 2 5 4 7 0 4 7 0 9 40 1020 1020 9 0 6
ITOTAL ALL 2817 3 240 3 4 6 6 3 7 3 6 4 2 8 7 4 9 0 8 56 2 8 5661 5935 6 150 6 3 2 3 66 8 5 6 6 1 9 7064 7 1 3 6 7204 70 3 2]
SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A
4
4
7
ANNEX M: SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE OATA
EMT YIELD (MT) CEP (NM) OAR CM P TKP {2000 PSI) I
S S-7 2.12 4.50 1.50 0.60 1.21 0.02
SS-S 1.73 3.00 1.00 0.60 2.08 0.04
S S - 9 / 1 4.47 20.00 0.40 0.65 46.05 0.46
S S - 9 / 4 5.61 (3MRV) 3.50 0.40 0.65 14.41 0.52
S S - 1 1 / 1 0.97 0.95 0.76 0.70 1.67 0.03
S S - 1 1 / 3 1.89 (3MRV) .50 0.60 0.70 1.75 0.10
SS -1 3 0.71 0.60 1.00 0.75 0.71 0.02
S S - 17 - 1 3.32 (4MIRV) .75 0.24 0.80 14.33 0.27
S S - 1 7 / 2 2.00 4.00 0.23 0.60 47.63 0.59
S S - 1 7 / 3 2.52 (4MIRV) .50 0.20 0.85 15.75 0.31
S S - 1 1 / 1 4.90 24.00 0.23 0.60 157.28 0.79
S S - 1 6 / 2 7.44 (8MIRV) .90 0.23 0.80 17.62 0.32
S S - 1 1 / 3 4.47 20.00 0.19 0.80 204.10 0.80
S S - 1 8 / 4 6.30 (10MIRV) .50 0.14 0.65 32.14 0.51
S S - 1 1 / 1 4.02 (6MIRV) .55 0.19 0.80 18.60 0.33
S S - 1 9 / 2 2.45 6.00 0.16 0.80 128.68 0.78
SS-1  9 / 3 4.02 (6MIRV) .55 0.13 0.85 39.72 0.58
SS- N- 4 1.00 1.00 1.50 0.70 0.44 0.01
SS- N- 5 1.22 1.50 1.50 0.70 0.58 0.01
S S - N - 6 / 1 0.83 0.75 0.70 0.75 1.69 0.04
S S - N - S / 3 1.26 (2MRV) .50 0.70 0.75 2.58 0.05
SS- N- 8 0.63 0.75 0.60 0.70 1.29 0.03
SS - N - 1 7 0.63 0.50 0.75 0.70 1.12 0.02
S S -N -1 8 2.48 (3MRV) .75 0.50 0.75 3.53 0.07
S S - N - 1 S / 3 2.39 (7MIRV) .20 0.50 0.75 1.37 0.03
SS -N -2 0 2.92 (8MIRV) 22 0.30 0.75 4.05 0.08
S S - N - 2 3 2.20 (10MIRV) .10 0.26 0.75 3.19 0.07
SS - 2 4 6.30 (10MIRV) ,5( 0.10 0.75 63.00 0.64
SS-2S 0.67 0.55 0.10 0.80 67.13 0.68
SOURCE: SAME AS ANNEX A
2
*7*
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Annex N Notes on Sources
The great number of sources used in this dissertation reflects the 
attempt to demonstrate the widespread nature of thinking that does not fit 
comfortably within the deterrent paradigm. Many works can be categorized 
as appropriate to either the deterrent (Bundy) or compellent approach 
(Betts), but with others this simplistic delineation does not apply.
In the West, two schools of thought tend to dominate the discussion 
of superpower nuclear strategy, a liberal-enlightened approach and a 
strident-ideological one. The key difference between them is their view 
of the Soviet Union; the former sees the U.S.S.R. as being far more benign 
than the latter. Each tends to disregard the other, yet both schools have 
produced major works that, if nothing else, reflect the tremendous 
ambiguity in superpower plans for nuclear weapon use in war. To a degree, 
works like those of MccGwire and Garthoff reflect a deterrent approach to 
Soviet military doctrine (peacetime), yet they acknowledge a more complex 
explanation is needed to account for Soviet military strategy (wartime). 
Those of the right wing like Kolkowicz and Douglas tend to accept a 
compellent approach and focus on Soviet military strategy acknowledging 
that a war fighting force structure begets deterrence.
The main theoretical base for this paradigmatic distinction is 
provided by Schelling; what he refers to as compellence, George calls 
coercive diplomacy and Betts calls nuclear blackmail. The concept of 
trying to achieve some political leverage from some military advantage is 
not new, but Mandelbaum's reference to "strategic mercantilism" is 
particularly illuminating.
Some western analysis of deterrence confuses deterrence and 
compellence by treating them as one thing in the inclusive expression,
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deterrence theory (Zagare, Morgan). This invites the conceptual danger 
wherein those that intend to attack compellence also attack deterrence and 
those that intend to attack deterrence also attack compellence. At times 
it is all of deterrence theory that is in fact under attack (Rappoport, 
Green), but in most cases criticisms are more specific.
It is worth noting that criticisms of deterrence come both from 
within the paradigm (MccGwire, Jervis) and from outside (Gray, Luttwak). 
Obviously those attacks from outside are sharper and less subtle^ and they 
tend to recommend rather simplistically either additions to war fighting 
capability or disarmament. Those from within the deterrent paradigm, on 
the other hand, criticize the logic of present strategy for the nuclear 
excess that has created arsenals larger than required to deter.
The United States right wing, epitomized by the Committee on the 
Present Danger, evokes images of the Soviet Union as being intent on 
domination. Most Soviet sources, but particularly senior Soviet military 
writers, portray the United States as seeking to compel the USSR. Both 
governments' leaders insist that the sole justification for their 
military forces is simply to deter the other, yet during the 1970-1986 
period, each country added significantly to their nuclear arsenals in what 
amounts to a dual application of the Schlesinger doctrine.
There are literally thousands of sources available that address the 
nuclear conundrum, much of it repetitive. Those sources selected 
represent a wide variety of disciplines, and many demonstrate the presence 
of compellent thinking even though most of it is couched in terms of 
deterring compellence. Those sources that were particularly useful have 
been so noted in the text or in the corresponding notes.
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